37590/18

FIFTH SECTION CASE OF ZAYETS v. UKRAINE (Application no. 37590/18) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 2 July 2026 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Zayets v. Ukraine, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Diana Sârcu, President, Gilberto Felici, Nicholas Emiliou, judges, and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.37590/18) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 26July 2018 by two Ukrainian nationals, MrSergiy Anatoliyovych Zayets and MsNataliya Yuriyivna Zayets (“the applicants”), who were born in 1974 and 1981 respectively and lived in Irpin, and were represented by MrP.Leach, MrT.Collis, MsJ.Gavron, MsK.Levin and MrM.Timofeev, lawyers from the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC), a non‑governmental organisation based in London, the United Kingdom; the decision to give notice of the application to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agents, MrI.Lishchyna at the time of giving notice and, most recently, MsM.Sokorenko, from the Ministry of Justice; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 11 June 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: introduction 1.The present case concerns the applicants’ complaints under Article2 of the Convention about the State authorities’ failure to take appropriate preventive measures to safeguard the life of their son and to conduct an effective investigation into the circumstances of his death. subject matter of the case Events of 22November 2016 and related facts 2.On 22November 2016 at about 3 p.m. the applicants’ son, who was ten years old at that time, was struck by a train on his way home while crossing the railway line at an informal crossing point near his school (300 metres from his home) near the railway station in Irpin, Kyiv Region. He died at the scene. The train had left the scene of the event at 3.13 p.m. before the local police were informed of the accident at 3.14 p.m.; the police arrived at the scene of the event at 3.40 p.m. 3.The applicants submitted that the unauthorised crossing point near their son’s school, despite its danger to life, had been used by local inhabitants for many years because in that area the railway line had been completely open and unfenced. There had even been a paved track leading to that point and a striped pedestrian zone marked on the street parallel to the track, which had been removed after the fatal accident. As regards warnings to the public, the local authorities had merely set up two warning signs at the crossing point that read, “Walking on the railway is forbidden, the fine is from 34to170 [Ukrainian] hryvnias”. Those warning signs had been printed with black letters on white A4paper and taped to the poles in the middle of the train tracks. The applicants stated that their design, display and positioning had been wholly inadequate to attract the attention of adults and even less so children who had intended to use the crossing point during the daylight hours, let alone in the dark. Official statistics in respect of the period from 2011 to 2017 and an announcement of 20March 2017 published on the Ukrainian Railway administration’s official website stated that Irpin railway station was among the 28 most dangerous railway stations in Ukraine on account of the large number of accidents recorded during the specified period. At the end of 2016, that is, after the fatal accident, a concrete fence was constructed by local businessmen along the railway line alongside the school and in 2017 a metal fence was installed by the Ukrainian Railway on the opposite side of the railway line. In addition, in 2018 a 200-metre metal fence was constructed on both sides of the railway line, thus extending the fencing towards Kyiv. 4.The Government submitted that according to official statistics of the Ukrainian Railway, between 2010 and 2020, 35 accidents had been recorded at Irpin railway station, where 20 persons had died, including five who had committed suicide. All these accidents had allegedly occurred as a result of a violation by the victims of the railway traffic safety rules. The Government further submitted that, at the time of the accident in the present case, an authorised pedestrian (underground) crossing point had been in place, and was still in currently place, at Irpin railway station, that is, 300metres away from the scene of the events and 600 metres away from the school, so that local residents, including children, had not been deprived of safe access to the opposite part of the street. Moreover, in 2018 an innovative ground crossing in the form of a labyrinth, with sound and light alarms, had been built by the Ukrainian Railway and the Irpin Town Council. Criminal investigation into the circumstances of the death of the applicants’ son 5.On the day of the accident the local police opened a criminal investigation into the death of the applicants’ son under Article276 of the Criminal Code (Violation of rules related to safety of traffic or operation of railway, water or air transport). On the same day an inspection of the scene was carried out and two eyewitnesses to the accident were questioned. The eyewitnesses explained that they had seen the applicants’ son crossing the railway tracks near the railway station wearing a hood over his eyes. They stated that his head had been lowered, he had not looked around and had not paid attention to the sound signals of the approaching train. The eyewitnesses testified that the applicants’ son had been struck by the train at 3.05 p.m. 6.On 7December 2016 the father of the deceased (“the first applicant”) was granted victim status within the criminal proceedings and given access to the investigation material for familiarisation. 