C-272/25

ORDER OF THE COURT (Ninth Chamber) 18 December 2025 (*) ( Appeal – Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Plant protection products – Active substances clothianidin and thiamethoxam – Determination of maximum residue levels for the relevant active substances in or on certain products – Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 – Conditions of admissibility of the action – Direct concern – Evidence ) In Case C‑272/25 P, APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 9 April 2025, Maud Tea & Seed Co. Ltd, established in Kolkata (India), represented by D. Waelbroeck and I. Antypas, avocats, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: European Commission, defendant at first instance, THE COURT (Ninth Chamber), composed of M. Condinanzi, President of the Chamber, N. Jääskinen and A. Kornezov (Rapporteur), Judges, Advocate General: M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, makes the following Order 1        By its appeal, Maud Tea & Seed Co. Ltd seeks to have set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 30 January 2025, Maud Tea & Seed v Commission (T‑247/23, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2025:126), by which the General Court dismissed as inadmissible its action for annulment, primarily, of Commission Regulation (EU) 2023/334 of 2 February 2023 amending Annexes II and V to Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards maximum residue levels for clothianidin and thiamethoxam in or on certain products (OJ 2023 L 47, p. 29, corrigendum OJ 2023 L 96, p. 89; ‘the regulation at issue’) in its entirety or, in the alternative, as regards those levels applicable to teas.  Background to the dispute 2        The facts of the dispute are set out as follows in paragraphs 2 to 15 of the order under appeal: ‘2      The [appellant] is a company established in India whose activities include the production and marketing of tea. 3      Clothianidin and thiamethoxam (“the substances at issue”) are active substances belonging to the neonicotinoid family which are used as insecticides in agriculture for seed coating. 4      Clothianidin and thiamethoxam were included in Annex I to Council Directive 91/414/EEC of 15 July 1991 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market (OJ 1991 L 230, p. 1), since 1 August 2006 and 1 February 2007 respectively by Commission Directive 2006/41/EC of 7 July 2006 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC to include clothianidin and pethoxamid as active substances (OJ 2006 L 187, p. 24), and Commission Directive 2007/6/EC of 14 February 2007 amending Council Directive 91/414/EEC to include metrafenone, Bacillus subtilis, spinosad and thiamethoxam as active substances (OJ 2007 L 43, p. 13). 5      The active substances listed in Annex I to Directive 91/414 are deemed to have been approved under Regulation (EC) No 1107/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC (OJ 2009 L 309, p. 1) and are listed in Part A of the annex to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 540/2011 of 25 May 2011 implementing Regulation No 1107/2009 as regards the list of approved active substances (OJ 2011 L 153, p. 1). Expiry of the approval of the substances at issue 6      On account of the risks to bees arising from the use of the substances at issue, the European Commission has progressively restricted the conditions for approval of those substances. 7      First, on 24 May 2013, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) No 485/2013 amending Implementing Regulation No 540/2011, as regards the conditions of approval of the active substances clothianidin, thiamethoxam and imidacloprid, and prohibiting the use and sale of seeds treated with plant protection products containing those active substances (OJ 2013 L 139, p. 12). 8      Second, on 29 May 2018, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/784 amending Implementing Regulation No 540/2011 as regards the conditions of approval of the active substance clothianidin (OJ 2018 L 132, p. 35) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/785 amending Implementing Regulation No 540/2011 as regards the conditions of approval of the active substance thiamethoxam (OJ 2018 L 132, p. 40). By those two implementing regulations, the Commission, inter alia, restricted the approval of the substances at issue solely to uses in permanent greenhouses and provided that the crops obtained remain in a permanent greenhouse throughout their life cycle. 9      The approvals of clothianidin and thiamethoxam expired on 31 January 2019 and 30 April 2019 respectively and were not renewed, with the result that the use of the substances at issue is now prohibited within the European Union. Amendment of the maximum residue levels of the substances at issue 10      Regulation (EC) No 396/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 February 2005 on maximum residue levels of pesticides in or on food and feed of plant and animal origin and amending Directive 91/414 (OJ 2005 L 70, p. 1) lays down provisions on maximum residue levels (“MRLs”) of pesticides in or on products of plant or animal origin covered by Annex I thereto for use as fresh, processed and/or composite food or feed (“the relevant products”). 11      The MRLs for the substances at issue applicable to teas are set at 0.7 mg/kg for clothianidin and 20 mg/kg for thiamethoxam. 12      On account of the growing international concerns linked to the decline of pollinators, on the one hand, and the expiry of the approval of the substances at issue referred to in paragraph 9 above, on the other, the Commission adopted the [regulation at issue] on 2 February 2023. Under that regulation, the MRLs for the substances at issue present in or on the relevant products were lowered to the limit of determination, the latter being defined by Article 3(2)(f) of Regulation No 396/2005 as the validated lowest residue concentration which can be quantified and reported by routine monitoring with validated control methods. 