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WyrokETPCz2013-05-07
Analiza orzeczenia
Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.
Zagadnienie prawne
Czy brytyjskie przepisy wyborcze, uniemożliwiające głosowanie obywatelom mieszkającym poza Zjednoczonym Królestwem dłużej niż 15 lat, naruszyły prawo do wolnych wyborów z art. 3 Protokołu nr 1 Konwencji?Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że ograniczenie prawa do głosowania dla obywateli mieszkających poza Zjednoczonym Królestwem dłużej niż 15 lat, choć nie zostało wyraźnie uzasadnione przez strony, służyło uzasadnionemu celowi ograniczenia prawa wyborczego do tych obywateli, którzy mają bliski związek z Wielką Brytanią i są najbardziej bezpośrednio dotknięci jej prawami. Trybunał podkreślił znaczenie marginesu oceny (margin of appreciation) dla państw w regulowaniu wyborów parlamentarnych. Stwierdził, że 15-letni okres, w którym można głosować po opuszczeniu kraju, nie jest okresem nieistotnym. Trybunał uznał, że ogólny charakter tego środka promuje pewność prawa i pozwala uniknąć arbitralności, a także, że ograniczenie to było proporcjonalne do realizowanego uzasadnionego celu, nie naruszając istoty prawa skarżącego.Stan faktyczny
Skarżący, Harry Shindler, jest obywatelem brytyjskim urodzonym w 1921 roku, który od 1982 roku mieszka we Włoszech po przejściu na emeryturę. Zgodnie z brytyjskim prawem, obywatele mieszkający za granicą krócej niż 15 lat mogą głosować w wyborach parlamentarnych. Pan Shindler nie spełnia tego kryterium, ponieważ mieszka poza Wielką Brytanią od ponad 30 lat, co uniemożliwiło mu udział w wyborach powszechnych 5 maja 2010 roku. Skarżący utrzymywał silne więzi z Wielką Brytanią, m.in. jako emerytowany żołnierz, pobierający emeryturę i płacący podatki w UK, oraz posiadający tam rodzinę.Rozstrzygnięcie
Stwierdza brak naruszenia art. 3 Protokołu nr 1 (prawo do wolnych wyborów) Konwencji.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
issued by the Registrar of the Court
ECHR 143 (2013)
07.05.2013
Right to vote of British national who has lived outside UK for
over 30 years not violated by UK election laws
In today’s Chamber judgment in the case of Shindler v. the United Kingdom
(application no. 19840/09), which is not final1, the European Court of Human Rights
held, unanimously, that there had been:
no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections) of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
The case concerned whether the right to vote of a British national not resident in the
United Kingdom since 1982 had been violated by election laws preventing those resident
outside of the United Kingdom for more than 15 years from voting.
The Court, taking into account the room for manoeuvre (‘margin of appreciation’) to be
left to the United Kingdom Government in regulating its parliamentary elections, decided
that the election law in question had not gone too far in restricting the right to
Mr Shindler’s right to free elections.
The Court has also notified in writing today a committee judgment in the case of
Erdoğan Çoban v. Turkey (no. 18375/09)2, which is final.
Principal facts
The applicant, Harry Shindler, is a British national who was born in 1921 and lives in
Ascoli Piceno, Italy. He left the United Kingdom in 1982 following his retirement and
moved to Italy with his wife, an Italian national.
Under primary legislation, British citizens residing overseas for less than 15 years are
permitted to vote in parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom. Mr Shindler does not
meet the 15-year criterion and is therefore not entitled to vote. In particular, he was
unable to vote in the general election of 5 May 2010.
Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court
Relying on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, Mr Shindler complained that no time-limit should
be imposed on the right of EU citizens resident abroad to vote in their country of origin
while they retained the nationality of that country. Mr Shindler maintained that he had
retained very strong ties with the UK as a retired serviceman of the British Army Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month
period following its delivery, any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the
Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges considers whether the case deserves further
examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final judgment. If the referral
request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.
Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for
supervision of its execution. Further information about the execution process can be found here:
www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution
In this case, the applicant complained in particular about the excessive length of criminal proceedings
brought against him for aiding and abetting an illegal organisation, the DHKP-C.
Violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial within a reasonable time)
Violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy)
receiving a pension from the State paid into a British bank account on which he paid tax
and had family members in the UK. He argued that the fifteen year time limit had the
effect of disenfranchising him completely and that it was not a proportionate limitation of
his right.
The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 26 March 2009.
Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:
Ineta Ziemele (Latvia), President,
David Thór Björgvinsson (Iceland),
George Nicolaou (Cyprus),
Ledi Bianku (Albania),
Zdravka Kalaydjieva (Bulgaria),
Vincent A. de Gaetano (Malta),
Paul Mahoney (the United Kingdom),
and also Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (right to free elections)
Neither Mr Shindler nor the government had expressly identified the legitimate aim of
the restriction on non-resident voting in this case. However, the Court was satisfied that
it pursued the legitimate aim of confining the parliamentary franchise to those citizens
with a close connection to the United Kingdom and who would therefore be most directly
affected by its laws.
The Court noted that if Mr Shindler returned to live in the United Kingdom, his right to
vote as a resident would be restored. In those circumstances it could not be said that the
restriction impaired the very essence of Mr Shindler’s rights under Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1. Consequently, the Court considered that the central question in the case was
whether the election laws in question were a proportionate limitation on the right to vote
which struck a fair balance between the competing interests.
The Court reviewed the activities of Council of Europe bodies and found that they had
demonstrated a growing awareness at European level of the problems posed by
migration in terms of political participation in countries of origin and residence. However,
there was a disparity in approaches, and the Court therefore emphasised the importance
of leaving Governments room for manoeuvre (‘margin of appreciation’) in this area. It
also noted that Parliament had sought to weigh the competing interests in the case on
several occasions and had debated the question of non-residents’ voting rights in some
detail. The evolution of its views could be seen in amendments to the period on non-
residence since the introduction of overseas voting in 1985.
The Court found that allowing non-residents to vote for 15 years after leaving the
country was not an unsubstantial period of time. Having regard to the significant burden
which would be imposed if the United Kingdom were required to ascertain in every
application to vote by a non-resident whether the individual had a sufficiently close
connection to the country, the Court was satisfied that the general measure in this case
promoted legal certainty and avoided problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency
inherent in weighing interests on a case-by-case basis.
The Court concluded, having regard to the margin of appreciation available to the United
Kingdom in regulating its parliamentary elections, that the restriction imposed on
Mr Shindler’s right to vote was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Therefore
there had been no violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention in
Mr Shindler’s case.
Separate opinions
Judge Kalaydjieva expressed a concurring opinion, annexed to the judgment.
The judgment is available only in English.
This press release is a document produced by the Registry. It does not bind the Court.
Decisions, judgments and further information about the Court can be found on
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The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of
Europe Member States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European
Convention on Human Rights.
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© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 13.07.2026. · Źródło