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WyrokETPCz2015-07-07

Analiza orzeczenia

Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.

Zagadnienie prawne
Czy przewlekłość postępowań sądowych w Polsce oraz wadliwe funkcjonowanie krajowego środka odwoławczego na przewlekłość postępowania stanowiły naruszenie prawa do rozpoznania sprawy w rozsądnym terminie (art. 6 ust. 1) oraz prawa do skutecznego środka odwoławczego (art. 13) Konwencji?
Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że długość postępowań krajowych w sprawach skarżących była nadmierna, naruszając art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji. Stwierdził również, że krajowy środek odwoławczy przewidziany w ustawie z 2004 r., choć początkowo uznany za skuteczny, stał się wadliwy w praktyce. Sądy krajowe stosowały zasadę „fragmentacji postępowania”, ignorując okresy przed wejściem w życie ustawy z 2004 r. lub ograniczając ocenę do jednej instancji, co prowadziło do niewystarczających lub odrzuconych roszczeń o odszkodowanie. Ta systemowa wadliwość, pomimo uchwały Sądu Najwyższego z 2013 r., uzasadniała zastosowanie procedury wyroku pilotażowego.
Stan faktyczny
Trzech skarżących, Wiesław Rutkowski, Mariusz Orlikowski i Aleksandra Grabowska, złożyło skargi dotyczące przewlekłości postępowań sądowych w Polsce. Pan Rutkowski był stroną w postępowaniu karnym trwającym 7 lat i 10 miesięcy, pan Orlikowski w postępowaniu cywilnym trwającym 11 lat i 8 miesięcy, a pani Grabowska w postępowaniu cywilnym trwającym 13 lat i 2 miesiące. Wszyscy skarżący złożyli skargi na przewlekłość na podstawie ustawy z 2004 r., ale ich roszczenia zostały albo oddalone, albo przyznano im niewystarczające odszkodowanie, ponieważ sądy krajowe stosowały zasadę „fragmentacji postępowania”.
Rozstrzygnięcie
Trybunał jednogłośnie stwierdził naruszenie art. 6 § 1 Konwencji w odniesieniu do wszystkich trzech skarżących. Trybunał jednogłośnie stwierdził naruszenie art. 13 Konwencji. Trybunał zastosował procedurę wyroku pilotażowego. Trybunał zasądził zadośćuczynienie pieniężne na rzecz skarżących.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

