C-308/25

Provisional text OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SPIELMANN delivered on 11 June 2026 (1) Case C‑308/25 Agenzia delle Entrate – Direzione Provinciale di Bergamo v Isolanti Group Srl (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte di Giustizia Tributaria di secondo grado della Lombardia – Milano (Tax Court of Second Instance, Lombardy – Milan, Italy)) ( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Article 4(3) TEU – Obligation to ensure effective collection of the European Union’s own resources – Common system of value added tax (VAT) – Directive 2006/112/EC – Articles 2 and 273 – Principle of tax neutrality – National legislation permitting the simplified resolution of tax disputes ) Introduction 1.        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns tax legislation which allows taxable persons for the purposes of value added tax (VAT) who have failed to meet certain requirements and have brought proceedings before the tax courts to have their tax debt extinguished, except in disputes relating to the VAT levied on imports. By way of derogation from the ordinary rules, the savings made may range, depending on the level of proceedings and the stage of the proceedings, from 10% to 95% of the tax debt and include exemption from payment of late payment interest and penalties. 2.        In proceedings between the Agenzia delle Entrate – Direzione Provinciale di Bergamo (Tax Authority – Provincial Directorate of Bergamo, Italy) (‘the tax authority’) and Isolanti Group Srl, the legal successor to Bergamo Isolanti SpA, concerning the recovery of unduly deducted VAT, the Corte di Giustizia Tributaria di secondo grado della Lombardia – Milano (Tax Court of Second Instance, Lombardy – Milan, Italy), the referring court, raises the question of whether it is required to discontinue the proceedings on the basis of the simplified resolution of the tax dispute. 3.        This request therefore concerns the interpretation of Article 4(3) TEU, Articles 250 and 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (2) and the principle of fiscal neutrality and provides the Court with an opportunity to clarify its case-law on ‘tax amnesties’. Legal framework European Union law The EU Treaty 4.        Article 4(3) TEU provides: ‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.’ Directive 2006/112 5.        Article 2(1) of Directive 2006/112 provides: ‘The following transactions shall be subject to VAT: (a)      the supply of goods for consideration within the territory of a Member State by a taxable person acting as such; (b)      the intra-Community acquisition of goods for consideration within the territory of a Member State …: … (c)      the supply of services for consideration within the territory of a Member State by a taxable person acting as such; (d)      the importation of goods.’ 6.        Article 250(1) of that directive provides: ‘Every taxable person shall submit a VAT return setting out all the information needed to calculate the tax that has become chargeable and the deductions to be made including, in so far as is necessary for the establishment of the basis of assessment, the total value of the transactions relating to such tax and deductions and the value of any exempt transactions.’ 7.        The first paragraph of Article 273 of that directive is worded as follows: ‘Member States may impose other obligations which they deem necessary to ensure the correct collection of VAT and to prevent evasion, subject to the requirement of equal treatment as between domestic transactions and transactions carried out between Member States by taxable persons and provided that such obligations do not, in trade between Member States, give rise to formalities connected with the crossing of frontiers.’ Italian law 8.        Article 1(186) to (200) of legge n. 197 – Bilancio di previsione dello Stato per l’anno finanziario 2023 e bilancio pluriennale per il triennio 2023-2025 (Law No 197 – State Budget for the 2023 financial year and multi-year budget for the three-year period 2023-2025) of 29 December 2022 (3) provides: ‘186.      Disputes before the tax courts in which the [tax authority] … is a party, pending at any stage or level of proceedings, including those before the Corte suprema di cassazione [(Supreme Court of Cassation, Italy)], even following referral of a case back to a lower court, on the date on which this law enters into force, may be resolved, at the request of the party lodging the application initiating proceedings or of the party that has taken over or has standing to do so, by means of payment of an amount equal to the value of the dispute. The value of the dispute [shall be the amount of the tax, net of interest and any penalties imposed in the contested measure]. 187.      In the case of an action pending at first instance, a dispute can be resolved by means of payment of 90% of the value of that dispute. 188.      By way of derogation from the provisions of paragraph 186, where the competent tax authority has been unsuccessful in the most recent or only non-interim judgment given on the date on which this law enters into force, disputes may be resolved by means of payment of: (a)      40% of the value of the dispute where the authority has been unsuccessful at first instance; or (b)      15% of the value of the dispute where the authority has been unsuccessful at second instance. 189.      Where an action has been upheld in part or the taxable person and the competent tax authority have both been unsuccessful in part, the amount of the tax, net of interest and any penalties, shall be payable in full in relation to the part of the contested measure which has been confirmed by the court judgment and at a reduced rate, according to the provisions of paragraph 188, in relation to the part of the contested measure which has been annulled. 190.      Tax disputes pending before the Corte suprema di cassazione [(Supreme Court of Cassation)] in which the competent tax authority has been unsuccessful at all previous levels of proceedings can be resolved by means of payment of an amount equal to 5% of the value of the dispute. … 192.      The simplified resolution mechanism shall apply to disputes in which notice of the action at first instance was served on the defendant by the date on which this law enters into force and for which the proceedings have not been concluded with a final judgment by the date of submission of the request referred to in paragraph 186. 193.      Disputes that concern any of the following, even if only in part, shall be excluded from the simplified resolution mechanism: (a)      traditional own resources … and the [VAT] levied on imports; (b)      sums due as recovery of State aid … . 194.      The simplified resolution mechanism shall be implemented through the submission of the request referred to in paragraph 195 and payment of the amounts due in accordance with paragraphs 186 to 191 by 30 September 2023; where the amounts due exceed EUR 1 000, payment by instalments shall be permitted … 195.      By 30 September 2023, a separate request for simplified resolution, exempt from stamp duty, must be submitted for each separate dispute and a separate payment must be made. “Separate dispute” means that relating to each contested measure. … 198.      In disputes pending at any stage and level of proceedings, where the submission referred to in the second sentence of paragraph 197 has been made, the proceedings shall be declared concluded by an order of the president of the division or by an order in chambers if a date for the decision has been set. The costs of the proceedings shall be borne by the party that has incurred them. … 200.      Any refusal of a simplified resolution must be notified by 30 September 2024 in accordance with the procedures for the service of procedural documents. Such refusals may be challenged within sixty days of notification before the court before which the dispute is pending. …’ The dispute in the main proceedings, the questions referred for a preliminary ruling and the procedure before the Court 9.        