C-43/24

Provisional text JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber) 12 March 2026 (*) ( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Citizenship of the Union – Article 21(1) TFEU – Right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States – Impediments – Request to amend gender data in the civil status registers – Directive 2004/38/EC – Article 4(3) – Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union – Right to respect for private and family life – Obligation, for a court of a Member State, to comply with the case-law of the constitutional court of that State – Interpretation in conformity with EU law ) In Case C‑43/24 [Shipova] (i), REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Supreme Court of Cassation, Bulgaria), made by decision of 18 January 2024, received at the Court on 23 January 2024, in the proceedings K. M. H. v Obshtina Stara Zagora, JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber), composed of K. Jürimäe (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, acting as Judge of the Second Chamber, F. Schalin, M. Gavalec and Z. Csehi, Judges, Advocate General: J. Richard de la Tour, Registrar: R. Stefanova-Kamisheva, Administrator, having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 22 May 2025, after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: –        K. M. H., by D.I. Lyubenova, advokat, and A. Schuster, avvocato, –        the Bulgarian Government, by T. Mitova and R. Stoyanov, acting as Agents, –        the Estonian Government, by M. Kriisa, acting as Agent, –        the Hungarian Government, by Zs. Biró-Tóth and M.Z. Fehér, acting as Agents, –        the Netherlands Government, by M.K. Bulterman, A. Hanje and P.P. Huurnink, acting as Agents, –        the Portuguese Government, by P. Barros da Costa, A. Pimenta, J. Ramos and Â. Seiça Neves, acting as Agents, –        the European Commission, by E. Montaguti and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents, after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 4 September 2025, gives the following Judgment 1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 9 TEU, Articles 8, 10 and 21 TFEU as well as of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). 2        The request has been made in proceedings between K. M. H. and Obshtina Stara Zagora (municipality of Stara Zagora, Bulgaria) concerning a request for a declaration that she is a female person, by ordering the change of her first name, patronymic and family name, and for that change to appear in her birth certificate.  Legal context  European Union law  Treaty on European Union 3        Article 9 TEU provides: ‘In all its activities, the [European] Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.’  FEU Treaty 4        According to Article 8 TFEU: ‘In all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.’ 5        Article 21(1) TFEU provides: ‘Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect.’  The Charter 6        Article 7 of the Charter, headed ‘Respect for private and family life’, states: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’ 7        Article 52 of the Charter, entitled ‘Scope and interpretation’, provides, in paragraph 3 thereof: ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms[, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the ECHR’)], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’  Directive 2004/38/EC 8        Under Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ 2004 L 158, p. 77, and corrigendum OJ 2004 L 229, p. 35): ‘Member States shall, acting in accordance with their laws, issue to their own nationals, and renew, an identity card or passport stating their nationality.’  Bulgarian law  Law on the civil status register 9        Article 9(1) of the Zakon za grazhdanskata registratsia (Law on the civil status register) of 27 July 1999 (DV No 67 of 27 July 1999) provides: ‘The name of a Bulgarian citizen born in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria shall be composed of a first name, a patronymic and a family name. The three parts of the name shall be recorded in the birth certificate.’ 10      Under Article 45(1)(6) to (8) of the Law on the civil status register, the birth certificate is to contain the name of the newborn, the child’s personal identification number (only for Bulgarian citizens) as well as his or her sex and nationality.  Law on Bulgarian identity documents 11      Under Article 9(1) of the Zakon za bulgarskite lichni dokumenti (Law on Bulgarian identity documents, DV No 93 of 11 August 1998), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the Law on Bulgarian identity documents’): ‘In the event of a change of name, personal identification number (personal number/foreign personal number), sex, nationality or a substantial and lasting change of appearance, the person shall be required to request new Bulgarian identity documents within a maximum period of 30 days.’ 12      Article 13(1) of the Law on Bulgarian identity documents lists the types of identity documents. Those include the identity card, the passport and the driving licence.  The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 13      K. M. H. was born in Bulgaria on 7 August 1990. She is registered in the civil status registers of that Member State as being male, with a name composed of a first name, a patronymic and a family name corresponding to that sex. She was also assigned a personal identification number and issued an identity document, which identify her as male. 14      However, according to the description of the facts established by the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Supreme Court of Cassation, Bulgaria), which is the referring court, K. M. H. has always, since her childhood, felt like a woman in her appearance, behaviour, perception, emotions and mannerisms. 