7.Between December 2016 and June 2018 the first applicant repeatedly complained to prosecutors at various levels of alleged inactivity on the part of the investigating authorities and requested that an effective investigation into his son’s death be carried out. He received mostly formal responses without any details, stating only that his requests were being considered, that they had been forwarded to different prosecutor’s offices or that they had been rejected as unsubstantiated. 8.Between December 2016 and July 2018 numerous instructions were given by superior police officers and the prosecutor’s office as to the investigative steps to be taken in the case (including the questioning of the victims and witnesses, the collection of material and medical evidence, and the conduct of forensic medical and technical examinations and of an additional inspection of the scene) Those instructions were never followed, so disciplinary measures were proposed to be applied with the purpose of intensifying the investigation process. The applicants stated that for more than two and a half years there had been no investigator in charge of the case and that their access to the investigation material had been restricted. In addition, the first applicant and his lawyers had secured certain pieces of evidence (such as copies of the speed records and the railway’s internal inquiry), but the police investigator had failed to retrieve the original documents. This might have led to the irreparable loss of those documents because of the time-limit on the statutory storage period. 9.In March-April 2017 the police investigator examined the applicants’ son’s mobile phone, school backpack and the items inside of it, which had been declared material evidence. No investigative steps have been taken since then. 10.As of January 2021 the investigation was still pending. Internal inquiry into the accident 11.On 28November 2016 a commission of the Kyiv Railway Directorate issued an internal inquiry report mainly based on explanations by the train driver and his assistant, finding that the accident had occurred as a result of a violation of the railway traffic safety rules by the applicants’ son, who had suddenly appeared on the railway track. It was noted in the report that the train driver had used sound signals and emergency braking at a speed of 50km/h (the braking distance was 138 metres), but the collision could not be avoided. It was suggested that in order to prevent similar accidents in the future, it was necessary to take the following steps: (i)to inform the personnel at the railway station of the circumstances and causes of the accident, (ii)to continue to warn the passengers and public via loudspeakers at the railway station about approaching trains, and (iii)to continue to inform the public through the loudspeakers of the necessity to comply with safety rules related to railway transport. 12.The applicants stated that the above-mentioned report did not contain any information whether the warnings made via the loudspeakers could have been heard at the informal crossing point. Moreover, they pointed out that the train driver and his assistant had never been questioned within a criminal investigation, nor had they been medically examined to check their physical and mental fitness for operating the train, including for alcohol or drug consumption. They further stated that the investigating authorities had never tried to address the contradiction between the statements of the train crew and the eyewitnesses who had claimed that their son had not run but had been moving at a slow pace. Criminal proceedings against officials of Irpin Railway Station 13.On 9February 2017 the first applicant requested that a criminal investigation be opened under Article367 of the Criminal Code into the neglect of official duties on the part of the head of Irpin railway station in relation to the safety of the railway lines in Irpin. In support of his request, the first applicant submitted that Irpin railway station was a high-risk area, where between 2011 and 2016 the local police had recorded 19 persons injured or dead. 14.Following a complaint lodged by the first applicant with an investigating judge, on 24February 2017 the local police opened an investigation into the neglect of official duties on the part of officials of Irpin railway station. 15.On 19April 2017 the first applicant requested to have himself recognised as a victim within the criminal proceedings. The police investigator did not do so, but instead summoned the first applicant as a witness. The Government submitted that the first applicant had not appeared having been summoned and that this had enabled the local police to proceed. The first applicant disagreed, stating that the police investigator had telephoned him in the days before the hearing and informed him that it had been cancelled on account of a busy schedule. 16.On 16May 2017 the Irpin City Court of Kyiv Region ordered the police investigator to grant victim status to the first applicant. No implementation of that order has followed. 