C-396/25

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Sixth Chamber) 4 June 2026 (*) ( Appeal – Access to documents – Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Article 7 – Request for access to documents relating to food additives and food enzymes – Partial refusal to examine the request for access due to the very large number of documents requested – Premature confirmatory application – No challengeable act – Action for annulment ) In Case C‑396/25 P, APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 12 June 2025, Alexandra Molitorisová, residing in Kulmbach (Germany), represented by K. Purnhagen, Universitätsprofessor, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: European Commission, represented by M. Burón Pérez and K. Herrmann, acting as Agents, defendant at first instance, THE COURT (Sixth Chamber), composed of I. Ziemele, President of the Chamber, S. Gervasoni and M. Bošnjak (Rapporteur), Judges, Advocate General: M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the written procedure, having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion, gives the following Judgment 1        By her appeal, Ms Alexandra Molitorisová seeks to have set aside the order of 14 April 2025 of the General Court of the European Union, Molitorisová v Commission (T‑353/24, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2025:412), by which that court dismissed her action seeking annulment of the European Commission’s decisions refusing her requests for access to certain documents relating to food additives and food enzymes.  Legal context 2        Article 6 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43), entitled ‘Applications’, provides in paragraph 3: ‘In the event of an application relating to a very long document or to a very large number of documents, the institution concerned may confer with the applicant informally, with a view to finding a fair solution.’ 3        Article 7 of that regulation, entitled ‘Processing of initial applications’, provides: ‘1.      An application for access to a document shall be handled promptly. An acknowledgement of receipt shall be sent to the applicant. Within 15 working days from registration of the application, the institution shall either grant access to the document requested and provide access in accordance with Article 10 within that period or, in a written reply, state the reasons for the total or partial refusal and inform the applicant of his or her right to make a confirmatory application in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. 2.      In the event of a total or partial refusal, the applicant may, within 15 working days of receiving the institution’s reply, make a confirmatory application asking the institution to reconsider its position. 3.      In exceptional cases, for example in the event of an application relating to a very long document or to a very large number of documents, the time limit provided for in paragraph 1 may be extended by 15 working days, provided that the applicant is notified in advance and that detailed reasons are given. 4.      Failure by the institution to reply within the prescribed time limit shall entitle the applicant to make a confirmatory application.’ 4        Article 8 of that regulation, under the heading ‘Processing of confirmatory applications’, provides in paragraph 3: ‘Failure by the institution to reply within the prescribed time limit shall be considered as a negative reply and entitle the applicant to institute court proceedings against the institution and/or make a complaint to the Ombudsman, under the relevant provisions of the EC Treaty.’  Background to the dispute 5        The background to the dispute is described in paragraphs 2 to 13 of the order under appeal. ‘2.      On 25 March 2024, the applicant, acting on the basis of [Regulation No 1049/2001], requested access to “all public summaries of dossiers supporting applications for food additives and food enzymes [pursuant to Article 2(1)(c) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 234/2011 of 10 March 2011 implementing Regulation (EC) No 1331/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a common authorisation procedure for food additives, food enzymes and food flavourings (OJ 2011 L 64, p. 15)] that were ever received by the Commission or are in [the] possession of the Commission” (“the request for access”). 3.      The request for access was made via the portal of the EASE platform and was registered under the reference GestDem 2024/1651. 4.      On 16 April 2024, the Commission informed the applicant that the request for access concerned a very large number of documents from third parties which would need to be assessed individually and that the detailed analysis of those documents, together with the need to consult the third parties concerned, could not be carried out within the time limits laid down in Article 7 of Regulation No 1049/2001. Consequently, it asked her to specify the objective of that request and her specific interest in the documents requested, with a view to finding a fair solution pursuant to Article 6(3) of that regulation. It was stated that, in the absence of a reply within five working days, the Commission would unilaterally restrict the scope of that request, so that it could be dealt with within 30 working days. 5.      By email of 18 April 2024, the Commission informed the applicant that it was not able to deal with her request for access within the time limit required by Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001 and that it was extending that time limit by 15 working days until 13 May 2024, pursuant to Article 7(3) of that regulation. 6.      On 18 April 2024, the applicant informed the Commission that she objected to a limitation on the scope of her request for access. 7.      