15      In December 2014, K. M. H. consulted a psychologist who concluded that she was suffering from gender dysphoria and social and relational dysphoria. After consulting a specialist in endocrinology and andrology, K. M. H. began hormone therapy in Italy, where she currently lives, and entered into a stable family relationship with an Italian national. 16      Faced on a daily basis, particularly in her search for employment, with inconveniences and problems caused by the discrepancy between, on the one hand, her appearance and behaviour and, on the other hand, the sex indicated on her identity documents, K. M. H. requested, in the course of 2017, the Rayonen sad Stara Zagora (District Court, Stara Zagora, Bulgaria) to declare that she is a female person, ordering the change of her name from K. M. H. (male first name, patronymic and family name) to K. M. H. (female first name, patronymic and family name), and that that change be recorded in her birth certificate. 17      Despite the medical opinions and legal assessments confirming the gender identity claimed by K. M. H., her request was rejected on the ground that Bulgarian legislation did not provide for the possibility of altering, on psychological grounds, the facts established in a civil status document. That rejection decision was upheld on appeal by the Okrazhen sad Stara Zagora (Regional Court, Stara Zagora, Bulgaria). According to that court, that legislation provides that sex is registered at birth on the basis of primary sexual characteristics. A change of gender is permitted only if it is necessitated by a bodily change. 18      Hearing an appeal, the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Supreme Court of Cassation, Bulgaria) held that, notwithstanding the absence of national rules on the matter, the principle of respect for private and family life requires the courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether the material conditions for changing a person’s gender identity – to which a legal change in the civil status data recorded in that person’s birth certificate is subject – are met, in order to strike the necessary fair balance between the public interest and the interests of the said person, in the light of Article 8 ECHR. The case was then referred back to the Okrazhen sad Stara Zagora (Regional Court, Stara Zagora) for it to gather new evidence relating to K. M. H.’s medical situation. 19      By a decision of 21 November 2019, the Okrazhen sad Stara Zagora (Regional Court, Stara Zagora) again rejected K. M. H.’s request on the ground that Bulgarian legislation did not provide for a gender change procedure on the basis of the self-determination of the person concerned. 20      K. M. H. lodged an appeal against that decision before the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Supreme Court of Cassation), which is the referring court. 21      That court observes that it is bound by Interpretative Decision No 2/20 of 20 February 2023 of the plenary assembly of civil chambers of the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Supreme Court of Cassation) (‘the interpretative decision’). It is apparent from that decision, however, that the substantive law in force in Bulgaria does not provide for the possibility of changing the data relating to the sex, name and personal identification number appearing in the civil status documents of a person who claims to be transgender. According to the said decision, EU law does not call for a different conclusion, since the rules on the civil status of persons fall within the competence of the Member States. The same decision is based, inter alia, on a judgment handed down on 26 October 2021 by the Konstitutsionen sad (Constitutional Court, Bulgaria), by which the latter court held that the term ‘sex’, within the meaning of the Bulgarian Constitution, must be understood as referring exclusively to its biological dimension, on account of the moral and/or religious rules and principles which must prevail over the interests of transgender persons. 22      The referring court nevertheless expresses doubts as to the interpretation adopted in the interpretative decision, first of all, in the light of Article 8 ECHR and Article 9 TEU. To limit the scope of the national law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex to intersex persons would constitute such discrimination within the meaning of those articles. It might also violate the right to a fair trial of Bulgarian transgender persons, since identical or similar cases would be treated differently in other EU Member States. 23      That court asks, next, whether the prohibition on altering the data contained in a birth certificate breaches the principles of equality of Union citizens and freedom of movement laid down in Articles 8 and 21 TFEU, as are enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter, in so far as the persons concerned will be unable to prove their identity with their identity documents. 24      The said court considers, last, that it is for the Court of Justice to assess whether a binding interpretation of the Bulgarian Constitution by the Konstitutsionen sad (Constitutional Court), according to which the term ‘sex’ is understood only in its biological sense, is consistent with the requirements of EU law and may constitute a legal impediment to the taking into account of gender identity in civil status documents. 