17.As of January 2021 the investigation was ongoing, without any investigative steps taken. Disciplinary inquiry in respect of police investigators and their superiors 18.In January-May 2018 and April-May 2020 the Main Department of the National Police of Kyiv carried out two internal inquiries into the conduct of the investigations by the Irpin police, in particular in relation to the death of the applicants’ son. From the results of those inquiries it was established that the investigations had been improper and that there were solid grounds to bring the police investigators and their supervisors to disciplinary liability. However, most of them were not disciplined, given that they had already been dismissed from the police or already disciplined for other offences. Two police investigators were strictly warned of the necessity to comply with the domestic legislation and prevent similar shortcomings in the future and their superior was warned that more severe disciplinary measures would be taken in the event of similar violations of domestic legislation. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE2 OF THE CONVENTION 19.The applicants complained that the State had failed to undertake legislative and administrative measures as regards railway security and that its authorities had failed to make safety arrangements to protect the life of their son. The applicants further complained that there had been no effective investigation into the circumstances of their son’s death. The applicants relied on Articles2 and13 of the Convention. 20.The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos.37685/10 and22768/12, §§114 and126, 20March 2018), considers that the issues raised should be examined solely from the perspective of Article2 of the Convention (see Vyacheslavova and Others v. Ukraine, no.39553/16 and 6others, §288, 13March 2025, with further references therein). 21.The Government did not object to the admissibility of the application. 22.The Court notes that the applicants’ complaints are not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article35§3(a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. Preventive obligation under Article2 of the Convention 23.The applicants insisted that the local authorities had been aware that the informal railway crossing point near the Irpin railway station had posed a specific, real and immediate risk to the life of local residents, notably the children. The applicants asserted that their son had simply followed the example of hundreds of people who had routinely used that crossing point as a shortcut from one part of the town, which was bisected by the train tracks, to another; he had been able to access it because the railway line at that point had been completely open, unfenced and unmonitored. The applicants considered that the most appropriate measure in the circumstances had been to erect physical barriers to prevent access to the railway tracks through the crossing point in question, which had been well within the available budgetary resources of the local authorities. However, this had been done belatedly, that is, after the death of their son. Accordingly, the applicants stressed that there had been a direct causal link between the local authorities’ negligence and their son’s death. The applicants lastly argued more generally that their case disclosed the lack of appropriate legislative and administrative framework with regard to the safety of railway infrastructure. 24.The Government asserted that the domestic authorities had taken all the necessary and sufficient measures to safeguard the life of the applicants’ son as well as other local inhabitants. In addition, the Ukrainian Railway in general and Irpin railway station in particular had constantly drawn the attention of the public, including the local population, employees of enterprises and students of educational institutions, to the safety rules on railway transport. Moreover, preventive educational work had systematically been carried out in the educational institutions of Irpin. Lastly, the Government emphasised that the positive obligation of the State to protect lives was to be interpreted in such a way as not to impose an excessive burden on the domestic authorities, bearing in mind, in particular, the unpredictability of human conduct. 25.The general principles concerning the positive obligation of the State to protect life in a life-threatening situation were summarised in Kalender v.Turkey (no.4314/02, §§42,43 and49, 15December 2009), Binişan v.Romania (no.39438/05, §§71-73, 20May 2014) and Prilutskiy v. Ukraine (no.40429/08, §§30-33, 26February 2015). More specifically, whenever a State undertakes or organises dangerous activities, or authorises them, it must ensure through a system of rules and sufficient control that the risk is reduced to a reasonable minimum. If damage nevertheless arises, it will only amount to a breach of the State’s positive obligations if it was due to insufficient regulations or insufficient control, but not if the damage was caused through the negligent conduct of an individual or the concatenation of unfortunate events. For such an obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to life and, if so, that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk. The Court also underlined that the positive obligation is not to be interpreted in such a way as to impose an excessive burden on the authorities, bearing in mind, in particular, the unpredictability of human conduct and operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources (see, for example, Ciechońska v. Poland, no. 19776/04, § 64, 14 June 2011). 