By letter of 7 May 2024 [(“the letter of 7 May 2024”)], the Commission informed the applicant that, in the absence of a mutual agreement on a fair arrangement and given the workload that would result from dealing with the request for access, its scope would be reduced to 30 documents, namely 14 food additives applications and 16 food enzymes applications received in 2023, which could be dealt with within 30 working days from the date of registration of the request for access. The [Commission] … further informed the applicant of her rights under Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 in the following terms: “In accordance with Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, you are entitled to make a confirmatory application requesting the Commission to review this position. Such a confirmatory application should be addressed to the Secretariat-General of the Commission within 15 working days upon receipt of this letter.” 8.      By email of 8 May 2024, the applicant made a confirmatory application [(“the application of 8 May”)] asking the Commission to reconsider its position as expressed in its letter of 7 May 2024. The Commission acknowledged receipt of that email the same day. 9.      On 13 May 2024, the Commission informed the applicant that it was not able to deal with the reduced request for access in accordance with her letter of 7 May 2024 within the time limit expiring the same day, but that it would endeavour to provide the documents covered by the request as soon as possible. 10.      By email of 29 May 2024, the applicant reminded the Commission of her confirmatory application of 8 May 2024. In that same email, she informed the Commission of technical issues preventing her from accessing the dossier on her request for access via the portal of the EASE platform. 11.      By email of 3 June 2024, the Commission informed the applicant that a reply to her request for access was in the process of being signed by the hierarchy and would be sent to her as soon as possible. In that same email, the Commission explained that the confirmatory application of 8 May 2024 could not be registered as such, since she had submitted it to the Commission before expiry of the time limit for replying to the request for access, but that the applicant was entitled to submit a fresh confirmatory application for lack of initial reply within the required time limit. 12.      On 3 June 2024, the applicant replied to the email referred to in paragraph 11 above, explaining that she had made a confirmatory application on 8 May 2024 in accordance with the information contained in the [letter of 7 May 2024], and that on 8 May 2024 she had received an acknowledgement of receipt of her email of that same day, with the result that her letter of 8 May 2024 had to be regarded as a confirmatory application triggering the time limits for reply laid down in Article 8 of Regulation No 1049/2001. 13.      By letter of 19 June 2024 [(“the letter of 19 June 2024”)], the Commission replied to the request for access and provided the applicant with 26 documents to which it decided to grant full access, as well as 2 documents to which it granted partial access pursuant to the exceptions provided for in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001. The Commission further informed the applicant that access to two documents had to be denied pursuant to those exceptions. In that same letter, the Commission informed the applicant of her right to make a confirmatory application pursuant to Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 requesting the Commission to reconsider its position as set out in that letter.’  The action before the General Court and the order under appeal 6        By her action based on Article 263 TFEU, the appellant sought annulment of the ‘implied decision of the defendant of 16 November 2020 to refuse access to certain documents relating to food additives and food enzymes sought pursuant to [Regulation No 234/2011]’, and for the Commission to be ordered to pay the costs. 7        By separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 3 December 2024, the Commission raised a plea of inadmissibility pursuant to Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, in which it contended that the Court should dismiss the action as manifestly inadmissible and order the appellant to pay the costs. 8        On 17 January 2025, the appellant lodged her observations on the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Commission, by which she claimed that the General Court should declare the action to be admissible and order the Commission to pay the costs. 9        In her observations, the appellant expressly stated that the action was directed mainly at the letter of 7 May 2024 and, in the alternative, at the alleged implied decision to refuse the application of 8 May 2024, referred to in paragraph 8 of that order. In addition, the appellant stated, in the further alternative, that her action had to be understood as being directed at ‘any other document, which the [General] Court finds that it would qualify as a negative decision on a confirmatory application and had been delivered through the [portal of the EASE platform] in a legally effective way’. 10      By the order under appeal, the General Court upheld the objection of inadmissibility raised by the Commission and held the action to be inadmissible. It also ordered each party to bear its own costs.  Procedure before the Court of Justice and forms of order sought by the parties to the appeal 11      In her appeal, the appellant applied for legal aid. 12      By order of 27 October 2025 (C‑396/25 P AJ), the Court dismissed that application. 13      The appellant claims that the Court should: –        set aside the order under appeal; –        declare her action for annulment admissible; –        refer the case back to the General Court for a ruling on the merits and reserve the costs; –        annul the implied rejection decision; and –        order the Commission to pay the costs at first instance and on appeal. 14      The Commission contends that the Court should: –        dismiss the appeal; and –        order the appellant to pay the costs.  The appeal 15      In support of her appeal, the appellant puts forward a sole ground of appeal comprising 12 parts, alleging that the General Court erred in law ‘by defining the legal nature of the facts submitted by the [a]ppellant and determining the legal consequences thereof’.  