25      In those circumstances, the Varhoven kasatsionen sad (Supreme Court of Cassation) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1)      Do the principles of the equality of Union citizens and freedom of movement enshrined in Article 9 [TEU] and in Articles 8 and 21 [TFEU], and reinforced in Article 7 of the [Charter] and Article 8 [ECHR] preclude national legislation of a Member State which rules out any possibility of amending the entry concerning gender, name and identification number … contained in the civil status documents of an applicant who states that he or she is [a transgender person]? (2)      Do the principles of the equality of Union citizens and freedom of movement enshrined in Article 9 [TEU] and in Article 8 and Article 21 [TFEU], and the prohibition of discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation laid down in Article 10 TFEU, which are reinforced in Article 7 of the Charter … and Article 8 [ECHR], and the principle of an effective remedy, preclude national case-law (in casu, [the interpretative decision]) to the effect that the material law applicable in the territory of a Member State of the European Union does not provide for any possibility of changing the gender, name and identification number recorded in the civil status documents of an applicant who states that he or she is [a transgender person], thereby placing him or her in a position different from that in which he or she would be in another Member State under whose case-law the opposite is the case? Is it permissible for national case-law, on the basis of religious values and moral principles, not to permit a change of gender identity unless it is required by certain – intersex – persons for medical reasons? Is it permissible for national case-law, on the basis of religious values and moral principles, to permit a change of gender for medical reasons only in certain cases and for certain (intersex) persons, but not in other cases of a change of gender identity for other, different medical reasons? (3)      Does the obligation of the Member States of the European Union to recognise a person’s civil status as established in another Member State under the law of that State, which is recognised in the case-law of the [Court of Justice] (in the judgments [of 5 June 2018, Coman and Others, C‑673/16, EU:C:2018:385, and of 14 December 2021, Stolichna obshtina, rayon “Pancharevo”, C‑490/20, EU:C:2021:1008]) in relation to the application of Directive [2004/38] and Article 21(1) TFEU, also apply in relation to gender as an essential element of the civil status entry, and does a change of gender, established in another Member State, on the part of a person who also has Bulgarian nationality, require that [change] to be recorded in the corresponding registers of [Bulgaria]? (4)      Is a binding interpretation of the [Bulgarian] constitution by a judgment of the [Konstitutsionen sad (Constitutional Court)] to the effect that the term ‘gender’ is to be understood exclusively in the biological sense, permissible in the light of the right to a fair trial arising from the Charter and the ECHR[? I]s that interpretation compatible with the requirements of EU law; and is it capable of constituting a legal impediment to the [recording] of a change of gender [in the civil status registers]?’  Consideration of the questions referred  Admissibility 26      It is settled that a national of a Member State who has exercised, in his or her capacity as a Union citizen, his or her freedom to move and reside within a Member State other than his or her Member State of origin, may rely on the rights pertaining to Union citizenship, in particular the rights provided for in Article 21(1) TFEU, including, where appropriate, against his Member State of origin (judgments of 23 October 2007, Morgan and Bucher, C‑11/06 and C‑12/06, EU:C:2007:626, paragraph 22; of 5 June 2018, Coman and Others, C‑673/23, EU:C:2018:385, paragraph 31; and of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraph 41). 27      In the case at hand, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that K. M. H. has exercised her right, enshrined in Article 21(1) TFEU, to move and reside freely in a Member State other than her State of origin, since she is residing in Italy, where she has developed a stable family relationship. 28      In those circumstances, the answer to the first and second questions, which concern, inter alia, the interpretation of Article 21, is necessary for the referring court in order to resolve the dispute before it. Those questions must therefore be declared admissible. The same is true of the fourth question in so far as it concerns the consequences to be drawn from a possible incompatibility of national law, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court, with the interpretation of the said Article 21 by the Court of Justice. 29      By contrast, in so far as the third question is based on the premiss that the change of gender of the person concerned has been established in a Member State other than that person’s Member State of origin, that question appears to be unrelated to the description of the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings provided by the referring court. 30      According to settled case-law, the justification for making a request for a preliminary ruling is not for advisory opinions to be delivered on general or hypothetical questions, but rather that it is necessary for the effective resolution of a dispute concerning EU law (see judgments of 16 December 1981, Foglia, 244/80, EU:C:1981:302, paragraph 18; of 26 February 2013, Åkerberg Fransson, C‑617/10, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 42; and of 1 December 2022, DELID, C‑409/21, EU:C:2022:946, paragraph 37). It follows that the third question is inadmissible.  