On 24 March 2021, Bergamo Isolanti was served with a notice of assessment issued by the tax authority, in which the latter sought to recover unduly deducted VAT relating to false invoices, together with interest and penalties amounting to a total of EUR 95 787.42. In that notice, that company was criticised for having shown no diligence in assessing the subjective profile of its contracting parties and for failing to act with the diligence normally required of a reasonably experienced trader. 10.      By an application notified on 19 May 2021, Isolanti Group, which had in the meantime absorbed Bergamo Isolanti, brought an action seeking cancellation of that notice. 11.      By judgment of 5 April 2022, the Commissione tributaria provinciale di Bergamo (Provincial Tax Court, Bergamo, Italy) upheld the action brought by Isolanti Group. 12.      On 3 November 2022, the tax authority brought an appeal against that judgment before the referring court. 13.      On 3 August 2023, Isolanti Group requested a stay of proceedings on the ground that it had submitted a request for resolution of the pending tax dispute under to Article 1(186) et seq. of Law No 197/2022. 14.      By a submission lodged on 24 April 2024, the tax authority stated that the request for resolution had been accepted and that, accordingly, the conditions for finding that the dispute had become devoid of purpose were satisfied. 15.      The referring court states that it should take formal notice of the parties’ concurring submissions and discontinue the proceedings on the basis of the resolution of the tax dispute, pursuant to the provisions of Law No 197/2022, without being able to rule on the substance of the complaints raised by the tax authority against the judgment delivered at first instance. 16.      In that regard, the referring court states that Law No 197/2022 introduced a set of rules which allow taxable persons who have failed to meet certain requirements to extinguish their tax debt on favourable terms, by way of derogation from the ordinary rules, thereby benefiting from savings ranging, depending on the level and stage of the proceedings, from 10% to 95% of their tax debt and to be exempt from the payment of interest and penalties, except as regards disputes relating to the VAT levied on imports. 17.      However, the referring court considers that the application of the provisions of Law No 197/2022 is likely to result in an infringement of Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 250 and 273 of Directive 2006/112 and of the Italian State’s obligation to ensure collection of all of the VAT due on its territory, effective collection of the EU’s own resources and compliance with the principles of fiscal neutrality and equal treatment of taxable persons. 18.      In those circumstances, the Corte di Giustizia Tributaria di secondo grado della Lombardia – Milano (Tax Court of Second Instance, Lombardy – Milan) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1)      Do Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 250 and 273 of Directive 2006/112/EC … preclude the national legislation laid down in Article 1(193)(a) of legge 197 del 2022 (Law No 197/2022), in so far as it excludes from the mechanism of simplified resolution only disputes concerning [even] only partially the VAT levied on imports and not also those concerning even only partially [EU] VAT or VAT provided for by EU law, for which the simplified resolution of disputes is instead permitted[?] (2)      Do the principle of fiscal neutrality and the proper functioning of the common system of [VAT] preclude the national legislation laid down in Article 1(193)(a) of Law No 197/2022 in so far as it – illogically or otherwise in a discriminatory manner – excludes from the mechanism of simplified resolution only disputes concerning the VAT levied on imports and not also those concerning even only partially [EU] VAT or VAT provided for by EU law, for which the simplified resolution of disputes is instead permitted, taking into account also the principle referred to in Article 4(3) TEU with which national rules and practices must comply[?] (3)      Is the mechanism of simplified resolution laid down in the abovementioned national legislation, even if considered compatible with EU law, contrary to the general principle of proportionality, in so far as it could result in a benefit for the private taxpayer of up to 95% of the unpaid tax and, consequently, an economic loss for the State budget, which is also significant from the point of view of EU law?’ 19.      The Italian Government and the European Commission have submitted written observations in this case and presented oral arguments at the public hearing held on 18 March 2026. Analysis 20.      By its questions, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 250(1) and 273 of Directive 2006/112 preclude a simplified resolution mechanism such as that at issue in the main proceedings, in the light of, on the one hand, the obligation to ensure the collection of all the VAT (first and third questions) and, on the other hand, the principle of neutrality, in particular since simplified resolution is excluded for tax disputes concerning the VAT levied on imports (second question). 21.      As a preliminary point, I would note that the national legislation at issue applies to ongoing tax disputes. Simplified resolution therefore takes place after the VAT return has been submitted and verified by the tax authority. However, Article 250 of Directive 2006/112 concerns the obligation to submit the VAT return. Accordingly, as the Commission argues, I am of the view that it is not necessary to interpret that provision in the present case. 22.      In order to answer the questions referred, which I shall examine together, I shall, in the first place, recall the relevant case-law in order to examine, in the second place, the simplified resolution mechanism at issue in the light of the provisions and principles relied on by the referring court, as interpreted in the light of that case-law. Principles and case-law of the Court relating to ‘tax amnesties’ 23.      It follows, in particular, from Article 273 of Directive 2006/112, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, that Member States are under an obligation to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on their territory. (4) 24.      Although, under the common system of VAT, the Member States are required to ensure compliance with the obligations to which taxable persons are subject, they enjoy in that respect a certain latitude, inter alia, as to how they use the means at their disposal. (5) 25.      The Court has, however, stated that that latitude is limited in two respects. On the one hand, Member States are under an obligation to ensure effective collection of the European Union’s own resources, which include, as provided in Article 2(1) of Council Decision 2007/436/EC, Euratom of 7 June 2007 on the system of the European Communities’ own resources, (6) revenue from application of a uniform rate to the harmonised VAT assessment bases determined according to European Union rules. (7) On the other hand, that latitude is limited by the obligation not to create significant differences in the manner in which taxable persons are treated, either within a Member State or throughout the Member States. Directive 2006/112 must be interpreted in accordance with the principle of fiscal neutrality inherent in the common system of VAT, according to which economic operators carrying out the same transactions must not be treated differently in relation to the levying of VAT, either within a Member State or throughout the Member States. Any action by the Member States concerning the collection of VAT must comply with that principle, (8) the purpose of which is to enable ‘fair competition’ within the internal market. (9) 26.      The Court has already been called upon to rule on Italian ‘tax amnesty’ schemes. 27.      