The first, third to fifth and seventh parts of the sole ground of appeal: incorrect legal categorisation of the letter of 7 May 2024  Arguments of the parties 16      By the first part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having found, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, that the letter of 7 May 2024 constitutes a preparatory measure. In view of its form, content and context, contrary to what the General Court stated in paragraph 34 of the order under appeal, that letter fulfils all the relevant legal criteria to constitute an ‘initial reply’ within the meaning of Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001, against which a confirmatory application could be filed. 17      By the third part of the sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having found, in paragraph 28 of the order under appeal, that the letter of 7 May 2024 was merely part of a process aimed at finding a fair arrangement and for having found, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, that that letter was a preparatory measure. That letter was a unilateral step, not a step taken with a view to conferring or negotiating under Article 6(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001. 18      By the fourth part of the sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having failed to find that, in view of the form, content and context of the letter of 7 May 2024, that letter was an initial reply. She argues that, despite the similarities between that letter and the letter of 19 June 2024, the General Court drew a distinction between those two letters. 19      The General Court also failed to categorise properly the letter of 7 May 2024 in finding, in paragraph 28 of the order under appeal, that that letter provided the appellant with information in the interest of sound administration, whilst also recognising, in paragraph 36 of the order under appeal, that that letter contained incorrect information which may have misled the appellant as to the need to make a confirmatory application. 20      In that regard, a wrongful act cannot comply with the principle of sound administration which, moreover, applies only to decisions capable of producing legal effects and, therefore, of being the subject of an action, including through a confirmatory application. 21      Moreover, the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraph 36 of the order under appeal, that the incorrect information in question did not change the nature of the letter of 7 May 2024 but had implications only for the award of costs, as alluded to in paragraph 44 of the order under appeal. That incorrect information ought to have been taken into account as characteristic of an initial reply as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001. 22      By the fifth part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the letter of 7 May 2024 produces legal effects. An initial reply as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001 produces such effects inasmuch as, following such a reply or lack thereof, an applicant may make a confirmatory application pursuant to Article 7(2) of that regulation. The letter of 7 May 2024 also affected the appellant’s legal position significantly because a unilateral limitation placed on the scope of the request for access cannot be considered to be merely a piece of information. 23      By the seventh part of the sole ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the order under appeal, the General Court incorrectly based its line of legal argument on paragraphs 47 and 48 of the order of 7 June 2017, De Masi v Commission (T‑11/16, EU:T:2017:385), which tend to confirm, by analogy, that the letter of 7 May 2024 constitutes an initial reply. 24      The Commission disputes that entire line of argument.  Findings of the Court 25      By the first, third to fifth and seventh parts of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the reasoning set out in paragraphs 28 to 31 of the order under appeal, by which the General Court dismissed her action as inadmissible in so far as it was directed at the letter of 7 May 2024, and in paragraphs 34 and 36 of the order under appeal, in which the General Court reiterated its assessment that that letter did not constitute an initial statement of position of the Commission on the request for access to the documents concerned. 26      In that regard, it must be examined whether the General Court erred in law, in the first place, in holding the action brought before it to be inadmissible in so far as it was directed at the letter of 7 May 2024 on the ground that it did not constitute an act capable of being challenged through an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU or, in the second place, in holding that the letter of 7 May 2024 did not constitute an initial statement of position as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001. 27      In the first place, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation No 1049/2001 provide for a two-stage procedure for access to documents of the institutions. The reply to an initial application for access to documents, under Article 7(1) of that regulation, is merely an initial statement of position, which in principle cannot be subject to an appeal. Such a reply confers on the applicant the right, provided for in Article 7(2) of that regulation, to repeat an application for access notwithstanding a first reasoned refusal and allows the EU institution concerned to reconsider its initial position before taking a final refusal decision, which could be the subject of an action before the Courts of the European Union and, where appropriate, to remedy any illegalities affecting an initial refusal (see, to that effect, judgment of 29 July 2024, Validity v Commission, C‑51/23 P, EU:C:2024:664, paragraph 49 and the case-law cited). 