The first and second questions  Preliminary observations 31      It should be noted as a preliminary point that, according to settled case-law, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, it is for the latter to provide the national court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to decide the case before it. To that end, the Court may find it necessary to consider provisions of EU law to which the national court has not referred in its questions (see judgments of 20 March 1986, Tissier, 35/85, EU:C:1986:143, paragraph 9, and of 22 February 2024, Direcţia pentru Evidenţa Persoanelor şi Administrarea Bazelor de Date, C‑491/21, EU:C:2024:143, paragraph 23). The fact that the referring court has formally referred, in its questions, to certain specific provisions of EU law does not prevent the Court from providing it with all the elements of interpretation which may be useful for the judgment in the main proceedings, by extracting from the body of material provided by that court, and in particular from the statement of reasons for the order for reference, the elements of EU law which require interpretation in the light of the subject matter of the dispute (see judgments of 29 November 1978, Redmond, 83/78, EU:C:1978:214, paragraph 26, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 45). 32      From that point of view, it should be noted that, by its first and second questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks the Court as to the interpretation of Article 9 TEU, Articles 8, 10 and 21 TFEU and Article 7 of the Charter. 33      As has been noted in paragraph 27 of the present judgment, in the case in the main proceedings, it is common ground that K. M. H., as a Union citizen, has exercised her right to move and reside freely in a Member State other than her Member State of origin, in accordance with Article 21 TFEU. She may, therefore, rely on the rights conferred by that article, subject, in accordance with paragraph 1 thereof, to the limitations and conditions laid down in the Treaties and by the measures adopted to give them effect. Those limitations and conditions are laid down by Directive 2004/38, the purpose of which is, inter alia, to lay down the conditions for the exercise of those rights and the limitations on them (judgment of 22 February 2024, Direcţia pentru Evidenţa Persoanelor şi Administrarea Bazelor de Date, C‑491/21, EU:C:2024:143, paragraph 27). 34      In that regard, it should be noted that Article 4(3) of that directive requires Member States, acting in accordance with their laws, to issue to their own nationals an identity card or passport stating their nationality in order to enable them to exercise the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2024, Direcţia pentru Evidenţa Persoanelor şi Administrarea Bazelor de Date, C‑491/21, EU:C:2024:143, paragraph 35). 35      The amendment of gender data requested by K. M. H. in the context of the main proceedings, however, would, pursuant to Article 9(1) of the Law on Bulgarian identity documents, read in combination with Article 13(1) thereof, entail the obligation, for K. M. H., to request new Bulgarian identity documents. 36      In those circumstances, without there being any need to rule on the interpretation of Article 9 TEU and of Articles 8 and 10 TFEU, it must be considered that, by its first and second questions, the referring court is asking, in essence, whether Article 21 TFEU and Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38, read in the light of Article 7 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which does not permit the amendment of gender data, such as the sex, family name, patronymic, first name and personal identification number, recorded in the civil status registers of that Member State, of a national of that Member State who has exercised his or her right to move and reside freely in another Member State.  Substance 37      As EU law currently stands, a person’s status, which is relevant to the rules on changing the family name, patronymic, first name or gender identity of a person, is a matter which falls within the competence of the Member States. EU law does not detract from that competence. Nevertheless, in exercising that competence, each Member State must comply with EU law, in particular the provisions of the FEU Treaty on the right conferred on all Union citizens to move and reside within the territory of the Member States (see, to that effect, judgments of 26 June 2018, MB (Change of gender and retirement pension), C‑451/16, EU:C:2018:492, paragraph 29; of 14 December 2021, Stolichna obshtina, rayon ‘Pancharevo’, C‑490/20, EU:C:2021:1008, paragraph 52, and of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraph 53). 38      The exercise of the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, however, enshrined in Article 21 TFEU, is likely to be hindered by a Member State’s refusal to recognise a change of gender identity made pursuant to the procedures laid down for that purpose in the Member State in which the Union citizen concerned exercised that right, whether or not that change is linked to a change of family name or first name. Like a family name or a first name, gender defines a person’s identity and personal status. Consequently, the refusal to amend and recognise the gender identity which a national of one Member State has lawfully acquired in another Member State is liable to cause serious inconvenience for that national at administrative, professional and private levels (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraph 55). 