2697/15

FIFTH SECTION CASE OF RUSSU v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (Application no. 2697/15) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 2 July 2026 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Russu v. the Republic of Moldova, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Gilberto Felici, President, Diana Sârcu, Nicholas Emiliou, judges, and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.2697/15) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 20 December 2014 by a Moldovan national, Ms Maria Russu (“the applicant”), who was born in 1943 and lives in Chișinău, and was represented by Mr P. Cazacu, a lawyer practising in Chișinău; the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent at the relevant time, MrD.Obadă; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 11 June 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.The case concerns the annulment of a twelve-year-old donation contract by the upholding of an allegedly time-barred court action, resulting in the applicant losing the ownership of half of her late parents’ house and the adjacent plot of land. 2.In 2000 the applicant’s brother (L.P.) transferred half of the ownership of their late parents’ house to the applicant by means of a donation contract signed in the presence of a public notary. 3.In 2005 the applicant, L.P. and his spouse acquired the ownership of the adjacent land from the municipality. The applicant lived in the donated house for some ten years and paid all the bills and taxes related to the house and land until 2012, when her brother initiated court proceedings to challenge the property title and the validity of the donation contract. He argued that he had been misled by his sister and had realised only in 2012, during inheritance proceedings after his spouse’s death, that he had actually donated half of the house. 4.On 1 March 2013 the Buiucani District Court granted L.P.’s court action. It declared null and void the donation contract of 2 March 2000, concluded between L.P. and the applicant, and the landowner authentication title issued in the applicant’s name. 5.The court held that the donation of the disputed house had been conducted without the consent of L.P.’s spouse, which was mandatory under the law. The court also noted that the applicant had taken advantage of L.P. being deaf and mute. He had not been provided with a translator and had not understood the nature of the contract. In those circumstances, the above‑mentioned contract was declared null and void (absolute nullity). 6.On 4 March 2013 the Buiucani District Court, by an additional decision, ordered the applicant’s eviction from the disputed house. 7.On 16 July 2013 the Chișinău Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the above-mentioned judgment. It considered that the applicant had misled L.P. and by deception had taken him to the notary and had him sign the document. The applicant challenged the above-mentioned decision by means of an appeal on points of law. 8.On 18 December 2013 the applicant’s appeal was upheld, and the case was returned for retrial by the appellate court. 9.On 13 March 2014 that court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the lower court. 10.On 20 August 2014 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant and upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment. The Supreme Court stated that the lower courts had correctly applied the old Civil Code (1964) and the absolute nullity in the given case and that enough evidence had been provided to justify the absolute nullity of the donation contract. 11.As a result of the proceedings, the applicant lost her title over half of the disputed house and the adjacent plot of land. 12.The applicant complained of a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because the domestic courts examined the time-barred action. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 13.The relevant provisions of the Civil Code, in force before 12June2003 and after that date as well as the practice were described in Virprod-Lux S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova (no. 5067/08, §§ 18-20, 18June 2019). THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT THE LOCUS STANDI OF THE APPLICANT’S DAUGHTER 14.On 2 September 2021 the applicant died. Her daughter and only heir, Ms Angela Russu, expressed her wish to continue with the application. The Government submitted that the applicant’s heir had not proved that she had any legitimate interest in pursuing the application. They therefore invited the Court to strike the application out of its list of cases. 15.The Court notes that the original application concerned an alleged breach of the principle of legal certainty and the resulting loss of the title over half of a house and the adjacent plot of land. It reiterates that the economic nature of the interests at stake is a valid reason for pursuing an application (see, for instance, Sandu and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia, nos. 21034/05 and 7 others, § 50, 17 July 2018).Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court accepts that the daughter of the applicant has a legitimate interest in pursuing the application in her late mother’s stead. However, for reasons of convenience, the text of the judgment will continue to refer to Ms Maria Russu as “the applicant”. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 16.The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the proceedings before the domestic courts had been unfair and in breach of the principle of legal certainty. She alleged that the domestic courts had failed to apply the statute of limitations in accordance with the provisions of the old Civil Code, establishing a three-year time-limit within which one could defend in court his rights. As a result, the applicant’s brother had been able to successfully challenge the donation contract more than 12 years after the fact, disregarding the principle set out in Article 6 of the new Civil Code. 17.The Government submitted that the domestic courts in their decisions had acted in accordance with the law and reached a fair balance between the applicant’s alleged ownership right and the legitimate interest in protecting L.P.’s previously violated rights from abuse on account of his physical disability. 