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WyrokETPCz2011-04-14
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Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.
Zagadnienie prawne
Czy retrospektywne przedłużenie aresztu prewencyjnego poza maksymalny okres dozwolony w momencie popełnienia przestępstwa narusza prawo do wolności (art. 5 ust. 1) oraz zakaz stosowania kar bez podstawy prawnej (art. 7 ust. 1) Konwencji?Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że przedłużenie aresztu prewencyjnego skarżącego poza pierwotnie ustalony maksymalny okres dziesięciu lat, na podstawie ustawy zmienionej po popełnieniu przestępstwa, stanowiło naruszenie art. 5 ust. 1. Brak było wystarczającego związku przyczynowego między pierwotnym wyrokiem skazującym a dalszym pozbawieniem wolności, a ryzyko ponownego popełnienia przestępstwa nie było wystarczająco konkretne, aby uzasadnić pozbawienie wolności na podstawie innych przepisów art. 5 ust. 1. Trybunał podkreślił, że pozytywne obowiązki państwa w zakresie ochrony potencjalnych ofiar nie mogą usprawiedliwiać środków naruszających prawa konwencyjne jednostki. Ponadto, Trybunał stwierdził naruszenie art. 7 ust. 1, uznając areszt prewencyjny za "karę" w rozumieniu tego artykułu, a jego retrospektywne przedłużenie za nałożenie cięższej kary niż ta, która obowiązywała w momencie popełnienia przestępstwa, co jest niedopuszczalne nawet w kontekście ochrony przed poważnymi przestępstwami.Stan faktyczny
Skarżący, Richard Jendrowiak, został skazany w maju 1990 r. za usiłowanie przymusu seksualnego i orzeczono wobec niego areszt prewencyjny z powodu tendencji do popełniania poważnych przestępstw seksualnych. Po odbyciu kary więzienia, w październiku 2002 r., jego areszt prewencyjny został przedłużony na czas nieokreślony na podstawie zmienionego prawa, mimo że w momencie popełnienia przestępstwa maksymalny okres wynosił dziesięć lat. Sąd krajowy uzasadnił przedłużenie ryzykiem ponownego popełnienia przestępstwa. Skarżący został zwolniony w sierpniu 2009 r. z powodu choroby.Rozstrzygnięcie
Stwierdza naruszenie art. 5 ust. 1 Konwencji. Stwierdza naruszenie art. 7 ust. 1 Konwencji. Zasądza skarżącemu 27 467 EUR tytułem szkody niemajątkowej. Zasądza skarżącemu 4 000 EUR tytułem kosztów i wydatków.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
issued by the Registrar of the Court
no. 339
14.04.2011
Retroactive extension of prisoner’s preventive detention not
justified by State’s obligation to protect potential victims
In
today’s
Chamber
judgment
in
the
case
Jendrowiak
v.
Germany
(application no. 30060/04), which is not final1, the European Court of Human Rights
held, unanimously, that there had been:
A violation of Article 5 § 1 (right to liberty and security) of the European
Convention on Human Rights and
A violation of Article 7 § 1 (no punishment without law).
The case concerned the applicant’s complaint that his preventive detention was
retrospectively extended beyond the maximum period of ten years authorised at the
time of his offence.
Principal facts
The applicant, Richard Jendrowiak, is a German national who was born in 1953. After a
history of several previous convictions of rape and attempted rape, the Heilbronn
Regional Court convicted him of attempted sexual coercion and sentenced him to three
years’ imprisonment in May 1990. At the same time, the court ordered his placement in
preventive detention, holding that Mr Jendrowiak had a tendency to commit serious
sexual offences and was thus likely to reoffend.
After having served his full prison sentence, Mr Jendrowiak was placed in preventive
detention, the continuation of which was ordered at regular intervals. In October 2002,
he had served ten years in preventive detention, which had been the maximum period
for a first period of preventive detention under the law in force at the time of his offence
and conviction. Pursuant to Article 67d § 3 of the Criminal Code as amended in 1998,
which allowed the duration of a convicted person's preventive detention to be extended
to an unlimited period of time, the Karlsruhe Regional Court ordered Mr Jendrowiak’s
preventive detention to continue. Relying on a psychiatric expert opinion, it found that
Mr Jendrowiak, whose situation and attitude had not changed and who refused therapy,
was likely to reoffend if released. The decision was upheld by the court of appeal.
On 22 March 2004, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider Mr Jendrowiak’s
constitutional complaint. It referred to its leading judgment of February 2004 in another
case (subsequently an application before the European Court of Human Rights, M. v.
