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WyrokETPCz2012-03-08

Analiza orzeczenia

Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.

Zagadnienie prawne
Czy brak możliwości zaskarżenia decyzji prokuratora o odrzuceniu wniosku o zwolnienie z mandatu drogowego, skutkujący automatycznym zatrzymaniem kaucji jako zapłaty grzywny, narusza prawo dostępu do sądu z art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji?
Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że odmowa rozpatrzenia wniosków skarżących o zwolnienie z mandatu przez nadinspektora policji z prokuratury, oparta na błędnych podstawach formalnych i skutkująca zatrzymaniem kaucji jako zapłaty grzywny, bez możliwości zaskarżenia tej decyzji do sądu, naruszyła istotę ich prawa dostępu do sądu. Trybunał podkreślił, że ograniczenia prawa dostępu do sądu muszą być proporcjonalne i nie mogą naruszać samej istoty tego prawa. W tym przypadku, decyzja prokuratora uniemożliwiła sądowe rozstrzygnięcie „zarzutu karnego” i wysłuchanie argumentów skarżących przez „trybunał” w rozumieniu art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji.
Stan faktyczny
Jean Cadène i Damien Célice, francuscy obywatele, otrzymali mandaty za wykroczenia drogowe zarejestrowane przez fotoradary. Po wpłaceniu kaucji w wysokości 68 euro, złożyli wnioski o zwolnienie z kary, argumentując odpowiednio, że nie mogli rozpoznać wykroczenia bez zdjęcia i że nie byli kierowcami w momencie zdarzenia. Ich wnioski zostały odrzucone przez nadinspektora policji z prokuratury z powodu rzekomych braków formalnych, a kaucja została zatrzymana jako zapłata grzywny. W konsekwencji, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych poinformowało ich o utracie punktów na prawach jazdy.
Rozstrzygnięcie
Stwierdza naruszenie art. 6 § 1 Konwencji. Część skargi dotycząca art. 6 § 2 (w odniesieniu do wymogu wpłaty kaucji) uznana za niedopuszczalną. Nie ma oddzielnego pytania w odniesieniu do art. 6 § 2 (w odniesieniu do braku dowodów fotograficznych). Stwierdzenie naruszenia stanowi wystarczające słuszne zadośćuczynienie za szkodę niemajątkową.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

