49257/22

THIRD SECTION CASE OF NIKITIN v. ESTONIA (Application no. 49257/22)             JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 3 February 2026   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Nikitin v. Estonia, The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Diana Kovatcheva, President, Peeter Roosma, Canòlic Mingorance Cairat, judges, and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no. 49257/22) against the Republic of Estonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 6 October 2022 by an Estonian national, Mr Vladimir Nikitin (“the applicant”), who was born in 1968, is detained in Viru Prison and, having been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr J. Valdma, a lawyer practising in Tallinn; the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning the use of a glass partition during short-term meetings in prison to the Estonian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr Tim Kolk, Representative of Estonia to the European Court of Human Rights, and to declare the remainder of the application inadmissible; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 13 January 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.  The complaint concerns eight short-term meetings that the applicant, a life prisoner in Viru Prison, had with his wife and her son between 2 June 2018 and 19 December 2019, during which the applicant was separated from his visitors by a glass partition and could talk to them only over an intercom system. 2.  In November 2020 the applicant, considering that the separation by a glass partition during the meetings had violated his rights, lodged an application with the Viru Prison authorities for compensation in relation to those meetings. The prison authorities dismissed the application, noting that the applicant had never asked for meetings to be held without the glass partition. That would have been a more appropriate remedy, as well as being required under the State Liability Act (riigivastutuse seadus). The prison authorities also referred to general security considerations relating to short-term meetings (without linking these to the applicant’s personal situation) and to alternative means of communication that were available. They noted that section 31(21) of the Internal Prison Rules (vangla sisekorraeeskiri) provided that in certain situations prison authorities had discretion to allow meetings without a glass partition (without indicating that the applicant’s circumstances could have fallen into any of the categories listed in the relevant provision). 3.  In subsequent submissions before the Tartu Administrative Court and the Tartu Court of Appeal (described further in paragraphs 4 and 5 below), the Viru Prison authorities stated that the applicant’s situation did not fit under any of the exceptions provided for in section 31(21) of the Internal Prison Rules. 4.  On 31 May 2021 the Tartu Administrative Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the decision of the prison authorities. It referred to alternative means available to the applicant for maintaining contact and found that the interference with the applicant’s rights had not been sufficiently severe to warrant compensation. The court considered, as part of its analysis of the constitutionality of the measure, that the requirement set out in section 31(2) of the Internal Prison Rules that a glass partition be used during short-term meetings was proportionate to the need to ensure prison security, and added that section 31(21) of the Rules provided for exceptions from that requirement. The applicant appealed. 5.  On 28 February 2022 the Tartu Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. The court considered, referring to alternative means of maintaining contact and the applicant’s own passivity in addressing the issue at hand, that the interference with his rights had not been particularly severe. The court noted that the applicant had never complained about the set-up of the visits and had never requested that the visits be organised in a room without a glass partition. He had thus failed to use a primary remedy (esmane õiguskaitsevahend) – namely an application to oblige the administrative body to either adopt a certain administrative decision or to take administrative measures (kohustamiskaebus) – which had been a prerequisite for lodging a claim for compensation. However, the court admitted that the above-mentioned remedy might not have been effective in preventing the interference with respect to each meeting request. Lastly, the Tartu Court of Appeal noted that it did not consider the use of the glass partition to be unlawful (õigusvastane), referring, inter alia, to the general dangerousness of the applicant. Even presuming that the use of the glass partition had been unlawful, awarding monetary compensation would not have been warranted in any event. 6.  On 7 June 2022 the Supreme Court refused to examine an appeal on points of law brought by the applicant. 7.  The applicant complained of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the refusal to allow him to have short-term meetings without a glass partition. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 8.  The Government claimed, and the applicant did not disagree, that he had not exhausted domestic remedies with respect to one meeting on 19 December 2019. The Court thus declares the complaint inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of that particular meeting. 9.  As for the remainder of the complaint, the Court cannot uphold the Government’s objection that the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage given that he failed to ask for a meeting without a glass partition (see further § 13 below). The Court further notes that the applicant’s complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 10.  The general principles concerning prisoners’ right to respect for their family life and restrictions on prisoners’ visiting rights have been summarised in Khoroshenko v. Russia ([GC], no. 41418/04, §§ 106 and 116-26, ECHR 2015). 11.  Although the Government noted that the applicant had married his wife, S.V., only in November 2018 and that the person he referred to as his stepson in his application to the Court is S.V.’s adult son, K.V., (born in 1993) who had until 2018 also been imprisoned in Viru Prison, the Government did not contest that the use of a glass partition during short-term meetings interfered with the applicant’s private and family life. The Court sees no reason to hold differently. 12.  