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WyrokETPCz2020-02-18

Analiza orzeczenia

Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.

Zagadnienie prawne
Czy ograniczenie praw kontaktowych ojca z córką, oparte częściowo na jego stanie zdrowia psychicznego, bez odpowiedniej oceny ryzyka i najlepszego interesu dziecka, stanowiło naruszenie prawa do poszanowania życia prywatnego i rodzinnego (art. 8) oraz zakazu dyskryminacji (art. 14 w zw. z art. 8) Konwencji?
Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że krajowe sądy nie przeprowadziły rzetelnej oceny stanu zdrowia psychicznego skarżącego ani nie zbadały, czy stanowił on realne zagrożenie dla dziecka, opierając się na samym fakcie choroby psychicznej. Brakowało również właściwej analizy najlepszego interesu dziecka i rozważenia alternatywnych rozwiązań. To doprowadziło do naruszenia art. 8. W kontekście art. 14 w zw. z art. 8, Trybunał stwierdził, że skarżący był traktowany odmiennie od innych rodziców ubiegających się o kontakty z dziećmi ze względu na jego stan zdrowia psychicznego, co stanowiło dyskryminację. Państwo pozwane nie przedstawiło przekonujących i wystarczających powodów uzasadniających to zróżnicowanie, zwłaszcza w świetle braku rzetelnej oceny ryzyka.
Stan faktyczny
Marcel-Dan Cînța, ojciec czteroletniej córki, ubiegał się o uregulowanie kontaktów z nią w trakcie postępowania rozwodowego. Sąd krajowy ograniczył jego kontakty do dwóch razy w tygodniu, w obecności matki i w miejscach publicznych, opierając się na jego chronicznej chorobie psychicznej oraz zeznaniach matki o jego agresywnym zachowaniu. Skarżący twierdził, że nigdy nie był agresywny wobec córki ani żony, a sąd oparł się wyłącznie na jego chorobie.
Rozstrzygnięcie
Stwierdza naruszenie art. 8 Konwencji (jednogłośnie). Stwierdza naruszenie art. 14 Konwencji w związku z art. 8 Konwencji (pięcioma głosami do dwóch). Zasądza na rzecz skarżącego 10 000 EUR tytułem zadośćuczynienia za szkodę niemajątkową.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