13      To that end, the annex to the [regulation at issue] provides, first, for the deletion of the columns relating to the substances at issue in Annex II to Regulation No 396/2005 and, second, for the addition of columns relating to those substances in Annex V to that regulation. 14      Pursuant to the [regulation at issue], the MRLs for the substances at issue applicable to teas were reduced to 0.05 mg/kg. 15      The [regulation at issue] states that it applies from 7 March 2026, it being noted that the old MRLs for the substances at issue continue to apply to products manufactured in or imported into the European Union before that date.’  The proceedings before the General Court and the order under appeal 3        By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 10 May 2023, the appellant brought an action for annulment, primarily, of the regulation at issue in its entirety or, in the alternative, of the regulation at issue in so far as it concerns the MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam in or on teas. 4        By separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 23 October 2023, the Commission raised a plea of inadmissibility on the basis of Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, by which it contended that the Court should dismiss the action as inadmissible and order the appellant to pay the costs. 5        By a measure of organisation of procedure of 16 May 2024, the Court put written questions to the appellant concerning, inter alia, the production of evidence of the placement of its products on the EU market, to which the appellant replied within the prescribed period. 6        By the order under appeal, the Court upheld the second plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, alleging that the appellant did not have standing to bring proceedings, and, consequently, dismissed the action as inadmissible. In particular, the Court considered that the appellant had not established that it was directly affected by the regulation at issue, since it had not produced evidence to show that, on the date at which the action was brought, its tea production was exported to the European Union.  Form of order sought by the appellant 7        The appellant requests that the Court of Justice: –        set aside the order under appeal; –        declare the action for annulment admissible and refer the case back to the General Court for a decision on the merits; –        in the alternative, refer the case back to the General Court to rule afresh on the admissibility of the action; and –        order the Commission to pay the costs incurred in the appeal proceedings and in the proceedings at first instance.  The appeal 8        Under Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may, at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part. 9        That provision must be applied in the present case. 10      In support of its appeal, the appellant raises three grounds of appeal, alleging, first, distortion of the evidence; second, an error of law in applying the test as to whether the appellant is directly concerned; and, third, insufficient and unclear reasoning.  First ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the evidence  Arguments of the appellant 11      By its first ground of appeal, which is in two parts, the appellant maintains that the General Court manifestly distorted the evidence produced by the appellant, first, by failing to appraise it and mischaracterising it and, second, by wrongly declining to attribute any probative value to the sworn statement of its director of operations and plantations attesting to the fact that the European Union is a key export market for the appellant. 12      By the first part of that ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the order under appeal was vitiated by the General Court’s error of assessment in declining to attribute any probative value to that statement solely on the ground that it emanated from the appellant’s director of operations and plantations and contained figures that were not supported by other pieces of evidence. The appellant argues that it had in fact produced several other pieces of evidence to support that statement, namely an internal tax invoice, a legal opinion detailing the nature of the relationship between the appellant and its sister company, the annual accounts of that sister company for the 2022-2023 financial year and a list drawn up by the Tea Board of India listing the sister company as one of the top 100 Indian tea exporters for 2022 and 2023. 13      The appellant also argues that it had produced various reports from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) as well as export data from the Tea Board of India. It claims that the General Court dismissed that body of evidence on the ground that this was general data relating to exports of Indian tea, which did not specifically concern the appellant and which did not make it possible to establish that its tea production was, at least in part, exported to the European Union. 14      It infers from this that the General Court manifestly distorted the substantial body of evidence submitted. In particular, while the General Court was required to evaluate that evidence as a whole and to determine whether it was mutually supporting, it had carried out an erroneous piecemeal assessment of that evidence, failing to take account of its cumulative value and dismissing essential pieces of evidence in isolation. 15      The General Court had, moreover, failed to take account of certain information on the website of the appellant’s sister company, to which reference had been made in the appellant’s written submissions. That information indicated that that company holds several certifications, such as Naturland, a certification institution established in Germany, and BioSuisse, a certification primarily associated with imports into Switzerland, signifying, according to the appellant, exports to the European Union or, at the very least, to the broader European region. 