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Zagadnienie prawne
Czy luka w ustawodawstwie krajowym, powstała między zniesieniem kary śmierci a wprowadzeniem kary dożywotniego pozbawienia wolności, uprawniała skarżącego do zastosowania łagodniejszej kary 15 lat pozbawienia wolności na podstawie art. 7 Konwencji?Ratio decidendi
Trybunał podkreślił znaczenie intencji ustawodawcy przy interpretacji prawa karnego, zwłaszcza w kontekście humanizacji prawa i retroaktywnego stosowania łagodniejszej ustawy. Stwierdził, że trzymiesięczna luka między zniesieniem kary śmierci a jej zastąpieniem dożywociem nie była zamierzona. Ponieważ Parlament zastąpił karę śmierci dożywociem, a sądy zastosowały tę łagodniejszą formę kary w porównaniu do kary śmierci, Trybunał uznał, że nie doszło do naruszenia art. 7 Konwencji.Stan faktyczny
Skarżący, Vladimir Ruban, obywatel Ukrainy, został skazany w lipcu 2009 r. za zabójstwo kwalifikowane i bandytyzm popełnione w 1996 r. W 1996 r. za to przestępstwo groziło 15 lat więzienia lub kara śmierci. 29 grudnia 1999 r. Sąd Konstytucyjny uznał karę śmierci za niekonstytucyjną. Trzy miesiące później, 29 marca 2000 r., Parlament zastąpił karę śmierci dożywociem. Skarżący został skazany na dożywocie i twierdził, że w okresie luki powinien był otrzymać maksymalnie 15 lat więzienia.Rozstrzygnięcie
Trybunał stwierdził, że nie doszło do naruszenia art. 7 (brak kary bez ustawy) Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
issued by the Registrar of the Court
ECHR 252 (2016)
12.07.2016
Life prisoner was not entitled to a more
lenient sentence due to a gap in legislation
In today’s Chamber judgment1 in the case of Ruban v. Ukraine (application no. 8927/11) the
European Court of Human Rights held, by six votes to one, that there had been:
no violation of Article 7 (no punishment without law) of the European Convention on Human
Rights.
The case concerned entitlement to a more favourable sentence due to a gap in legislation. Mr Ruban
– serving a life sentence for aggravated murder – alleged that, had he been sentenced during the
three-month gap between the time when the death penalty had been abolished in Ukraine and life
imprisonment had not yet been introduced, the courts would have had no choice but to sentence
him to a maximum of 15 years’ imprisonment.
The Court stressed the importance of taking into account what the intention of the legislator was
and, in particular, whether it was to humanise the criminal law and to give retrospective effect to
more lenient law. In the Court’s view the creation of the three-month gap – between the abolition of
the death penalty and its replacement with life imprisonment – had not been intentional. In any
case, in Mr Ruban’s case, Parliament had replaced the death penalty with a life sentence, and the
courts had therefore in fact applied the more lenient form of punishment.
Principal facts
The applicant, Vladimir Ruban, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1972 and is currently serving
a life sentence for aggravated murder and banditry.
In July 2009 Mr Ruban was convicted at first-instance of aggravated murder and banditry. The
offences had been committed in 1996 and, at that time, the 1960 Criminal Code provided for years’ imprisonment or the death penalty for an offence of aggravated murder. However, on December 1999 the Constitutional Court had found the death penalty to be unconstitutional with
immediate effect; and, three months later, on 29 March 2000, Parliament had amended the Criminal
Code so as to replace the abolished death penalty with life imprisonment for the offence of
aggravated murder. Mr Ruban was thus sentenced to life imprisonment.
In an appeal to the Supreme Court in July 2010, Mr Ruban claimed that he should have benefited
from the more lenient sentence which had been applicable to an offence of aggravated murder
during the three-month period between the ruling of the Constitutional Court and the amendment
of the Criminal Code, namely 15 years’ imprisonment. However, the Supreme Court upheld the
judgment of July 2009, noting that Mr Ruban had been sentenced correctly.
Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court
Relying on Article 7 §§ 1 and 2 (no punishment without law), Mr Ruban alleged that, had he been
sentenced during the three-month gap between the time when the death penalty had been
1. Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month period following its delivery,
any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges
considers whether the case deserves further examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final
judgment. If the referral request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.
Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for supervision of its execution.
Further information about the execution process can be found here: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.
abolished and life imprisonment had not yet been introduced, the courts would have had no choice
but to sentence him to a maximum of 15 years’ imprisonment, as no other alternative had been
available in the Criminal Code.
The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 15 October 2010.
Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:
Angelika Nußberger (Germany), President,
Ganna Yudkivska (Ukraine),
Khanlar Hajiyev (Azerbaijan),
Erik Møse (Norway),
Faris Vehabović (Bosnia and Herzegovina),
Síofra O’Leary (Ireland),
Mārtiņš Mits (Latvia),
and also Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar.
Decision of the Court
The Court recalled the principle, as guaranteed under Article 7, that the criminal law could not be
extensively construed to an accused’s detriment. Notably, where there were differences between
the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of an offence and subsequent criminal laws
enacted before a final judgment was rendered, the courts had to apply the law whose provisions
were most favourable to the defendant (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) of September 2009).
In Mr Ruban’s case, he had been found guilty of crimes committed in 1996, but had ultimately been
convicted of those crimes only in 2010 by the final decision of the Supreme Court. The Court noted
that there was no dispute between the parties as to the principle of retroactivity of the most lenient
wording of the criminal law, but rather of the interpretation of the version of the Criminal Code
which had existed in the three months between 29 December 1999 and 29 March 2000.
In the Court’s view there had been a three-month gap between the abolition of the death penalty
and its replacement with life imprisonment but the creation of that gap had not been intentional.
Stressing the importance of taking into account whether the intention of the legislator was to
humanise the criminal law and to give retrospective effect to more lenient law, it could not detect
any intention of the legislature in particular, and of the State in general, to mitigate the law to the
extent claimed by Mr Ruban.
It concluded that at the time when Mr Ruban had committed his crime in 1996, it had been
punishable by the death penalty. Parliament had then replaced that penalty with a life sentence,
which it considered proportionate, and the courts had therefore in fact applied the more lenient
form of punishment in Mr Ruban’s case. It followed that there had therefore been no violation of
Article 7 of the European Convention.
Separate opinion
Judge Hajiyev expressed a dissenting opinion which is annexed to the judgment.
The judgment is available only in English.
This press release is a document produced by the Registry. It does not bind the Court. Decisions,
judgments and further information about the Court can be found on www.echr.coe.int. To receive
the Court’s press releases, please subscribe here: www.echr.coe.int/RSS/en or follow us on Twitter
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Press contacts
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The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member
States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.
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© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 16.07.2026. · Źródło