69358/13

FIFTH SECTION CASE OF MARTYNOVSKIY v. UKRAINE (Application no. 69358/13)             JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG 12 February 2026         This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Martynovskiy v. Ukraine, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:  Gilberto Felici, President,  Mykola Gnatovskyy,  Vahe Grigoryan, judges, and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no. 69358/13) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 19 September 2013 by a Ukrainian national, Mr Roman Yuryevich Martynovskiy (“the applicant”), who was born in 1965, lives in Kyiv and was represented by Mr A.V. Yakovlev and Mr M. Kikkas, lawyers practising in Kyiv; the decision to give notice of the application to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Marharyta Sokorenko, of the Ministry of Justice; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 22 January 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.  The application concerns the temporary suspension of the applicant’s licence to practise as an advocate (Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention). 2.  The applicant received his advocate’s licence in 1993 and at the relevant time was working as an advocate in Sevastopol (Crimea, Ukraine). 3.  On 12 October 2012 the members of the Sevastopol Bar elected the applicant to represent them in the Higher Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar (“the HQDCB”), one of the governing bodies of the Bar of Ukraine. 4.  On 7 December 2012 the HQDCB held its first meeting, but the applicant did not attend. According to the applicant, he had not been informed of the meeting. 5.  Lawyer D. complained to the HQDCB that by failing to attend the meeting of 7 December 2012 the applicant had violated Article 62 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the Congress of Advocates on 17 November 2012 and published on 18 January 2013, which provided that advocates elected to self-government bodies should abstain from actions which might result in blocking the work of those bodies. D. stated that before the meeting of 7 December 2012 the HQDCB had posted a message on its website informing of the date and place of the meeting of 7 December 2012. D. asked the HQDCB to suspend the applicant’s licence. A copy of D.’s complaint is not available to the Court. 6.  On 24 January 2013 the head of the HQDCB transferred D.’s complaint to the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Regional Bar of Zakarpattya (“the QDC of Zakarpattya”). He noted that, in accordance with Article 63 §2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, a complaint lodged against an advocate elected to a self-government body had to be examined by a regional Bar located outside of the region in which the advocate had been elected. 7.  In February 2013 the applicant learned that the QDC of Zakarpattya was examining a complaint against him. 8.  On 5 March 2013 the applicant sent a letter to the QDC of Zakarpattya. He stated that the message to which D. had referred did not mention the applicant’s name or address, so it was not clear whether or not it had been addressed to the applicant. The applicant further noted that during the meeting of 7 December 2012 the HQDCB adopted its Rules of Procedure, which proved that its work had not been blocked by his absence. In his complaint D. stated that the applicant had been elected to the HQDCB by advocates of the Chernigiv Regional Bar, while in fact he had been elected by the advocates of the Sevastopol Bar. The applicant also stated that, in accordance with the Law on the Bar and practice of law, D.’s complaint had to be examined by the Sevastopol Bar because he was practising in Sevastopol; the transfer of the complaint to a different regional Bar had been unlawful. The applicant concluded that it was unclear how D.’s rights had been violated by his absence from the meeting. 9.  On 17 April 2013, in the applicant’s absence, the Disciplinary Chamber of the QDC of Zakarpattya suspended the applicant’s licence to practise as an advocate for six months for his failure to attend the meeting of 7 December 2012 and violating Article 62 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Chamber noted, without referring to concrete evidence, that all members of the HQDCB had been informed of the meeting on 7 December 2012 through the message on the website. 10.  On 22 April 2013 the applicant was informed of the meeting and the decision of 17 April 2013. 11.  On 16 May the QDC of Zakarpattya upheld the decision of 17 April 2013. 12.  The applicant appealed against the decisions of 17 April and 16 May 2013 to the HQDCB, however the appeal did not have a suspensive effect. In the appeal he complained that the QDC of Zakarpattya had not been competent to examine the complaint because under Article 33 of the Law on the Bar and practice of law, complaints against advocates had to be examined by the Bar of the region where those lawyers were practising. He also noted that under the law, the Head of HQDCB was not competent to transfer the complaint to the QDC of Zakarpattya. He further stated that his right to equality of arms had been violated because he had not been informed of the hearing before it had taken place on 17 April 2013. 