28      Consequently, as correctly observed by the General Court in paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, only the measure adopted by the Commission in response to a confirmatory application, which replaces the initial statement of position, is a decision and is capable of producing legal effects such as to affect the applicant’s interests and, therefore, of being the subject of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU (order of 15 February 2012, Internationaler Hilfsfonds v Commission, C‑208/11 P, EU:C:2012:76, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 29      Under that case-law, and contrary to the appellant’s assertions, an initial statement of position as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001 does not by itself produce legal effects capable of affecting the applicant’s interests and, therefore, of being the subject of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, even where such a statement of position entails a partial or total refusal of access to the documents requested. 30      Moreover, according to settled case-law, in order to determine whether an act produces such effects and may, accordingly, form the subject matter of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU, it is necessary to examine the substance of that act and to assess those effects in the light of objective criteria, such as the content of that act, taking into account, as appropriate, the context in which it was adopted and the powers of the institution, body, office or agency which adopted the act (judgment of 10 February 2026, WhatsApp Ireland v European Data Protection Board, C‑97/23 P, EU:C:2026:81, paragraph 67 and the case-law cited). 31      In particular, in the case of acts drawn up in several procedural stages, an act is, in principle, open to challenge only if it definitively determines the position of the competent EU institution, body, office or agency, to the exclusion of intermediate measures whose aim is to prepare that final measure and which produce no independent legal effects vis-à-vis third parties (judgment of 10 February 2026, WhatsApp Ireland v European Data Protection Board, C‑97/23 P, EU:C:2026:81, paragraph 69 and the case-law cited). 32      The General Court did not depart from the case-law referred to in paragraphs 30 and 31 of the present judgment when it observed, in paragraph 28 of the order under appeal, that, by the letter of 7 May 2024, the Commission merely stated that no fair arrangement under Article 6(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001 had been found and informed the appellant that, as a result, in the interest of sound administration, it would proceed with a unilateral limitation of the scope of the request for access. 33      Nor did the General Court depart from that case-law in holding, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, that the letter of 7 May 2024 did not contain the Commission’s definitive position on the request for access to documents of 25 March 2024 and, therefore, was merely a preparatory measure adopted in the course of the procedure for processing that request, without any intention of putting an end to that procedure. 34      It follows that, as correctly stated in paragraph 30 of the order under appeal, as a preparatory act, the letter of 7 May 2024 is not capable of forming the subject matter of an action for annulment. 35      As regards the appellant’s line of argument to the effect that that letter cannot be regarded as being part of a process for finding a fair arrangement under Article 6(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, that line of argument is based on an incorrect interpretation of paragraph 28 of the order under appeal, since the General Court did not in any way state that, by that letter, the Commission was seeking to confer with the appellant. 36      In any event, it follows from the case-law referred to in paragraph 30 of the present judgment that the unilateral nature of an act does not suffice to establish that it is capable of forming the subject matter of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU. 37      In those circumstances, the General Court cannot be criticised for having referred, in paragraphs 29 and 30 of the order under appeal, to paragraphs 47 and 48 respectively of the order of 7 June 2017, De Masi v Commission (T‑11/16, EU:T:2017:385), which concern a letter that did not contain the Commission’s final position, categorised as a preparatory measure not constituting a challengeable act. 38      Moreover, in paragraph 36 of the order under appeal, the General Court held that the incorrect information provided by the Commission in the letter of 7 May 2024 as to the possibility of making a confirmatory application may have misled the appellant. The General Court added, however, that that fact did not change the nature of that letter. 39      On that latter point, it follows from the case-law referred to in paragraph 30 of the present judgment that the question whether an act is challengeable must be the subject of an overall assessment aimed at determining the substance of that act in the light of relevant objective criteria. Hence, an isolated analysis of a fact such as the incorrect statement as to the need to make a confirmatory application cannot be regarded as decisive. 40      Therefore, the General Court was correct in holding, in paragraph 31 of the order under appeal, that the action brought before it was inadmissible in so far as it was directed at the letter of 7 May 2024. 41      In the second place, it follows from paragraph 28 of the order under appeal that, in the General Court’s view, the letter of 7 May 2024 neither grants nor refuses the request for access and, therefore, does not constitute an initial statement of position as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001. In paragraph 34 of the order under appeal, the General Court reiterated its assessment that the letter of 7 May 2024 does not constitute an initial statement of position. 42      That analysis is consistent with paragraph 7 of the order under appeal, a point not disputed by the appellant, from which it follows, in essence, that since the Commission and the appellant did not manage to arrive at a ‘fair arrangement’ within the meaning of Article 6(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the Commission refused to examine the request for access in its entirety given the workload it would have entailed. 43      The General Court did not err in law in taking the view that such a partial refusal to examine the request cannot be equated with a partial refusal to grant access to the documents requested, on the ground that a derogation from the obligation to examine a request for access may be permitted, exceptionally, where the workload that would result from a specific and individual examination of the documents would prove to be particularly burdensome, thereby exceeding the limits of what may be reasonably required. 