C-39/95
WyrokTSUE1996-03-21CELEX: 61995CJ0039ECLI:EU:C:1996:127
Analiza orzeczenia
Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.
Zagadnienie prawne
Czy art. 4 ust. 6 rozporządzenia (EWG) nr 3820/85, wyłączający z zakresu jego stosowania pojazdy używane do zbierania i usuwania odpadów, obejmuje pojazdy prywatnych przedsiębiorstw zajmujących się zbieraniem i przetwarzaniem odpadów, które transportują kontenery na odpady lub odpady przemysłowe, w tym na długie dystanse?Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że art. 4 ust. 6 rozporządzenia nr 3820/85, jako przepis derogacyjny, wymaga ścisłej interpretacji w świetle celów rozporządzenia, tj. harmonizacji warunków konkurencji, poprawy warunków pracy i bezpieczeństwa drogowego. Wyłączenie dotyczy usług świadczonych w interesie publicznym, a pojęcie „zbieranie odpadów” odnosi się do czynności zbierania odpadów z miejsca ich złożenia, gdzie transport jest pomocniczy, odbywa się na ograniczonym dystansie i przez krótki czas. Transport na długie dystanse nie wchodzi w zakres tego wyłączenia. Ponadto, wyłączenie obejmuje zarówno odpady domowe, handlowe, jak i specjalne, o ile ich zbieranie leży w interesie publicznym, i może być świadczone zarówno przez władze publiczne, jak i prywatne przedsiębiorstwa działające pod ich kontrolą, co wynika ze zmiany brzmienia przepisu w porównaniu do poprzedniego rozporządzenia.Stan faktyczny
Pan Goupil, prezes i dyrektor generalny firmy zajmującej się sprzątaniem i przetwarzaniem odpadów, został oskarżony o czterokrotne naruszenie przepisów dotyczących czasu pracy kierowców. Jego firma używała pojazdów do zbierania odpadów od przedsiębiorstw i transportowania ich na wysypisko lub do spalarni. Podczas kontroli stwierdzono, że jeden z kierowców przekroczył ustawowy limit ciągłej jazdy. Pan Goupil argumentował, że pojazdy jego firmy są zwolnione z tych przepisów na mocy art. 4 ust. 6 rozporządzenia nr 3820/85.Rozstrzygnięcie
Słowa „pojazdy używane do zbierania i usuwania odpadów” w art. 4 ust. 6 rozporządzenia Rady (EWG) nr 3820/85 z dnia 20 grudnia 1985 r. w sprawie harmonizacji niektórych przepisów socjalnych dotyczących transportu drogowego należy interpretować w ten sposób, że obejmują one pojazdy używane do zbierania wszelkiego rodzaju odpadów, które nie podlegają bardziej szczegółowym przepisom, oraz do transportu takich odpadów na krótkie odległości, w ramach ogólnej usługi w interesie publicznym świadczonej bezpośrednio przez władze publiczne lub przez prywatne przedsiębiorstwa pod ich kontrolą.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
Case C-39/95
Criminal proceedings
against
Pierre Goupil
(Reference for a preliminary rulingfrom the Tribunal de Police, La Rochelle)
«(Social legislation relating to road transport – Derogation for refuse vehicles)»
Opinion of Advocate General Léger delivered on 25 January 1996
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber), 21 March 1996
Summary of the Judgment
Transport – Road transport – Social legislation – Derogations – Vehicles used in refuse collection and disposal – Definition
(Council Regulation No 3820/85, Art. 4(6))
When it refers amongst the categories of transport excluded from the scope of its provisions to transport by
vehicles used in ... refuse collection and disposal, Article 4(6) of Regulation No 3820/85 on the harmonization of certain social legislation relating to road transport must
be interpreted as referring to vehicles used for the collection of waste of all kinds which is not subject to more specific
rules and for the transportation of such waste over short distances, within the context of a general service in the public
interest provided directly by the public authorities or by private undertakings under their control.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber)
21 March 1996 (1)
((Social legislation relating to road transport – Derogation for refuse vehicles))
In Case C-39/95,
REFERENCE to the Court under Article 177 of the EC Treaty by the Tribunal de Police, La Rochelle (France), for a preliminary
ruling in the criminal proceedings before that court against
Pierre Goupil,
on the interpretation of Article 4(6) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 of 20 December 1985 on the harmonization of certain
social legislation relating to road transport (OJ 1985 L 370, p. 1),
THE COURT (First Chamber),,
composed of: D.A.O. Edward, President of the Chamber, P. Jann (Rapporteur) and L. Sevón, Judges,
Advocate General: P. Léger,
Registrar: H. von Holstein, Deputy Registrar
after considering the written observations submitted on behalf of:
─
Mr Goupil, by Paul Mauriac and Alexandre Carnelutti, both of the Paris Bar,
─
the French Government, by Edwige Belliard, Deputy Director of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
Anne de Bourgoing, on assignment to the same department, acting as Agents,
─
the United Kingdom, by Lindsey Nicoll, of the Treasury Solicitor's Department, acting as Agent,
─
the Commission of the European Communities, by Götz zur Hausen, Legal Adviser, acting as Agent,
having regard to the Report for the Hearing,
after hearing the oral observations of Mr Goupil, represented by Paul Mauriac and Alexandre Carnelutti, of the French Government,
represented by Romain Nadal, Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
acting as Agent, of the United Kingdom, represented by Nicholas Green, Barrister, and of the Commission, represented by Götz
zur Hausen, at the hearing on 30 November 1995,
after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 25 January 1996,
gives the following
Judgment
By judgment of 31 January 1995, received at the Court on 17 February 1995, the Tribunal de Police (Local Criminal Court),
La Rochelle, referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EC Treaty a question on the interpretation
of Article 4(6) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 of 20 December 1985 on the harmonization of certain social legislation
relating to road transport (OJ 1985 L 370, p. 1; hereinafter
the regulation).