issued by the Registrar of the Court   ECHR 237 (2015)   07.07.2015   Pilot judgment: Poland has to take further steps to tackle problem   of lengthy court proceedings and adequately compensate victims   The case of Rutkowski and Others v. Poland (application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11)   concerned the applicants’ complaints that the length of the proceedings before the Polish courts in   their respective cases had been excessive and that the operation of the remedy at national level for   the excessive length of court proceedings was defective.   In today’s Chamber judgment1 in the case the European Court of Human Rights held, unanimously,   that there had been:   a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a hearing within a reasonable time) of the European Convention   on Human Rights, and   a violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy).   The Court concluded that the situation of which the applicants complained had to be qualified as a   practice which was incompatible with the European Convention and decided to apply the pilot-   judgment procedure.2   The Polish Government had argued that a 2013 resolution by the Polish Supreme Court,   acknowledging that the previous practice as regards compensation for unreasonable length of   proceedings had been defective, had put an end to that practice. However, an increased inflow of   repetitive cases before the Court in 2013 and 2014 involving length of proceedings and insufficient   compensation at national level showed that further measures were needed. The Council of Europe’s   Committee of Ministers, in the course of the execution of the Court’s judgments, was to monitor   such measures to be taken by Poland.   There are about 650 similar cases pending before the Court at different stages of the procedure.   The Court decided to communicate to the Polish Government all new applications, giving it a two-   year time limit for processing those cases and affording redress to all victims.   Principal facts   The applicants, Wiesław Rutkowski, Mariusz Orlikowski, and Aleksandra Grabowska, are Polish   nationals who live in Warsaw, Łódź, and Poznań respectively.   In Mr Rutkowski’s case, the complaint concerns criminal proceedings against him on suspicion of   participating in an organised criminal group. He was charged with those offences in September 2002   and was eventually acquitted in July 2010.   Mr Orlikowski’s and Ms Grabowska’s complaints concern two different sets of civil proceedings. Mr   Orlikowski lodged a claim for damages against his landlord in March 1999 and in November 2010 an   appeal court eventually granted his claim in part. Ms Grabowska joined the proceedings in a civil   1. Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month period following its delivery,   any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges   considers whether the case deserves further examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final   judgment. If the referral request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.   Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for supervision of its execution.   Further information about the execution process can be found here: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.   See here for further information on the pilot-judgment procedure.   case in April 2000 which concerned the rights to property she had inherited. In June 2013 an appeal   court eventually upheld a decision rejecting her claim.   While their respective proceedings were pending, all three applicants lodged complaints about the   length of the proceedings under a law enacted in 2004 providing for remedies for breaches of the   right to have a case examined in judicial proceedings without undue delay (“the 2004 Act”).   Mr Rutkowski was awarded the equivalent of 500 euros (EUR) in compensation. Mr Orlikowski’s and   Ms Grabowska’s complaints were dismissed. As regards the assessment of the length of the   proceedings, in both Mr Rutkowski’s and Ms Grabowska’s case, the courts took into account only the   period starting from the date on which the 2004 Act had entered into force. In Mr Orlikowski’s case,   they took into account only the period after the appeal court had quashed the judgment of the first   instance court.   Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court   Relying on Article 6 § 1 (right to a hearing within a reasonable time), all applicants complained that   the length of the proceedings in their respective cases had been unreasonable. They further   complained, under Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), that the national courts had defectively   applied the 2004 Act in that they had refused to acknowledge the excessive length of the   proceedings and in consequence to grant them appropriate and sufficient just satisfaction.   The case originated in three applications which were lodged with the European Court of Human   Rights on 30 November 2010, 21 February 2011 and 21 July 2011 respectively.   The case was communicated to the Polish Government for observations on 2 October 2012.   The parties were also invited to express their views on whether the case revealed a systemic   problem of excessive length of proceedings in Poland as well as ineffective operation of a domestic   remedy in that respect and whether the case would be suitable for the Court’s pilot-judgment   procedure.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Guido Raimondi (Italy), President,   Päivi Hirvelä (Finland),   Ledi Bianku (Albania),   Nona Tsotsoria (Georgia),   Paul Mahoney (the United Kingdom),   Krzysztof Wojtyczek (Poland),   Faris Vehabović (Bosnia and Herzegovina),   and also Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar.   Decision of the Court   Article 6 § 1   The Court found violations of Article 6 § 1 in respect of all three applicants on account of the   unreasonable length of the proceedings in their respective cases before the Polish courts. While Mr   Rutkowski’s case had been of more than average complexity – involving a large number of accused –   this did not justify the entire length of proceedings of seven years and ten months at one level of   jurisdiction. As regards the other two applicants, the Court accepted both Mr Orlikowski’s and Ms   Grabowska’s submission that their respective cases had not been particularly complex. The Court   found no justification for the delays that had led to an overall length of proceedings of 11 years and   more than eight months in Mr Orlikowski’s case and 13 years and two months in Ms Grabowska’s   case.   Article 13   Shortly after the introduction of the 2004 Act the Court had examined the remedies introduced by it   and had found them to be “effective” within the meaning of Article 13. However, having regard to   subsequent developments in the Polish judicial practice the Court saw good reason for reconsidering   its previous position.   As shown by the fact in the applicants’ case, considerable delays which had occurred in their   respective proceedings had not been taken into account by the courts dealing with their complaints.   