13.  Since his licence had been suspended, the applicant was not allowed to attend the meeting of the HQDCB on 19 April 2013. 14.  On 18 July 2013 D. submitted his observations to the HQDCB requesting it to reject the applicant’s appeal. 15.  In 2013 the HQDCB held two hearings in the applicant’s case, but failed to reach a decision. No hearings were held in 2014. 16.  In July 2014 the Bar Council of Ukraine adopted changes to the HQDCB’s Rules of Procedure, according to which a draft decision was considered as rejected unless a majority of the HQDCB members voted in its favour. 17.  A hearing planned for 2015 was cancelled owing to a change of rapporteur in the applicant’s case. 18.  In July 2013, as a result of his suspension, the applicant had founded a non-governmental organisation (NGO – the Regional Centre for Human Rights) and had been focusing on his work there ever since. Between 2013 and 2015 the applicant had worked as the Head of the Board of Directors of the Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision, a governmental body which coordinated the provision of State-funded legal aid services. During the same period the applicant had written a methodological recommendation for advocates which had been published by the Coordination Centre and had received remuneration for that work. 19.  In 2016 the rapporteur in the applicant’s case prepared a HQDCB draft decision suggesting granting the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of 17 April and 16 May 2013 and annulling those decisions. 20.  On 22 July 2016 the draft decision was put to vote at a HQDCB meeting where 19 out of 30 HQDCB members were present. Out of 19 members, 11 voted in favour of the decision, 6 voted against it, and 2 abstained. In view of the changes to the Rules of Procedure adopted in 2014 (see paragraph 16 above), the draft decision was rejected and the decisions suspending the applicant’s licence remained valid. 21.  On 5 October 2016 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Kyiv District Administrative Court against the decisions of the Zakarpattya Bar and the decision of the HQDCB. He complained that the changes to the Rules of Procedure had been unlawfully adopted and then unlawfully applied to his appeal against the decisions issued prior to the adoption of the changes to the Rules. The applicant argued that he had been found guilty of a violation of the Rules of Conduct which had been published on 18 January 2013, that is after he had allegedly violated them. The applicant argued that he had not been informed of the meeting of 7 December 2012. He also complained that the Head of the HQDCB had had no right to transfer his case to another region. He stated that he had been informed of the hearing on 17 April 2013 after that hearing had already taken place. 22.  On an unspecified date in 2016 the applicant also lodged an appeal against the HQDCB’s decision with the Podilskyy District Court of Kyiv. 23.  On 22 December 2016 the Podilskyy District Court decided not to examine the applicant’s appeal. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal. 24.  The representative of the HQDCB asked the Kyiv District Administrative Court to suspend examination of the applicant’s appeal lodged on 5 October 2016 until the end of the examination of his appeal against the decision of 22 December 2016. The applicant did not object against the request. On 16 February 2017 the Kyiv District Administrative Court granted the request and suspended the examination of the appeal of 5 October 2016. 25.  On 6 March 2017 the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 22 December 2016. The outcome of that set of proceedings remains unknown. 26.  The case file contains a copy of the applicant’s letter of 5 May 2018 to the President of the Kyiv District Administrative Court, in which the applicant stated that on 5 April 2017 he had informed that court of the decision of 6 March 2017 and had asked it to resume the examination of his appeal lodged on 5 October 2016, however no follow-up had been given to that letter. The applicant’s letter of 5 April 2017 is not available to the Court. 27.  On 15 May 2018 the Kyiv District Administrative Court resumed the examination of the applicant’s appeal lodged on 5 October 2016. The court noted that the applicant had informed it of the decision of 6 March 2017 and had asked it to resume the proceedings. 28.  Also on 15 May 2018 the Kyiv District Administrative Court scheduled a hearing in the applicant’s case for 13 June 2018. 29.  In January 2019, then again in January and August 2020, the applicant enquired with the Kyiv District Administrative Court about the progress in his case, but received no reply. The Government did not provide any information about the progress of the case from May 2018 to April 2021. 30.  On 8 April 2021 the Kyiv District Administrative Court found that all the decisions issued by the self-government bodies of the Bar against the applicant had been lawful. 31.  