38693/15

FIFTH SECTION CASE OF GRAFESCOLO S.R.L. v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (Application no. 38693/15) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 11 June 2026 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Grafescolo S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: María Elósegui, President, Diana Sârcu, Sébastien Biancheri, judges, and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no. 38693/15) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 24July 2015 by Grafescolo S.R.L. (“the applicant company”), incorporated in the Republic of Moldova in 1999, which was represented by MrV.Nagacevschi, a lawyer practising in Chișinău; the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their acting Agent, MsD.Maimescu; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 21 May 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.The case concerns the alleged breach of the applicant company’s right to adversarial proceedings and of the principle of equality of arms. The applicant company relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 2.On 13 February 2003 the Vadul lui Vodă City Council (“the city council”) adopted a decision authorising the applicant company to purchase a plot of land – together with greenhouses situated on it – which belonged to the local authorities and which was located on the banks of the Nistru River. On 11March 2003 the Vadul lui Vodă City Hall (“the city hall”) and the applicant company concluded a sales agreement pursuant to which the applicant company paid part of the purchase price and registered its ownership of the land. 3.On 15 June 2006 the city council revoked its decision of 13February 2003 on the grounds that the full purchase price had not been paid by the applicant company as agreed. The applicant company asked the city council to set aside that decision, but no reply followed. On 4 October 2006 the applicant company therefore brought a claim against the city council in the Ciocana District Court. 4.By a judgment of 13 April 2007, the Ciocana District Court dismissed the applicant company’s claim as unsubstantiated. On 5 September 2007 the Chișinău Court of Appeal quashed the first‑instance judgment on appeal and, deciding anew, set aside the city council’s decision of 15 June 2006. 5.On 31 October 2007 the city council lodged an appeal on points of law against the appellate court’s decision. The appeal was signed by the mayor of Vadul luiVodă. On 16 January 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the appeal on points of law lodged by the local council. It quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and upheld the judgment of the Ciocana District Court of 13April 2007. The Supreme Court did not state any position in respect of the applicant company’s initial defence concerning the statute of limitations. 6.The Supreme Court’s final decision of 16 January 2008 was subject to scrutiny by the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) in the judgment Grafescolo S.R.L. v. the Republic of Moldova (no.36157/08, 22July 2014), in which the Court found a violation of Article6§1 of the Convention, holding that the domestic courts had failed to respond to the applicant company’s complaint on the grounds of the statute of limitations when ruling on the dispute. Based on that judgment, on 20January 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice set aside its decision of 16January 2008 and retained the case for a fresh examination of the city council’s appeal on points of law of 31 October 2007. 7.In its observations of 24 April 2015 in reply to the city council’s appeal (see paragraph5 above), the applicant company asked the Supreme Court of Justice to declare the appeal inadmissible, arguing that the mayor did not have the competence to represent the city council. It explained that, according to section14 of the Law on public local administration, in the version in force at the material time, the city council should have either appointed a legal representative to defend the lawfulness of its decisions before the courts or granted the mayor with the necessary authorisation to act on its behalf. The applicant company further argued that under the applicable legislation, the appeal should be rejected as having been lodged by an unauthorised person. 8.By a final decision of 20 May 2015, the Supreme Court of Justice allowed the city council’s appeal on points of law and quashed the appellate court’s decision of 5 September 2007. It noted that the city hall and the city council were distinct legal entities but did not explain further as to whether the mayor was competent to sign an appeal on behalf of the council in the absence of special authorisation. Without ruling on the admissibility objection, it sent the case back for a fresh examination, instructing the appellate court to address the issue of the council’s representation. In addition, the Supreme Court of Justice relied on the assumption that the city hall had had no procedural standing in the case, an argument not raised by the parties or discussed during the hearing. 9.In their decisions of 15 December 2015 and 29 June 2016, the Chișinău Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Justice, respectively, failed to address the issue of the council’s representation. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 10.The applicant company complained that the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Justice had violated its right to a fair hearing under Article6 §1 of the Convention. It argued that the city council’s appeal on points of law had been signed by the mayor of Vadul lui Vodă on behalf of the local council without any legal authorisation or formal delegation of powers. In its view, the Supreme Court ought to have declared the appeal inadmissible in accordance with domestic procedural law, instead of examining and allowing it. The applicant company further complained that the Supreme Court of Justice had relied on the assumption that the city hall and, in particular, the mayor lacked procedural standing – that is, an argument not raised by the parties or discussed during the hearing. The applicant company also alleged that, by raising and relying on that assumption without notifying the parties, the Supreme Court had breached the principles of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms. The Government objected, endorsing the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Justice in its decision of 20May 2015. 