39      For a Union citizen who has exercised his or her freedom to move and reside freely in another Member State and who, during his or her period of residence in that other Member State, has changed his or her first name and gender identity, there is a real risk, because he or she bears two different first names and has been given two different identities, of having to dispel doubts as to his or her identity and the authenticity of the identity documents submitted or the veracity of their content, which is such as to hinder the exercise of the right which flows from Article 21 TFEU (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 October 2008, Grunkin and Paul, C‑353/06, EU:C:2008:559, paragraph 28; of 22 December 2010, Sayn-Wittgenstein, C‑208/09, EU:C:2010:806, paragraphs 69 and 70; and of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraph 56 and the case-law cited). 40      Unlike the situation referred to in the preceding paragraph, K. M. H. does not hold any documents of the host Member State in whose territory she resides, namely Italy, which contain data relating to her gender identity different from those entered in the civil status register of the Member State of which she is a national, namely the Republic of Bulgaria. 41      However, as the Advocate General emphasised in point 60 of his Opinion, it is common ground that K. M. H. needs to clear up the doubt raised by the discrepancy between, on the one hand, the indication of her gender on the only identity card that she holds and, on the other hand, her lived gender identity. 42      It is apparent from her written observations that the fact that her identity card or indeed the travel documents which were issued to her mention a male identity causes her considerable inconvenience whenever she has to identify herself to airline or hotel staff, but also to the law enforcement authorities, particularly when crossing a border. 43      The Court has moreover held, in that regard, on several occasions, that many daily actions, both in the public and in the private domains, require a person to provide evidence of his or her own identity, evidence which is normally provided in the form of a passport or identity card (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 December 2010, Sayn-Wittgenstein, C‑208/09, EU:C:2010:806, paragraph 61; of 12 May 2011, Runevič-Vardyn and Wardyn, C‑391/09, EU:C:2011:291, paragraph 73; and of 2 June 2016, Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff, C‑438/14, EU:C:2016:401, paragraph 43). 44      The discrepancy between a person’s appearance and the gender data which appear on his or her identity card or passport is thus such as to oblige that person to dispel doubts as to his or her identity and the authenticity of the identity document submitted or the veracity of their content, which is such as to hinder the exercise of the right which flows from Article 21 TFEU. 45      In accordance with settled case-law, however, a restriction on the right to freedom of movement of persons, such as that at issue in the case in the main proceedings, may be justified if it is based on objective public-interest considerations and if it is proportionate to a legitimate objective pursued by national law (judgments of 22 December 2010, Sayn-Wittgenstein, C‑208/09, EU:C:2010:806, paragraph 81; of 5 June 2018, Coman and Others, C‑673/16, EU:C:2018:385, paragraph 41; and of 25 November 2025, Wojewoda Mazowiecki, C‑713/23, EU:C:2025:917, paragraph 55). 46      In the case at hand, the Bulgarian Government merely argues that the legal recognition of gender identity falls within the exclusive competence of the Member States. As for the referring court, it has cited national case-law which refers to the exclusive recognition of sex in its biological sense and to moral or religious rules and principles as regulators of behaviour. 47      In that regard, although the drawing up of identity documents such as the identity card or passport falls within the exclusive competence of the authorities of the Member State of which the person concerned is a national, the fact remains that those documents must be issued, in accordance with Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38, in order for that person to be able to exercise his or her right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 February 2024, Direcţia pentru Evidenţa Persoanelor şi Administrarea Bazelor de Date, C‑491/21, EU:C:2024:143, paragraph 35). 48      Furthermore, where a measure of a Member State which restricts a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the FEU Treaty is justified by an overriding reason in the public interest recognised by EU law, such a measure implements EU law, within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, such that it must comply with the fundamental rights enshrined therein and, in particular, with the right to respect for private and family life, referred to in Article 7 thereof (see judgment of 25 November 2025, Wojewoda Mazowiecki, C‑713/23, EU:C:2025:917, paragraphs 55 and 63 and the case-law cited). 49      As follows from the Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (OJ 2007 C 303, p. 17), in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, however, the rights guaranteed in Article 7 thereof have the same meaning and the same scope as those guaranteed in Article 8 ECHR, the latter article constituting a minimum threshold of protection (see, to that effect, judgments of 14 December 2021, Stolichna obshtina, rayon ‘Pancharevo’, C‑490/20, EU:C:2021:1008, paragraph 60; of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraph 63; and of 25 November 2025, Wojewoda Mazowiecki, C‑713/23, EU:C:2025:917, paragraph 64). 