The applicant’s appeals were rejected (final decision of the Supreme Court of 9 December 2021). The courts established that the QDC of Zakarpattya and the HQDCB had examined the applicant’s case in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, in particular, the transfer of D.’s complaint to the QDC of Zakarpattya had been lawful. However, the courts were not competent to re-examine the facts of the case and rule on the reasons why the applicant had not attended the meeting of 7 December 2012. 32.  According to the applicant, he was able to familiarise himself with the final decision in his case only in November 2022. The applicant did not explain why he had not been able to familiarize himself with that decision before that date.   THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT         ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 33.  The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that because of the decisions of 17 April and 16 May 2013 he had been deprived of the opportunity to practise as an advocate. He complained under Article 13 that he did not have a domestic remedy for his complaint under Article 8. 34.  The Government submitted that the applicant should have been familiar with Article 62 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and that therefore the negative consequences of his own behaviour had been foreseeable to him. The applicant had not informed the Disciplinary Chamber of the reasons why he had been absent from the meeting of 7 December 2012. There was no evidence to suggest that the applicant’s reduced income – as a result of his suspension – had had a serious impact on his private life. Moreover, the applicant had not been precluded from working as a lawyer (see paragraph 18 above). The suspension had not been related to the quality of the legal services provided by the applicant to his clients, therefore it could not have affected his reputation as a lawyer and his interaction with society. The disputed suspension had not called into question the applicant’s moral character and had not affected the core of the applicant’s professional reputation. The applicant’s suspension had only been temporary and had not affected his future career. In sum, the applicant’s suspension did not reach the level of severity necessary for Article 8 to apply. 35.  The applicant submitted that the Rules of Professional Conduct had been adopted by the Congress of Advocates on 17 November 2012 and had only been made public on 18 January 2013. On 7 December 2012 the applicant had therefore not been aware of the contents of Article 62 of those Rules. The applicant further stated that he had not been informed of the meeting of 7 December 2012 and the Government had not provided any evidence to the contrary. In 2015 the information concerning the applicant’s suspension had still been visible in the Register of Advocates. The suspension had had a negative impact on the applicant’s career far beyond 2012, in particular, from 2013 to 2023 he had only obtained authorisation thirty-five times to represent clients as an advocate. The suspension had had a significant effect on the applicant’s reputation as an advocate and as an individual. The applicant provided a copy of a media publication concerning his suspension, which stated that he had “neglected his duties and [had] not attend[ed] the Commission meeting”. Neither the QDC of Zakarpattya nor the HQDCB had contemplated a less severe punishment, even assuming that there had indeed been any misconduct on the part of the applicant. 36.  The Court reiterates that there are some typical aspects of private life which may be affected by dismissal, demotion, non-admission to a profession or other similarly unfavourable measures. These aspects include (i) the applicant’s “inner circle”; (ii) the applicant’s opportunity to establish and develop relationships with others; and (iii) the applicant’s social and professional reputation. There are two ways in which a private-life issue would usually arise in such a dispute: either because of the underlying reasons for the impugned measure (in that event the Court employs the reason-based approach) or – in certain cases – because of the consequences for private life (in that event the Court employs the consequence-based approach). If the consequence-based approach is at stake, the threshold of severity with respect to all the above-mentioned aspects assumes crucial importance. It is for the applicant to show convincingly that the threshold was attained in his or her case. The applicant has to present evidence substantiating consequences of the impugned measure. The Court will only accept that Article 8 is applicable where these consequences are very serious and affect his or her private life to a very significant degree. The Court has established criteria for assessing the severity or seriousness of alleged violations in different regulatory contexts. An applicant’s suffering is to be assessed by comparing his or her life before and after the measure in question. In determining the seriousness of the consequences in employment-related cases it is appropriate to assess the subjective perceptions claimed by the applicant against the background of the objective circumstances existing in the particular case. This analysis would have to cover both the material and the non-material impact of the measure. However, it remains for the applicant to define and substantiate the nature and extent of his or her suffering, which should have a causal connection with the impugned measure. Having regard to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the essential elements of such allegations must be sufficiently raised before the domestic authorities dealing with the matter (see Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, §§ 115-117, 25 September 2018). 