11.The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 12.The general principles concerning adversarial proceedings and equality of arms have been summarised in, for example, Regner v.theCzech Republic ([GC], no. 35289/11, § 146, 19 September 2017). The Court has also previously held that a party to judicial proceedings can expect a specific and express reply to those submissions which are decisive for the outcome of the proceedings in question (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v.Portugal [GC], nos.55391/13 and 2 others, § 185, 6 November 2018). 13.The Court observes that the appeal on points of law lodged on behalf of the city council was signed by the mayor of Vadul lui Vodă. The applicant company explicitly challenged the admissibility of that appeal, arguing that domestic law required the council to appoint a legal representative (see paragraph5 above) and that the appeal must therefore be rejected on procedural grounds. These arguments were clearly raised before the Supreme Court of Justice which was called on to determine whether the appeal on points of law had been validly lodged by a duly authorised representative before examining it on the merits. 14.The Court observes, however, that the Supreme Court of Justice did not address this issue. Although it briefly stated in its decision of 20May 2015 that the city council and the city hall were distinct legal entities, it provided no analysis of whether, in the absence of a specific mandate from the city council, the mayor had the authority to represent it in the proceedings. The Supreme Court neither addressed the applicant company’s submissions, nor gave any reasons for not ruling on this decisive matter. It proceeded instead to admit the appeal on points of law and to quash the appellate court’s decision. Furthermore, in its decision of 29 June 2016, the Supreme Court of Justice itself failed to engage with that issue which it had instructed the lower court to consider. It neither criticised the Court of Appeal for its failure to properly address the council’s representation, nor did it seek to rule on the matter within its own jurisdiction. 15.By failing to examine the applicant company’s clearly formulated procedural objection, the Supreme Court deprived it of an essential safeguard inherent in the principle of equality of arms. The Court considers that this omission placed the applicant company at a substantial disadvantage in relation to the opposing party, whose procedural standing to lodge an appeal on points of law had been legitimately called into question. 16.Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Justice relied on an assumption that the city hall lacked procedural standing – an issue not raised by the parties or discussed during the hearing – without giving the applicant company an opportunity to comment. Addressing novel grounds without adversarial debate further undermined the fairness of the proceedings. In these circumstances, the Court concludes that the domestic proceedings, viewed as a whole, breached the principles of equality of arms and adversarial hearing. 17.There has accordingly been a violation of Article6§1 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 18.The applicant company claimed restitution of the plot of land in question – together with the greenhouses situated on it – in respect of pecuniary damage. It also claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 1,950 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. The applicant company submitted a timesheet drawn up by its lawyer in support of those claims. 19.The Government maintained that the claims were excessive and, in any event, unsubstantiated. They further argued that, in the absence of a contract for legal services between the applicant company and its lawyer, no award should be made in respect of costs of expenses. 20.The Court cannot speculate as to whether the applicant company would have obtained restitution of the land and had there been no breach of Article6 §1 of the Convention; it therefore rejects the claim concerning pecuniary damage. However, it awards the applicant company EUR3,600 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 21.Furthermore, according to Rule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Court, itemised particulars of all claims, together with any relevant supporting documents, are to be submitted, failing which the claim may be rejected in whole or in part. The Court notes that the applicant company failed to submit an agreement for legal representation, or an itemised list of hours spent on the case for its representation before the Court, signed on behalf of the applicant company, or receipts for the payment of court fees. The Court therefore makes no award in respect of costs and expenses. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention; Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant company, within three months, EUR 3,600 (three thousand six hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, to be converted into Moldovan lei at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; that from the expiry of the above‑mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant company’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 June 2026, pursuant to Rule77§§2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Martina KellerMaría Elósegui Deputy RegistrarPresident