16      By the second part of the first ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court disregarded settled case-law according to which a statement drawn up in the interests of its author may have evidential value, where corroborated by other evidence. By declining to attach any significance to the sworn statement of the appellant’s director of operations and plantations, the General Court failed to acknowledge – and, accordingly, to consider – the evidence capable of confirming the substance of that statement.  Findings of the Court 17      According to settled case-law, where an appellant alleges distortion of the evidence by the General Court, the appellant must, pursuant to Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of its Rules of Procedure, indicate precisely the evidence alleged to have been distorted by the General Court and show the errors of appraisal which, in the appellant’s view, led to such distortion. In addition, according to settled case-law, that distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 10 December 2020, Comune di Milano v Commission, C‑160/19 P, EU:C:2020:1012, paragraph 84). 18      In the present case, first of all, it is not at all apparent from the arguments expounded before the Court of Justice that any of the pieces of evidence invoked by the appellant and referred to in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the present order are capable of demonstrating that either the appellant or its sister company did in fact export tea to the European Union at the time when the action was brought. It is not readily apparent from those arguments or, moreover, from those pieces of evidence that, contrary to the General Court’s findings, at least one of them specifically covered exports, by the appellant or by its sister company, of tea to the European Union. 19      It follows that the arguments summarised in paragraphs 12 to 14 of the present order do not in any way reveal errors of appraisal that would have led to any distortion on the part of the General Court and do not make it possible to establish that any distortion of the evidence is obvious from the documents in the Court’s file. 20      In particular, by the arguments summarised in paragraph 14 of the present order, the appellant is, in fact, seeking a fresh assessment of the evidence, without indicating in a sufficiently precise manner the distortion levelled against the General Court or showing the errors of analysis which led it to commit it. Such a line of argument is, therefore, inadmissible at the appeal stage (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 November 2024, Harley-Davidson Europe and Neovia Logistics Services International v Commission, C‑297/23 P, EU:C:2024:971, paragraph 80 and the case-law cited). 21      Next, in so far as the appellant relies on German and Swiss certifications, it is apparent from the case file submitted to the General Court that such certifications were not produced or even referred to in the appellant’s pleadings before that court, so that that line of argument must be regarded as having been raised for the first time before the Court of Justice. Consequently, in accordance with settled case-law, that line of argument must be declared inadmissible (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, thyssenkrupp v Commission, C‑581/22 P, EU:C:2024:821, paragraph 123 and the case-law cited). 22      Lastly, in paragraphs 107 to 113 of the order under appeal, the General Court recalled that, in accordance with its case-law, probative value cannot be attributed to a sworn statement such as that drawn up by the appellant’s director of operations and plantations unless it is supported by other evidence. 23      As it is, in paragraphs 101, 104 and 119 of that order, the General Court noted that that statement was not supported by any other evidence, even though, as has been stated in paragraph 5 of the present order, the appellant had been requested to produce such evidence. 24      Moreover, contrary to what the appellant maintains before the Court of Justice, it is apparent from paragraphs 18 to 21 of the present order that the appellant has failed to establish that it provided the General Court with evidence capable of supporting the sworn statement of its director of operations and plantations attesting to the fact that the European Union is an export market for it. 25      In those circumstances, the appellant’s arguments concerning an error of law allegedly committed by the General Court in its assessment of the probative value of that statement must be rejected as manifestly unfounded. 26      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded.  Second ground of appeal, alleging an error of law in applying the ‘direct concern’ test  Arguments of the appellant 27      By its second ground of appeal, which is in three parts, the appellant claims that, by adopting an overly narrow interpretation of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, the General Court incorrectly ruled that the appellant was not directly concerned by the regulation at issue. It argues, in essence, that the General Court failed to take into account the broader perspective of a global exporter and the operational impact of the regulation at issue on its business activities, thereby infringing the appellant’s right to an effective judicial remedy. 28      By the first part of that ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by requiring the appellant, in paragraph 120 of the order under appeal, to prove the existence of actual exports of tea to the European Union at the date on which the action was brought, when, according to the appellant, the General Court was required to adopt the broader perspective of a global exporter. The General Court should have taken due account of the dynamic and fluid nature of international trade and of the legitimate interest of global tea exporters, such as the appellant, in maintaining ongoing access to the EU market. According to the appellant, by adopting a particularly narrow interpretation of the condition of direct concern to the appellant, the General Court disregarded the realities of global trade. 