44      Viewed from that perspective, the explanations provided by the Commission in the letter of 7 May 2024 aim to demonstrate that the workload entailed by a specific and individual examination of the documents requested would prove to be unreasonable, that it attempted to confer with the applicant for access and that it put forward solutions to replace a specific and individual examination of the documents requested. 45      The reasons for the order under appeal referred to in paragraph 43 of the present judgment are compatible with the Court’s case-law according to which it flows from the principle of proportionality that the institutions may, in particular cases in which the volume of documents for which access is requested or in which the number of passages to be censured would involve an inappropriate administrative burden, balance the interest of the applicant for access against the workload resulting from the processing of the application for access in order to safeguard the interests of sound administration (judgment of 2 October 2014, Strack v Commission, C‑127/13 P, EU:C:2014:2250, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). 46      On that latter point, the appellant argues that the implementation of the principle of sound administration, referred to by the General Court in paragraphs 28 and 29 of the order under appeal, can only concern acts against which an action may be brought, at least in the form of a confirmatory application. 47      However, although it is true that an infringement of the right to sound administration may be found only at the end of an appropriate action, the procedure leading to the adoption of an act capable of being the subject of an action, including when it comprises preparatory acts, must comply with the requirements flowing from that right, which is affirmed in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and is a general principle of EU law (see, to that effect, judgment of 12 March 2026, Deldwyn, C‑477/24, EU:C:2026:182, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited). 48      Since the General Court was correct in holding that the letter of 7 May 2024 set out the reasons for partial refusal to examine the request for access, and not the reasons for partial refusal to grant access to the documents requested, paragraph 36 of the order under appeal, described in paragraph 38 of the present judgment, does not contain any error of law as regards the question whether the letter of 7 May 2024 constituted an initial statement of position as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001. 49      In that regard, it is apparent from that provision that the information relating to the right to make a confirmatory application contained in the reply to the initial request for access does not suffice for it to constitute an initial statement of position refusing access, since it also contains reasons for the total or partial refusal to grant access. Consequently, as correctly observed by the General Court in paragraph 36 of the order under appeal, that incorrect information did not change the nature of the letter of 7 May 2024. 50      Nor can the General Court’s reasoning be criticised for having taken account, for the purpose of awarding costs in paragraph 44 of the order under appeal, of the fact that that information was incorrect. Such a fact does not necessarily have the same implications, respectively, for the assessment of the nature of a document forming the subject of an action for annulment and the award of costs relating to those proceedings, as those two questions are governed by separate legal schemes. 51      In those circumstances, the General Court did not err in law in holding that the letter of 7 May 2024 did not constitute an initial statement of position as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001. 52      In the light of the foregoing, the first, third to fifth and seventh parts of the sole ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.  The eighth part of the sole ground of appeal: incorrect legal categorisation of the application of 8 May 2024  Arguments of the parties 53      By the eighth part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises paragraph 38 of the order under appeal, in which the General Court held that the alleged implied decision to refuse the application of 8 May 2024 was not a challengeable act. 54      The appellant argues that the General Court further erred in holding, in paragraph 39 of the order under appeal, that, by the adoption of an explicit decision to refuse partial access of 19 June 2024, the Commission de facto revoked the implied decision to refuse access, which therefore disappeared from the EU legal order. 55      The Commission contends that the eighth part of the sole ground of appeal is ineffective, as the appellant has not adapted her application to challenge the reply of 19 June 2024.  Findings of the Court 56      By the eighth part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises, in essence, paragraph 38 of the order under appeal, in which the General Court dismissed her application as inadmissible in so far as it was directed at the alleged implied decision to refuse the application of 8 May 2024. 57      In paragraph 34 of the order under appeal, the General Court held that, since the letter of 7 May 2024 does not constitute an initial statement of position, the application of 8 May 2024 cannot be categorised as a confirmatory application. 58      In that regard, it is stated in paragraph 8 of the order under appeal that, by email of 8 May 2024, the appellant made a confirmatory application to the Commission. However, a ‘confirmatory application’ within the meaning of Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation No 1049/2001 must be further to receipt of an initial statement of position effecting total or partial refusal of access, as required by Article 7(2), or a failure to provide such a statement of position within the prescribed time limit, in accordance with Article 7(4). 