62122/19;5979/20;5984/20;9004/20;11282/20;12199/20;12885/20;12886/20;12887/20;13148/20;13188/20;18993/20;19003/20;19005/20;19217/20;19228/20;19229/20;30117/20;30125/20;30126/20
WyrokETPCz2024-04-25ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:0425JUD006212219
Analiza orzeczenia
Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.
Zagadnienie prawne
Czy dożywotnie kary pozbawienia wolności z możliwością zwolnienia warunkowego dopiero po bardzo długim okresie naruszają zakaz nieludzkiego lub poniżającego traktowania z art. 3 Konwencji?Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że dożywotnie kary pozbawienia wolności, które przewidują możliwość zwolnienia warunkowego dopiero po upływie bardzo długiego okresu, naruszają art. 3 Konwencji. Kluczowe jest to, że tak długi okres oczekiwania na możliwość przeglądu kary uniemożliwia uznanie jej za "redukowalną" w rozumieniu art. 3. Trybunał podkreślił, że zbyt długie opóźnienie w krajowej ocenie postępów więźnia w rehabilitacji i zasadności dalszego pozbawienia wolności jest niezgodne z Konwencją, ponieważ uniemożliwia władzom krajowym ocenę, czy zmiany w osobie skazanego i postępy w rehabilitacji są na tyle znaczące, by dalsze pozbawienie wolności nie było już uzasadnione na podstawie uzasadnionych celów penologicznych.Stan faktyczny
Dwudziestu skarżących, skazanych na Węgrzech na kary dożywotniego pozbawienia wolności, złożyło skargi do ETPCz. Skarżyli się, że możliwość zwolnienia warunkowego przysługuje im dopiero po odbyciu bardzo długiego okresu kary, wahającego się od 26 lat i 5 miesięcy do 48 lat i 1 miesiąca. Skarżący argumentowali, że takie warunki stanowią nieludzkie lub poniżające traktowanie, naruszając art. 3 Konwencji.Rozstrzygnięcie
Trybunał jednogłośnie: łączy skargi; uznaje skargi za dopuszczalne; stwierdza naruszenie art. 3 Konwencji; uznaje, że stwierdzenie naruszenia stanowi wystarczające zadośćuczynienie za szkodę niemajątkową; zasądza na rzecz skarżących kwoty wskazane w załączonej tabeli tytułem kosztów i wydatków.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF GYENGE AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY
(Applications nos. 62122/19 and 19 others
– see appended list)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
25 April 2024
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Gyenge and Others v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Gilberto Felici, President,
Péter Paczolay,
Raffaele Sabato, judges,
and Attila Teplán, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 4 April 2024,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in applications against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on the various dates indicated in the appended table
2. The applicants were represented by D.A. Karsai, a lawyer practising in Budapest.
3. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were given notice of the applications.
THE FACTS
4. The list of applicants and the relevant details of the applications are set out in the appended table.
5. The applicants complained of their life sentences with a possibility of release on parole only after a lengthy period of time.
THE LAW
JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
6. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 of the Convention
7. Sentenced to life imprisonment, the applicants complained that they could be released on parole only after having served a very long time. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
Article 3
““No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
8. The Court reiterates that the automatic review of a sentence after a specified minimum term represents an important safeguard for the prisoner against the risk of detention in violation of Article 3. The relevant principles have been summarised in Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 57592/08, §§ 66-68, 17 January 2017), and Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom ([GC], nos. 66069/09 and 2 others, § 44, ECHR 2013 (extracts)).
9. In the leading case of Bancsók and László Magyar v. Hungary (no. 2), nos. 52374/15 and 53364/15, 28 October 2021), the Court already found violations of Article 3 in respect of life sentences with a possibility of release on parole only after inordinately long periods of time.
10. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion on the admissibility and merits of these complaints. In the light of its case-law on the subject, it considers that the fact that the applicants can hope to have their progress towards release reviewed only after they have served a very lengthy period of time is sufficient to conclude that these life sentences cannot be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention. Such a long waiting period unduly delays the domestic authorities’ review of “whether any changes in the life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds” (see Vinter and Others, cited above, § 119).
11. These complaints are therefore admissible and disclose a breach of Article 3 of the Convention.
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
12. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
13. The Court considers that its finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction and accordingly makes no award in respect of non-pecuniary damage (see, in particular, Bancsók and László Magyar (no.2), cited above, § 52).
14. As to costs and expenses, regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case‑law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sums indicated in the appended table.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
Decides to join the applications;
Declares the applications admissible;
Holds that these applications disclose a breach of Article 3 of the Convention;
Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants;
Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months, the amounts indicated in the appended table, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 April 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Attila Teplán Gilberto Felici
Acting Deputy Registrar President
APPENDIX
List of applications raising complaints under Article 3 of the Convention
(life sentence with a possibility of release on parole only after a lengthy period of time)
No.
Application no.
Date of introduction
Applicant’s name
Year of birth
Name of the court
Date of the final judgment
Minimum term to be served after sentencing before eligibility for release
Amount awarded for costs and expenses per application
(in euros)[1]
62122/19
06/11/2019
Ottó Zsolt GYENGE Pécs Court of Appeal, 27/11/2003
28 years 3 months
5979/20
14/01/2020
Antal FARKAS Debrecen Court of Appeal, 14/10/2013
35 years 7 months
5984/20
10/01/2020
Mihály ARNÓCZKI Budapest Court of Appeal, 27/11/2007
26 years 5 months
9004/20
16/01/2020
Ilona BOGDÁN Győr Court of Appeal, 04/04/2006
31 years 2 months
11282/20
19/02/2020
Miklós HORVÁTH Supreme Court of Hungary, 29/01/2002
29 years 6 months
12199/20
25/02/2020
József MOLNÁR Kúria, 24/04/2012
33 years 7 months
12885/20
02/03/2020
Sándor MOLNÁR Kúria,10/04/2018
36 years 10 months
12886/20
02/03/2020
Róbert KÓTAI Debrecen Court of Appeal, 20/04/2010
27 years 7 months
12887/20
02/03/2020
Pál LEGÉNY Budapest Court of Appeal, 23/06/2005
27 years 7 months
13148/20
03/03/2020
Roland STÁHL Supreme Court of Hungary, 04/03/2003
28 years 5 months
13188/20
03/03/2020
Mihály PRESING Supreme Court of Hungary, 04/04/2002
38 years 7 months
18993/20
24/04/2020
Norbert GÖRCSI Pécs Court of Appeal, 26/01/2010
28 years 6 months
19003/20
24/04/2020
Bertalan András GÉCZY Budapest Court of Appeal, 24/03/2009
35 years 7 months
19005/20
24/04/2020
Gábor DOMJÁN Pécs Court of Appeal, 07/06/2011
28 years 5 months
19217/20
24/04/2020
Gábor KALMÁR Budapest Court of Appeal, 21/10/2004
27 years 7 months
19228/20
24/04/2020
Norbert Tamás LÁBADY Pécs Court of Appeal, 26/08/2014
38 years 8 months
19229/20
24/04/2020
Péter István LÖVEY Debrecen Court of Appeal, 08/10/2012
26 years 10 months
30117/20
02/07/2020
Ferenc NAGY Debrecen Court of Appeal, 23/11/2010
48 years 1 month
30125/20
02/07/2020
Jing Zhe ZHAO Supreme Court, 08/10/2002
26 years 11 months
30126/20
02/07/2020
Tamás VITOVSZKI Debrecen Court of Appeal, 30/06/2008
36 years 9 months
[1] Plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants.
© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 29.07.2026. · Źródło