On those occasions, it held, in two judgments relating to a failure to fulfil obligations, that a general and indiscriminate waiver of verification of taxable transactions effected in a series of tax years infringed Articles 2 and 22 of the Sixth Directive 77/388/EEC, (10) as well as Article 10 EC, which laid down, in essence, the principle of sincere cooperation, now set out in Article 4(3) TEU. (11) The provisions of Italian law at issue in those cases essentially granted broad immunity from assessment or investigation by tax authorities in respect of amounts of VAT which had not been declared in good time, in exchange for a payment varying from half the amount subsequently declared to a purely token amount of tax. For the Court, in those cases, the effect of the considerable imbalance between the amounts actually due and the amounts paid by taxable persons wishing to take advantage of the tax amnesty in question was tantamount to a tax exemption and those significant variations in the treatment of taxable persons in Italy distorted fiscal neutrality. 28.      Similarly, by two orders, (12) the Court has ruled that Articles 2 and 22 of the Sixth Directive precluded an Italian law which, in the light of the earthquake that struck the provinces of Catania, Ragusa and Syracuse (Italy), allowed the taxpayers concerned to obtain a reduction of 90% and 60% of the VAT due for the years 1990 to 1992, in breach of the obligations to collect all the VAT and the principle of fiscal neutrality. The Court held that the measure at issue in the main proceedings had the effect, first, not of relieving some taxable persons of the tax burden as regards VAT, but of allowing some taxable persons to keep or recover sums paid by the final consumer and payable to the tax authorities. Moreover, the Italian authorities definitively deprived themselves of the possibility of carrying out checks as regards the taxable situations and, consequently, failed to ensure the collection in full of the VAT due in Italy. (13) 29.      By contrast, in the judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni, (14) the Court considered that neither Article 4(3) TEU nor Articles 2 or 22 of the Sixth Directive precluded the application in VAT matters of an ‘exceptional’ provision of national law under which proceedings pending before a higher court were automatically terminated where they originated in an application brought at first instance more than 10 years before the date of the entry into force of that provision and the tax authorities had been unsuccessful at first and second instance. The provision at issue in that case had the automatic effect of making the decision of the court of second instance – a decision unfavourable to the tax authorities – became final and thus of extinguishing the debt claimed by the tax authorities. The Court’s reasoning in finding the provision compatible with EU law was based on its exceptional and limited nature, on the lack of any overall discriminatory effect and on the need to give judgment within a reasonable time. 30.      Similarly, in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Degano Trasporti, the admission of a partial payment of a VAT claim by an insolvent trader, in the context of a procedure for an arrangement with creditors, was held not to constitute a ‘general and indiscriminate waiver of collecting VAT’ and therefore not to be contrary either to the obligation on Member States to ensure collection of all of the VAT due on their territory or to the effective collection of the European Union’s own resources. (15) 31.      Have the judgments in Belvedere Costruzioni and in Degano Trasporti shattered the ‘dogma’ of the impossibility of adopting VAT amnesties (16) and opened a Pandora’s box? 32.      I do not think so. 33.      That case-law, clarified by the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, (17) becomes coherent in the factual and legal circumstances of each particular case. 34.      Accordingly, in the case which gave rise to the judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni, the Court pointed out, in particular, that the Italian decree-law at issue covered the conclusion solely of tax proceedings pending before the court of third instance which, at the date of the entry into force of that provision, had lasted for more than 10 years since the application at first instance was made, and that it pursued the objective of remedying the breach of the reasonable time requirement. It therefore constituted not a general waiver of the collection of VAT for a certain period but an exceptional provision intended to ensure observance of the reasonable time principle by concluding the oldest proceedings pending before the tax court of third instance. Moreover, because of its specific and limited character as a result of its conditions of application, such a measure did not create significant differences in the way in which taxable persons were treated as a whole, and did not therefore infringe the principle of fiscal neutrality. (18) 35.      In the case which gave rise to the judgment in Degano Trasporti, the procedure for an arrangement with creditors as described by the referring court was considered compatible with the obligation on Member States to ensure effective collection of the European Union’s resources, on the ground, in particular, that it was subject to strict conditions of application. Accordingly, the Court held that an insolvent trader could apply to a court to open a procedure for an arrangement with creditors for the purpose of settling its debts by liquidating its assets, in which that trader offered only partial payment of a VAT debt and established by an independent expert’s report that that debt would not be repaid more fully in the event of that trader’s bankruptcy. The specific and limited character of that measure was also highlighted as making it compatible with the principle of fiscal neutrality. (19) 36.      It therefore follows from those two judgments that it is only in certain specific circumstances that a Member State may reasonably consider it legitimate to waive full payment of a VAT debt, provided that such circumstances are exceptional, specific and limited and that the Member State does not thereby create significant differences in the way in which taxable persons are treated as a whole and does not therefore infringe the principles of effective collection of VAT and fiscal neutrality. Application to the legislation at issue in the main proceedings Infringement of the obligation to collect VAT in full 37.      In the first place, I would recall that the national legislation at issue established a simplified resolution mechanism which allows taxable persons who have failed to meet certain requirements to extinguish a tax debt on favourable terms, by way of derogation from the ordinary rules, thereby benefiting from savings varying from 10% to 95% of their tax debt, depending on the level of proceedings and the outcome of the preceding procedural stages, and being exempt from the payment of late payment interest and any applicable penalties. 38.      Accordingly, the simplified resolution mechanism established by the national legislation at issue entails in itself a mechanism which undermines the obligation to collect VAT in full. 39.      It consists in the resolution of the dispute in return for payment of a part of the amount of VAT due, based on an assessment of the percentage of the chances of success of the various parties. The VAT, deemed to be due at the time of the simplified resolution, is therefore not paid in full in return for a ‘saving’ of the remainder of the proceedings. Accordingly, simplified resolution is based, in essence, on the assumption that the lower the probability that the tax authority will ultimately succeed, the more the VAT collected may be reduced. Conversely, the more likely it is that the tax authority will be successful and the taxable person be unsuccessful, the higher the amount the taxable person must pay to resolve the dispute. The number of proceedings which have already taken place and their outcomes are factors which affect those ‘probabilities’. 40.      