51775/21

FIRST SECTION CASE OF RASPOVIĆ v. CROATIA (Application no. 51775/21) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 4 June 2026 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Raspović v. Croatia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Artūrs Kučs, President, Davor Derenčinović, Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges, and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no.51775/21) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 15 October 2021 by a Croatian national, Ms Ivana Raspović (“the applicant”), who was born in 1983 and lives in Sukošan, and was represented by Ms T. Gregov, a lawyer practising in Zadar; the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning Article 10 of the Convention to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 13 May 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.The application concerns the imposition of a fine on the applicant for contempt of court in respect of remarks she had made in her capacity as an advocate. 2.The applicant is a lawyer who represented a client in civil proceedings before the Zadar Municipal Court. Those proceedings were adjudicated by JudgeM.P., who delivered a judgment rejecting the claim advanced by the applicant’s client. 3.On 27 June 2019 the applicant lodged an appeal against the Zadar Municipal Court’s judgment, in which she criticised, inter alia, the allegedly prolonged inactivity of Judge M.P. She accused him of “obviously not feeling like doing his job” and “not reading properly and not seeing the indication [of the defendants] in the statement of claim, which is the problem of the court and not the plaintiff”. 4.On 9 July 2019 the applicant was fined 3,000 Croatian kunas (HRK – equivalent to approximately 400 euros (EUR)) by Judge M.P. for contempt of court owing to the statements she had made in the appeal. Referring to section 110 of the Civil Procedure Act, the court held that the applicant’s communication with the court had been inappropriate. It noted that the statutory fine ranged from HRK 500 to HRK 10,000 and that a HRK 3,000 fine was sufficient in the circumstances. 5.On 25 July 2019 the applicant lodged an appeal against the above‑mentioned decision. She emphasised that she had only criticised the judge’s work. She also insisted,inter alia, that the judge was “not doing his job”, “was doing absolutely nothing in [that] court” and that he “had abused his authority”. She wrote (translation from Croatian, preserving the original capitalisation): “... If this judge is doing his job (and he is not), THEN I WILL BE HAPPY TO DONATE THE HRK 3,000 TO THE STATE BUDGET IF THOSE FUNDS ARE IMMEDIATELY REDISTRIBUTED AS AN INCENTIVE TO [JUDGE M.P.] IN THE FORM OF A BONUS FOR VERY SUCCESSFUL WORK ... THEN I WILL NOT REGRET PAYING THE HRK3,000. However, even if he had imposed the maximum fine on me, it would not change the fact, the reality and the truth that this judge does absolutely nothing in [that] court ... the result of which is that the President of the court unburdens [Judge M.P.] and assigns those cases to other judges. What does this point to? That the judge is doing his job or not??? ... [Judge M.P.] abused his authority while performing his duties as a judge. He does not work on the cases that are assigned to him ...” 6.On 26 July 2019 the Zadar Municipal Court, through Judge M.P., fined the applicant for contempt of court for the remarks she had made in the appeal against the decision of 9July 2019. The fine amounted to HRK 10,000 (equivalent to approximately EUR 1,330). When imposing the fine, the court considered that the applicant had previously been fined for similar conduct but had continued to insult the court and stated that she would not stop even if given the maximum penalty. 7.On 6 August 2019 the applicant lodged a supplement to the appeal against the ruling of the Municipal Court of 9 July 2019 (see paragraphs 4-5 above), arguing that the sanction was excessive and that she had been expressing strong criticism. 8.On 16 August 2019 the applicant lodged an appeal and, on 25November2019, a supplement to the appeal against the ruling of the Municipal Court of 26 July 2019 (see paragraph 6 above). She reiterated the arguments raised in the supplement to the appeal of 6 August 2019 (seeparagraph 7 above) and stated that even if she were sanctioned with the maximum fine, it would not change the fact that Judge M.P. was not doing his job. 9.On 30 January 2020 the Osijek County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded and upheld the ruling of 9 July 2019. On the same day the Osijek County Court varied the decision of 26July 2019 and reduced the fine to HRK 4,000 (equivalent to approximately EUR 530). 10.On 18 March 2020 the applicant filed a petition for leave toappeal on points of law against both decisions of the Osijek County Court, which was declared inadmissible by the Supreme Court on 28July 2020. 11.On 20 March 2020 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court against both rulings of the Osijek County Court, complaining of a violation of the right to freedom of expression. 12.On 2 June 2021 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It referred to the principles established in the Court’s case-law on Article 10 of the Convention and held that the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression could not be considered disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued – namely the maintenance of judicial authority and respect for the court. The language used by the applicant implied that the judge was incompetent at his job, which could not be considered an appropriate way to raise objections in respect of allegedly excessive length of civil proceedings. Moreover, imposing fines on the applicant had not created a chilling effect on her ability to use permissible means to protect her clients’ rights in the future. 13.On 17 September 2020 the Croatian Bar Association initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant for a serious breach of professional duty, and, according to the latest information provided by the parties, those proceedings are still pending. 14.The applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the fines imposed on her had interfered with her freedom of expression, had not been based in law, had had no legitimate aim and had not been necessary. She also alleged that she had expressed criticism of the work of the judge in question but had had no intention of offending him, and that the fines had had a chilling effect on her. