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issued by the Registrar of the Court   ECHR 011 (2014)   14.01.2014   ECHR upholds House of Lords’ decision that State immunity applies in civil   cases involving torture of UK nationals by Saudi Arabian officials abroad   but says the matter must be kept under review   In today’s Chamber judgment in the case of Jones and Others v. the United Kingdom (application   nos. 34356/06 and 40528/06), which is not final1, the European Court of Human Rights held, by six   votes to one , that there had been:   no violation of Article 6 § 1 (right of access to court) of the European Convention on Human Rights   either as concerned Mr Jones’ claim against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or as concerned all four   applicants’ claims against named Saudi Arabian officials.   The case concerned four British nationals who alleged that they had been tortured in Saudi Arabia   by Saudi State officials. The applicants complained about the UK courts’ subsequent dismissal for   reasons of State immunity of their claims for compensation against Saudi Arabia and its officials.   The Court found that the granting of immunity to Saudi Arabia and its State officials in the   applicants’ civil cases had reflected generally recognised current rules of public international law and   had not therefore amounted to an unjustified restriction on the applicants’ access to court. In   particular, while there was some emerging support at the international level in favour of a special   rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged   against foreign State officials, the weight of authority suggested that the State’s right to immunity   could not be circumvented by suing named officials instead. The House of Lords had considered the   applicants’ arguments in detail and dismissed them by reference to the relevant international law   principles and case-law. However, in light of the current developments in this area of public   international law, this was a matter which needed to be kept under review by Contracting States.   Principal facts   The applicants, Ronald Grant Jones, Alexander Hutton Johnston Mitchell, William James Sampson   (now deceased), and Leslie Walker, are British nationals who were born in 1953, 1955, 1959 and   respectively.   The applicants all claim that they were arrested in Riyadh in 2000 or 2001, and subjected to torture   while in custody. Medical examinations carried out on returning to the United Kingdom all   concluded that the applicants’ injuries were consistent with their allegations.   In 2002 Mr Jones brought proceedings against Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Interior and the official who   had allegedly tortured him claiming damages. His application was struck out in February 2003 on the   grounds that Saudi Arabia and its officials were entitled to State immunity under the State Immunity   Act 1978.   Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month period following its delivery,   any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges   considers whether the case deserves further examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final   judgment. If the referral request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.   Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for supervision of its execution.   Further information about the execution process can be found here: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution   A claim by Mr Mitchell, Mr Sampson and Mr Walker against the four State officials that they   considered to be responsible for their torture was struck out for the same reason in February 2004.   The applicants appealed the decisions, and their cases were joined. In October 2004 the UK Court of   Appeal unanimously found that, though Mr Jones could not sue Saudi Arabia itself, the applicants   could pursue their cases against the individually named defendants. However, this decision was   overturned by the House of Lords in June 2006, which held that the applicants could not pursue any   of their claims on the ground that all of the defendants were entitled to State immunity under   international law, which was incorporated into domestic law by the 1978 Act.   Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court   Relying on Article 6 § 1 (access to court), the applicants complained that the UK courts’ granting of   immunity in their cases meant that they had been unable to pursue claims for torture either against   Saudia Arabia or against named State officials. They alleged that this had amounted to a   disproportionate violation of their right of access to court.   The applications were lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 26 July 2006 and   September 2006, respectively.   The Redress Trust, Amnesty International, the International Centre for the Legal Protection of   Human Rights and JUSTICE were given leave to submit written comments.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Ineta Ziemele (Latvia), President,   Päivi Hirvelä (Finland),   George Nicolaou (Cyprus),   Ledi Bianku (Albania),   Zdravka Kalaydjieva (Bulgaria),   Vincent A. de Gaetano (Malta),   Paul Mahoney (the United Kingdom),   and also Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar.   Decision of the Court   The Court recalled that everyone had the right under Article 6 § 1 to have any legal dispute relating   to his or her civil rights and obligations brought before a court, but that this right of access to court   was not absolute. States could impose restrictions on it. However, a restriction had to pursue a   legitimate aim, and there had to be a reasonable relationship between the aim and the means   employed to pursue it (the restriction must be proportionate).   