issued by the Registrar of the Court   ECHR 096 (2012)   08.03.2012   Inability to challenge denial of request for exemption from   road-traffic fine breached right of access to a court   In today’s Chamber judgments in the cases of Cadène v. France (application   no. 12039/08) and Célice v. France (no. 14166/09), which are not final1, the European   Court of Human Rights held, unanimously, that there had been:   a violation of Article 6 § 1 (access to court) of the European Convention on Human   Rights.   The case concerned two French drivers who complained that the denial by the public   prosecutor of their requests for exemption from fines had deprived them of their right to   the determination of a criminal charge against them by an independent and impartial   tribunal.   Principal facts   The applicants are Jean Cadène, a French national who was born in 1936 and lives in   Perpignan, and Damien Célice, a French national who was born in 1970 and lives in   Paris. Their cars were caught by speed cameras in August 2007 and June 2008   respectively, following which they received notice that they had committed a minor   offence under the Road-Traffic Code and had to pay a standard fine of 68 euros.   After paying the amount of the fine by way of deposit, Mr Cadène applied to the public   prosecutor’s office to be exempted from the penalty, complying with the requisite time-   limit and formalities, arguing that he was unable to recognise any offence without   receiving the photograph identifying the person responsible. Mr Célice did the same,   claiming that he had not been the driver at the time of the offence.   In a letter of 19 October 2007 a police superintendant of the prosecution service   declared inadmissible Mr Cadène’s application for exemption on the ground that it did   not give reasons. In a letter of 3 September 2008 Mr Célice received a similar letter,   declaring his application inadmissible because it had not been accompanied by an explicit   denial of responsibility for the offence. In both cases, the deposit was retained as   payment of the fine itself.   On 31 December 2007 and 21 November 2008, respectively, the Interior Ministry   informed the applicants that the offences had been established as a result of their   payment of the fine and that they would consequently lose one point from their licence.   Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, Chamber judgments are not final. During the three-month   period following their delivery, any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the   Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges considers whether the case deserves further   examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final judgment. If the referral   request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.   Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for   supervision of its execution. Further information about the execution process can be found here:   www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution   Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court   Relying on Article 6 § 1 (right of access to a court) and Article 6 § 2 (presumption of   innocence), the applicants complained that there had been a violation of their right to   the determination of a criminal charge against them by an independent and impartial   tribunal and a breach of their right to be presumed innocent.   The applications were lodged with the European Court of Human Rights respectively on   February 2008 and 26 February 2009.   The judgments were given by a Chamber of seven, composed as follows:   Dean Spielmann (Luxembourg), President,   Elisabet Fura (Sweden),   Karel Jungwiert (the Czech Republic),   Mark Villiger (Liechtenstein),   Ann Power-Forde (Ireland),   Ganna Yudkivska (Ukraine),   André Potocki (France), Judges,   and also Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar.   Decision of the Court   Article 6 § 1   The Government had argued that the two applications were inadmissible on account of a   failure to exhaust domestic remedies, as the applicants could have appealed against the   enforcement of the penalty in a community court (juridiction de proximité). In the Célice   case, the Government further argued that the applicant could also have brought   proceedings to establish State liability for shortcomings in the justice system.   The Court reiterated that only remedies capable of providing effective redress for an   alleged violation had to be exhausted. It first observed that the applicants had not had   access to the community court procedure, as that could only be used to appeal against   enforceable fines after addition of the surcharge. As to a claim of State liability, such   proceedings did not entail any judicial review of the “charge” capable of providing   redress for the alleged violation. The Court thus dismissed the Government’s arguments   on this point and declared the applications admissible.   On the merits, the Court pointed out that the right to a court, of which the right of   access was one aspect, was not absolute; it was subject to limitations permitted by   implication, in particular where the conditions of admissibility of an appeal were   concerned. However, these limitations could not restrict or reduce a person’s access in   such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right was impaired. They   must pursue a legitimate aim and there must be a reasonable relationship of   proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.   In the applicant’s case the Court observed, firstly, that the official from the public   prosecutor’s office, a police superintendent, had declared inadmissible the applicants’   applications for exemption on erroneous grounds, namely, because Mr Cadène’s   application had not given reasons and that of Mr Célice had not explicitly denied   responsibility for the offence. On the appropriate application form, the applicants had, in   fact, clearly indicated that they denied having committed the offence and, in a   supporting letter, had duly explained their reasons. In addition, the Government had not   disputed the fact that the police superintendant, whose discretionary power was confined   to examining the formal admissibility of the application, had misused his authority.   Moreover, in both cases, the inadmissibility decision of the public prosecutor’s office had   led to the retention of the deposit, which was equivalent to the amount of the standard   fine. Thus, in spite of the applicants’ challenge, the process had led to the completion of   the public prosecution without any determination of the “criminal charge” or the hearing   of the applicants’ arguments by a “tribunal”, within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the   Convention. Accordingly, the very essence of the applicants’ right of access to a court   had been impaired.   Lastly, the Court took note of the decision by the French Constitutional Council2 to the   effect that, where an official of the prosecution service declared inadmissible an   application for exemption from a standard fine, after the deposit had been paid, and   where that declaration had the effect of converting the deposit into the fine itself, the   inability to appeal against such a decision before the community court was incompatible   with the “right to an effective judicial remedy”.   The Court thus found that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1.   Article 6 § 2   Mr Célice had argued that the obligation to pay a deposit in order to submit an   application for exemption or an appeal to the public prosecutor breached the right to be   presumed innocent. On this point the Court confirmed its previous case-law, reiterating   that the fact of subjecting the admissibility of such an application or appeal to the prior   payment of a deposit corresponding to the amount of the standard fine did not, as such,   entail a violation of Article 6 § 2. The Court thus declared this part of the application   inadmissible.   Mr Cadène had complained that, by refusing to send him the photographic evidence in   support of the charge against him, the public prosecutor’s office had deprived him of the   possibility of defending himself, in breach of his right to be presumed innocent. In view   of its finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1, the Court found that no separate question   arose under Article 6 § 2.   Article 41   Under this Article the Court held in particular that the finding of a violation constituted   sufficient just satisfaction for the non-pecuniary damage sustained.   The judgments are available only in French.   This press release is a document produced by the Registry. It does not bind the Court.   Decisions, judgments and further information about the Court can be found on   www.echr.coe.int. To receive the Court’s press releases, please subscribe to the Court’s   RSS feeds.   Press contacts   [email protected]e.int | tel: +33 3 90 21 42 08   Céline Menu-Lange (tel: + 33 3 90 21 58 77)   Tracey Turner-Tretz (tel: + 33 3 88 41 35 30)   Kristina Pencheva-Malinowski (tel: + 33 3 88 41 35 70)   Nina Salomon (tel: + 33 3 90 21 49 79)   Denis Lambert (tel: + 33 3 90 21 41 09)   decision no. 2010-38 QPC (preliminary ruling on constitutionality) of 29 September 2010   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of   Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European   Convention on Human Rights.   4

© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 15.07.2026. · Źródło