49006/18;17943/19;25908/19;25916/19;47596/19;54087/19;2614/20;5882/20;13783/20

WyrokETPCz2023-01-12ECLI:CE:ECHR:2023:0112JUD004900618

Analiza orzeczenia

Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.

Zagadnienie prawne
Czy dożywotnie pozbawienie wolności bez możliwości zwolnienia warunkowego, w świetle węgierskiego prawa, stanowi nieludzkie i poniżające traktowanie w rozumieniu art. 3 Konwencji?
Ratio decidendi
Trybunał stwierdził naruszenie art. 3 Konwencji, ponieważ węgierski system prawny, przewidujący dożywotnie pozbawienie wolności bez możliwości zwolnienia warunkowego, nie oferuje de facto redukowalności kary. Jedyną drogą do rozważenia zwolnienia jest obowiązkowa procedura ułaskawienia, dostępna dopiero po odbyciu czterdziestu lat kary, co Trybunał uznał za niewystarczające. Brak odpowiednich gwarancji proceduralnych w tej procedurze, w połączeniu z długim okresem oczekiwania, uniemożliwia skazanym realną nadzieję na resocjalizację i zwolnienie, co jest niezgodne z wymogami art. 3 Konwencji. Trybunał oparł się na swojej wcześniejszej linii orzeczniczej, w szczególności na wyroku w sprawie T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary.
Stan faktyczny
Skarżący to dziewięciu obywateli (węgierskich, rumuńskich, bułgarskich) skazanych na Węgrzech na dożywotnie pozbawienie wolności bez możliwości zwolnienia warunkowego. Skarżyli się, że ich wyroki stanowią nieludzkie i poniżające traktowanie, naruszające art. 3 Konwencji, ponieważ węgierskie prawo nie przewiduje realnej możliwości rewizji kary i zwolnienia, a jedyną opcją jest ułaskawienie po 40 latach odbycia kary.
Rozstrzygnięcie
Trybunał jednomyślnie: łączy skargi; uznaje skargi za dopuszczalne; stwierdza naruszenie art. 3 Konwencji; uznaje, że stwierdzenie naruszenia stanowi wystarczające słuszne zadośćuczynienie za szkodę niemajątkową; zasądza od państwa pozwanego kwotę 4 500 EUR, wspólnie, na pokrycie kosztów i wydatków; oddala pozostałe roszczenia skarżących o słuszne zadośćuczynienie.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

FIRST SECTION CASE OF COMAN AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY (Applications nos. 49006/18 and 8 others – see appended list)             JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 12 January 2023   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Coman and Others v. Hungary, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:  Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President,  Lətif Hüseynov,  Erik Wennerström, judges, and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table, (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein; the decision to give notice of the applications to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”) represented by their Agent, Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 6 December 2022, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.  The cases concern the applicants’ sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of release on parole. The applicants’ details are set out in the appendix. They complained that their sentences constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. 2.  The general principles concerning life imprisonment without the possibility for release on parole have been summarised in the case of T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14, § 38, 4 October 2016). THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 3.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 4.  The Government requested the Court to declare the applications inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies since the applicants G.F. Coman, L. Tóth, M. Nagy, R. Tóth, Z.G. Ráduly, M.I. Georgiev, C. Kabai and I. Tóth had failed to lodge a constitutional complaint against their sentencing judgments under sections 26 or 27 of the Constitutional Court Act and the constitutional complaint of Mr P. Banya was still pending. 5.  The Court has previously rejected the Government’s argument as to the effectiveness of a constitutional complaint in respect of prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment without release on parole in the case of Sándor Varga and Others v. Hungary (nos. 39734/15 and 2 others, §§ 34-35, 17 June 2021). The Government have not provided any reason in the present case that could lead the Court to a different conclusion. 6.  Having regard to the above considerations, the Court concludes that the applicants’ complaints under Article 3 of the Convention cannot be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies; it therefore dismisses the Government’s preliminary objections in that connection. 7.  The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 8.  In the T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary judgment (cited above), the Court held that the fact that the applicants could have their release considered, by way of the mandatory pardon procedure, only after they had served forty years of their life sentences was sufficient to conclude that the new Hungarian legislation did not offer de facto reducibility of the applicants’ whole life sentences. That factor, coupled with the lack of sufficient procedural safeguards in the second part of the procedure, as provided for by the new legislation, led the Court to find a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (ibid., § 50). 9.  The Court notes that the arguments raised by the Government in the instant case are similar to those already examined and rejected in T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (cited above). The Government have not submitted any new circumstances which would lead the Court to depart from its previous findings that whole life sentences such as those of which the applicants complained cannot be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. 10.  There has accordingly been a violation of that provision. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 11.  The applicants claimed 10,000 euros (EUR) each in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. In addition, applicant G.F. Coman claimed jointly with a separate group of eleven other applicants EUR 17,780 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. Applicants P. Banya, Z.G. Ráduly, M.I. Georgiev, C. Kabai and I. Tóth claimed EUR 9,562 jointly in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. Applicant L. Tóth claimed EUR 4,318 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. Applicants M. Nagy and and R. Tóth claimed EUR 1,778 each in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 12.  The Government contested those claims. 13.  The Court considers that its finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction and accordingly makes no award under this head. 14.  Having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award the applicants, who were represented by the same lawyer, EUR 4,500, jointly, for the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, and dismisses the remainder of the claims. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Decides to join the applications; Declares the applications admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention; Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants; Holds (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants EUR 4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros), jointly, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, within three months, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement; (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 January 2023, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.    Liv Tigerstedt  Krzysztof Wojtyczek  Deputy Registrar President     APPENDIX No. Application no. Case name Lodged on Applicant Year of birth Place of residence Nationality Represented by 1. 49006/18 Coman v. Hungary 09/10/2018 Gheorghe Florin COMAN Szeged Romanian Dániel András KARSAI 2. 17943/19 Tóth v. Hungary 28/03/2019 László TÓTH Szeged Hungarian Dániel András KARSAI 3. 25908/19 Nagy v. Hungary 07/05/2019 Mihály NAGY Szeged Hungarian Dániel András KARSAI 4. 25916/19 Tóth v. Hungary 07/05/2019 Róbert TÓTH Sátoraljaújhely Hungarian Dániel András KARSAI 5. 47596/19 Banya v. Hungary 26/08/2019 Pál BANYA Szeged Hungarian Dániel András KARSAI 6. 54087/19 Ráduly v. Hungary 09/10/2019 Zsolt Gyula RÁDULY Szeged Hungarian Dániel András KARSAI 7. 2614/20 Georgiev v. Hungary 19/12/2019 Metodi Ivanov GEORGIEV Szeged Bulgarian Dániel András KARSAI 8. 5882/20 Kabai v. Hungary 16/01/2020 Csaba KABAI Szeged Hungarian Dániel András KARSAI 9. 13783/20 Tóth v. Hungary 06/03/2020 István TÓTH Szeged Hungarian Dániel András KARSAI

© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 29.07.2026. · Źródło