33029/17

FIFTH SECTION CASE OF PANUŞ v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (Application no. 33029/17)             JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 12 March 2026 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Panuş v. the Republic of Moldova, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:  Andreas Zünd, President,  Mykola Gnatovskyy,  Vahe Grigoryan, judges, and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no. 33029/17) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 18 April 2017 by a Moldovan national, Mr Sandu Panuş (“the applicant”), who was born in 1990 and lives in Durlești, and was represented by Ms D. Străisteanu, a lawyer practising in Chișinău; the decision to give notice of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning a limitation of access to a court to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agents at the time, Mr O. Rotari and Mr D. Obadă, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations;   Having deliberated in private on 12 February 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.  The case concerns an alleged breach of the applicant’s right of access to a court, contrary to the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 2.  On 8 August 2013 the applicant had his driving licence withdrawn. He challenged the withdrawal of his driving licence in court and on 4 September 2013 the Chișinău District Court upheld his appeal and restored his driving licence. 3.  Meanwhile, on 14 August and 8 September 2013, the applicant was fined by the police patrol for driving without a valid driving licence. He successfully challenged the relevant decisions in court, arguing that the initial withdrawal of his driving licence had been set aside by the Chișinău District Court. 4.  On 26 June 2015 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the Ministry of Justice as the respondent and the Ministry of Internal Affairs as an intervening third party. He claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage resulting from the unlawful administrative proceedings brought against him (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above). He relied on provisions of the Civil and Administrative Codes and of Law no. 1545/1998 on compensation for damage caused by unlawful acts of criminal investigation bodies, prosecution authorities and courts. 5.  On 27 January 2016 the Buiucani District Court found Law no. 1545/1998 applicable to the applicant’s situation, partially upheld his claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage and rejected his claims in respect of pecuniary damage. 6.  On 2 June 2016 the Chișinău Court of Appeal reversed the judgment of the district court and adopted a new judgment rejecting the applicant’s claims on the grounds that they had been lodged against the wrong respondent. The appellate court confirmed the applicability of Law no. 1545/1998 but held that the responsibility to compensate for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage lay with the national authority that had delivered the unlawful decisions, as provided for in Article 13 of the Law. 7.  The applicant appealed and argued that his claims had been correctly lodged against the Ministry of Justice, as provided for in Article 5 of Law no. 1545/1998, and against the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to which the National Patrol Inspectorate was directly subordinate. 8.  On 12 October 2016 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment of the Chișinău Court of Appeal, endorsing the reasoning provided by the appellate court. 9.  On 20 October 2016 the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice was served on the applicant. 10.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of a breach of his right of access to a court. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 11.  The relevant provisions of the Law no. 1545/1998 on compensation for damage caused by unlawful acts of criminal investigation bodies, prosecution authorities and courts, as in force at the relevant time, read as follows: Article 5 “(1) Cases concerning the compensation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage shall be examined in accordance with the applicable civil procedure rules. The authority representing the State in court for this category of cases is the Ministry of Justice. ... Article 13 (1) ... Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the unlawful imposition of administrative fines by bodies other than the court shall be compensated for by those bodies.”   THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION Admissibility 12.  The Government argued that the applicant had failed to exhaust available domestic remedies, as he had failed to lodge his claims against the correct respondent, that is, the National Patrol Inspectorate. 13.  The applicant argued that he had exhausted the available remedy and had brought his claims against the correct respondent, which at the time had been the Ministry of Justice, as provided for in Article 5 of Law no. 1545/1998. 14.  The Court finds that the issue of whether the applicant’s rejected claims were lodged against the correct respondent or not is at the heart of his complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant already raised this complaint in his appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice (see paragraph 7 above). The Government did not argue that there existed a remedy capable of providing redress for the applicant’s complaint, but rather suggested that the applicant should reinitiate the same proceedings as a remedial action. However, the Court finds that the applicant should not be expected to lodge yet again the same action, this time against another respondent authority, as this would place an excessive burden on him and, in any event, would not address the applicant’s allegations concerning the initial set of proceedings. It therefore dismisses the Government’s objection. 15.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. Merits 16.  