44977/20;50601/20;46309/22

WyrokETPCz2024-10-10ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:1010JUD004497720

Analiza orzeczenia

Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.

Zagadnienie prawne
Czy wyrok dożywocia z możliwością ubiegania się o zwolnienie warunkowe dopiero po bardzo długim okresie odbywania kary narusza zakaz nieludzkiego lub poniżającego traktowania z art. 3 Konwencji?
Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że długi okres oczekiwania na możliwość przeglądu kary dożywocia, który uniemożliwia ocenę postępów więźnia w rehabilitacji i zasadności dalszego pozbawienia wolności, sprawia, że kara ta nie jest redukowalna w rozumieniu art. 3 Konwencji. Powołał się na swoje wcześniejsze orzecznictwo, w tym sprawy Vinter i inni oraz Bancsók i László Magyar (nr 2), podkreślając, że automatyczny przegląd kary po określonym minimalnym terminie stanowi ważną gwarancję dla więźnia.
Stan faktyczny
Skarżący zostali skazani na Węgrzech na kary dożywotniego pozbawienia wolności. Zgodnie z krajowymi przepisami, możliwość ubiegania się o zwolnienie warunkowe przysługiwała im dopiero po odbyciu bardzo długiego okresu kary (od 29 lat i 5 miesięcy do 30 lat). Skarżący zarzucili, że takie warunki zwolnienia warunkowego naruszają art. 3 Konwencji, ponieważ ich wyroki dożywocia nie są redukowalne.
Rozstrzygnięcie
Trybunał jednogłośnie: postanowił połączyć skargi; uznał skargi za dopuszczalne; stwierdził, że skargi ujawniają naruszenie art. 3 Konwencji w odniesieniu do wyroku dożywocia z możliwością zwolnienia warunkowego dopiero po długim okresie; orzekł, że państwo pozwane ma zapłacić skarżącym kwoty wskazane w załączonej tabeli tytułem kosztów i wydatków; oddalił pozostałe roszczenia skarżących o słuszne zadośćuczynienie.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

FIRST SECTION CASE OF KESZTHELYI AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY (Applications nos. 44977/20 and 2 others - see appended list)             JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 10 October 2024       This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Keszthelyi and Others v. Hungary, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:  Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President,  Lətif Hüseynov,  Erik Wennerström, judges, and Attila Teplán, Acting Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 19 September 2024, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.  The case originated in applications against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table. 2.  The applicants were represented by Ms E. Frank, a lawyer practising in Budapest. 3.  The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the applications. THE FACTS 4.  The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table. 5.  The applicants complained of the life sentence with a possibility of release on parole only after a lengthy period of time. THE LAW JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 6.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 of the Convention 7.  The applicants complained of their life sentences with a possibility of release on parole only after having served a very long time. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: Article 3 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” 8.  The Court reiterates that the automatic review of a sentence after a specified minimum term represents an important safeguard for the prisoner against the risk of detention in violation of Article 3. The relevant principles have been summarised in Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 57592/08, §§ 66-68, 17 January 2017), and Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 66069/09 and 2 others, § 44, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). 9.  In the leading case of Bancsók and László Magyar v. Hungary (no. 2), (nos. 52374/15 and 53364/15, 28 October 2021), the Court already found a violation in respect of life sentences with a possibility of release on parole only after a lengthy period of time. 10.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of these complaints. In the light of its case-law on the subject, it considers that the fact that the applicants can hope to have their progress towards release reviewed only after they have served a very lengthy period of time is sufficient to conclude that these life sentences cannot be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. Such a long waiting period unduly delays the domestic authorities’ review of “whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds” (see Vinter and Others, cited above, § 119). 11.  These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 3 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 12.  Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 13.  The Court considers that its finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction and accordingly makes no award in respect of non-pecuniary damage (see, in particular, Bancsók and László Magyar (no.2), cited above, § 52). 14.  As to costs and expenses, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Decides to join the applications; Declares the applications admissible; Holds that these applications disclose a breach of Article 3 of the Convention concerning the life sentence with a possibility of release on parole only after a lengthy period of time; Holds (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 10 October 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.    Attila Teplán Krzysztof Wojtyczek  Acting Deputy Registrar President       APPENDIX List of applications raising complaints under Article 3 of the Convention (life sentence with a possibility of release on parole only after a lengthy period of time) No. Application no. Date of introduction Applicant’s name Year of birth   Representative’s name and location Name of the court Date of the final judgment Minimum term to be served after sentencing before eligibility for release Amount awarded for costs and expenses per application (in euros)[1]     44977/20 21/09/2020 István KESZTHELYI   Frank Evelyn Budapest Pécs Court of Appeal, 27/05/2004 30 years     50601/20 03/11/2020 József HARSÁNYI   Frank Evelyn Budapest Budapest Court of Appeal, 03/02/2006 29 years 5 months     46309/22 17/09/2022 Gábor KAPCZÁR   Kovács Arthur Szeged Kúria, 10/12/2018 30 years     [1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.

© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 16.07.2026. · Źródło