Specifically, where the taxable person has already become a party to the proceedings by filing or submitting the request for resolution to the court having jurisdiction by 1 January 2023, the dispute may be resolved by payment of 90% of the VAT due. Where the tax authority has been unsuccessful in the most recent or only judgment given by that date, the dispute may be resolved by payment of 40% of the VAT due if the tax authority was unsuccessful at first instance and by payment of 15% if it was unsuccessful at second instance. Where both the taxable person and the tax authority have been unsuccessful in part, the same percentages apply to the part of the contested measure which has been annulled. However, for the part of the contested measure upheld by the court decision, the amount of tax, net of interest and any penalties, is payable in full. Finally, in order to resolve a tax dispute pending before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) as at 1 January 2023, in which the tax authority has been unsuccessful at all previous levels of proceedings, the taxable person is permitted to pay only 5% of the amount of VAT due. Whether or not it is permissible to waive the collection of VAT 41.      In the second place, it is necessary to consider whether such simplified resolution amounts to a waiver of the collection of VAT in full which is acceptable in the light of the Member States’ discretion in this matter. 42.      In my view, the answer is ‘no’ for four reasons. 43.First, I consider, as the Commission submits, that the scope of the national legislation at issue is very broad, which confers on the waiver of the collection of VAT a general character. 44.      Apart from the exclusion of the application of the simplified resolution mechanism (20) provided for by Law No 197/2022 relating to the VAT levied on imports, that simplified resolution mechanism applies to all disputes pending before the tax courts as at 1 January 2023, the date of its entry into force, provided that the request for such resolution was submitted before 30 September 2023. (21) The duration of the ongoing proceedings is therefore of little importance, since this includes disputes brought shortly before 1 January 2023, including those which have been pending for only a short time. Moreover, in the dispute in the main proceedings, the notice of assessment, dated March 2021, was challenged in May 2021 and adjudicated at first instance on 5 April 2022 and the request for simplified resolution was made on 3 August 2023 before the appeal court, in a dispute which had therefore been ongoing for just over two years. (22) 45.      Moreover, that simplified resolution mechanism applies irrespective of the level of proceedings before which the dispute is ongoing and therefore the court before which it is being heard. It may therefore be applied even at final instance before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation). In that respect, the scope of the legislation at issue differs considerably from that at issue in the judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni, which applied only at third instance and solely to disputes pending for more than ten years. 46.      Furthermore, that simplified resolution may be requested by the taxable person regardless of the amounts involved or the nature of the infringement in question, since no ceiling is specified in that regard. Nor does the existence of evasion prevent the simplified resolution mechanism from applying. 47.      In addition, as confirmed by the Italian Government at the hearing, neither the tax authority nor the court hearing the case has any discretion, where appropriate, to refuse simplified resolution, (23) except on purely formal grounds. If the taxable person for the purposes of VAT submits, within the prescribed period, the request for simplified resolution and pays the amounts due in accordance with the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, the proceedings automatically end and the dispute becomes devoid of purpose, irrespective of the amounts involved, the infringement in question or the reasoning of the court hearing the case previously. Neither the tax authority nor the court hearing the case therefore has the possibility of objecting to the termination of the dispute in order, where appropriate, to obtain, for example, a definitive interpretation from the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) on the matter. (24) 48.      It is true that, as the Italian Government points out, simplified resolution takes place ‘downstream’ from the exercise of the power of taxation, which must necessarily have been exercised and exhausted. Simplified resolution thus presupposes that verification has already been carried out and, unlike the measure at issue in the case which led to the judgment in Commission v Italy, does not in itself result in the tax authority losing the power to verify taxable transactions. 49.      However, the fact that tax authorities are not deprived of any possibility of carrying out checks as regards the taxable situations is not a decisive criterion and is not sufficient to conclude that legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings is consistent with the obligation to collect VAT laid down in Article 273 of Directive 2006/112. (25) 50.      It follows, in my view, that the Italian Government’s argument, based on the fact that the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) has recognised that a simplified resolution mechanism is compatible with EU law provided that it does not entail a waiver, on the part of the authorities, of the right to verify the tax must be rejected as relating to an element which is not decisive. 51.      The simplified resolution mechanism at issue therefore seems to me, in the light of its broad scope, to constitute a general waiver of the collection of VAT for a certain period. 52.Secondly, I am of the view that the measure at issue creates significant differences in the way in which taxable persons are treated as a whole and, therefore, infringes the principle of fiscal neutrality. 53.      I would recall that the principle of fiscal neutrality, which was intended by the EU legislature to reflect, in matters relating to VAT, the general principle of equal treatment, precludes in particular treating economic operators carrying out the same transactions differently for VAT purposes. (26) 54.      First of all, the simplified resolution mechanism at issue allows taxable persons who have brought an action which is pending and who so request not only to pay a reduced amount of the VAT due, but also to be exempt from any applicable penalties and late payment interest, whereas this is not the case for other taxable persons in Italy who have fully discharged their obligations in relation to the payment of VAT. 55.      The simplified resolution mechanism thus gives rise to a difference in treatment contrary to the principle of fiscal neutrality. (27) 56.      Moreover, the inequality resulting from the legislation at issue in the main proceedings may be significant since, before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), the benefit may be of up to 95% of the VAT due, as is apparent from the third question referred by the referring court. Furthermore, the relationship between, on the one hand, the percentage of the amount of VAT to be paid to resolve the dispute and, on the other hand, the statistical probability that the decision will be favourable to one or other of the parties does not seem clear to me. (28) 57.      Finally, a mere request for simplified resolution leads to the waiver of any penalties imposed in the contested measure and late payment interest, which further adds to the unequal treatment that, in my view, is incompatible with the principle of fiscal neutrality. 58.      In that regard, I would point out that it follows from Articles 2 and 273 of Directive 2006/112, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, that Member States are required to take all legislative and administrative measures appropriate for ensuring collection of all the VAT due on their territory and for preventing fraud. In the absence of harmonisation of EU legislation in the field of the penalties applicable in cases of non-compliance with the conditions laid down by arrangements established under such legislation, Member States have the power to choose the penalties which seem to them to be appropriate, in accordance with EU law and its general principles, and, consequently, in accordance with the principles of proportionality and fiscal neutrality. It should also be borne in mind that, when choosing the penalties, Member States are required to comply with the principle of effectiveness, which requires effective and dissuasive penalties to be established to counter infringements of harmonised VAT rules and to protect the financial interests of the European Union. (29) 59.      