59      First, the application of 8 May 2024 does not constitute a ‘confirmatory application’ within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 since, as noted in paragraph 51 of the present judgment, the letter of 7 May 2024 does not constitute an initial statement of position as referred to in Article 7(1) of Regulation No 1049/2001. 60      Secondly, the appellant filed the application of 8 May 2024 before the expiry of the time limit provided for the Commission’s reply, which ran until 13 May 2024, as is apparent from paragraph 5 of the order under appeal. 61      In that regard, it should be noted that the time limits provided for in Regulation No 1049/2001 are not fixed solely in the interest of the applicant for access. Therefore, a new request for access sent prematurely, before expiry of the time limit provided for the Commission’s reply to the initial request, cannot come within the scope of Article 7(4) of Regulation No 1049/2001. 62      As a result, the General Court did not err in stating, in paragraph 34 of the order under appeal, that the application of 8 May 2024 could not ‘be categorised’ as a confirmatory application. 63      In paragraph 37 of the order under appeal, the General Court correctly inferred therefrom that the appellant could not rely on the time limit for reply referred to in Article 8(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, provided for in the event of failure to reply to a confirmatory application, to conclude that there was a challengeable implied decision to refuse her application of 8 May 2024. 64      It follows that, as correctly stated in paragraph 38 of the order under appeal, the action before the General Court was inadmissible in so far as it was directed at an alleged implied decision to refuse the application of 8 May 2024. 65      The findings set out above are not capable of being called into question either by the Commission’s actions following that alleged implied decision, in particular the sending of the letter of 19 June 2024, or by the manner in which the General Court assessed that letter in paragraph 39 of the order under appeal. 66      It follows from those considerations that the eighth part of the sole ground of appeal is, in any event, unfounded and must, therefore, be rejected.  The second and ninth parts of the sole ground of appeal: incorrect legal categorisation of the letter of 19 June 2024  Arguments of the parties 67      By the second part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises paragraph 39 of the order under appeal inasmuch as it categorises the letter of 19 June 2024 as an ‘explicit decision to refuse partial access’. In fact, the delivery of the documents that accompanied the letter of 19 June 2024 represented the execution of the initial decision contained in the letter of 7 May 2024. 68      Moreover, in paragraph 39 of the order under appeal, the General Court suggests that the letter of 7 May 2024 constitutes an initial reply. Paragraph 39 of the order under appeal is also clearly at odds with the facts of the case since, in the appellant’s submission, her reply to the Commission’s email of 3 June 2024 was a confirmatory application where there was no initial reply. 69      By the ninth part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court was incorrect in holding that the letter of 19 June 2024 was a decision. 70      In paragraph 10 of the order under appeal, the General Court noted that the appellant had not had access to that letter until 10 July 2024, when the action for annulment was lodged. She discovered that letter only once access to her file had been re-established, which she found on 5 December 2024, after learning of the Commission’s objection of inadmissibility put forward before the General Court. Hence the General Court erred in law in failing to draw legal inferences from the fact that that same letter could not produce legal effects. 71      In that regard, the right of access to the file entails that the interested party must have the opportunity to examine all documents that may be of relevance to her defence. Infringement of the right of access to the file during the procedure prior to adoption of a decision can cause the decision to be annulled if the rights of defence have been infringed, which infringement is not remedied by the mere fact that access was made possible during the judicial proceedings. 72      The Commission contends that the second and ninth parts of the sole ground of appeal are ineffective and, in any event, unfounded.  Findings of the Court 73      By the second and ninth parts of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises paragraph 39 of the order under appeal inasmuch as the General Court categorises the letter of 19 June 2024 as an explicit decision to refuse partial access. 74      In paragraph 39 of the order under appeal, the General Court held that, in any event, by the adoption of an explicit decision to refuse partial access of 19 June 2024, the Commission de facto revoked the implied decision to refuse access, which therefore disappeared from the EU legal order and, consequently, could no longer be the subject matter of an action for annulment. 75      It should be noted in that regard that, as is apparent from paragraphs 14, 20 and 21 of the order under appeal, the action before the General Court was not directed at the letter of 19 June 2024. 76      Thus, by its statement in paragraph 39 of the order under appeal, the General Court merely added an element of explanation for the administrative procedure in question, namely that, even if an implied refusal decision had come about from the Commission’s silence on expiry of the time limit provided for the reply to the appellant’s alleged confirmatory application of 8 May 2024, such an implied decision had disappeared from the EU legal order on the date the action was lodged before the General Court. 77      In those circumstances, the Court finds that paragraph 39 of the order under appeal is purely for the sake of completeness. According to settled case-law, complaints directed against grounds included in a decision of the General Court purely for the sake of completeness cannot lead to the decision being set aside and are therefore ineffective (judgment of 26 February 2026, Air France v Commission, C‑369/22 P, EU:C:2026:118, paragraph 112 and the case-law cited). 