29      The appellant also maintains that the conditions of admissibility set out in Article 263 TFEU must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental right to effective judicial protection. Accordingly, even if the General Court had been entitled to find, on the basis of the evidence before it, that the appellant was not exporting tea to the European Union at the time when the action was brought (quod non), the condition of direct concern to the appellant cannot be so narrowly construed as to deprive the appellant of the opportunity to challenge the legality of the regulation at issue, since that would clearly have the effect of preventing the appellant, in future, from exporting to the European Union tea containing residues above the new MRLs for clothianidin and thiamethoxam. 30      By the second part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by finding, in paragraphs 121 to 123 of the order under appeal, that the substantial and immediate operational impact of the regulation at issue on its business activities was not such that that regulation could be regarded as being of direct concern to the appellant, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. 31      The appellant claims to have shown that it used products containing the substances covered by the regulation at issue and that that regulation accordingly imposes significant changes to its existing farming practices, which directly affects its legal and economic situation. According to the appellant, the obligation to adapt those farming practices due to the new MRLs directly affects its legal obligations, since it will no longer have access to the EU market unless it complies with those MRLs, which effectively means that the lawful access to the EU market which it previously had is being revoked. In addition, the need to adapt farming methods could potentially lead to higher costs, lower yields and an increased risk of resistance or crop loss, fundamentally altering its operational situation. 32      By the third part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law by depriving it, through an overly restrictive interpretation of the condition of direct concern, of the right to an effective judicial remedy.  Findings of the Court 33      First, it is apparent from settled case-law that, in the context of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, the admissibility of the action must be assessed in the light of the situation prevailing at the time when the application was lodged (see, to that effect, judgment of 24 October 2013, Deutsche Post v Commission, C‑77/12 P, EU:C:2013:695, paragraph 65 and the case-law cited). 34      Consequently, the General Court did not err in law when examining whether, at the time when the action was brought before it, the appellant had demonstrated that it was exporting tea to the European Union, in order to determine whether the regulation at issue directly affected its legal situation for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. 35      Second, in so far as the appellant relies on the dynamic and fluid nature of international trade to assert that the regulation at issue will prevent it, in future, from exporting tea to the European Union, it must be noted that that line of argument is being raised for the first time before the Court of Justice. Consequently, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 21 of the present order, it must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. 36      Third, as regards the impact of the regulation at issue on the appellant’s activities, the General Court found, in paragraph 122 of the order under appeal, that since exports of tea to the European Union had not been established, the effects of that regulation on the appellant’s legal situation had not been demonstrated. 37      It was thus only for the sake of completeness that the General Court added, in paragraph 123 of the order under appeal, that the mere fact that a measure may have an influence on an applicant’s material situation, and not on its legal situation, is not sufficient for it to be held that the measure is of direct concern to that applicant. 38      It is apparent from settled case-law that complaints directed against the grounds included in a decision of the General Court purely for the sake of completeness cannot lead to that decision being set aside and are therefore ineffective (judgment of 1 August 2025, France and Commission v CWS Powder Coatings and Others, C‑71/23 P and C‑82/23 P, EU:C:2025:601, paragraph 134 and the case-law cited). 39      Fourth, in so far as the appellant maintains that the General Court’s interpretation of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU adversely affected its right to an effective judicial remedy, it should be recalled that Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is not intended to change the system of judicial review laid down by the Treaties, and particularly the rules relating to the admissibility of direct actions brought before the Courts of the European Union, as is apparent also from the Explanation on Article 47 of the Charter, which must, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 6(1) TEU and Article 52(7) of the Charter, be taken into consideration for the interpretation of the Charter (judgment of 4 June 2015, Andechser Molkerei Scheitz v Commission, C‑682/13 P, EU:C:2015:356, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). 40      As the General Court was fully entitled to find in paragraphs 44 to 47 of the order under appeal, the fact that an applicant must be directly concerned by the measure against which that applicant brings an action for annulment is among the conditions of admissibility of that action and requires in particular that that measure directly affect the applicant’s legal situation. It follows that Article 47 of the Charter does not preclude the action brought by the appellant in the present case being declared inadmissible given that the regulation at issue is not of direct concern to the appellant (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 June 2015, Andechser Molkerei Scheitz v Commission, C‑682/13 P, EU:C:2015:356, paragraphs 30 and 31). 