Contrary to the Court’s established case-law on the assessment of the reasonableness of the   proceedings, those courts had not examined the overall length of the proceedings but only selected   parts of them. In two of the applicants’ cases, the courts had disregarded the periods before the   entry into force of the 2004 Act; in the case of one applicant the appeal court had limited its   assessment to the court instance at which the main proceedings were pending. The approach taken   by the courts in the applicants’ cases reflected the principle of “fragmentation of proceedings”   established by the Polish Supreme Court in numerous rulings between 2005 and 2012. Following   that principle assessment of a length complaint was to be limited to the period after the 2004 Act’s   entry into force and to the court instance at which the case was currently pending.   The “fragmentation” of the proceedings had decisive consequences for the outcome of the   applicants’ claims for compensation, which were either entirely rejected or only partly granted. The   amount of compensation granted to Mr Rutkowski corresponded to only 5.5% of what the Court   would have awarded him had there been no remedy at national level. The domestic award thus had   to be considered manifestly unreasonable in the light of the standards set by the Court. In   conclusion the Court found that their complaints under the 2004 Act had failed to provide the   applicants with appropriate and sufficient redress.   There had accordingly been a violation of Article 13.   Article 46   The Court considered that it was justified to apply the pilot-judgment procedure, since the facts of   the applicants’ case revealed the existence of a systemic problem giving rise to many similar   applications. Having regard to the considerable scale of the problem of excessive length of   proceedings in Poland accompanied by the lack of sufficient redress for a breach of the reasonable-   time requirement, the Court found that the situation of which the applicants complained had to be   qualified as practice incompatible with the Convention.   Since the introduction of the remedy under the 2004 Act in Poland, the Court had delivered 280   judgments finding a breach of the reasonable-time requirement in cases where the applicants had   unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a ruling acknowledging that breach and to be granted   compensation before the Polish courts. In addition, in 358 similar cases such a breach had been   acknowledged by the Government and they had paid compensation under the terms of a friendly   settlement or a unilateral declaration. There were currently about 650 similar cases pending before   the Court and over 300 Polish cases involving the excessive length of judicial proceedings were   pending at the execution stage before the Committee of Ministers.   The Court considered that the systemic problem leading to a practice incompatible with Article 6 § 1   and Article 13 of the Convention required Poland to implement comprehensive large-scale legislative   and administrative actions. However, as regards Article 6 § 1, the Court abstained from indicating   any specific measures to be taken, noting that the Committee of Ministers, in the course of the   execution of judgments, was better placed to monitor such measures that needed to be taken by   Poland.   As shown by the general measures adopted by the Polish Government in execution of a previous   Grand Chamber judgment concerning the length of proceedings3 those measures had three principal   aims: the simplification and acceleration of the proceedings; the transfer of some responsibilities   from judges to non-judicial officers; where appropriate the transfer of some cases traditionally   examined by the courts to other legal professions, for instance public notaries. While the Court   welcomed those developments it noted that the scale and complexity of the problem of excessive   length of proceedings required the State to make further consistent long-term efforts to achieve   compliance with Article 6 § 1.   As regards the practice incompatible with Article 13, the Court noted that in a March 2013   resolution the Polish Supreme Court had decided that in the light of Convention standards the   principle of “fragmentation” of proceedings no longer had any basis. However, the Court was not   persuaded by the Polish Government’s argument that the resolution had put an end to the previous   defective practice as regards compensation for unreasonable length of proceedings. The Court noted   in particular that it had not been established that the lower courts in Poland had put the resolution   in practice. Indeed in 2013 and 2014 there had been an increased inflow of repetitive cases before   the Court involving length of proceedings and insufficient compensation at national level.   As regards the procedure to be followed in similar cases, the Court decided that those applications   which were pending before the Court were to be communicated to the Polish Government. It was   necessary to allow the Government a two-year time limit for processing those communicated   applications and affording redress to all victims – by way of, for example, friendly settlements – who   had lodged their applications with the Court before the delivery of today’s judgment. Pending the   adoption of such measures, the Court decided to adjourn adversarial proceedings in all those cases   for two years from the date on which today’s judgment becomes final.   As regards future cases which might be lodged after the delivery of today’s judgment, the Court   decided to adjourn adversarial proceedings for one year following the delivery of the judgment.   After the expiry of that term the Court will decide on a further procedure, in the light of subsequent   developments and, in particular, any measures that may be taken by Poland in execution of the   present judgment.   Just satisfaction (Article 41)   The Court held that Poland was to pay Mr Rutkowski 9,200 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary   damage and EUR 750 in respect of costs and expenses; it was to pay Mr Orlikowski EUR 8,800 in   respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 750 in respect of costs and expenses; and it was to pay   Ms Grabowska EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 180 in respect of costs and   expenses.   The judgment is available only in English.   This press release is a document produced by the Registry. It does not bind the Court. Decisions,   judgments and further information about the Court can be found on www.echr.coe.int. To receive   the Court’s press releases, please subscribe here: www.echr.coe.int/RSS/en or follow us on Twitter   @ECHRpress.   Press contacts   [email protected] | tel.: +33 3 90 21 42 08   Nina Salomon (tel: + 33 3 90 21 49 79)   Tracey Turner-Tretz (tel: + 33 3 88 41 35 30)   Céline Menu-Lange (tel: + 33 3 90 21 58 77)   Kudła v. Poland Grand Chamber judgment of 26 October 2000   Denis Lambert (tel: + 33 3 90 21 41 09)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member   States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.   5

© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 15.07.2026. · Źródło