18.The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 19.The general principles concerning legal certainty in civil proceedings have been summarised in Brumărescu v. Romania ([GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999-VII), and Baroul Partner-A v. Moldova (no. 39815/07, §§ 36-37, 16 July 2009). The Court has found, in particular, that examining an appeal outside the legal time-limits may undermine the principle of legal certainty (see Ghirea v. Moldova no. 15778/05, § 35, 26 June 2012). 20.The Court reiterates that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts in interpreting domestic legislation. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation. This applies in particular to the interpretation by courts of rules of a procedural nature, such as the prescribed time-limit for instituting court actions. The Court’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention in general and with the principle of legal certainty, guaranteed by Article 6, in particular (see, mutatis mutandis, Platakou v. Greece, no. 38460/97, § 37, ECHR 2001-I). 21.In the present case, the Court notes that the domestic courts chose not to dismiss the L.P.’s action under the provisions of the old Civil Code, but to apply the provisions of the new Civil Code, which had entered into force in June 2003. 22.The Court does not contest the State’s power to enact new legislation regulating time-limits in civil proceedings. However, it does not follow that it is compatible with the Convention to apply those new rules in a manner which would unsettle legal situations which have become final by way of the application of the relevant limitation period before the enactment of such legislation. To admit the contrary would amount to admitting that a State is free to disregard a time-limit and challenge final legal situations simply by making use of its power to enact new legislation after the expiry of the time‑limit in question. The Court notes that the above conclusion appears to be consistent with Article 6 of the new Civil Code, which states that the new Code does not have retroactive effect and cannot “alter or abolish the conditions in which a prior legal situation was constituted, or the conditions in which such a legal situation ceased to exist” (see Virprod-Lux S.R.L, cited above, § 32). 23.The Court concludes that the interpretation of the statutory time-limit for instituting legal proceedings adopted by the domestic courts produced effects incompatible with the principle of legal certainty as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention. By allowing L.P.’s action, the domestic courts caused the applicant to lose property acquired under a donation contract concluded twelve years earlier, thereby altering a legal situation that had become final by virtue of the expiry of the limitation period and undermining the principle of legal certainty. There has therefore been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS UNDER WELL-ESTABLISHED CASE-LAW 24.The applicant also raised another complaint which is covered by the well‑established case-law of the Court, namely that the judgment upholding a time-barred court action, for the annulment of a twelve-year-old donation contract had had the effect of infringing her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions as secured by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. This complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article35 §3(a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. Accordingly, it must be declared admissible. 25.Having examined all the material before it, the Court concludes that the complaint discloses a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see Ipteh SA and Others v. Moldova, no. 35367/08, § 38, 24November 2009). APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 26.In so far as pecuniary damage is concerned, the applicant claimed the market value of half of the house and the adjacent plot of land with similar characteristics in the amount of 42,500 euros (EUR). She also claimed EUR4,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,500 in respect of costs and expenses. 27.The Government disputed the amount claimed by the applicant in respect of pecuniary damage without submitting an alternative valuation. They also argued that the applicant’s claims in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and for costs and expenses were excessive and invited the Court to dismiss them. 28.The Court finds a direct causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary damage alleged. Having regard to the information available to it concerning property prices on the Chisinau property market, and in the absence of any alternative valuation by the Government, the Court considers that the applicant’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage is well-founded and awards it in full. 29.Having regard to the violations found above, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. Furthermore, having regard to the documents in its possession, it considers it reasonable to award EUR 1,500 for costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant. 30.The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares that Ms Angela Russu has standing to pursue the proceedings before the Court in her late mother’s stead; Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention; Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: EUR 42,500 (forty-two thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage; EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 July 2026, pursuant to Rule77§§2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Martina KellerGilberto Felici Deputy RegistrarPresident