21806/05

FOURTH SECTION             CASE OF CHRAPKOVÁ v. SLOVAKIA   (Application no. 21806/05)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   3 November 2009   FINAL   03/02/2010   This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Chrapková v. Slovakia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:  Nicolas Bratza, President,  Giovanni Bonello,  David Thór Björgvinsson,  Ján Šikuta,  Päivi Hirvelä,  Ledi Bianku,  Nebojša Vučinić, judges, and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 13 October 2009, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.  The case originated in an application (no. 21806/05) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Ms Vlasta Chrapková (“the applicant”), on 10 June 2005. 2.  The Slovak Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková. 3.  On 21 May 2007 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 3). THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 4.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Piešťany.     A.  Proceedings concerning the applicant's action under the Land Ownership Act 1991 5.  On 31 December 1992 the applicant filed an action with the Nitra District Court. Under the Land Ownership Act 1991 she claimed compensation for agricultural property and livestock which had been transferred to a co-operative in 1951. 6.  In March 1997, January 2002 and May 2005 issues of a procedural nature were determined by the court of appeal. 7. In September 2007 the Government informed the Court that the proceedings were pending before the District Court. No information is available about further developments in the case. B.  Constitutional proceedings 8.  On 30 December 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay. The decision stated that the proceedings had been pending for 12 years. During that period not a single hearing had been held with a view to taking evidence and establishing the facts relevant for the determination of the applicant's action. Such situation was not justified by the complexity of the case. The applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings in that, upon the court's instruction of 3 June 1993, she had completed her action on 10 March 1997 and had not informed the District Court that, in the meantime, she had initiated proceedings with a view to establishing which person was obliged under the relevant law to pay compensation to her. 9.  As to the conduct of the District Court, unjustified delays in the proceedings exceeded 8 years. Furthermore, the District Court had failed to proceed in an effective manner, whereby the proceedings had been protracted. The Constitutional Court pointed to (i) the insufficient instruction of the applicant about essentials of her action and (ii) the decisions of the Regional Court of September 1997 and January 2002 to quash the District Court's decisions. 10.  The Constitutional Court awarded SKK 100,000 (the equivalent of 2,574 euros at that time) to the applicant as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It ordered the District Court to avoid any further delay in the proceedings and to reimburse the applicant's costs. THE LAW I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 11.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings examined by the Constitutional Court had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...” A.  Admissibility 12.  The Government pointed, in respect of the proceedings examined by the Constitutional Court, to the complexity of the case from the factual and legal point of view and to the fact that the amount of just satisfaction awarded by the Constitutional Court was relatively high. On the other hand, they admitted that since the beginning of the proceedings until the Constitutional Court's finding, i.e. during a period of 12 years, not a single hearing had been held. In view of the above, the Government left the question whether the applicant could still be considered a victim to the Court's discretion. 13.  The applicant argued that the amount of just satisfaction granted by the Constitutional Court was disproportionately low in the circumstances of the case. Furthermore, she disagreed with the statement of the Constitutional Court that she had contributed to the length of the proceedings in the period between 3 June 1993 and 10 March 1997. 14.  The Court notes that the applicant exclusively complained about undue delays in the proceedings examined by the Constitutional Court. The period to be taken into consideration thus began on 31 December 1992 and ended on 15 December 2004. During that period the proceedings were pending for almost 12 years. The Constitutional Court held that the District Court had failed to proceed in an effective manner, awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR 2,574 as just satisfaction and ordered the District Court to avoid any further delay in the proceedings. 15.  The amount awarded by the Constitutional Court cannot be considered as providing adequate and sufficient redress to the applicant in view of the Court's established case-law (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006-V, and Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 65-107, ECHR 2006-V).   16.  In view of the above, in respect of the proceedings up to the time of the Constitutional Court's finding, the Court concludes that the applicant did not lose her status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.   17.  The applicant's constitutional complaint was only directed at the proceedings before the first-instance court. This fact has to be taken into account when determining the merits of the application and, if appropriate, the applicant's claims for just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention (see, for example, Judt v. Slovakia, no. 70985/01, § 61, 9 October 2007, with further reference).   18. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.  Merits 19.  The Government agreed with the Constitutional Court's finding that undue delays had occurred in the proceedings examined by it and stated that the complaint was not manifestly ill-founded. 20.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). 21.  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above). 22.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court notes that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. 23.  Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings up to the Constitutional Court's finding was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. 24.  There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.       II.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 25.  Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A.  Damage 26.  The applicant claimed 146,134.6 euros (EUR) plus default interest in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 27.  The Government contested the pecuniary damage claimed by the applicant. They considered the claim for non-pecuniary damage exaggerated. They left the matter to the Court's discretion and requested the Court to take into account the just satisfaction awarded by the Constitutional Court. 28.  The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, and bearing in mind the sum awarded by the Constitutional Court, it awards the applicant EUR 2,380 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. B.  Costs and expenses 29.  The applicant submitted no claim for costs and expenses. C.  Default interest 30.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY 1.  Declares the application admissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;       3.  Holds (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,380 (two thousand three hundred and eighty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 November 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.    Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza  Registrar President