78      Therefore, the second and ninth parts of the sole ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.  The tenth part of the sole ground of appeal: error of law resulting from distortion of the facts  Arguments of the parties 79      By the tenth part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant submits that, if paragraph 10 of the order under appeal were to be interpreted as meaning that the General Court did not accept as established that access to the file was compromised at the time the action for annulment was brought, that would mean that the General Court distorted the facts. 80      In that regard, the General Court made an error in its assessment of the facts and evidence demonstrating that the appellant did not have access to the file, namely the email referred to in paragraph 10 of the order under appeal and two screenshots from the EASE platform dated 27 May and 5 July 2024. 81      On the basis of that assessment, in paragraphs 13 and 39 of the order under appeal, the General Court reached a legal conclusion concerning the validity and legal effects of the letter of 19 June 2024, without carrying out the verifications of fact required under EU law, which affected its assessment of the legal nature of the letter of 7 May 2024. 82      The General Court also erred in failing to find that the appellant would probably have reconsidered her defence strategy if she had received the letter of 19 June 2024. 83      The Commission disputes that line of argument.  Findings of the Court 84      The tenth part of the sole ground of appeal is based on the premiss that, if paragraph 10 of the order under appeal were to be interpreted as meaning that the General Court did not accept as established that the appellant did not have access to the letter of 19 June 2024 until the time the action for annulment was brought on 10 July 2024, the Court of Justice should conclude that the General Court distorted the facts and evidence. 85      In paragraph 10 of the order under appeal, the General Court stated that, by an email of 29 May 2024, the appellant informed the Commission of technical issues preventing her from accessing the dossier on her request for access via the portal of the EASE platform. However, the General Court did not regard those technical issues as established, still less that they had continued until the time the action for annulment was brought. 86      According to settled case-law, a distortion must be obvious from the documents in the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence. Thus, it is not sufficient to show that a document could be interpreted differently from the interpretation adopted by the General Court (judgment of 26 February 2026, Cathay Pacific Airways v Commission, C‑382/22 P, EU:C:2026:129, paragraph 70 and the case-law cited). 87      That is not the situation here. The alleged distortion is not readily apparent either from the email summarised by the General Court in paragraph 10 of the order under appeal or from the two screenshots in question, which at most establish that there were in fact technical access issues on the EASE platform on two dates before the action for annulment was brought before the General Court, between which there were other exchanges between the appellant and the Commission. 88      On that latter point, the annexes to the application before the General Court include two emails addressed to the appellant on 19 June 2024, containing an automatic notification of receipt of a new message on the EASE platform concerning the request for access to the documents which gave rise to the present proceedings. 89      In any event, even if it were held that the letter of 19 June 2024 could not be relied on against the appellant, in order to have a challengeable act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation No 1049/2001, she ought to have made a confirmatory application on 13 May 2024 following the Commission’s failure to reply to her initial request for access. 90      Paragraph 12 of the order under appeal indicates that, by an email of 3 June 2024 in response to an email from the Commission on the same day, the appellant refused to make such an application on the ground that, in her view, her application of 8 May 2024 constituted a confirmatory application following an initial statement of position by the Commission. 91      Consequently, the tenth part of the sole ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.  The sixth part of the sole ground of appeal: the ipso jure public and non-confidential nature of the documents requested  Arguments of the parties 92      By the sixth part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having failed to consider the fact, which was relevant for determining whether the letter of 7 May 2024 is a challengeable act, that the request for access to documents concerned information that was ipso jure non-confidential and subject to a legal obligation of public disclosure by the Commission. 93      Contrary to what the General Court stated in paragraphs 25 and 35 of the order under appeal, the documents at issue would not have required the Commission to spend time examining the request or possibly reconsider its position. The Commission has no discretion to refuse access to such documents. 94      The Commission contends that this part is ineffective and, in any event, unfounded.  Findings of the Court 95      By the sixth part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant disputes paragraphs 25 and 35 of the order under appeal, on the ground that the documents requested are ipso jure public and non-confidential. 