12013/21

SECOND SECTION CASE OF Z.G. v. HUNGARY (Application no. 12013/21)               JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 31 March 2026 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Z.G. v. Hungary, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:  Jovan Ilievski, President,  Péter Paczolay,  Juha Lavapuro, judges, and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no. 12013/21) against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 16 February 2021 by a Hungarian national, Z.G. (“the applicant”), who was born in 1965, lives in Budapest and was represented by Mr G. Kaposi, a lawyer practising in Győr; the decision to give notice of the application to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice; the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 10 March 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.  The case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Article 8 of the Convention in regard to a search of his home and seizure of material in the context of a fiscal fraud investigation concerning one of his clients, and ultimately, the applicant himself. 2.  The applicant is a lawyer. The seat of his law firm was registered in Nyíregyháza. The national register of lawyers indicated that the archives of his law firm were in Budapest, without information on their exact location. The Nyíregyháza Bar Association stated in its non-public records that the address of the applicant’s law firm archives was in District III of Budapest since 2013. According to Act no. LXXVIII of 2017 on Attorneys at Law, section 190(4), the location of archives is registered but this information is not available to the public. 3.  In January 2017, the applicant acted in Debrecen at the National Tax and Customs Office (hereinafter referred to as the ‘NTCA’) as defence lawyer of K.F.Á. in a criminal case for tax fraud. In 2018 and 2019, the NTCA began investigating K.F. – K.F.Á.’s father – to determine whether he could be suspected of having committed criminal acts as well. K.F. was also a client of the applicant’s law firm. In its procedure conducted against K.F., the NTCA sent documents by post to the applicant’s address in District III of Budapest. 4.  On 24 July 2020 the NTCA ordered the search of two of the applicant’s residences in Budapest and the seizure of documents related to the “criminal connection” between the applicant and K.F., to the legal relationship between the applicant and the “companies concerned”, and to the “fictitious seat” of those companies. 5.  The NTCA carried out the search of the applicant’s properties in Budapest on 28 July 2020. The applicant’s property located at District III of Budapest was searched between 7:30 a.m. and 2:43 p.m. in the presence of the applicant who remained onsite for the whole duration of the measure. There was a sign at the entrance gate displaying “Z.G. Law Firm” among other commercial entities which operate at the premises. The applicant provided the NTCA investigators with powers of attorney signed by K.F., evidence of the confidential material stored at the premises and grounds for the applicant’s refusal to assist in the search and seizure of his home. The applicant claimed that part of his residence was used by his law firm as its archives. His wife, as well as three of his legal advisers were present at different times. The lawyers offered him legal advice and expressed their objections, which were later recorded in the minutes of the search and seizure operation. 6.  The NTCA investigators searched the premises despite the objections and seized file folders labelled with the name of K.F. They further made an electronic copy of e-mails and other data with the assistance of IT experts and seized documents totalling 717 pages concerning company K, as an immediate measure, which was subsequently authorised by the NTCA. 7.  The applicant was placed in short-term arrest and transported to Debrecen, where he was questioned as a suspect of fiscal fraud. The seat of the applicant’s law firm in Nyíregyháza was searched on the basis of a separate, judicially authorised search and seizure warrant. The measure was conducted in the presence of the applicant, an attorney of the Nyíregyháza Bar Association, a prosecutor and the NTCA investigators between 10:37 p.m. and 11:40 p.m., which did not bring forward any further evidence. 8.  The applicant’s complaint against the search and seizure was dismissed by the Hajdú-Bihar County regional prosecutor’s office on 4 August 2020. It reasoned that since there was no listing for the applicant’s property in District III of Budapest in the national register of lawyers, the procedural safeguards for the protection of the attorney-client privilege could not apply. It further concluded that the immediate measure of seizure was lawful. 9.  The requests of the applicant and his legal representative for judicial review of the decision of the regional prosecutor’s office were dismissed by the Debrecen District Court on 19 August and 11 September 2020. The District Court held that the applicant had failed to inform the respective bar association of the address of his law firm’s archives and that Articles 303 and 309 of Act no. XC of 2017 on the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CCP’) were inapplicable to the case. At the material time those provisions read as follows: Article 303 “1. A search may be ordered by the court, prosecution, or investigating authority. 2. If a search is to be conducted in the offices of a notary, or in a law office, for the purpose of gaining access to protected data related to the activities of a notary or an attorney-at-law, it shall be ordered by a court. At any search conducted in the offices of a notary, or in a law office, the attendance of a prosecutor shall be obligatory. 3. A search may be conducted even without a court decision if adopting a court decision required for ordering a search would cause any delay that would significantly jeopardise the purpose of the search. In such a situation, the permission of the court shall be obtained ex-post without delay. If such a search is not ordered by a court, the result of the search may not be used as evidence.” Article 309 “1. A seizure may be ordered by the court, prosecution, or investigating authority. 2. Seizure of a means of evidence kept in the offices of a notary, or a law office, and containing protected data related to the activities of a notary or an attorney-at-law shall be ordered by a court.” 10.  The applicant, referring to legal professional privilege, complained that the search of his premises and the seizure of documents, data and e‑mails had violated his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 11.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 12.  The applicant argued that his premises at District III of Budapest had been searched, and materials had been seized in breach of Articles 303(2) and 309(2) of the CCP. The removal of confidential information had not taken place in accordance with the CCP either. In any event, the measures had not been accompanied by specific procedural safeguards. 13.  The Government submitted that the search and seizure of the property located at District III of Budapest had been lawfully ordered and implemented in compliance with the provisions of the CCP. A judicial authorisation or the presence of the prosecutor had not been required since the property in question was not listed in the national register of lawyers as belonging to his law firm at the time of the search. They further pointed out that the search and seizure order had been sufficiently detailed and adequately reasoned. 