Late payment interest is also intended to counter infringements of harmonised VAT rules and to protect the financial interests of the European Union. (30) Charging default interest helps in particular to combat failures to pay declared amounts of VAT within the prescribed time limits. (31) 60.      However, the Italian legislation at issue allows the taxable person concerned to avoid penalties and late payment interest, which places taxable persons acting in good faith who have paid the correct amount of VAT within the statutory time limits in a less favourable position than taxable persons who have not done so and who benefit from the possibility of requesting simplified resolution. 61.      Accordingly, in the dispute in the main proceedings, it is apparent from the file before the Court that the notice of assessment related to a total amount of EUR 95 787.42 claimed by the tax authority, comprising EUR 33 153 in unduly deducted VAT, EUR 6 688.73 in late payment interest and EUR 55 945.69 in penalties. The simplified resolution thus resulted, in addition to the waiver of approximately 60% of the VAT, in the exemption of penalties and late payment interest. 62.      This results, in my view, in a ‘considerable imbalance’ between the amounts actually due and the amounts paid by taxable persons seeking to benefit from the simplified resolution mechanism at issue, an imbalance which leads to significant variations in the treatment of taxable persons in Italy, thereby distorting the principle of fiscal neutrality. (32) 63.Thirdly, as noted by the referring court, such a system may be regarded as being likely to encourage tax evasion, in breach of Article 273 of Directive 2006/112. 64.      In that regard, the referring court states that ‘the rules at issue, far from constituting exceptional measures aimed at addressing specific and limited, highly critical situations, are instead in line with the trend in Italian tax legislation of providing for frequent and general relief measures favouring less scrupulous taxpayers, under various names’, since those rules constitute ‘a mechanism which encourages evasion by taxpayers and ultimately creates, in the minds of taxpayers, a kind of undue expectation, causing the system to lose its deterrent effect.’ (33) 65.      That finding by the referring court reinforces, in my view, the idea that the infringement of the obligation to collect VAT goes beyond the discretion left to Member States in that regard. 66.Fourthly, as stated by the referring court in its second question, the fact that VAT on importation is excluded from the simplified resolution mechanism also constitutes an infringement of the principle of ‘external’ fiscal neutrality. 67.      The principle of VAT neutrality precludes economic operators, supplying similar, or even identical, goods or services, from being treated more or less favourably according to whether those goods or services are supplied within the country of consumption or imported from third countries. (34) 68.      However, the rules governing the simplified resolution mechanism at issue allow only taxable persons liable for VAT on domestic supplies and intra-Community acquisitions to benefit, under certain conditions, from a reduction in the percentage of the amount of tax due, in addition to exemption from the payment of penalties and interest, unlike taxable persons liable for VAT on importation, who are excluded from that benefit. 69.      The argument put forward by the Italian Government at the hearing, according to which VAT on importation, levied after customs clearance upon the physical entry of the goods into the territory of the Member State concerned, is not comparable to VAT levied after declaration in connection with an intra-Community transaction, (35) does not, in my view, alter that finding as regards their comparability in the light of the principle of fiscal neutrality. 70.      Consequently, like the Commission, I consider that that legislation also infringes the principle of ‘external’ fiscal neutrality, in so far as, under that legislation, economic operators supplying similar or even identical goods or services are granted more favourable treatment if they supply them within the country of consumption than if they import them from third countries. The justification relied on: reducing the backlog and complying with the reasonable time requirement 71.      In the third place, the Italian Government, in order to justify the legislation at issue, relies on the objective of ‘reducing the enormous backlog in the tax courts and ensuring compliance with the principle that the duration of proceedings must be reasonable set out in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]’, as well as ‘allowing the effective implementation of the reform of tax procedure introduced by Law No 130/2022 [(36)] and of the principle of proportionality’. 72.      It is true that the obligation to ensure effective collection of the European Union’s resources cannot run counter to compliance with the principle that judgment be given within a reasonable time, which, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, (37) must be observed by the Member States when they implement EU law. (38) The Court, following in this matter the Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, thus held, in the judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni, that an exceptional provision intended to ensure observance of the reasonable time principle by concluding the oldest proceedings pending before the tax court of third instance, with the consequence that the decision of the court of second instance becomes final and binding, did not infringe the principle of fiscal neutrality. (39) 73.      However, I am in no way convinced by the Italian Government’s argument relying on that justification in the circumstances of the main proceedings. 74.      First of all, there is no complete consensus as to whether, in 2022, the number of pending cases was too high overall or whether the duration of proceedings was too long. The referring court refers to the 2023 annual report on the state of tax disputes, drawn up by the Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (Ministry of the Economy and Finance), and states that the objectives of reducing disputes set out in Law No 197/2022 at issue here arise in a context which does not present any particular problems as regards the time taken to resolve tax disputes. (40) The Italian Government, for its part, refers to the final report of 30 June 2021 of the Interministerial Commission for the Reform of Tax Justice and highlights the backlog and the duration of proceedings. I note, however, that it is clear from that report that it is primarily before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) that the issues of backlogs and of the duration of proceedings arise. (41) This is also what the Commission stated during the hearing. (42) 75.      Next, in order to ensure compliance with the principle that the duration of proceedings must be reasonable and to reduce the workload on the tax courts, a reform of tax disputes was introduced by Law No 130/2022, presented as an important step in the National Recovery and Resilience Plan. (43) That law thus introduced structural measures, such as, as stated by the Italian Government, the allocation of jurisdiction in tax matters to new judges recruited for that purpose and the creation, within the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), of a civil chamber responsible solely for tax disputes, giving the First President the power to adopt appropriate organisational measures. That law also provided for a simplified resolution mechanism, in the context of and limited to cases pending before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), (44) which the Commission referred to at the hearing, concluding that, unlike Law No 197/2022 at issue in the present case, it could be regarded as satisfactory. 76.      