15666/18

WyrokETPCz2025-10-09ECLI:CE:ECHR:2025:1009JUD001566618

Analiza orzeczenia

Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.

Zagadnienie prawne
Czy przewlekłość postępowania karnego, w którym skarżąca uczestniczyła jako następca prawny zmarłego syna, naruszyła prawo do rozpoznania sprawy w rozsądnym terminie z art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji, a także czy skarżąca posiadała status ofiary w tej sprawie?
Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że skarżąca posiadała status ofiary w rozumieniu art. 34 Konwencji, ponieważ miała moralny interes w kontynuowaniu postępowania karnego w celu udowodnienia niewinności zmarłego syna, zwłaszcza że był on wcześniej uniewinniony przez sądy niższych instancji. Sądy krajowe nie sprzeciwiły się jej statusowi i przyznały jej prawa proceduralne. W odniesieniu do przewlekłości postępowania, Trybunał, odwołując się do swojego ugruntowanego orzecznictwa, stwierdził, że długość postępowania, trwającego ponad 11 lat i 6 miesięcy (z czego ponad 5 lat od momentu przystąpienia skarżącej), była nadmierna i nie spełniała wymogu „rozsądnego terminu” z art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji, nie znajdując żadnych okoliczności uzasadniających taką długość.
Stan faktyczny
W lipcu 2007 roku syn skarżącej, V.A., został oskarżony o handel ludźmi. Po uniewinnieniu przez sądy niższych instancji, Sąd Najwyższy uchylił wyrok i skierował sprawę do ponownego rozpoznania. V.A. zmarł w październiku 2013 roku. W listopadzie 2013 roku skarżąca została przyjęta jako jego następca w postępowaniu karnym, które zostało ostatecznie umorzone z powodu śmierci V.A. w styczniu 2019 roku. W międzyczasie, w grudniu 2016 roku, skarżąca pozwała Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości, domagając się odszkodowania za przewlekłość postępowania, ale jej roszczenia zostały oddalone przez sądy krajowe z powodu braku statusu ofiary.
Rozstrzygnięcie
Trybunał jednogłośnie: - Uznaje skargi dotyczące nadmiernej długości postępowania za dopuszczalne i stwierdza, że nie ma potrzeby odrębnego badania pozostałych skarg wniesionych przez skarżącą. - Stwierdza, że niniejsza skarga ujawnia naruszenie art. 6 § 1 Konwencji. - Orzeka, że państwo pozwane ma zapłacić skarżącej, w ciągu trzech miesięcy, kwoty wskazane w załączonej tabeli, przeliczone na walutę państwa pozwanego po kursie obowiązującym w dniu rozliczenia. - Orzeka, że od upływu wyżej wymienionych trzech miesięcy do dnia rozliczenia, od powyższych kwot będą naliczane odsetki proste według stopy równej krańcowej stopie oprocentowania Europejskiego Banku Centralnego w okresie zwłoki plus trzy punkty procentowe.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