issued by the Registrar of the Court   ECHR 068 (2020)   18.02.2020   Father suffered discrimination after his contact rights with his daughter   were restricted on the grounds of his mental health   In today’s Chamber judgment1 in the case of Cînța v. Romania (application no. 3891/19) the   European Court of Human Rights held,   unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family   life) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and,   by five votes to two, that there had been a violation of Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) in   conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention.   The case concerned court-ordered restrictions on the applicant’s contact with his daughter.   The Court found in particular that the domestic decisions to restrict the applicant’s contact had been   based partly on the fact that he had a mental illness. The courts had ordered that he only have   contact twice a week in the presence of his estranged wife, with whom the child was to live.   However, the courts had failed to carry out any meaningful assessment to explain why his mental   health should be a reason to curtail his contact rights even though there had been no evidence to   show he could not take care of his daughter. Nor had the courts properly examined allegations that   the child would be unsafe in his care; shown in what way they had taken account of the child’s best   interests; or considered alternative contact arrangements.   The Court considered that the fact that he suffered from a mental illness could not in itself justify   treating him differently from other parents seeking contact with their children. His contacts rights   had been restricted after the courts had made a distinction based on his mental health for which   they had not provided relevant and sufficient reasons.   He had made out a prima facie case of discrimination, which the respondent State had not been able   to rebut and there had been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.   Principal facts   The applicant, Marcel-Dan Cînța, is a Romanian national who was born in 1965 and lives in Baia   Mare (Romania).   In July 2018 the applicant sought a court order from Baia Mare District Court for his daughter, who   was four at the time, to either live with him during proceedings for divorce from his wife or for him   to have regular contact with her at his home. Both he and his estranged spouse had had psychiatric   problems, although at the time of the divorce the applicant’s wife was no longer registered as   suffering from a mental illness.   In September 2018 the court allowed the applicant to have contact from 6 p.m. to 8 p.m. on   Tuesdays and Thursdays, only in public places and in the mother’s presence. The child was to live   with her mother and the applicant was to pay maintenance.   1. Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is not final. During the three-month period following its delivery,   any party may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court. If such a request is made, a panel of five judges   considers whether the case deserves further examination. In that event, the Grand Chamber will hear the case and deliver a final   judgment. If the referral request is refused, the Chamber judgment will become final on that day.   Once a judgment becomes final, it is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for supervision of its execution.   Further information about the execution process can be found here: www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution.   The court based its decision on medical evidence which showed that the applicant had a chronic   mental illness, as well as statements from the mother, who complained that he had been physically   and psychologically aggressive because of his condition. Other relatives involved in the child’s care   and the daughter herself were also questioned by the court.   On appeal to Maramureş County Court, the applicant argued that the lower court had relied   exclusively on his illness, in a subjective and partial manner. He had never been violent towards his   daughter or his wife. The County Court dismissed his appeal, finding that the medical evidence,   witness statements, correspondence and the applicant’s attitude towards the child’s mother   justified the restrictions on his contact rights.   Complaints, procedure and composition of the Court   Relying on Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), the applicant complained about the   limited time allowed for contact with his daughter and the conditions placed on it.   Under Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) taken together with Article 8, he complained that he   had been discriminated against on the grounds of his health, notably his mental illness, in the setting   of the contact rights.   The application was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 9 January 2019.   Judgment was given by a Chamber of seven judges, composed as follows:   Jon Fridrik Kjølbro (Denmark), President,   Faris Vehabović (Bosnia and Herzegovina),   Iulia Antoanella Motoc (Romania),   Carlo Ranzoni (Liechtenstein),   Stéphanie Mourou-Vikström (Monaco),   Georges Ravarani (Luxembourg),   Péter Paczolay (Hungary),   and also Andrea Tamietti, Section Registrar.   Decision of the Court   Article 8   The Court noted that it was common ground that the domestic decisions had entailed an   interference with Mr Cînța’s right to respect for his private life. The interference had been in   accordance with the law and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting others’ rights so the   question for the Court was whether it had met the standard of being “necessary in a democratic   society”.   The Court observed that the restriction had not been due to any evidence that Mr Cînța was unable   to look after his daughter but that it had been imposed, partly at least, because of his mental   disorder. At the same time, the domestic decisions had not substantiated allegations that he was a   threat to the child. Indeed, the courts had had available a letter from a psychiatric hospital which   had stated that he had been taking his medication on a regular basis and had not recently suffered   any deterioration in his condition.   More importantly, the Court could not see what evidence the applicant could have adduced to prove   that his mental condition posed no danger to his daughter’s safety – the courts had not   commissioned any fresh expert reports on him, a lacking which had substantially limited the factual   assessment of his caring skills, vulnerability and mental state.   It was also not clear how the domestic courts had established or assessed the child’s best interests.   For instance, the courts had decided on a contact regime involving both parents, even though the   courts had acknowledged that the applicant and his former wife had tense relations. Nor was there   any indication in the decisions about the benefit of such arrangements for the child.   Furthermore, the courts had not looked properly into allegations by the child of abusive behaviour   by her father, although domestic law prohibited absolutely the physical punishment and humiliating   and degrading treatment of children. The lack of such an assessment cast doubt on the whole   decision-making process. No alternative contact arrangements had been considered, such as   meetings supervised by the child-protection authority.   The Court concluded that the decision-making process leading to the decision on Mr Cînța’s contact   rights had not been conducted so as to ensure that his state of health at the time had been properly   assessed and that all views and interests had been duly taken into account. It was not satisfied that   the procedure had been accompanied by the safeguards that were necessary given the seriousness   of the interference and the interests at stake.   There had thus been a violation of the applicant’s rights protected by Article 8.   Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8   The Court found that the applicant had been treated differently from other parents seeking access   to a child owing to his mental health, a ground of possible discrimination which was covered by   “other status” in Article 14. It remained to be established whether the difference in treatment had   been justified.   While it was not the Court’s place to decide whether Mr Cînța’s mental condition impaired his ability   to care for his child, it had to examine whether the authorities had provided sufficient reasons for   taking that illness into account in their assessment of his case.   It noted that it had already found under Article 8 that the reliance on his mental health had not been   accompanied by a genuine domestic assessment of his situation. Indeed, no examination had been   made of any risk he might have posed to his daughter. The Court thus had to conclude that he had   been perceived as a threat to his child simply because of his mental health, without any   consideration of the concrete circumstances of the case and the family situation.   The Court took note of domestic legislation which recognised that people with mental disorders had   a right to a private life and the free exercise of all civil rights. Romania was, moreover, a party to the   United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the CRPD), while the   international community as a whole had strived for better and more coherent protection for the   rights of people with mental illness and mental disabilities. The Court’s own case-law had recognised   that mentally ill people were a vulnerable group whose rights required special consideration.   The Court reiterated its finding of a lack of a proper assessment of Mr Cînța’s mental health.   Moreover, it could not find any indication that his mental condition had even been a relevant issue   to be considered.   The Court concluded that the domestic courts had made a distinction between Mr Cînța and other   parents seeking contact with their children which had been based on his mental health but for which   they had not provided relevant and sufficient reasons. He had thus made out a prima facie case of   discrimination, which it was for the Government to reject or to provide a justification for.   However, the respondent State had not presented convincing reasons such as to rebut the   presumption of discrimination against the applicant on the grounds of his mental health. There had   accordingly been a breach of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.   Just satisfaction (Article 41)   The Court held that Romania was to pay the applicant 10,000 euros (EUR) in respect of   non-pecuniary damage.   Statement of dissent   Judges Mourou-Vikström and Ravarani made a statement of dissent, which is annexed to the   judgment.   The judgment is available only in English.   This press release is a document produced by the Registry. It does not bind the Court. Decisions,   judgments and further information about the Court can be found on www.echr.coe.int. To receive   the Court’s press releases, please subscribe here: www.echr.coe.int/RSS/en or follow us on Twitter   @ECHR_CEDH.   Press contacts   [email protected] | tel.: +33 3 90 21 42 08   Patrick Lannin (tel: + 33 3 90 21 44 18)   Tracey Turner-Tretz (tel: + 33 3 88 41 35 30)   Denis Lambert (tel: + 33 3 90 21 41 09)   Inci Ertekin (tel: + 33 3 90 21 55 30)   The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe Member   States in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights.   4

© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 17.07.2026. · Źródło