C-278/26
PostanowienieTSUE2026-06-30CELEX: 62026CO0278ECLI:EU:C:2026:528
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Zagadnienie prawne
Czy odwołanie od wyroku Sądu dotyczącego decyzji EUIPO powinno zostać dopuszczone do rozpoznania, jeśli skarżący nie wykazał, że podniesione kwestie mają istotne znaczenie dla jedności, spójności lub rozwoju prawa Unii, zgodnie z art. 58a Statutu Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej i art. 170a(1) Regulaminu postępowania?Ratio decidendi
Trybunał odmówił dopuszczenia odwołania do rozpoznania, ponieważ skarżący (Puma SE) nie spełnił wymogów określonych w art. 58a Statutu Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej oraz art. 170a i 170b Regulaminu postępowania. Skarżący nie wykazał w sposób konkretny i szczegółowy, że podniesione w odwołaniu kwestie prawne mają istotne znaczenie dla jedności, spójności lub rozwoju prawa Unii, ani nie wskazał, w jaki sposób Sąd rzekomo naruszył orzecznictwo, ani dlaczego taka sprzeczność miałaby istotne znaczenie. Wniosek o dopuszczenie odwołania do rozpoznania musi zawierać wszystkie niezbędne informacje, aby Trybunał mógł ocenić, czy odwołanie powinno być rozpoznane, a skarżący nie sprostał temu obowiązkowi.Stan faktyczny
Puma SE wniosła odwołanie od wyroku Sądu Unii Europejskiej z dnia 21 stycznia 2026 r. (T‑43/25), którym Sąd oddalił jej skargę o stwierdzenie nieważności decyzji Czwartej Izby Odwoławczej Urzędu Unii Europejskiej ds. Własności Intelektualnej (EUIPO) z dnia 13 listopada 2024 r. (R 275/2024-4). Decyzja EUIPO dotyczyła postępowania w sprawie sprzeciwu między Puma SE a Ningbo Gongfang Commercial Management Co. Ltd. w kwestii znaku towarowego przedstawiającego zakrzywiony pasek i nieregularny trójkąt w czarnym prostokącie. Puma SE zarzuciła Sądowi naruszenie art. 8 ust. 1 lit. b) rozporządzenia (UE) 2017/1001, twierdząc, że Sąd błędnie zastosował zasady porównywania kolidujących znaków.Rozstrzygnięcie
1. Odwołanie nie zostaje dopuszczone do rozpoznania.
2. Puma SE pokrywa własne koszty.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
ORDER OF THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed)
30 June 2026 (*)
( Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed )
In Case C‑278/26 P,
APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 1 April 2026,
Puma SE, established in Herzogenaurach (Germany), represented by M. Schunke and P. Trieb, Rechtsanwälte,
appellant,
the other party to the proceedings being:
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),
defendant at first instance,
THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed),
composed of T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, M. Condinanzi and N. Jääskinen (Rapporteur), Judges,
Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,
having regard to the proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, A. Rantos,
makes the following
Order
1 By its appeal, Puma SE asks the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 21 January 2026, Puma v EUIPO– Ningbo Gongfang Commercial Management (Representation of a curved stripe and an irregular triangle inside a black rectangle) (T‑43/25, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2026:31), whereby the General Court dismissed its action seeking annulment of the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 November 2024 (Case R 275/2024-4), concerning opposition proceedings between Puma SE and Ningbo Gongfang Commercial Management Co. Ltd.
The request that the appeal be allowed to proceed
2 Under the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal of EUIPO is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so.
3 In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
4 Under Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court to rule on that request.
5 In accordance with Article 170b(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court is to rule as soon as possible on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, in the form of a reasoned order.
Arguments of the appellant
6 In support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant submits that the single ground of its appeal, alleging an infringement of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), raises issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, which have not yet been addressed by the Court.