26.Turning to the present case, the Court notes that it has not been disputed by the parties that regulations existed to guarantee the safety of railway transport. Even though the applicants considered those regulations inappropriate to address the specific risk to life arising from the informal crossing point itself, there is nothing to suggest that the fatal accident occurred because of a lack of legislative and administrative measures or their non-implementation. In the instant case, the Court’s analysis will thus be limited to an examination of the adequacy of the practical measures used to prevent the death of the applicants’ son in a life-threatening situation related to a high-risk State activity, such as railway transport. 27.The Court further observes that the applicants made an arguable claim that the local authorities had been aware of the real and immediate risk to life of local residents posed by the existence of the non-authorised railway crossing point. The Court finds it established that the crossing point in question was used by local residents for many years as a shortcut from one part of the town, bisected by the train tracks, to another, and that the railway line at that point was completely open and unfenced. The awareness of the local authorities of that risk is confirmed by the facts that both preceded and followed the death of the applicants’ son (see paragraphs 3 and 4 above). It follows that the local authorities were required to take specific and reasonable measures to prevent that risk from materialising. Moreover, since the elementary school which the applicants’ son attended was located near that crossing point, the local authorities should have realised that such vulnerable groups as children might be easily subjected to the above risk. The States have more compelling responsibility towards members of the public who have to live with very real dangers (see, for example, Cevrioğlu v. Turkey, no.69546/12, §67, 4October 2016). 28.While the Government submitted that the domestic authorities had taken some measures to increase the public awareness of the safety rules on railway transport, those measures were obviously insufficient or irrelevant to the specific risk to life arising from the informal crossing point itself. The Court notes that after the applicants’ son’s death, physical barriers were erected together with other constructions related to railway safety in order to restrict public access to the railway tracks through the unauthorised crossing point and to prevent pedestrians from using that point (see paragraphs 3 and4 above). This confirms that the measure in question did not impose an excessive burden on the local authorities and fell very well within their budgetary resources. However, such vital measure was taken too late, that is, after the fatal accident. It is the Court’s view that the timely installation of the physical barriers clearly constituted an effective measure without diverting the State’s resources to an excessive degree (see, mutatis mutandis, Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no.48939/99, §107, ECHR2004-XII). 29.The foregoing considerations enable the Court to conclude that the domestic authorities failed to take in a timely manner the most appropriate and available measure which could have protected the life of the applicants’ son in the life-threatening situation. The State thus failed in its positive obligation to prevent his premature death, in violation of Article2 of the Convention. Procedural obligation under Article2 of the Convention 30.The applicants submitted that the investigative measures undertaken by the domestic authorities had not met even the most limited standard of effectiveness. Most notably, the applicants asserted that the fact that the investigation had been launched immediately after their son’s death had not excused the serious shortcomings in its conduct, both at the initial stage and afterwards. They further asserted that as a result of the investigating authorities’ inactivity, key evidence had been irreversibly lost, even the evidence gathered by the applicants’ lawyers that had not been accepted by the authorities. Their attempts to assist the investigation under Article276 of the Criminal Code had been ignored and, despite a court order, they had not been granted formal victim status within the proceedings under Article367 of the Criminal Code. The applicants lastly submitted that no serious disciplinary sanctions had been imposed on those responsible for the improper investigation. They argued that, in any event, the disciplinary inquiry had focused entirely on the failings of police investigators and their superiors and had not identified any systemic issues that had led to the occurrence of the investigative deficiencies or any new measures to be undertaken to remedy those failings. 31.The Government submitted that despite certain deficiencies in the criminal proceedings, the domestic authorities had taken steps to launch an investigation immediately and to collect principal evidence urgently. In particular, a significant number of investigative actions had been conducted within the first four months of the investigation. The Government argued that it could not be said that the length of the proceedings had led to the deterioration of evidence or had affected the results of the investigation. The Government also asserted that there was no indication that the applicants had not been involved in the proceedings or that the independence of the investigation had been called in question. Lastly, the Government emphasised that, as a result of the disciplinary inquiry, the police officers responsible for the improper investigation had been brought to disciplinary liability. 