The applicant submitted that his right of access to a court had been breached as a result of the domestic courts rejecting his claims on the ground that they had been lodged allegedly against the wrong respondent. He noted that while the domestic courts had found Law no. 1545/1998 applicable to his case, they had ignored the provisions under Article 5 of that Law, which, as worded at the material time, had specifically designated the Ministry of Justice as the authority representing the State in this type of dispute. Accordingly, the domestic courts had erroneously concluded that his claims had been brought against the wrong respondent and had failed to rule on the merits of his complaints. 17.  In respect of examples of domestic practice submitted by the Government (see paragraph 18 below), the applicant emphasised that the impugned proceedings had been concluded in 2016, whereas the judgments relied on by the Government had pertained to a later period. The applicant submitted four other judgments, delivered between 2014 and 2017, in which the domestic courts examined similar claims on the merits, with the Ministry of Justice appearing as the respondent. 18.  The Government submitted that the domestic courts had correctly concluded that the public authority responsible for compensation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage had been the one that had adopted the unlawful decision, as provided for in Article 13 of Law no. 1545/1998. Accordingly, the applicant’s claims had been wrongly directed against the Ministry of Justice and, therefore, had been properly rejected by the domestic courts, leaving him the possibility of initiating a new set of proceedings against the correct respondent. In support of their submissions, the Government provided 10 judgments delivered between 2019 and 2021 in cases similar to the present one. In all the judgments the respondent was the public authority that had adopted the unlawful decision. 19.  The Court notes that the parties did not contest the applicability of Law no. 1545/1998 to the present case and the dispute concerns only the identification of the correct respondent authority. 20.  The general principles governing the right of access to a court have been summarised by the Grand Chamber in Zubac v. Croatia ([GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-79, 5 April 2018). The Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention secures to everyone the right to have a claim relating to their civil rights and obligations brought before a court (ibid., § 76); that access to a court must be “practical and effective”, not “theoretical or illusory” (ibid., § 77); and that at the same time, the limitations applied must not restrict the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired (ibid., § 78). 21.  In the present case, the Court notes that Article 5 of Law no. 1545/1998 expressly designated the Ministry of Justice as the respondent authority in proceedings concerning compensation for unlawful acts committed by criminal investigation bodies, prosecution authorities and courts (see paragraph 11 above). Article 13 of the same Law set out the compensation mechanism and identified the authority responsible for paying the awarded damages. The judgments submitted by the Government (see paragraph 18 above) pertain to a later period, whereas the applicant provided examples of judgments from the relevant period in which the accepted respondent authority had been the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, during the proceedings at the domestic level, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had the procedural standing of third-party intervener, given its direct responsibility for the decisions taken by the National Patrol Inspectorate. The Government did not dispute the case-law examples submitted by the applicant of judicial practice during the relevant period. 22.  In the light of the circumstances above and considering the existing judicial practice at the relevant time and the explicit provision in Article 5 of Law no. 1545/1998, the Court concludes that the domestic courts’ refusal to examine the merits of the applicant’s case was unforeseeable and excessively formalistic, unduly restricting the applicant’s right of access to a court. It is well established in the Court’s case-law that “excessive formalism” can run counter to the requirement of securing a practical and effective right of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. This usually occurs in cases of a particularly strict construction of a procedural rule, preventing an applicant’s action being examined on the merits, with the attendant risk that his or her right to the effective protection of the courts would be infringed (see Zuvić v. Serbia, no. 3592/17, § 50, 3 June 2025). 23.  There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 24.  The applicant claimed 590 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, which represented the amount he had claimed before the domestic courts. He also claimed EUR 7,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 2,490 for the costs and expenses incurred domestically and before the Court. The applicant submitted proof of payment of legal fees to his lawyer. 25.  The Government contested these claims, considering them excessive and disproportionate. 26.  The Court notes that, since the domestic courts did not examine the applicant’s claims on the merits, it cannot substitute itself for those courts in determining the amount of pecuniary damage due. Moreover, after an eventual reopening of the present case, the domestic courts would be better placed to assess the amount of damage. It therefore rejects this claim. 27.  However, the applicant has undoubtedly suffered non-pecuniary damage. Given the nature of the violation found in the present case and making its assessment on an equitable basis as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant EUR 1,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 28.  The Court also considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 1,000 in respect of costs and expenses, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.   FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; Holds (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: (i)  EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (ii)  EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 March 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.    Martina Keller Andreas Zünd  Deputy Registrar President