There is no dispute that the interference was “in accordance with the law” and that it pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and crime and protecting the health and rights of others. 13.  The Court notes that the present case is on the facts very similar to Kalda v. Estonia ([Committee], no. 35245/19, 1 March 2022). However – although they did not make the argument that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies – the Government attempted to distinguish the two cases by stressing that unlike the applicant in Kalda, the applicant in the case at hand had never requested that meetings be held without a glass partition (compare Kalda, cited above, § 1), and was thus responsible for the impugned interference. Instead, the applicant had lodged a claim for compensation a long time after the meetings had taken place. The Government added that an application to have meetings without the glass partition being present would not have been bound to fail. In support of that argument, they referred to section 24(1) of the Imprisonment Act and section 31 of the Internal Prison Rules, and to the Supreme Court’s judgments in cases nos. 3-15-1781 (adopted on 11 July 2023 after the case had been reopened following the Court’s judgment in Kalda (cited above)), 3-19-1416 and 3-19-61 (adopted on 17 June 2021 and 20 October 2021, respectively). In those cases, the Supreme Court had explained that under section 31(21)(3) of the Internal Prison Rules, meetings without a glass partition could be allowed, when a request was made, for prisoners wishing to meet family members, relatives and close friends “within the framework of activities organised by the prison”. The Government thus argued that domestic law in fact allowed prisoners to request meetings without a glass partition and, in turn, obliged the prison authorities to weigh relevant circumstances when deciding on the request. They added that meeting rooms without glass partitions existed in the prison. 14.  Although the applicant argued that he had orally asked for the meetings to be organised without a partition and had been refused, there is no need to adopt a definite position on that factual issue. 15.  The Court notes that it might be questioned whether the applicant’s wish to have individual short-term meetings could indeed be seen as falling within the “framework of activities organised by the prison”. In any event, the above-mentioned case-law of the Supreme Court, which appears to interpret that phrase in such a way, post-dates the factual circumstances of the present case. Moreover, although the Tartu Administrative Court made a reference to (the entirety of) section 31(21) of the Internal Prison Rules (see paragraph 4 above), it did so only in the context of assessing the overall constitutionality of the default rule of using a glass partition, and did not suggest in any way that the applicant’s situation fell within the scope of any of the exceptions provided for. This was not suggested by the Tartu Court of Appeal either, despite its judgment post-dating the above-mentioned Supreme Court judgments of June and October 2021.While the Tartu Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had not used the primary remedy, it expressed doubts as to whether using that remedy would (on each occasion) have been effective (see paragraph 5 above). The Court also notes that in the domestic court proceedings, the Viru Prison authorities clearly ruled out the applicant falling within any of the exceptions listed in section 31(21) of the Internal Prison Rules (see paragraph 3 above). 16.  Against that background and timeline, the Court is not convinced that, on the assumption that the applicant never requested short-term meetings without a glass partition, he can be reproached for not having done so. The factual difference outlined between the present case and that of Kalda cannot therefore, in these specific circumstances, provide any grounds for different conclusions to be drawn on the merits. 17.  The Government submitted further arguments concerning the overall security concerns for short-term meetings, as well as the applicant-specific risk factors linked to the characters of S.V. and K.V., and to the specifics of their connection to the applicant. However, the Court notes that although the Tartu Court of Appeal referred, without specifying or substantiating any further, to factors relating to the applicant’s dangerousness (see paragraph 5 above), the domestic courts never explained or analysed which exact risks emanating from the applicant were relevant in the context of his requests to meet his wife and her son. The factors relating to S.V. and K.V. were not analysed in the domestic proceedings either (compare Kalda, cited above, § 6). 18.  In the light of the above reasoning, the Court concludes that the authorities failed to strike a fair balance between the aims relied on and the applicant’s rights. The fact that the applicant was at the same time allowed to have long-term meetings with his wife and her son, to make telephone calls and to correspond through written letters does not alter that finding. 19.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 20.  The applicant claimed compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage but left the amount to the Court’s discretion. He lodged no claim in respect of costs and expenses. 21.  The Government submitted that, should a violation be found, the finding of a violation would, in itself, constitute sufficient just satisfaction. They noted that in the domestic proceedings the applicant had claimed compensation in the sum of 1,500 euros (EUR) and argued that, having regard to the principle of ne ultra petita, the damages awarded by the Court should not exceed that amount. 22.  The Court, noting that in the proceedings before the Court the applicant made no quantified claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage that would bind the Court, and ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable. 23.  The Court makes no award in respect of costs and expenses. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the complaint concerning seven short-term meetings from 2 June 2018 until 19 December 2019 admissible and the remainder of the application, concerning the short-term meeting of 19 December 2019, inadmissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention; Holds (a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts: EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points. Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 February 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.    Olga Chernishova Diana Kovatcheva  Deputy Registrar President