44393/15

FIFTH SECTION CASE OF CUCEROV v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (Application no. 44393/15) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 2 July 2026 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Cucerov v. the Republic of Moldova, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Gilberto Felici, President, Diana Sârcu, Nicholas Emiliou, judges, and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.44393/15) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 25August2015 by a Moldovan national, Mr Anatoli Cucerov (“the applicant”), who was born in 1986, lives in Bălți and was represented by MrC. Tănase, a lawyer practising in Chișinău; the decision to give notice of the application to the Moldovan Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent at the relevant time, MrO.Rotari; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 11 June 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.The case concerns the domestic courts’ alleged failure to properly examine the applicant’s allegation that he had been incited to commit an offence. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE INVESTIGATION INTO SUSPECTED BRIBE‑TAKING AND THE APPLICANT’S ARREST 2.According to the official version of events, at the end of December 2012 the applicant – while serving as a police patrol officer, and outside of any criminal or administrative proceedings – unlawfully confiscated the driving licence of a certain R. on account of an alleged breach of road safety regulations. The applicant did not draw up any procedural document in this respect, contrary to the requirements of the law. 3.In exchange for the return of the driving licence, the applicant demanded from R. 1,500 Moldovan lei ((MDL) – approximately 63euros (EUR) at the time of the events). R. informed the applicant that he would bring him the money within a few days. 4.From 15 January until 10 September 2013 R. served in the military. According to him, after completing his service he required his driving licence to find employment. He reached out to the applicant, who confirmed that their prior arrangement was still valid. 5.Since R. did not have the sum requested by the applicant, on 7October2013 he lodged a complaint with the National Anticorruption Centre, submitting, inter alia, that at the end of December 2012 the applicant had unlawfully confiscated his driving licence and had demanded MDL 1,500 in exchange for its return. 6.In response to R.’s complaint, a criminal investigation into suspected bribe-taking was initiated. 7.On the same day the Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office initiated proceedings to authorise the interception and recording of communications between R. and the applicant, along with the surveillance of the handover of the funds requested by the latter. 8.At approximately 5.20 p.m. on 7 October 2013, while inside the applicant’s vehicle, R. handed over the requested amount of money. 9.Later that day the applicant called R., and at about 6.45 p.m. they met near Bălți central bus station, where the applicant handed R. his driving licence. Shortly thereafter the applicant was apprehended by officers of the National Anticorruption Centre. 10.On 8 October 2013 the Bălți District Court confirmed the lawfulness of the order of 7 October 2013 to initiate proceedings to authorise the special investigative measures (that is, the interception and recording of communications between R. and the applicant, along with the surveillance of the handover of funds). 11.Following the completion of the above-mentioned special investigative measures, the prosecuting authority submitted a motion with the investigating judge seeking confirmation of their lawfulness. 12.On 9 October 2013 the investigating judge confirmed the lawfulness of the measures in question. THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT 13.On 7 October 2013 a criminal investigation into suspected bribe‑taking was initiated in respect of the applicant. 14.On 5 November 2013 a further criminal investigation into the suspected offence of exceeding official authority was initiated in respect of the applicant. 15.On 11 November 2013 the cases were joined in a single investigation. 16.On 20 November 2013 the applicant was charged with taking a bribe and exceeding official authority. 17.On 13 June 2014 the Bălți District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. The court referred to, inter alia, R.’s initial complaint to the police and subsequent statements made by him, the results of the investigative measures, documents confirming that from 15January until 10September2013 R. had served in the military, police officers’ reports, and other relevant documents. The applicant was sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment and a five-year ban on holding office or performing duties within law-enforcement agencies. He was also subsequently ordered to pay a criminal fine of MDL 20,000 (approximately EUR 1,050). 18.The applicant appealed against that judgment. He pointed to multiple alleged procedural shortcomings concerning the special investigative measures and challenged the lawfulness of the evidence obtained as a result of them. He further submitted that between December 2012 and October 2013 he had not had any contact with R. and had not undertaken any actions aimed at obtaining money from him. He also argued that the money allegedly given to him by R. had never been found in his possession. The applicant submitted that he had been the victim of entrapment and emphasised that the courts had failed to address that argument. 19.On 20 October 2014 the Bălți Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s appeal, quashing the first-instance court’s judgment. Nevertheless, it found him guilty of bribe-taking and exceeding official authority, sentencing him to five years’ imprisonment (suspended on probation for a period of three years) and a five-year ban on holding office or performing duties within law‑enforcement agencies. He was also subsequently ordered to pay a criminal fine of MDL 22,000 (approximately EUR 1,170). The court did not address the applicant’s argument of entrapment. 20.The applicant appealed on points of law, essentially repeating the arguments that he had made before the appellate court. 21.On 17 March 2015 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the lower court’s judgment. The court dismissed the applicant’s argument of entrapment, stating that – in accordance with the applicable legal provisions – such an argument could not be made at that stage in the proceedings if it had not been made in a previous appeal. 22.The applicant complained that the proceedings had been unfair and in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 23.The Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 24.The Court has developed a set of principles applicable to entrapment, which includes a substantive and a procedural test of incitement. Those principles have been summarised in Matanović v. Croatia (no.2742/12, §§122-35, 4April 2017), and Akbay and Others v. Germany (nos. 40495/15 and 2 others, §§ 109-24, 15 October 2020).The Court also found inVanyan v. Russia(no.53203/99, §§ 45-50, 15 December 2005) that the issue of entrapment could be relevant even where a private individual, acting as an undercover agent, had carried out an operation organised and supervised by the police. 