37.  The Court notes that while the case at hand does not involve an employment-related dispute in the strict sense, it nonetheless concerns unfavourable measures employed in the context of a person’s professional life. The Court therefore considers that the general principles concerning the applicability of Article 8 of the Convention laid down in Denisov (cited above) are also relevant to the present case (see Bagirov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 81024/12 and 28198/15, § 87, 25 June 2020; see also, mutatis mutandis, Polyakh and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 58812/15 and 4 others, §§ 207-11, 17 October 2019; Convertito and Others v. Romania, nos. 30547/14 and 4 others, § 29, 3 March 2020; and Platini v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 526/18, § 56, 11 February 2020). 38.  The Court observes that the applicant’s suspension was temporary and lasted for six months. The Court does not discern a causal link between the disputed suspension and the fact that between 2013 and 2023 the applicant, according to his own submissions, was only authorised to represent clients as an advocate thirty-five times. Firstly, the applicant did not submit any information as to how many authorisations he had obtained before his suspension and, secondly, it cannot be excluded that the applicant voluntarily focused on activities other than representing clients as an advocate after his suspension (see paragraph 18 above). 39.  The Court also notes that the applicant did not assert that he had lost all or a large part of his income because of the suspension. Moreover, it has not been disputed by the parties that between 2013 and 2015 the applicant developed methodological manuals for advocates and received payment for that work. During and after the suspension the applicant continued to work in the legal field, namely as an expert for an NGO and as president of the board of directors of a governmental body (ibid). Even if the applicant’s situation among his “inner circle”, other advocates, or society in general was affected by his temporary suspension, there are no factual grounds, let alone evidence put forward by the applicant, that would indicate that such effects were so substantial as to constitute an interference with the applicant’s rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (see J.B. and Others v. Hungary, no. 45434/12, 45438/12 and 375/13, § 133, 27 November 2018). 40.  Accordingly, measuring the applicant’s subjective perception against the objective background and assessing the material and non-material impact of his suspension on the basis of the evidence presented before the Court, it has to be concluded that the negative effects which the impugned measure had on the applicant’s private life did not cross the threshold of seriousness for the issue to be raised under Article 8 of the Convention. 41.  It follows that this Article is not applicable, and that the applicant’s complaint must be dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4. As regards Article 13, this provision having no independent existence, the related complaint is likewise incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4.        ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION   Lack of access to a remedy with a suspensive effect 42.  The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention that he did not have access to a court and an effective remedy because his appeals against the decision of 17 April 2013 had not had a suspensive effect, meaning that the decision had been executed before he could effectively appeal against it. 43.  The Government submitted that the Bar is an independent body and the State was not responsible for its actions or omissions. The courts which had reviewed the decision of the Bar had acted in accordance with the law and their decisions had not been arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. The applicant had brought court proceedings challenging the alleged procedural violations committed by the bodies of the Bar and therefore he had exercised his right of access to a court. 44.  It is undisputed between the parties that the civil limb of Article 6 is applicable, since the applicant has an arguable claim under the Convention concerning the “determination of civil rights and obligations” (see Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, no. 36889/18, § 64, 20 October 2020). 45.  The Court considers that the measure imposed on the applicant did not produce irreversible effects which would imperatively warrant access to a remedy with a suspensive effect (see, mutatis mutandis, De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no. 22689/07, §§ 82-83, ECHR 2012). It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4.    