9401/07
WyrokETPCz2010-11-23ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:1123JUD000940107
Analiza orzeczenia
Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.
Zagadnienie prawne
Czy przewlekłość postępowania sądowego w sprawie o ustalenie wysokości wynagrodzenia naruszyła prawo skarżącej do rozpoznania sprawy w rozsądnym terminie, gwarantowane przez art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji?Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że łączny czas trwania postępowania sądowego, wynoszący ponad 6 lat i 10 miesięcy (4,5 roku przed orzeczeniem Sądu Konstytucyjnego i kolejne 2 lata i 5 miesięcy), był nadmierny i nie spełniał wymogu "rozsądnego terminu" z art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji. Trybunał podkreślił konieczność szczególnej staranności w sprawach dotyczących sporów pracowniczych. Odmówił uznania zarzutu rządu, że skarżąca powinna była złożyć nową skargę konstytucyjną, biorąc pod uwagę długość postępowania po orzeczeniu Sądu Konstytucyjnego.Stan faktyczny
Skarżąca, Terézia Bruňová, w 2000 roku wniosła pozew przeciwko prywatnej firmie o ustalenie wysokości wynagrodzenia. Sprawa toczyła się przed Sądem Rejonowym w Michalovcach i Sądem Okręgowym w Koszycach. Sąd Konstytucyjny w 2006 roku nie stwierdził naruszenia prawa do rozsądnego terminu w odniesieniu do początkowego okresu postępowania (ok. 4,5 roku). Postępowanie kontynuowano, a w 2008 roku Sąd Rejonowy umorzył sprawę z powodu wycofania roszczenia przez skarżącą, co stało się ostateczne w 2009 roku.Rozstrzygnięcie
Stwierdza dopuszczalność skargi.
Stwierdza naruszenie art. 6 ust. 1 Konwencji.
Nie przyznaje żadnych kwot z tytułu słusznego zadośćuczynienia na podstawie art. 41 Konwencji.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF BRUŇOVÁ v. SLOVAKIA
(Application no. 9401/07)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
23 November 2010
This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Bruňová v. Slovakia,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
Lech Garlicki, President,
Ján Šikuta,
Vincent Anthony de Gaetano, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 2 November 2010,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 9401/07) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovak national, Ms Terézia Bruňová (“the applicant”), on 6 February 2007.
2. The applicant was represented by Mr R. Soták, a lawyer practising in Michalovce. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
3. On 24 February 2010 the President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol no. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
4. The Government objected to the examination of the application by a Committee. After having considered the Government's objection, the Court rejects it.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Michalovce.
6. On 23 March 2000 she lodged an action against a private company for determination of the amount of her salary. The case was dealt with by the Michalovce District Court and also by the Košice Regional Court, which quashed part of the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the District Court.
7. On 24 August 2006 the Constitutional Court found no violation of the applicant's right to a hearing within a reasonable time. As the applicant complained exclusively about the period of the proceedings before the Michalovce District Court, the Constitutional Court examined only that period (approximately four years and a half).
8. The proceedings were then pending before the District Court and the Košice Regional Court. On 3 December 2008 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had withdrawn her claim. The decision became final on 3 February 2009.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
9. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
10. The Government relied on the Constitutional Court's finding of 24 August 2006 and argued that the applicant should have lodged a fresh constitutional complaint in respect of the subsequent period.
11. At the time of the Constitutional Court's judgment the period of the proceedings of which the applicant had complained lasted four years and a half for one level of jurisdiction. Subsequently courts at two levels of jurisdiction dealt with the case for another two years and five months. In view of its established case-law (see Becová v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 23788/06, 18 September 2007), the Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
12. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). The Court reiterates that special diligence is necessary in employment disputes (Ruotolo v. Italy, judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 230-D, p. 39, § 17).
13. The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see Frydlender, cited above).
14. Having examined all the materials submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
15. Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
16. On 7 July 2010, after the application had been communicated to the respondent Government and the parties informed that the admissibility and merits of the case would be examined at the same time, the Court invited the applicant to submit her claims for just satisfaction by 18 August 2010. The applicant did not submit any just satisfaction claims within the time-limit fixed by the Court. The Court, therefore, makes no award under Article 41 of the Convention (see, for example, A. R., spol. s r. o. v. Slovakia, no. 13960/06, §§ 62-65, 9 February 2010, with further references).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 23 November 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Fatoş Aracı Lech Garlicki
Deputy Registrar President
© Rada Europy / Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka, źródło: HUDOC (hudoc.echr.coe.int), pozyskano 13.07.2026. · Źródło