25.The Court notes that, according to the prosecution, at the end of December 2012 the applicant (who was a police patrol officer) unlawfully confiscated R.’s driving licence. In exchange for its return, the applicant demanded MDL 1,500 from R. Following R.’s complaint to the National Anticorruption Centre on 7October 2013, the police arranged for him to meet with the applicant in order to prove that the latter had committed the offence of bribe-taking. As no police officer was directly involved, the present case does not concern undercover police work, but rather the actions of a private individual under police supervision. 26.As for the substantive test of entrapment, the Court takes note of the applicant’s argument before the domestic courts that for approximately ten months in 2013 he had not had any contact with R. and had not undertaken any actions aimed at obtaining money from him. Moreover, according to the applicant, the charges against him had lacked any logic, because individuals who had lost or damaged their driving licence had the right to obtain a new one from the Public Services Agency without incurring costs as high as those paid by R. Consequently, R. had had no reason to offer a bribe in order to recover his driving licence, unless by doing so he had intended to entrap the applicant. The Court finds that – in view of the fact that R. initiated contact with the applicant in October 2013, after a long period during which the latter had done nothing to solicit a bribe – the case falls into the category of “entrapment cases” (compare Grba v.Croatia, no.47074/12, §105, 23November 2017). 27.In order to determine whether the applicant was incited to commit the offence of bribe-taking, the Court must determine whether he could be reasonably considered to have been engaged in the relevant criminal activity prior to the police’s involvement. In other words, it must be determined whether the applicant would have committed the crime in the absence of the alleged incitement. 28.The Court notes that the information contained in the case file is equivocal in that regard; in particular, the applicant took R.’s driving licence without drawing up any official document and kept it for almost a year, but it was R. who renewed contact with the applicant. It is apparent from the transcript of a wiretapped telephone call placed by R. to the applicant on 7October 2013 that the two individuals had not been in contact since January 2013, given that the applicant enquired about the reason for R.’s not having contacted him since then. It follows that R. complained to the authorities about the applicant’s soliciting of a bribe without yet knowing whether the applicant still had the driver’s licence and still sought to obtain money in exchange for its return. Given those circumstances, it is impossible for the Court to determine with certainty whether or not the applicant was in fact incited by R., under the direction of the police, to commit the crime of which he was eventually convicted. However, his submission about entrapment was arguable. The Court will therefore examine the manner in which the domestic courts assessed the argument of entrapment raised by the applicant. 29.As for the procedural test of incitement, the Court notes that the applicant clearly raised the argument that he was a victim of entrapment before the domestic courts. In such a situation, “it falls to the prosecution to prove that there was no incitement, provided that the defendant’s allegations are not wholly improbable. In the absence of any such proof, it is the task of the judicial authorities to examine the facts of the case and to take the necessary steps to uncover the truth in order to determine whether there was any incitement” (seeRamanauskas v.Lithuania [GC], no.74420/01, § 70, ECHR 2008). However, rather than analysing the argument in question – which, as noted above, was not completely groundless – the courts at all three levels of jurisdiction did not in any way examine the issue of entrapment. The Supreme Court of Justice noted that that argument could not be raised at that stage of the proceedings if it had not already been made in the lower courts, and it therefore did not examine that submission. However, it is apparent from the case file that the applicant had raised that argument at every level of jurisdiction. 30.Having regard to the foregoing, the Court finds that the domestic courts failed to properly assess whether the actions of R. – who had been acting on behalf of the police – had had the effect of inciting the applicant to commit the offence of which he was subsequently convicted, or whether there had been any indication that the offence would have been committed without such intervention. Although in the present case the domestic courts had reason to suspect that there had been entrapment, they did not analyse the relevant factual and legal elements which would have helped them to distinguish entrapment from a legitimate form of investigative activity (see, for instance,Khudobin v. Russia, no.59696/00, § 137, ECHR 2006‑XII (extracts)). In view of the above, and of the use of evidence obtained through actions taken by R. while under police supervision to convict the applicant, his trial was deprived of the fairness required by Article 6 of the Convention. 31.There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 §1of the Convention. OTHER COMPLAINTS 32.In his observations of 30 May 2020, the applicant raised further complaints under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the domestic courts’ failure to give proper reasons for their decisions. 33.However, the Court notes that those complaints were only submitted on 30 May 2020, which is more than six months after the date on which the applicant was convicted with final effect – that is, 17 March 2015. Accordingly, they must be rejected under Article35§§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non‑compliance with the six‑month time‑limit. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 34.The applicant claimed 2,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 35.The Government submitted, inter alia, that the applicant’s claim was excessive and unsubstantiated. 36.The Court considers that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the entrapment admissible, and the remainder of the application inadmissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 §1of the Convention, in respect of the complaint concerning the entrapment; Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant; Dismissesthe remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 July 2026, pursuant to Rule77§§2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. {signature_p_1}{signature_p_2} Martina KellerGilberto Felici Deputy RegistrarPresident