41      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the second ground of appeal must be rejected as, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded.  Third ground of appeal, alleging insufficient and unclear reasoning  Arguments of the appellant 42      The third ground of appeal is in two parts, the first of which asserts a failure to provide reasoning as to the assessment of the evidence and the appellant’s arguments and the second, a lack of clarity as regards the distinction between material and legal impacts on the appellant’s situation. 43      By the first part of that ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, in paragraphs 124 and 125 of the order under appeal, the General Court failed to provide sufficient reasoning in its assessment of the evidence submitted by the appellant, or to conduct a comprehensive analysis of that evidence. It also submits that the fact that the General Court did not sufficiently take into consideration, in paragraphs 121 to 123 of the order under appeal, its legal argument that substantial operational changes could satisfy the condition of direct concern constitutes a further error of law. 44      By the second part of that ground of appeal, the appellant maintains that the General Court’s statement in paragraphs 121 to 123 of the order under appeal that the mere fact that a measure may have an influence on an applicant’s material situation is not sufficient for that measure to be regarded as being of direct concern to the applicant, lacks clarity and precision. According to the appellant, the General Court did not explain the distinction it made between the material impacts, which it deemed insufficient to establish that the appellant was directly concerned, and those that have direct legal implications. That lack of clarity is, it argues, particularly problematic in the context of regulatory measures that impose substantial operational changes on businesses.  Findings of the Court 45      According to settled case-law, the obligation to state reasons is an essential procedural requirement that must be distinguished from the question whether the reasoning is well founded, which goes to the substantive legality of the measure at issue (judgment of 18 January 2024, Jenkinson v Council and Others, C‑46/22 P, EU:C:2024:50, paragraph 130 and the case-law cited). 46      Consequently, the General Court fulfils that obligation when the statement of reasons for a judgment or an order clearly and unequivocally discloses the General Court’s reasoning, in such a way as to enable the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and to enable the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review. The obligation to state reasons incumbent on the General Court does not, however, require the General Court to provide an account which follows exhaustively and one by one all the arguments put forward by the parties to the case; the reasoning may thus be implicit, on condition that it enables the persons concerned to ascertain the reasons why it has not upheld their arguments and provides the Court of Justice with sufficient material for it to exercise its power of review (judgment of 18 January 2024, Jenkinson v Council and Others, C‑46/22 P, EU:C:2024:50, paragraph 131 and the case-law cited). 47      In the present case, first of all, contrary to what is argued by the appellant, paragraphs 121 to 125 of the order under appeal clearly and unequivocally disclose the General Court’s reasoning in such a way as to enable the appellant to ascertain the reasons for the decision taken and to enable the Court of Justice to exercise its power of review. 48      Next, as is apparent from the case-law referred to in paragraph 46 of the present order, the General Court was in no way required to respond exhaustively to each of the arguments put forward by the appellant. It is clear from the order under appeal that the General Court found that none of the evidence submitted by the appellant supported the sworn statement referred to in paragraph 11 above and that, accordingly, the appellant had failed to establish that its legal situation was directly affected by the regulation at issue. 49      Lastly, as regards the argument concerning an insufficiently clear distinction between material and legal impacts on the appellant’s situation, it is sufficient to note that that argument relates to a ground included in the order under appeal for the sake of completeness, as noted in paragraph 37 of the present order, and cannot, therefore, be accepted, in accordance with the case-law recalled in paragraph 38 of the present order. 50      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the third ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded and, consequently, the appeal must be dismissed in its entirety as, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded.  Costs 51      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, applicable to the procedure on an appeal pursuant to Article 184(2) of those rules of procedure, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 52      Since the present order was adopted without the appeal having been notified to the other party to the proceedings and, therefore, before it could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the Court (Ninth Chamber) hereby orders: 1.      The appeal is dismissed as, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly unfounded. 2.      Maud Tea & Seed Co. Ltd shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 18 December 2025. A. Calot Escobar   M. Condinanzi Registrar   President of the Chamber *      Language of the case: English.