The question was raised in the course of criminal proceedings against Mr Goupil, who was charged with infringing the rules
on drivers' working time on four occasions.
The regulation prescribes the duration of driving and rest periods in Sections IV and V. However, Article 4 provides: This regulation shall not apply to carriage by:...
(6)
vehicles used in connection with the sewerage, flood protection, water, gas and electricity services, highway maintenance
and control, refuse collection and disposal, telegraph and telephone services, carriage of postal articles, radio and television
broadcasting and the detection of radio or television transmitters or receivers;
...
Mr Goupil is the chairman and general manager of a cleaning and waste treatment company. The company's vehicles collect waste
from undertakings and transport it to a tip or incineration plant. On an inspection, the gendarmerie discovered that one
of the company's drivers had on four occasions exceeded the statutory limit for continuous driving. Mr Goupil was prosecuted
for infringement of the regulation and of French Decree No 1130 of 17 October 1986.
At the hearing before the national court, Mr Goupil stated that under Article 4(6) of the regulation he was not obliged to
equip his company's vehicles with a tachograph and that the excess driving time could not therefore constitute an infringement.
The Tribunal de Police, La Rochelle, decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following question to the Court of Justice
for a preliminary ruling: Does Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 exempt from the scope of Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 vehicles belonging to private
companies engaged in the collection and treatment of waste which transport waste skips or industrial waste, including cases
where such transport is effected over long distances?
In this question, the national court seeks in effect a definition of the phrase
vehicles used in connection with ... refuse collection and disposal used in Article 4(6) of the regulation.
Article 4 of the regulation lists certain categories of transport which are excluded from its scope. Being thus a derogation
from the general scheme, Article 4 may not be interpreted in such a way as to extend its effects beyond what is necessary
to safeguard the interests which it seeks to secure. Furthermore, the scope of the derogations which it lays down must be
determined in the light of the aims pursued by the regulation (see Case C-116/91
Licensing Authority South Eastern Traffic Area v
British Gas [1992] ECR I-4071, paragraph 12).
With regard to the interests which Article 4(6) of the regulation seeks to safeguard, the derogations provided for in that
provision are based on the nature of the services in connection with which the vehicles are used. In that respect it is apparent
from the list in Article 4(6) that the services envisaged by that provision are all general services performed in the public
interest (see
Licensing Authority South Eastern Traffic Area v
British Gas , cited above, paragraph 13).
The purpose of the regulation, as the first recital in its preamble states, is to harmonize conditions of competition and
to improve working conditions and road safety.
In the light of those objectives, and primarily that relating to the improvement of road safety, the term
refuse collection should be interpreted as applying only to the collection of refuse from a place where it has been deposited. Vehicles used
for that activity travel over a limited distance and for a short period, and the transport remains ancillary to the collection.
Refuse transport which does not have those features cannot fall within the exemption. It is for the national court to determine
in each case before it whether that is so.
Moreover, since the services referred to in Article 4(6) are in the public interest, refuse which is capable of being the
subject of that activity should be defined to include both domestic and commercial waste and also special waste, the collection
of which is in the public interest. That interpretation also conforms to the objective of harmonizing conditions of competition,
without however preventing more specific provisions from being applied to certain types of waste, such as Article 13(1)(d)
of the regulation, which applies to animal waste.
Within the limits thus defined, the movement of vehicles when empty and when preparing to carry out such transportation also
falls within Article 4(6) of the regulation.
Finally, the vehicles in question do not have to be used by the public authorities directly in order to benefit from the exemption.
Regulation No 3820/85 is intended to make more flexible the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 on the harmonization
of certain social legislation relating to road transport (OJ, English Special Edition 1969 (I), p. 170). Unlike the provision
it replaces, namely Article 4(4) of Regulation No 543/69, as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2827/77 of 12 December
1977 amending Regulation (EEC) No 543/69 (OJ 1977 L 334, p. 1), Article 4(6) of Regulation No 3820/85 no longer refers to
vehicles which are used by other public authorities for public services. The result of that amendment in the wording is that the derogation may benefit not only the public authorities but also
private undertakings which provide a general service in the public interest under their control.
The answer to the question must therefore be that the words
vehicles used in connection with ... refuse collection and disposal in Article 4(6) of the regulation must be interpreted as covering vehicles used for the collection of waste of all kinds
which is not subject to more specific rules and for the transportation of such waste over short distances, within the context
of a general service in the public interest provided directly by the public authorities or by private undertakings under their
control.
Costs
The costs incurred by the French Government, the United Kingdom and the Commission of the European Communities, which have
submitted observations to the Court, are not recoverable. Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings,
a step in the proceedings pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court.
On those grounds,
THE COURT (First Chamber)
in answer to the question referred to it by the Tribunal de Police, La Rochelle, by judgment of 31 January 1995, hereby rules:
Edward
Jann
Sevón
Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 21 March 1996.
R. Grass
D.A.O. Edward
Registrar
President of the First Chamber
–
Language of the case: French.
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