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT 15.The Government argued that the sole intent of the applicant’s statements had been to insult Judge M.P. and the courts, and that consequently the present complaint should be declared inadmissible as incompatibleratione materiaewith Article 10 of the Convention. The Government further argued that the applicant had not been a victim of a violation and that she had not suffered any significant disadvantage given that she had never paid the fines that were imposed on her. 16.The Court finds these objections closely related to the substance of the applicant’s Article 10 complaint and therefore joins them to the merits. The Court further notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible. 17.Having regard to its case-law on the matter (see, for example,Radobuljac v. Croatia, no. 51000/11, §§ 51-52, 28 June 2016, and the cases cited therein), the Court considers that fining the applicant for contempt of court amounted to an interference with her right to freedom of expression. That interference was prescribed by law, in section 110 of the Civil Procedure Act, and it pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining the authority of the judiciary within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Radobuljac, cited above, § 53). It remains, therefore, to be examined whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 of the Convention. 18.The general principles for assessing the necessity of an interference with the exercise of freedom of expression in contempt‑of‑court cases were reiterated inPisanski v.Croatia(no.28794/18, § 69, 4June 2024) and inRadobuljac(cited above, §§ 56-61) 19.The Court considers that the present case is similar to Radobuljac (cited above), where the applicant was fined for contempt of court and a violation of Article 10 was found because the domestic courts had not given due regard to the content and context of the remarks. Similarly, in the present case, the domestic courts failed to situate the applicant’s statements within the context and forum in which they had been expressed. In that regard the Court notes that the applicant made the disputed remarks in the context of judicial proceedings in which she had lodged an appeal against a decision dismissing her client’s claim (see paragraph 3 above). Her other remarks were made within the proceedings concerning the fine and served to justify the language used in the above-mentioned appeal (see paragraph 5 above). Her remarks were thus part of internal communication between her, as a lawyer, and the appellate court, of which the general public was not aware, and were aimed at defending her client’s rights (seeRadobuljac, cited above, § 62, and the cases cited therein; compare Rogalski v. Poland, no.5420/16, § 47, 23March2023). 20.In this connection, the Court reiterates that the courts, as all other public institutions, are not immune from criticism and scrutiny (seeSkałka v.Poland, no. 43425/98, § 34, 27 May 2003). However, a clear distinction must be made between criticism and insult. In the present case the applicant’s statements show that she was complaining of the allegedly excessive length of the civil proceedings (see paragraphs 3 and 5 above). She submitted supporting documents showing that she had lodged several acceleratory remedies in the civil proceedings, which, in her view, had had no effect. In these circumstances, the Court accepts the applicant’s argument that in both of her appeals, she continued to express dissatisfaction with the way the domestic proceedings had been conducted. While it is true that the impugned remarks were made in a “caustic tone”, the use of such language in commenting on the administration of justice has been regarded as compatible with Article 10 (seePisanski, cited above, § 71, and Čeferin v. Slovenia, no.40975/08, §61, 16 January 2018, and the cases cited therein). Having regard to the foregoing, the Court cannot agree with the conclusion of the domestic courts, noting that the applicant’s remarks, although strongly worded, could not be regarded as having been intended solely to insult the court (see,afortiori,Čeferin, cited above, § 59, andRadobuljac, cited above, § 66; contrast Žugić v. Croatia, no. 3699/08, § 47, 31 May 2011). Accordingly, the Government’sratione materiae objection (see paragraphs 15-16 above) must be rejected (contrast Rujak v.Croatia(dec.), no.57942/10, §§ 25-31, 2 October 2012). 21.Lastly, it cannot be ignored that the applicant received two fines, the first amounting to HRK3,000 and the second to HRK 4,000 (approximately EUR 400 and EUR 530), which cannot be regarded as insignificant, especially given that the prescribed amount is between HRK 500 and HRK10,000 ( approximately EUR 66 and EUR 1,330) (see paragraph 4 above). The fact that the applicant had not yet paid the fines has no bearing on the present case, given that the fines were formally imposed and remain legally enforceable. For this reason, the Court also rejects the Government’s objections that the applicant was not a victim of a violation or that she did not suffer a significant disadvantage (see paragraphs 15-16 above). 22.The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the domestic courts went beyond what would have amounted to a “necessary” restriction on the applicant’s freedom of expression. 23.Consequently, the Court finds that there has been a violation of Article10 of the Convention in the present case. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 24.The applicant claimed 2,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 275in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court. 25.The Government contested these claims. 26.As regards non-pecuniary damage, the Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction in the circumstances. 27.The applicant’s claim in respect of costs and expenses must be rejected, regard being had to the terms ofRule 60 § 2 of the Rules of Courtand the applicant’s failure to provide the Court with any documents in support of her claim. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the application admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention; Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant; Dismisses the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 4 June 2026, pursuant to Rule77§§2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Liv TigerstedtArtūrs Kučs Deputy RegistrarPresident