Length of proceedings 46.  Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the consideration of his appeals against the decisions to suspend his licence had lasted too long. 47.  The Government submitted that it was not responsible for the period during which the applicant’s appeals had been under examination by the bodies of the Bar. As regards consideration of his appeals by the courts, the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings because he had instituted a parallel set of proceedings before the Podilskyy Court (see paragraph 24 above). There were no delays attributable to the domestic courts. 48.  The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicants and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicants in the dispute (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). 49.  The Court observes that the applicant instituted proceedings before the Kyiv District Administrative Court on 5 October 2016. The final decision in the case was delivered on 9 December 2021. The applicant familiarized himself with this decision in November 2022. 50.  The Court observes that in February 2017 the Kyiv District Administrative Court suspended the examination of the applicant’s case because the applicant instituted proceedings against the decisions of the Bar bodies at the Podilskyy District Court. It remains unknown why the proceedings had been resumed one year after 6 March 2017, when the Kyiv Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 22 December 2016 (see paragraph 25 above). The Court observes that there is no evidence in the case file that the applicant had indeed informed the Kyiv District Administrative Court of the decision of 6 March 2017 in April 2017. The Court therefore cannot establish whether the delay in the resumption of the proceedings between March 2017 and May 2018 was attributable to the applicant or to the Government. 51.  The Court further observes that following the resumption of the proceedings in May 2018 the applicant repeatedly enquired with the Kyiv District Administrative Court, in 2018 and 2019, about the progress in his case, but received no reply. It also observes that the Government did not submit any information about the progress of the case during that period (see paragraph 29 above). 52.  The Court accepts that the length of proceedings in the present case can be imputable to the Government only from 5 October 2016, when the applicant instituted proceedings before a court. However, in the Court’s view, the domestic courts should not have disregarded that consideration of the applicant’s appeals by the various bodies of the Bar had lasted for about three years at that point. 53.  The Court observes that the subject matter of the case was not particularly complex, given that the courts were only competent to verify the lawfulness of the proceedings before the bodies of the Bar. 54.  Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court has not found any fact or argument, including the applicant’s possible contribution to the delays, capable of justifying the overall length of the proceedings at the national level. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. 55.  This complaint is therefore admissible and discloses a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.    Other issues under Article 6 of the Convention 56.  The applicant alleged that both the bodies of the Bar and the courts had not examined the merits of the case, namely whether or not he had been informed of the meeting of 7 December 2012. He complained that the changes to the Rules of Procedure (see paragraph 16 above) had been unlawfully adopted and then unlawfully applied to his case because the decisions against him had been issued prior to the introduction of the changes. He also complained that the transfer of his case to the Zakarpattya Bar had been unlawful and that the decision of 17 April 2013 had been taken in his absence. 57.  The Court notes that the applicant had been able to raise those complaints before the bodies of the Bar and then the courts. The courts examined them using the proper procedure and established that the procedure before the bodies of the Bar had been lawful. The courts provided relevant and sufficient reasons for their conclusions and the Court sees no reason to depart from their findings. No arbitrariness can be discerned from the courts’ decisions. 58.  In view of the above, the Court considers that the present part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 59.  The applicant claimed 4,500 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 60.  The Government contested that claim. 61.  Having regard to the facts of the case and the Court’s conclusions, the Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. It thus sees no call to award him any amount under that head. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention concerning the length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings; Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 February 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.    Martina Keller Gilberto Felici  Deputy Registrar President