14.  The general principles concerning the search of the premises of a lawyer, notably regarding the importance of specific procedural safeguards when it comes to protecting the confidentiality of exchanges between lawyers and their clients, as well as professional secrecy have been summarised, for instance, in Reznik v. Ukraine (no. 31175/14, §§ 56-61, 23 January 2025) and Kulák v. Slovakia (no. 57748/21, §§ 73-77, 3 April 2025). 15.  It is not disputed by the parties that the search of the applicant’s premises, the seizure of documents and the copying of electronic data, including e-mail exchanges with his clients, amounted to an interference with his right to respect for his “private life”, “home” and “correspondence”. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. 16.  To be justified under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention an interference has to be in accordance with law, to pursue a legitimate aim and to be necessary in a democratic society. 17.  Regarding lawfulness, the Court observes that the parties disagreed on whether the applicant’s property had the status of a “law office” for the purposes of Articles 303(2) and 309(2) of the CCP. According to the domestic authorities, this was not the case and the procedural safeguards laid down in these provisions accordingly did not apply in the applicant’s case (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). The Court notes in that context that it has itself consistently interpreted the notion of “home” in Article 8 § 1 of the Convention as covering both private individuals’ homes and professional persons’ offices (see Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, §§ 29‑31, Series A no. 251-B). 18.  As to whether the national legislation and practice afforded appropriate and sufficient safeguards against abuse and arbitrariness and provided specific procedural safeguards when it comes to protecting the confidentiality of exchanges between lawyers and their clients, the Court reiterates that searches of lawyers’ homes or offices should be subject to especially strict scrutiny (see Kruglov and Others v. Russia, nos. 11264/04 and 15 others, § 125, 4 February 2020 with further references). The question in the present case is whether the rules and procedures for the search operation conducted at the applicant’s address in District III of Budapest were sufficiently rigorous for the interference to be “in accordance with the law” (see Reznik, cited above, § 61, with further references). 19.  As regards the authorities’ awareness that they would be searching a law firm, the Court notes that the NTCA retrieved the publicly available data stored on the applicant in the national register of lawyers in preparation of the investigation. That register listed ‘Budapest’ as the location of the applicant’s law firm’s archives, without including their exact addresses. Furthermore, the NTCA had prior knowledge of the applicant’s power of attorney to represent K.F.Á. and K.F. as their defence lawyer in criminal proceedings. The NTCA had sent documents by post to the applicant’s law firm in District III of Budapest (see paragraphs 1 to 3 above). 20.  The Court considers that any remaining ambiguity about the legal status of the location under investigation would have called for the application of clear and precise rules in Hungarian law to meet the standard of lawfulness under Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (compare, among many others, Sallinen and Others v. Finland, no. 50882/99, § 90, 27 September 2005). It notes in that context, however, that under the applicable law, the location of a law firm’s archives is registered by the bar association, but this information is not public (see paragraph 2 above). 21.  The Court further considers that the NTCA search and seizure order did not expound sufficiently in detail the plausible grounds, if any, for suspecting the applicant of having been involved in K.F.’s fraudulent tax evasion scheme (see paragraph 4 above). The NTCA also failed to demonstrate the reasons for believing that the relevant evidence in regard of those suspicions could be found at the premises to be searched, that is, at the applicant’s private residence (compare also Kruglov and Others, cited above, § 127). Moreover, it finds that none of the authorities involved examined the issue of whether privileged material was to be safeguarded to prevent interference with professional secrecy although they were aware that the applicant was a bar member and possessed documents covered by attorney‑client privilege (compare also Yuditskaya and Others v. Russia, no. 5678/06, § 29, 12 February 2015). Even though the authorities ensured the applicant’s presence (compare and contrast, Turán v. Hungary, no. 33068/05, § 21, 6 July 2010), there was not any independent observer involved in supervising the measure at the premises with the task to identify which documents were covered by legal professional privilege and should not be removed (compare and contrast Tamosius v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 62002/00, ECHR 2002-VIII; André and Another v. France, no. 18603/03, § 44, 24 July 2008). Moreover, as regards his e-mails with the company K and the electronic data held on the applicant’s data carriers, it does not seem that any sort of sifting procedure was followed during the search to prevent interference with professional secrecy (compare and contrast Sérvulo & Associados - Sociedade de Advogados, RL and Others v. Portugal, no. 27013/10, §§ 102-104, 3 September 2015), although IT experts were present. 22.  The Court further observes that the shortcomings in the search and seizure operation conducted in the absence of a prior judicial warrant were not counterbalanced by the ex post facto judicial review either. These decisions did not examine whether the search and seizure of all of the applicant’s documents and data was necessary for the investigation (compare also Robathin v. Austria, no. 30457/06, § 51, 3 July 2012). 23.  In view of the above, the Court concludes that the lack of procedural guarantees relating specifically to the protection of legal professional privilege fell short of the requirements flowing from the criterion that any interference must be “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (compare also Saber v. Norway, no. 459/18, § 57, 17 December 2020). 24.  In light of that conclusion, it is not necessary for the Court to review compliance with the other requirements in Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. 25.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 26.  The applicant claimed 300,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and EUR 12,000 plus VAT in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the domestic authorities and the Court. 27.  The Government considered these claims excessive. 28.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it considers that the applicant must have suffered some non‑pecuniary damage and awards him EUR 4,000 in that respect, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 29.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award a lump sum of EUR 4,000 for costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings and before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention; Holds  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:  EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;   EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;   that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 31 March 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.    Dorothee von Arnim Jovan Ilievski  Deputy Registrar President