Finally, it must be noted that the circumstances in the main proceedings are very different from those at issue in the judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni. In that judgment, the relevant legislation applied to proceedings which had been pending for at least ten years and which were resolved only at third instance, following two judicial decisions unfavourable to the tax authority. As Advocate General Sharpston pointed out, where a dispute has been pending for a very long time, there inevitably comes a point at which certain considerations ‘must outweigh the duty to pursue all VAT claims’ and at which ‘the criteria … set out [in that case] in the disputed provision do not appear unreasonable in that context’. (45) Similarly, in the judgment in Degano Trasporti, specific circumstances, relating in particular to the taxable person’s situation and its insolvency, justified the arrangement with creditors, subject to very specific conditions. 77.      That is not the case with the simplified resolution mechanism established by Law No 197/2022, which applies even to disputes which have been ongoing for a short time, such as that at issue in the present case, which, in a way, renders the Italian Government’s argument ineffective, at least in the context of the dispute in the main proceedings. 78.      It is true, as the Commission acknowledges in its observations, that the disputes eligible for simplified resolution could also date back further in time. 79.      However, as it points out, even before the introduction of the simplified resolution mechanism in 2023, the Italian legislation already provided for a measure substantially identical to that of 2023, intended to cover ongoing tax disputes in 2018. (46) Therefore, the 2023 simplified resolution mechanism might, in actual fact, primarily cover disputes pending for less than five years, which is, moreover, the case in the dispute at issue in the main proceedings. 80.      Furthermore, and in any event, it seems to me that that justification, based on the unreasonableness of the length of the proceedings, which it is for the national court to assess, is not capable of justifying a general measure that waives the collection of VAT and is contrary to the obligation of fiscal neutrality, such as that at issue in the dispute in the main proceedings. 81.      In the light of the foregoing, I consider that the answer to the questions referred should be that Article 4(3) TEU, Articles 2 and 273 of Directive 2006/112 and the principle of fiscal neutrality must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which disputes relating to VAT, with the exception of those concerning the VAT on imports, may be resolved at the request of the taxable person, in exchange for the payment of a certain percentage of the tax due, which varies depending on the level of proceedings and the outcome of the preceding procedural stages, without the taxable person having to pay penalties or late payment interest and without the tax authorities being able to object to the request on grounds other than formal grounds. The request for a limitation of the temporal effects of the Court’s judgment 82.      At the hearing, the Italian Government asked the Court, in the event that the latter should find, as I recommend, that EU law precludes legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, to impose temporal limits on the effects of the judgment to be delivered. 83.      In support of its request, the Italian Government stated, in essence, that having to reactivate proceedings in the 40 000 disputes concerned (47) would require an enormous effort on the part of the tax authority, particularly in terms of human resources, would have an impact on tax justice as a whole in terms of lengthening the duration of proceedings and would nullify the National Recovery and Resilience Plan. It adds that this would cause practical problems for the taxable undertakings concerned, which, confident that their cases had been definitively closed, will not have retained the documents necessary to exercise their rights in the context of the resumption of proceedings. 84.      I would first of all point out that, according to settled case-law, the interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, the Court gives to a rule of EU law clarifies and defines the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be or ought to have been understood and applied from the time of its entry into force. It follows that the rule, as thus interpreted, may, and must, be applied by the courts even to legal relationships which arose and were established before the judgment ruling on the request for interpretation, provided that in other respects the conditions for bringing a dispute relating to the application of that rule before the courts having jurisdiction are satisfied. (48) 85.      It is only quite exceptionally that the Court may, in application of the general principle of legal certainty inherent in the EU legal order, be moved to restrict, for any person concerned, the opportunity of relying on a provision which it has interpreted with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. Two essential criteria must be fulfilled before such a limitation can be imposed, namely that those concerned should have acted in good faith and that there should be a risk of serious difficulties. (49) 86.      More specifically, the Court has taken that step only in quite specific circumstances, notably where there was a risk of serious economic repercussions owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force and where it appeared that individuals and national authorities had been led to adopt practices which did not comply with EU law by reason of objective, significant uncertainty regarding the implications of European Union provisions, to which the conduct of other Member States or the European Commission may even have contributed. (50) 87.      However, in the present case, the Italian Government has not adduced evidence which is capable of satisfying the criterion that those concerned have acted in good faith. In particular, it is not apparent from the arguments of that government that the Commission was consulted on the national legislation at issue. Moreover, in the light of the relevant case-law, (51) even though the legislation at issue is not the same as that already examined by the Court, I am of the view that there is no ‘objective, significant uncertainty’ regarding the implications of the applicable EU provisions on the obligation to collect VAT in full and to comply with the principle of fiscal neutrality. 88.      Since that criterion has not been satisfied, there is no need to determine whether the criterion relating to the seriousness of the economic or organisational repercussions has been met. In any event, I consider that the Italian Government’s statements at the hearing, concerning the 40 000 disputes resolved by means of the simplified resolution mechanism which would have to be reopened by the tax authority and the practical difficulties which would ensue both for the justice system and for undertakings, cannot suffice in that regard. 89.      It follows from the foregoing that, in my view, it is not appropriate to limit the temporal effects of the present judgment. Conclusion 90.      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Corte di Giustizia Tributaria di secondo grado della Lombardia – Milano (Tax Court of Second Instance, Lombardy – Milan, Italy) as follows: Article 4(3) TEU and Articles 2 and 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax and the principle of fiscal neutrality must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which disputes relating to value added tax, with the exception of those concerning the value added tax on imports, may be resolved at the request of the taxable person, in exchange for the payment of a certain percentage of the tax due, which varies depending on the level of proceedings and the outcome of the preceding procedural stages, without the taxable person having to pay penalties or late payment interest and without the tax authorities being able to object to the request on grounds other than formal grounds. 1      Original language: French. 2      OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1. 