32.The relevant general principles concerning the effectiveness of an investigation were set out in Mikhno v. Ukraine (no.32514/12, §§131-34, 1September 2016, with further references). More specifically, in the particular context of the loss of life incurred in connection with dangerous activities, the Court has considered that an official criminal investigation is indispensable, given that public authorities are often the only entities to have sufficient relevant knowledge to identify and establish the complex phenomena that might have caused an incident (ibid., §131). Compliance of an official investigation with the procedural requirement of Article2 of the Convention is assessed on the basis of several essential parameters: the adequacy of the investigative measures, the promptness of the investigation, the involvement of the deceased person’s family and the independence of the investigation. In order to be “effective”, an investigation must be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts and, where appropriate, the identification and punishment of those responsible (ibid., §132). In cases involving potentially dangerous activities such as railway transport, if it is established that the fault attributable to the State agents or bodies goes beyond a simple error of judgment or negligence, in that they did not take, in full knowledge of the facts and in accordance with the powers conferred upon them, the necessary and sufficient steps to mitigate the risk inherent in rail transport, the failure to prosecute those responsible for endangering life may constitute a violation of Article2 of the Convention, irrespective of any other form of remedy that individuals may pursue on their own initiative (see, mutatis mutandis, Kalender, cited above, §52). In short, the judicial system required by Article2 of the Convention must include an official investigation mechanism that is capable of ensuring the criminal prosecution of attacks on life arising from railway transport activities if and in so far as the results of the investigation justify such prosecution. In such cases, the competent authorities must demonstrate exemplary diligence and promptness and proceed of their own motion with investigations to, on the one hand, ascertain the circumstances in which the incident took place and any shortcomings in the operation of the regulatory system and, on the other hand, identify the State officials or authorities involved in whatever capacity in the chain of events in issue (ibid., §53). The authorities must also pay due attention to the extremely serious consequences of the accident, especially where there was loss of life (ibid., §56). 33.Reviewing the facts of the present case in the light of those principles, the Court notes at the outset that a criminal investigation into the death of the applicants’ son was opened by the local police immediately after the accident had occurred (see paragraph 5 above). However, that investigation was limited to the inspection of the scene of the event, the questioning of two eyewitnesses on the day of the fatal accident (ibid.) and the examination of certain pieces of material evidence (see paragraph 9 above). Even though the first applicant was formally involved in that investigation, his numerous attempts to assist it were totally disregarded by the investigating authorities (see paragraphs 6-8 above). That investigation was marked by the police investigators’ failure to comply with the investigative instructions given by their superiors to take indispensable and obvious investigative steps (such as questioning the victims and witnesses, collecting material and medical evidence, conducting a forensic medical examination of the applicants’ son’s body and inspecting the train and examining it from a technical standpoint) and to take reasonable and available steps to secure the evidence that might have deteriorated and even been lost (see paragraph 8 above). Moreover, with the passage of time, the prospects that any effective investigation can be undertaken will increasingly diminish (see Prilutskiy, cited above, §43). 34.The Court further observes that the criminal investigation into possible negligence by railway station officials was opened three months after the applicants’ son’s death and only following the first applicant’s complaint to the judge (see paragraphs 13 and 14 above). Despite the court order to recognise the first applicant as a victim within the proceedings, the investigating authorities have failed to implement it up to the present time (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). Moreover, it appears that no investigative measures have been undertaken in the investigation to this day (see paragraph17 above). 35.The Court also takes note that the internal inquiry into the accident, which cannot be considered independent, was limited purely to the assessment of the explanations given by the train driver and his assistant (see paragraph 11 above). However, those explanations were never examined by way of a hearing of the investigating authorities and the train crew was never medically examined to verify their fitness to operate the train (see paragraph12 above). As to the disciplinary inquiry against the police investigators and their superiors, even though it was established that the investigations had been inadequate, the majority of the police officers concerned avoided disciplinary liability; only three of them were disciplined, and only symbolically (see paragraph 18 above). 