96      In paragraph 25 of the order under appeal it is stated, with reference to paragraph 94 of the order of 10 November 2011, Agapiou Joséphidès v Commission and EACEA (C‑626/10 P, EU:C:2011:726), and to the case-law cited, that the making of a confirmatory application must enable the institution concerned to re-examine its position before taking a definitive refusal decision which could be the subject of an action before the Courts of the European Union. It was further stated in paragraph 25, in line with the case-law cited, that such a procedure makes it possible to process initial applications more promptly and, consequently, more often than not to meet the applicant’s expectations, while also enabling the institution to adopt a detailed position before definitively refusing access to the documents sought by the applicant for access, in particular where that applicant reiterates the request for disclosure of those documents notwithstanding a reasoned refusal by that institution. 97      Moreover, in paragraph 35 of the order under appeal, the General Court held that, contrary to what the appellant claimed, procedural economy did not justify allowing her to make a confirmatory application before the close of the first phase of the access to documents procedure, that is to say, before expiry of the time limit for reply on 13 May 2024, on the ground that, in its letter of 7 May 2024, the Commission gave her to understand that it would reduce to 30 the number of documents covered by the request for access. According to the General Court, procedural economy requires that the Commission be able, where necessary, to communicate the reasons why it refused access to certain documents under inter alia the exceptions laid down in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001, with the result that the applicant for access may, in a subsequent confirmatory application, articulate his or her arguments calling that assessment by the Commission into question. 98      The question whether or not, as a matter of substance, access to certain of the documents requested in the present case could be refused is irrelevant for the determination of the validity of the findings made in those paragraphs of the order under appeal, which concern only the procedure which may lead to such a refusal. 99      Accordingly, the sixth part of the sole ground of appeal must be rejected as ineffective.  The eleventh part of the sole ground of appeal: failure to examine the plea alleging infringement of the appellant’s rights to sound administration  Arguments of the parties 100    By the eleventh part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court’s failure to examine her third plea in law put forward at first instance, alleging infringement of her rights to sound administration. Such an omission by the General Court infringed her right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. 101    The Commission disputes the appellant’s line of argument.  Findings of the Court 102    By the eleventh part of the sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having failed to examine the third plea in law of her application, concerning the infringement of her rights to sound administration. 103    However, the General Court was not required to consider that plea since, as stated in paragraph 17 of the order under appeal, under Article 130(1) and (7) of its Rules of Procedure, the General Court decided to rule on and uphold the objection of inadmissibility without going to the substance of the case. 104    Consequently, the eleventh part of the sole ground of appeal must be rejected as unfounded.  The twelfth part of the sole ground of appeal: failure to use the language of the case  Arguments of the parties 105    By the twelfth part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having based its reasons on a large number of judgments which were not published or are not available in the language of the case, namely English, the language in which only the order under appeal was written. 106    In so doing, the General Court infringed her rights under the principle of sound administration and also her right to an effective judicial remedy and a fair trial. 107    The Commission disputes that line of argument.  Findings of the Court 108    By the twelfth part of her sole ground of appeal, the appellant criticises the General Court for having based itself on court decisions which are not available in the language of the case. 109    In that regard, it follows from the second subparagraph of Article 256(1) TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 168(1)(d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that an appeal must indicate precisely inter alia the contested elements of the decision of the General Court which the appellant seeks to have set aside, failing which the appeal or the ground of appeal in question will be dismissed as inadmissible (see, to that effect, judgment of 26 March 2026, Pumpyanskiy and Others v Council, C‑696/23 P, C‑704/23 P, C‑711/23 P, C‑35/24 P and C‑111/24 P, EU:C:2026:245, paragraph 157 and the case-law cited). 110    It should also be borne in mind that, under Article 169(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, the pleas in law and legal arguments relied on in support of an appeal must identify precisely those points in the grounds of the decision of the General Court which are contested. 111    Since the appellant has failed to specify which judgments and points in the grounds of the order under appeal are concerned, the twelfth part of the sole ground of appeal must be rejected as inadmissible. 112    In the light of all of the foregoing, the sole ground of appeal put forward by the appellant in support of her appeal must be rejected, and the appeal must therefore be dismissed in its entirety.  Costs 113    Under Article 184(2) of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs. 114    Under Article 138(1) of those Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 115    Since the Commission has applied for costs to be awarded against the appellant and the latter has been unsuccessful, she must be ordered to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the Commission. On those grounds, the Court (Sixth Chamber) hereby: 1.      Dismisses the appeal; 2.      Orders Ms Alexandra Molitorisová to bear her own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Commission. Ziemele Gervasoni Bošnjak Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 4 June 2026. A. Calot Escobar   I. Ziemele Registrar   President of the Chamber *      Language of the case: English.