3      GURI No 303 of 29 December 2022, Ordinary Supplement No 43 (‘Law No 197/2022’). 4      See, by analogy, judgments of 17 July 2008, Commission v Italy (C‑132/06, ‘the judgment in Commission v Italy’, EU:C:2008:412, paragraph 37), and of 29 March 2012, Belvedere Costruzioni (C‑500/10, ‘the judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni’, EU:C:2012:186, paragraph 20). See, also, judgments of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson (C‑617/10, ‘the judgment in Åkerberg Fransson’, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 25), and of 7 April 2016, Degano Trasporti (C‑546/14, ‘the judgment in Degano Trasporti’, EU:C:2016:206, paragraph 19). 5      See the judgment in Degano Trasporti (paragraph 20 and the case-law cited). 6      OJ 2007 L 163, p. 17. 7      See the judgments in Åkerberg Fransson (paragraph 26) and in Degano Trasporti (paragraph 22). Pursuant to Council Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom of 26 May 2014 on the system of own resources of the European Union (OJ 2014 L 168, p. 105), the EU’s own resources include, in particular, revenue from application of a uniform rate to the harmonised VAT assessment bases determined according to European Union rules. Consequently, there is a direct link between the collection of VAT revenue in accordance with the applicable EU law and the making available to the EU budget of the corresponding VAT resources, any shortfall in the collection of the former potentially leading to a reduction in the latter. 8      See the judgments in Belvedere Costruzioni (paragraphs 21 and 22) and in Degano Trasporti (paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 9      See the judgment in Commission v Italy (paragraph 45). See also recitals 4 and 7 of Directive 2006/112. 10      Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment (OJ 1977 L 145, p. 1; ‘the Sixth Directive’). 11      See the judgment in Commission v Italy, and judgment of 11 December 2008, Commission v Italy (C‑174/07, EU:C:2008:704). As the referring court noted, the case-law established in that regard under the Sixth Directive must be considered relevant (see, to that effect, the judgment in Åkerberg Fransson (paragraph 25)). 12      See orders of 15 July 2015, Nuova Invincibile (C‑82/14, ‘the order in Nuova Invincibile’, EU:C:2015:510), and of 18 March 2024, Giocevi (C‑37/23, ‘the order in Giocevi’, EU:C:2024:271). 13      See the orders in Nuova Invincibile (paragraphs 25 to 27) and in Giocevi (paragraph 19). 14      See, also, judgment of 29 March 2012, 3M Italia (C‑417/10, EU:C:2012:184); concerning direct taxation, see Simon, D., ‘Principes généraux du droit – Portée en droit national’, Revue Europe, LexisNexis, Paris, No 5, 2012, commentary No 177. 15      The judgment in Degano Trasporti (paragraph 28), and judgment of 16 March 2017, Identi (C‑493/15, EU:C:2017:219, paragraph 24). 16      See Allena, M., ‘VAT and Tax Amnesty in Italy’, International VAT Monitor, vol. 30, No 5, 2019, pp. 211 to 214. 17      Opinions of Advocate General Sharpston in Belvedere Costruzioni (C‑500/10, EU:C:2011:754, point 35 et seq.) and in Degano Trasporti (C‑546/14, EU:C:2016:13, point 34 et seq.). 18      The judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni (paragraphs 24, 26 and 27). 19      See the judgment in Degano Trasporti (paragraph 29). 20      I am disregarding here the two other exclusions provided for in Article 1(193) of Law No 197/2022, namely the EU’s own resources (‘levies, premiums, additional or compensatory amounts, additional amounts or factors, Common Customs Tariff duties and other duties established or to be established by the institutions of the Communities in respect of trade with non-member countries, customs duties on products under the expired Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community as well as contributions and other duties provided for within the framework of the common organisation of the markets in sugar’ (see Article 2(1)(a) of Decision 2007/436)) and sums due as recovery of State aid. 21      See Article 1(194) of Law No 197/2022. 22      This is very different from the case which gave rise to the judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni, in which only disputes pending for more than ten years were eligible for simplified resolution. 23      For example, if there is a genuine chance of obtaining a favourable decision from the court hearing the case because the appeal was brought against a ruling at first instance which is manifestly erroneous or based on case-law which was subsequently overturned or if an interpretation is sought on a question of principle raised by the dispute. 24      In the absence of legislative provisions governing that right to object to simplified resolution, such an objection by a court hearing the case could, moreover, give rise to discrimination. 25      See, to that effect, the order in Giocevi (paragraph 34). 26      See judgment of 16 February 2023, DGRFP Cluj (C‑519/21, EU:C:2023:106, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited). 27      See, also, the orders in Nuova Invincibile (paragraphs 25, 26 and 28) and in Giocevi (paragraphs 32 to 35), in which the Court held that the Italian provisions, which provided respectively for a reduction of 90% and 60% in the VAT amount payable, were contrary to the principle of VAT neutrality. 28      Before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), pursuant to Article 1(190) of Law No 197/2022, the dispute is resolved where the tax authority has been unsuccessful at all previous levels of proceedings and where the taxable person pays 5% of the VAT due. However, I note that the Commissione interministeriale per la riforma della giustizia tributaria (Interministerial Commission for the Reform of Tax Justice) proposes, in the final report of 30 June 2021 set out in Annex 2 to the Italian Government’s observations, a solution to reduce the number of disputes before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) which does not take into account the fact that the taxpayer may have been successful twice at the previous levels of proceedings because, according to that commission, ‘the number of annulments by the Corte suprema di cassazione [(Supreme Court of Cassation)] is no lower statistically whether the taxpayer has been successful twice or once previously’ (free translation). 29      See judgment of 17 May 2023, Cezam (C‑418/22, EU:C:2023:418, paragraphs 26 to 28 and the case-law cited). 30      See, to that effect, judgment of 11 April 2024, Legafact (C‑122/23, EU:C:2024:293, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). 31      See Opinion of Advocate General Rantos in Nekilnojamojo turto valdymas (C‑544/24, EU:C:2025:896, point 47 and the case-law cited). 32      See, to that effect, the judgment in Commission v Italy (paragraphs 42 to 44). It therefore seems to me neither necessary nor relevant to examine the principle of proportionality in greater detail here. 33      In doing so, as noted by the Commission, the referring court appears in essence to refer to Article 325(1) TFEU, which is not referred to as such in the request for a preliminary ruling, but which provides that ‘the Union and the Member States shall counter fraud and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union through measures … which shall act as a deterrent and be such as to afford effective protection in the Member States, and in all the Union’s institutions, bodies, offices and agencies’. In that regard, as stated by Advocate General Sharpston in point 75 of her Opinion in Commission v Italy (C‑132/06, EU:C:2007:632), ‘the literature suggests that, in order to be effective, tax amnesties inter alia should be one-off (or repetition will induce taxpayers to adapt their tactics in anticipation of future amnesties), should involve payment of at least what was due and generally some interest (or evasion will be perceived as rewarded) and should be accompanied by at least a credible announcement of enhanced auditing (or the trade-off between declaration and detection will not seem advantageous)’. Included among the literature cited by Advocate General Sharpston, see, for example, Stella, P., ‘An economic analysis of tax amnesties’, IMF Working Paper, No 42, 1989, and Boise, C. M., ‘Breaking open offshore piggybanks: Deferral and the utility of amnesty’, George Mason Law Review, Vol. 14, No 3, 2007, pp. 667 to 724, p. 693 et seq in particular. 