36.Taken overall, the domestic investigation in the present case has been pending for several years without any significant results and was marked by the following substantial shortcomings: (i)numerous shortcomings in the collection of evidence (see Basyuk v. Ukraine, no.51151/10, §67, 5November 2015); (ii)progressive deterioration or loss of evidence (see Antonov v. Ukraine, no.28096/04, §50, 3November 2011); (iii)improper safeguarding of the applicants’ rights as victims (see Masneva v. Ukraine, no.5952/07, §56, 20December 2011, and Prynda v. Ukraine, no.10904/05, §56, 31July 2012); (iv)lack of thoroughness and promptness which undermined the domestic authorities’ ability to establish the circumstances of the case (see Igor Shevchenko v.Ukraine, no.22737/04, §60, 12January 2012, and Zubkova v. Ukraine, no.36660/08, §40, 17October 2013); and (v)no genuine attempt by the investigating authorities to carry out a thorough investigation (see Lyubov Efimenko v. Ukraine, no.75726/01, §§76-80, 25November 2010, and Yuriy Slyusar v. Ukraine, no.39797/05, §§84-88, 17January 2013). For the Court, the domestic investigation into the death of the applicants’ son was so flagrantly deficient that it raises issues of either manifest incompetence by the authorities or sabotage of the investigative work (see Vyacheslavova and Others, cited above, §417). 37.Having regard to the considerations above, the Court cannot but conclude that the domestic investigation into the circumstances surrounding the accidental death of the applicants’ son in the life-threatening situation fell short of even the basic requirements of effectiveness, in violation of Article2 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 41 AND 46 OF THE CONVENTION 38.The applicants claimed 40,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and 52,600 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) in respect of pecuniary damage (the alleged costs for the installation of a fence on their son’s grave (UAH27,000) and of the memorial on the grave (UAH25,600)). The applicants also claimed in total EUR45,410.38 in legal fees for their representation at the domestic level and before the Court (the client agreements and professional fees were provided), for postal, printing and other administrative expenses (the relevant receipts were provided), and for translation expenses (the relevant invoices were provided), to be paid into the EHRAC’s bank account. The applicants, lastly, asked the Court to indicate to the Government to take a number of individual and general measures in the present case. As to the individual measures, the applicants requested that the domestic authorities carry out an effective investigation into the death of their son. As to the general measures, the applicants requested the implementation of amendments to the existing legislative and administrative framework in order to prevent similar railway incidents from occurring at other informal crossings or other parts of the rail line and to ensure that domestic investigations comply with the Convention requirement of effectiveness. 39.The Government submitted that the applicants’ pecuniary and non-pecuniary claims were ill-founded and that their claims for costs and expenses were unsubstantiated and exorbitant. The Government asked the Court to dismiss the applicants’ request under Article46 of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded because the present case did not disclose a systemic problem at the domestic level. 40.The Court considers that the applicants must have suffered some non‑pecuniary damage which is not sufficiently compensated for by the mere finding of a violation of the Convention. Regard being had to the circumstances of the present case and ruling on an equitable basis, the Court finds it reasonable to award the applicants jointly EUR24,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 41.As regards their claim in respect of pecuniary damage, the Court considers it appropriate to award the applicants EUR842, the equivalent of the amount for the installation of the memorial, as corroborated by the relevant payment receipts. 42.As to the costs and expenses claimed, according to the Court’s case‑law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, the Court considers that the applicants failed to show that the costs and expenses claimed had been necessarily and reasonably incurred. Regard being had to the documents in its possession, the Court awards the applicants EUR6,000 covering costs and expenses under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them. At the applicants’ request, the amount awarded under that head is to be paid directly into the bank account of the EHRAC (see, for example, Khlaifia and Others v. Italy [GC], no.16483/12, §288, 15December 2016). 43.Finally, as regards the Article46 request, the Court is of the opinion that it is most appropriate in the circumstances of the present case to leave it to the Government to choose the means to be used in the domestic legal order in order to discharge their legal obligation under Article46 of the Convention, to be undertaken under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article2 of the Convention as regards the respondent State’s failure to undertake its positive obligations to prevent the death of the applicants’ son in the life-threatening situation and to investigate the fatal accident effectively; Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: EUR24,000 (twenty-four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR842 (eight hundred and forty-two euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of pecuniary damage; EUR6,000 (six thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses, to be paid into the bank account of the EHRAC; that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 July 2026, pursuant to Rule77§§2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Martina KellerDiana Sârcu Deputy RegistrarPresident