Germany2), in which it had held that Article 67d § 3 of the Criminal Code was Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month
period following its delivery, any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the
Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges considers whether the case deserves further
examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final judgment. If the referral
request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.
Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for
supervision of its execution. Further information about the execution process can be found here:
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution
M. v. Germany (19359/04), Chamber judgment of 17.12.2009
constitutional and that the prohibition of retrospective punishment under the German
Basic Law did not extend to measures such as preventive detention, which had always
been understood as differing from penalties under the Criminal Code’s twin-track system
of penalties on the one hand and measures of correction and prevention on the other.
In August 2009, Mr Jendrowiak, who had been diagnosed with cancer, was released, his
preventive detention having been suspended on probation by the Karlsruhe Regional
Court.
Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court
Relying in particular on Articles 5 § 1 and 7 § 1, Mr Jendrowiak complained of the
retrospective extension of his preventive detention – until his release - beyond the
maximum period of ten years authorised at the time of his offence.
The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 10 August
2004.
Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven, composed as follows:
Dean Spielmann (Luxembourg), President,
Karel Jungwiert (the Czech Republic),
Boštjan M. Zupančič (Slovenia),
Mark Villiger (Liechtenstein),
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre (Monaco),
Ann Power (Ireland),
Angelika Nußberger (Germany), Judges,
and also Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
Article 5 § 1
In terms of the temporal course of events, Mr Jendrowiak’s case was a follow-up case to
the application M. v. Germany, in which the Court found that the retroactive extension of
a prisoners’ preventive detention had not been justified.
The Court saw no reason to depart from its findings in that judgment. It considered that
there had been no sufficient causal connection between Mr Jendrowiak’s conviction by
the sentencing court and his continued deprivation of liberty beyond the period of ten
years in preventive detention to be covered by Article 5 § 1 (a) as being detention "after
conviction" by the sentencing court. When the sentencing court ordered his preventive
detention in 1990, that decision meant that he could be kept in that form of detention
for a clearly defined maximum period. Without the amendment of the Criminal Code in the court responsible for the execution of sentences would not have had
jurisdiction to extend the duration of the detention.
Mr Jendrowiak’s continued detention had not been justified under any of the other sub-
paragraphs of Article 5 § 1. In particular, it had not been justified by the risk that he
could commit further serious offences if released, as those potential offences were not
sufficiently concrete and specific so as to fall under sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1.
The Court was aware of the fact that the domestic courts had ordered Mr Jendrowiak’s
preventive detention beyond a period of ten years because they considered that there
was still a risk that he might commit serious sexual offences, in particular rape, if
released. They had thus acted in order to protect potential victims from harm amounting
to inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 3 of the Convention.
While the Convention indeed obliged States to take reasonable steps within the scope of
their powers to prevent ill-treatment of which they had or ought to have had knowledge,
it did not permit a State to protect individuals from criminal acts of a person by
measures which were itself in breach of that person’s Convention rights. The scope of
any obligation to take preventive measures thus had to ensure that the authorities
exercised their powers to prevent crime in a manner which fully respected, in particular,
the guarantees contained in Article 5.
Consequently, the State authorities had not, in Mr Jendrowiak’s case, been in a position
to rely on their positive obligations under the Convention in order to justify his
deprivation of liberty, which did not fall within the permissible grounds for a deprivation
of liberty under Article 5 § 1. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 1.
Article 7 § 1
As regards the complaint under Article 7 § 1, the Court equally referred to its findings in
M. v. Germany. In that judgment, the Court had concluded that preventive detention
was to be qualified as a penalty for the purpose of Article 7 § 1. Like a prison sentence,
preventive detention entailed a deprivation of liberty. Following the amendment of the
German Criminal Code in 1998, preventive detention no longer had a maximum
duration. Given that at the time of his offence Mr Jendrowiak could have been kept in
preventive detention only for a maximum of ten years, the extension constituted a
heavier penalty which had been imposed on him retrospectively.
As regards the State’s positive obligation to protect potential victims from inhuman or
degrading treatment which might be caused by Mr Jendrowiak, the Court’s findings
under Article 5 applied with even stronger reason to the prohibition of retrospective
penalties under Article 7 § 1, from which no derogation was allowed even in time of
public emergency. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 7 § 1.
Article 41
Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court held that Germany was
to pay the applicant 27,467 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR
4,000 in respect of costs and expenses.
The judgment is available only in English.
This press release is a document produced by the Registry. It does not bind the Court.
Decisions, judgments and further information about the Court can be found on its
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The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of
Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European
Convention on Human Rights.
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