34      See judgment of 29 March 2012, Véleclair (C‑414/10, EU:C:2012:183), in which the Court held that Directive 2006/112 cannot be interpreted as allowing a Member State to make the right to deduct VAT on importation conditional upon the actual prior payment of that tax by the taxable person. 35      The reference made by the Italian Government to the judgment of 25 February 1988, Drexl (299/86, EU:C:1988:103, paragraphs 22 and 23), must, in my view, be disregarded. In that judgment, the Court held, in relation to the free movement of goods, that whilst offences concerning the VAT levied on imports and offences concerning the same tax levied on domestic sales of goods are distinguished by different circumstances, which mean that the Member States are not required to have the same system of rules for the two categories of offences, a manifest disproportion in the severity of the penalties laid down for the two categories of offences is nevertheless not justified. 36      Legge n. 130/2022 – Disposizioni in materia di giustizia e di processo tributari (Law No 130/2022 on provisions relating to tax justice and procedure) of 31 August 2022 (GURI No 204 of 1 September 2022, p. 5; ‘Law No 130/2022’). 37      According to that provision, ‘everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law’. 38      See the judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni (paragraph 23). I would point out that Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, does not apply in tax matters. According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘tax matters still form part of the hard core of public-authority prerogatives, with the public nature of the relationship between the taxpayer and the community remaining predominant’ and ‘tax disputes fall outside the scope of civil rights and obligations, despite the pecuniary effects which they necessarily produce for the taxpayer’ (see ECtHR, 12 July 2001, Ferrazzini v. Italy (CE:ECHR:2001:0712JUD004475998, § 29), and ECtHR, 23 November 2006, Jussila v. Finland (CE:ECHR:2006:1123JUD007305301, §§ 29 to 38). In the latter case, it was because the offence in question was criminal in nature that the ECtHR concluded that Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was applicable). 39      See the judgment in Belvedere Costruzioni (paragraph 26) and Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Belvedere Costruzioni (C‑500/10, EU:C:2011:754, point 48), according to which the requirement of effective collection cannot be absolute. For example, ‘the cost and likelihood of collection must be weighed against potential revenue’. 40      According to the referring court, that 2023 annual report shows that, in addition to the fact that, since 2011, the number of new tax cases has been steadily decreasing, the time taken to clear the backlog is 415 days at first instance and 656 days at second instance, periods which are each below the reasonable time period for the resolution of disputes and are such as to demonstrate a positive capacity to clear the backlog (acknowledged as being high at second instance). 41      According to that report, over the last decade, ‘the backlog before the courts adjudicating on the substance has decreased at first instance (by 70% between 2011 and 2021), whilst it has increased slightly at second instance (by just over 2%). The gap by comparison with other European countries is particularly evident in the number of appeals brought before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation). The backlog, which has continued to grow, has reached and exceeded the threshold of 55 300 actions, some of which (5 171) were brought at first instance more than ten years ago’. 42      In that regard, the Commission referred to point 15 of the final report of 30 June 2021 of the Interministerial Commission for the Reform of Tax Justice, from which it is apparent that there is ‘no court of final instance whose workload is comparable to that of the Corte suprema di cassazione [(Supreme Court of Cassation)]’ which even comes close to the more than 55 000 appeals pending. That report refers to ‘an extraordinary legislative intervention in the form of a simplified dispute resolution mechanism, which is justified by the public interest in the orderly resolution of disputes and not by the interest in replenishing public funds’ and which ‘concerns only disputes brought before the Corte suprema di cassazione [(Supreme Court of Cassation)]’. 43      See, in that regard, the report of 26 January 2023 of the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) on the administration of justice in 2022, submitted as an annex by the Italian Government, referring to the amendments introduced by Law No 130/2022. 44      It is apparent from Law No 130/2022 that the simplified resolution mechanism established, comprising the payment of 5% to 20% of the value of the dispute depending on the outcomes of the preceding proceedings on the merits, applied only to tax disputes pending before the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation) and was limited to disputes whose value did not exceed a certain threshold. 45      In that case, Advocate General Sharpston referred to the weighing of the cost of collection and the likelihood of recovery against potential revenue, to the existence of two judicial rulings unfavourable to the tax authority, to the fact that the passage of time could have rendered some amounts incapable of recovery and to the need to allow the taxable person to close his accounts within a reasonable time after the end of each VAT period (Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston in Belvedere Costruzioni (C‑500/10, EU:C:2011:754, point 48)). 46      See Article 6 of decreto legge n. 119 – Disposizioni urgenti in materia fiscale e finanziaria (Decree-Law No 119 laying down urgent fiscal and financial measures of 23 October 2018 (GURI No 247 of 23 October 2018, p. 1)). 47      In the present case, since requests for simplified resolution had to be submitted by taxable persons wishing to benefit from it by 30 September 2023, it is possible that many disputes are no longer pending. I infer from this that it is, accordingly, for the tax authority, in accordance with its national law, to take the measures necessary to comply with the judgment to be delivered by resuming those proceedings. 48      See, in particular, by analogy, judgments of 19 October 2017, Paper Consult (C‑101/16, EU:C:2017:775, paragraph 64), and of 28 October 2020, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Determination of toll rates for the use of motorways) (C‑321/19, EU:C:2020:866, paragraph 54). The reasoning set out in those judgments with regard to courts is also applicable to national authorities, such as the tax authority in the present case. 49      See judgments of 19 October 2017, Paper Consult (C‑101/16, EU:C:2017:775, paragraph 65), and of 28 October 2020, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Determination of toll rates for the use of motorways) (C‑321/19, EU:C:2020:866, paragraph 55). 50      See judgment of 28 February 2018, Imofloresmira – Investimentos Imobiliários (C‑672/16, EU:C:2018:134, paragraph 59). The first example of a temporal limit on the effects of a judgment of the Court is the judgment of 8 April 1976, Defrenne (43/75, EU:C:1976:56, known as ‘Defrenne II’, paragraph 72), in which the Court decided to impose temporal limits on the possibility of relying on the direct effect of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, holding that, in the light of the conduct of several Member States and the views adopted by the Commission and repeatedly brought to the notice of the circles concerned, it was appropriate to take exceptionally into account the fact that, over a prolonged period, the parties concerned had been led to continue with practices which were contrary to Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, although not yet prohibited under their national law. 51      See points 23 to 36 of the present Opinion.