FIFTH SECTION CASE OF VATAGA v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (Application no. 15666/18)             JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 9 October 2025   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Vataga v. the Republic of Moldova, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:  Andreas Zünd, President,  Diana Sârcu,  Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges, and Viktoriya Maradudina, Acting Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 18 September 2025, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.  The case originated in an application against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 21 March 2018. 2.  The applicant was represented by Mr G. Odobescu, a lawyer practising in Edineț. 3.  The Moldovan Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the application. THE FACTS 4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 5.  In July 2007 the applicant’s son (V.A.) was charged with human trafficking and in 2009 his case was sent for trial. In 2010 V.A. was acquitted and his acquittal was subsequently upheld by the Bălți Court of Appeal. The acquittal was quashed by the Supreme Court of Justice and the case was sent for retrial. 6.  In October 2013 V.A. died. 7.  On 14 November 2013 the Bălți Court of Appeal accepted the applicant as V.A.’s successor in the criminal proceedings. On 23 April 2018 the criminal proceedings against V.A. were discontinued due to his death. That decision became final on 29 January 2019 when the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the decision on appeal. 8.  In the meantime, on 21 December 2016 the applicant sued the Ministry of Justice under Law No. 87, seeking compensations for the excessive length of the criminal proceedings. 9.  On 20 March 2017 the Buiucani District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims under law No. 87 holding that she lacked victim status and could not complain about the length of the proceedings as she was neither the victim nor the defendant in the criminal proceedings. This judgment was upheld by the Chișinău Court of Appeal on 21 June 2017 and by the Supreme Court of Justice on 18 October 2017. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 10.  The applicant complained principally that the length of the proceedings in question had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. She relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 11.  The Government submitted that the application should be declared inadmissible ratione personae considering that a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention could only affect V.A. and not the applicant who lacked sufficient interest in the criminal proceedings against her son. 12.  The Court has previously granted victim status to close relatives, allowing them to submit an application where they have shown a moral interest in having the late victim exonerated of any finding of guilt (see Nölkenbockhoff v. Germany, 25 August 1987, § 33, Series A no. 123, and Grădinar v. Moldova, no. 7170/02, §§ 95 and 97-98, 8 April 2008) or in protecting their own reputation and that of their family (see Brudnicka and Others v. Poland, no. 54723/00, §§ 27-31, ECHR 2005‑II; Armonienė v. Lithuania, no. 36919/02, § 29, 25 November 2008; and Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain, no 34147/06, §§ 31-33, 21 September 2010), or where they have shown a material interest on the basis of the direct effect on their pecuniary rights (see Ressegatti v. Switzerland, no. 17671/02, §§ 23‑25, 13 July 2006; Grădinar, § 97 cited above). The applicant’s participation in the domestic proceedings has been found to be only one of several relevant criteria (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 100, ECHR 2014) 13.  Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the Court notes that the domestic courts continued examining the criminal charges against V.A. for almost five years after his death for the only reason that his mother, the applicant in the present case, had wished to continue participating in the criminal proceedings to prove that her late son had not committed any crime, especially since he had been previously acquitted by two courts (see paragraphs 5-7 above). The domestic courts did not object to the applicant’s victim status and allowed her to intervene in the criminal proceedings, having granted her certain procedural rights similar to the procedural status of a civil claimant. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the applicant could rely on Article 6 of the Convention and may claim to be a “victim”, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, in respect of the excessive length of these proceedings. 14.  The Court observes that the criminal proceedings against V.A. started in July 2007 and continued until the final decision of 29 January 2019. The applicant joined the proceedings in the capacity of V.A.’s successor on 14 November 2013, having been accepted as such by the domestic courts (see paragraph 7 above). On 21 December 2016 she sought compensation, under Law No. 87, for the excessive length of the proceedings. The domestic courts, however, dismissed her claims for the lack of the victim status (see paragraph 9 above). In these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant was no longer required to exhaust the domestic remedy for the subsequent period, after such a venue proved to be ineffective in her case. Accordingly, the Court will proceed to examine the alleged excessive length of the proceedings for the period in which the applicant can claim to be a victim under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on her own behalf, until 29 January 2019 (see appended table below). 15.  To sum up, the Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 16.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case; the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities; and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999‑II, and Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000‑VII). 17.  In the leading case of Cravcenco v. Moldova (no. 13012/02, 15 January 2008) the Court already found a violation in respect of issues similar to those in the present case. 18.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of justifying the overall length of the proceedings. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that, in this case, the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. 19.  The Court therefore finds that that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. REMAINING COMPLAINTS 20.  The applicant submitted additional complaints under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention, arguing that the excessive length of the criminal proceedings had adversely affected her private life and that she had not had an effective remedy under the domestic law. In view of the findings above, the Court considers that it has examined the main legal issue raised in the present case and that, accordingly, there is no need to deal separately with these remaining complaints. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 21.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law (see, in particular, Panzari v. Moldova, no. 27516/04, §§ 48-54, 29 September 2009), the Court finds it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the complaints about the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and finds that it is not necessary to examine separately the remaining complaints raised by the applicant; Holds that this application discloses a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; Holds (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 October 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.    Viktoriya Maradudina Andreas Zünd  Acting Deputy Registrar President APPENDIX Application raising complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (excessive length of criminal/civil proceedings) Application no. Date of introduction Applicant’s name Year of birth   Representative’s name and location Start of proceedings End of proceedings Total length Levels of jurisdiction Amount awarded for non-pecuniary damage per applicant (in euros)[1] Amount awarded for costs and expenses per application (in euros)[2] 15666/18 21/03/2018 Svetlana VATAGA   Ghenadie Odobescu Edineț Criminal proceedings against the applicant’s son initiated in July 2007   On 14/11/2013 the Bălți Court of Appeal accepted the applicant as a successor in the criminal proceedings after the death of her son in October 2013, with her own procedural rights 29/01/2019 Supreme Court of Justice More than 11 years and 6 months before 3 levels of jurisdiction, of which 5 years, 2 months and 15 days before 2 levels of jurisdiction since the applicant joined the proceedings 1,600   [1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable. [2] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 12.07.2026. · Źródło