As to the specific test in State immunity cases, the Court referred to its judgment of 2001 in the   similar case of Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom (no. 35763/97). There, the Grand Chamber had   explained that sovereign immunity was a concept of international law under which one State should   not be subjected to the jurisdiction of another State and that granting immunity in civil proceedings   pursued the legitimate aim of complying with international law to promote comity and good   relations between States through the respect of another State’s sovereignty. That being the case.   the decisive question when examining the proportionality of the measure was whether the   immunity rule applied by the national court reflected generally recognised rules of public   international law on State immunity. In Al-Adsani, which concerned the striking out of a torture   claim against Kuwait, the Court had found it established that there was not, at the time of its   judgment in that case, acceptance in international law of the proposition that States were not   entitled to immunity in respect of civil claims for damages concerning alleged torture committed   outside the State. There had therefore been no violation of Article 6 § 1.   In the applicants’ case, the Court accepted that the restriction on access to court as regards the   claims against Saudi Arabia and the State officials had pursued the legitimate aim of promoting good   relations between nations. It therefore applied the approach to proportionality set out in Al-Adsani.   The main issue of the applicants’ case was therefore whether the restrictions on access to court   arising from State immunity had been in conformity with generally recognised rules of public   international law.   As concerned the claim against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Court had to decide whether it   could be said that at the time Mr Jones’ claim had been struck out (in 2006) there was, in public   international law, an exception to the doctrine of State immunity in civil proceedings where   allegations of torture had been made against that State. The Court considered whether there had   been an evolution in accepted international standards on immunity in such torture claims lodged   against a State since Al-Adsani. For the Court, the conclusive answer to that question was given by   the judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in February 2012 in the case of Germany v.   Italy, where the ICJ had rejected the argument that a torture exception to the doctrine of State   immunity had by then emerged. The Court therefore concluded that the UK courts’ reliance on State   immunity to defeat Mr Jones’ civil action against Saudi Arabia had not amounted to an unjustified   restriction on his access to court. Therefore there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1 as concerned   the striking out of Mr Jones’ complaint against Saudi Arabia.   As concerned the claims against the State officials, again the sole matter for consideration was   whether the grant of immunity to the State officials reflected generally recognised rules of public   international law on State immunity. The Court was of the view, after an analysis of national and   international case-law and materials, that State immunity in principle offered State officials   protection in respect of acts undertaken on behalf of the State in the same way as it protected the   State itself; otherwise, State immunity could be circumvented by the suing of named individuals. It   then turned to consider whether there was an exception to this general rule in cases where torture   was alleged. It reviewed the position in international law and examined international and national   case-law. It noted that there was some emerging support at the international level in favour of a   special rule or exception in public international law in cases concerning civil claims for torture lodged   against foreign State officials. However, it concluded that the weight of authority was still to the   effect that the State’s right to immunity could not be circumvented by suing named officials instead,   although it added that further developments could be expected. The House of Lords in the   applicants’ case had carefully examined all the arguments and the relevant international and   comparative law materials and issued a comprehensive judgment with extensive references. That   judgment had been found to be highly persuasive by the national courts of other States.   The Court was therefore satisfied that the granting of immunity to State Officials in the applicants’   civil cases had reflected generally recognised current rules of public international law and had not   therefore amounted to an unjustified restriction on their access to court. Accordingly, there had   been no violation of Article 6 § 1 as regards the applicants’ claims against named State officials.   However, in light of the developments underway in this area of public international law, it added   that this was a matter which needed to be kept under review by Contracting States.   Separate opinions   Judge Kalaydjieva expressed a joint partly dissenting opinion and Judge Bianku expressed a   concurring opinion. These opinions are annexed to the judgment.   The judgment is available only in English.   This press release is a document produced by the Registry. It does not bind the Court. Decisions,   judgments and further information about the Court can be found on www.echr.coe.int. 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