7 The applicant claims, in essence, that the General Court disregarded and/or incorrectly applied the principles relating to the comparison of conflicting signs deriving from the case-law arising, in particular, from the judgment of 12 June 2008, O2 Holdings and O2 (UK) (C‑533/06, EU:C:2008:339, paragraphs 66 and 67), from which it follows that the examiner must, when comparing the two signs, take into account all the circumstances in which the mark applied for might be used. However, according to the appellant, the General Court based its comparison of the signs solely with regard to the form in which they were applied for or registered, excluding all other considerations.
8 In that regard, the applicant submits that, while the General Court recognised that the sign in the contested mark and that in the earlier marks had similar structures, but different orientations, it did not draw the correct conclusions from that finding. The appellant further argues that the General Court put too great an emphasis on the simple black background of the contested mark without taking into account that the signs of the earlier marks could also be used on a black background, so that, regardless of the sign in question, only the white stripes remain as a sign for the viewer, which could be interpreted as an indication of origin.
9 In that context, the appellant calls on the Court of Justice to clarify, in the interests of the unity, consistency and development of EU law, that the imperfect recollection of the marks in the minds of the relevant consumers, the speed of transactions concerning the goods in question, the potential circumstances of the use of the marks concerned and the possible different perspectives from which the consumer might view the mark are decisive factors when assessing the visual similarity of purely figurative signs, especially of signs that show abstract geometric figures that do not have a ‘natural’ orientation.
Findings of the Court
10 As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that it is for the appellant to demonstrate that the issues raised by its appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 20, and of 18 November 2025, EUIPO v Versiontech, C‑411/25 P, EU:C:2025:943, paragraph 20).
11 Furthermore, as is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read together with Article 170a(1) and Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must contain all the information necessary to enable the Court to give a ruling on whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed and to specify, where the appeal is allowed to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. Given that the objective of the mechanism provided for in Article 58a of that statute whereby the Court determines whether an appeal should be allowed to proceed is to restrict review by the Court to issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 21, and of 18 November 2025, EUIPO v Versiontech, C‑411/25 P, EU:C:2025:943, paragraph 21).
12 Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the judgment or order under appeal, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the judgment or order under appeal. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the judgment or order under appeal which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 22, and of 18 November 2025, EUIPO v Versiontech, C‑411/25 P, EU:C:2025:943, paragraph 22).
13 A request that an appeal be allowed to proceed which does not contain the information mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present order cannot, from the outset, be capable of demonstrating that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that justifies the appeal being allowed to proceed (order of 24 October 2019, Porsche v EUIPO, C‑613/19 P, EU:C:2019:905, paragraph 16 and the case-law cited).
14 In the present case, as regards the line of argument set out in paragraphs 7 to 9 of the present order, the Court of Justice finds that, whilst the appellant sets out the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, the fact remains that, first, it does not identify the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal which it intends to criticise and, second, it merely sets out that error of law without showing that the error, even if it were established, raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law which would justify the appeal being allowed to proceed. Furthermore, although, in its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant identifies the questions which, in its view, the Court of Justice should answer, it confines itself to arguing that clarification should be provided as regards the decisive criteria for the assessment of the visual similarity of the figurative signs and the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, without specifically setting out the reasons why such issues are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
15 In accordance with the burden of proof which lies with the appellant requesting that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant must demonstrate that, independently of the issues of law invoked in its appeal, the appeal raises one or more issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, the scope of that criterion going beyond the judgment under appeal and, ultimately, its appeal. In order to demonstrate that that is the case, it is necessary to establish both the existence and significance of such issues by means of concrete evidence specific to the particular case, and not simply of arguments of a general nature (order of 15 July 2025, Qozgar v EUIPO, C‑35/25 P, EU:C:2025:582, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited).
16 It follows that the appellant has not complied with all the requirements set out in paragraph 12 of the present order.
17 In those circumstances, it must be held that the request submitted by the appellant is not capable of establishing that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law.
18 In the light of the foregoing, the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.
Costs
19 Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.
20 Since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other party to the proceedings and, therefore, before it could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs.
On those grounds, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders:
1. The appeal is not allowed to proceed.
2. Puma SE shall bear its own costs.
Luxembourg, 30 June 2026.
A. Calot Escobar
T. von Danwitz
Registrar
President of the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed
* Language of the case: English.
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