48768/11

WyrokETPCz2014-01-28ECLI:CE:ECHR:2014:0128JUD004876811

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Zagadnienie prawne
Czy przewlekłość postępowania egzekucyjnego trwającego ponad 16 lat naruszyła prawo do rozpoznania sprawy w rozsądnym terminie z art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji oraz czy brak skutecznego środka odwoławczego w tym zakresie naruszył art. 13 Konwencji?
Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że długość postępowania egzekucyjnego, trwającego ponad 16 lat i 9 miesięcy, była nadmierna i nie spełniała wymogu „rozsądnego terminu” z art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji, pomimo pewnego przyczynienia się skarżącego do opóźnień. Trybunał podkreślił, że państwa-strony mają obowiązek zorganizować swój system sądowniczy w taki sposób, aby sądy mogły spełniać wymogi Konwencji. Ponadto, Trybunał stwierdził naruszenie art. 13, ponieważ skarżący nie miał skutecznego środka odwoławczego w związku z nadmierną długością postępowania, powołując się na swoje wcześniejsze orzecznictwo.
Stan faktyczny
Skarżący, João Aníbal Heitor Ratinho, w 1997 roku wszczął postępowanie egzekucyjne w sądzie w Lizbonie w celu uzyskania zapłaty 12 740 euro. Postępowanie to, obejmujące sprzeciw dłużnika, zajęcie majątku, zawieszenia z powodu bezczynności stron oraz próby sprzedaży zajętego przedsiębiorstwa, trwało ponad 16 lat i 9 miesięcy i nadal było w toku w momencie wydania wyroku.
Rozstrzygnięcie
Trybunał jednogłośnie: 1. Stwierdza dopuszczalność skargi. 2. Stwierdza naruszenie art. 6 § 1 Konwencji. 3. Stwierdza naruszenie art. 13 Konwencji. 4. Zasądza na rzecz skarżącego 12 740 EUR tytułem szkody niemajątkowej oraz 1 000 EUR tytułem kosztów i wydatków poniesionych przed Trybunałem. 5. Oddala pozostałą część roszczenia skarżącego o słuszne zadośćuczynienie.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

SECOND SECTION               CASE OF RATINHO v. PORTUGAL   (Application no. 48768/11)                 JUDGMENT         STRASBOURG   28 January 2014             This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Ratinho v. Portugal, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:  Dragoljub Popović, President,  Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,  Helen Keller, judges, and, Marialena Tsirli, Acting Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 7 January 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.  The case originated in an application (no. 48768/11) against the Portuguese Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Portuguese national, Mr João Aníbal Heitor Ratinho (“the applicant”), on 21 July 2011. 2.  The applicant was represented by Mr J. J. F. Alves, a lawyer practising in Matosinhos (Portugal). The Portuguese Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms. M. F. Graça de Carvalho, Deputy-Attorney General. 3.  On 17 October 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Lisbon. 5.  On 26 March 1997 the applicant started enforcement proceedings against a company before the court of Lisbon (domestic proceedings no. 1476/97.7 TVLSB) in order to obtain the payment of 12 740 euros (EUR). 6.  On 24 April 1997 the debtor (executada) opposed the proceedings through the introduction of a motion on that regard (dedução de embargos). The motion was granted and remained valid until 19 September 2006. In the course of the proceedings, procedural steps were taken in the context of the opposition, which had to be suspended twice while waiting for a final decision in other two different proceedings. 7. On 16 September 1997 the court ordered the seizure (penhora) of the debtor’s assets, which took place on 16 January 1998. The applicant opposed it on 22 January 1998. The court ordered the lift of the seizure (levantamento da penhora) on 15 October 1998. 8.  On 18 October 1999 the court ordered the suspension of proceedings because of the inactivity of the parties. The proceedings were suspended until May 2002. 9.  Between June 2002 and 20 June 2012 several procedural steps took place, mostly notifications, provision of information from the parties and court orders (despachos). On 11 March 2003 the court ordered the sale of the business establishment that had previously been seized. Several attempts to sell it were made until 24 May 2012. 10.  On 10 September 2012 due to the inactivity of the parties the court ordered the proceedings to be suspended once again. 11.  According to the last information received by the Court on 11 June 2013, the proceedings are still pending. THE LAW I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 6 § 1 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION 12.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement. He also complained that he had not had an effective remedy in this respect. He relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention, which read as follows in the relevant parts: Article 6 § 1 “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal...” Article 13 “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority...” 13.  The period to be taken into consideration began on 26 March 1997 and has not yet ended. It has thus lasted so far 16 years and 9 months. A.  Admissibility 14.  The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.  Merits 1)  Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention 15.  The Government acknowledged that the proceedings had to date been subject to a delay and that their length had exceeded what would legitimately be expected. For the Government, the applicant had nevertheless contributed to the delay by not taking any initiative to accelerate the progress of the proceedings. 16.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). 17.  The Court notes that the applicant could have taken steps to expedite the proceedings. Still, the Court recalls that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention imposes on the Contracting States the duty to organise their judicial system in such a way that their courts can meet each of its requirements (see Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 74, ECHR 1999‑II). 18.  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above). 19.  Having examined all the material submitted to and having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. 20.  There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1. 2)  Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention 21.  The Court recalls that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 for a case to be heard within a reasonable time (Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 156 ECHR 2000‑XI). 22. Having regard to its case-law in the subject (Martins Castro and Alves Correia de Castro v. Portugal, no. 33729/06, 10 June 2008; Garcia Franco and Others v. Portugal, no. 9273/07, § 50, 22 June 2010) and the fact that the Government have not submitted any arguments which would require it to depart from these findings in the present case, the Court considers that the applicant had had no effective remedy against the excessive length of the proceedings. 23.  Therefore, there has been a breach of Article 13. II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 24.  Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A.  Damage 25.  The applicant claimed 16,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 26.  The Government contested the claim, considering that the amount claimed was excessive. 27.  The Court considers that the applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 12,740 under that head. B.  Costs and expenses 28.  The applicant also claimed EUR 3,450 for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and the Court. 29.  The Government contested the claim. 30.  Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court rejects the claim for costs and expenses in the domestic proceedings and considers it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court. C.  Default interest 31.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, 1.  Declares the application admissible;   2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention;   3.  Holds (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts: (i)  EUR 12,740 (twelve thousand seven hundred and forty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (ii)  EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 January 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.   Marialena Tsirli  Dragoljub Popović  Acting Deputy Registrar President

© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 14.07.2026. · Źródło