50      According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, Article 8 ECHR protects a person’s gender identity as a constituent element and one of the most intimate aspects of his or her private life. Thus, that Article 8 encompasses the right of each person to establish details of their identity as individual human beings, which includes the right of transgender people to personal development and physical and moral integrity and to respect for and recognition of their gender identity. To that end, the said Article 8 imposes, inter alia, positive obligations on States, which entails the establishment of effective and accessible procedures guaranteeing effective respect for their right to gender identity, as the recognition of a person’s gender identity cannot be made conditional on surgical treatment that is not desired by that person. Furthermore, in view of the particular importance of that right, States have only limited discretion in this area (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraphs 64 and 65 and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights cited, and of 13 March 2025, Deldits, C‑247/23, EU:C:2025:172, paragraphs 47 and 48 and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights cited). 51      It thus follows from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that, under Article 8 ECHR, States are required to provide for a clear and foreseeable procedure for legal recognition of gender identity which allows for a change of gender data and thus of family name, patronymic and first name or personal identification number, on official documents, in a quick, transparent and accessible manner (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraph 66 and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights cited). 52      In the case at hand, as the Advocate General stated in points 91 and 92 of his Opinion, it follows from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights – in particular, from the judgment of 9 July 2020, Y.T. v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2020:0709JUD004170116), the scope of which on that point was not affected by its revision by the judgment of the ECtHR of 4 July 2024, Y.T. v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2024:0704JUD004170116, § 42 and 43), and from the judgment of 27 September 2022, P.H. v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2022:0927JUD004650920) – that the Bulgarian legislation at issue in the main proceedings must be regarded as incompatible with Article 8 ECHR. 53      In any event, in that context, it must also be borne in mind that national legislation which prevents a transgender person, in the absence of recognition of his or her gender identity, from fulfilling a requirement which must be met in order to be entitled to a right protected by EU law, must be regarded as being, in principle, incompatible with that law (see, to that effect, judgments of 7 January 2004, K. B., C‑117/01, EU:C:2004:7, paragraphs 30 to 34; of 27 April 2006, Richards, C‑423/04, EU:C:2006:256, paragraph 31; and of 4 October 2024, Mirin, C‑4/23, EU:C:2024:845, paragraph 60). 54      To tolerate discrimination based on the difference between biological sex and gender identity would be tantamount, as regards a transgender person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to safeguard (see, to that effect, judgment of 30 April 1996, P. v S., C‑13/94, EU:C:1996:170, paragraph 22). 55      It follows that legislation of a Member State, which does not permit a change of the gender data of one of its nationals who has exercised his or her right to move and reside freely within the territory of another Member State, is also contrary to the fundamental rights guaranteed to transgender persons by Article 7 of the Charter. It cannot be regarded as enabling those persons effectively to assert the rights conferred on them by Article 21 TFEU. 56      In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the first and second questions is that Article 21 TFEU and Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38, read in the light of Article 7 of the Charter, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which does not permit the amendment of gender data, such as the sex, family name, patronymic, first name and personal identification number, recorded in the civil status registers of that Member State, of a national of that Member State who has exercised his or her right to move and reside freely in another Member State.  The fourth question 57      By its fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether EU law must be interpreted as precluding a court of a Member State from being bound by the interpretation of national legislation, given by the constitutional court of that Member State, capable of constituting a legal impediment to the recording of a change of gender data in the civil status registers of the Member State in question, in contradiction with the interpretation of EU law given by the Court of Justice. 58      At the outset, it should be noted that the national court, having exercised the discretion conferred on it by the second paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, must, if necessary, disregard the rulings of a higher national court if it considers, having regard to the interpretation provided by the Court, that they are not consistent with EU law, refusing to apply, if need be, the national rule requiring it to comply with the decisions of that higher court (see judgments of 16 January 1974, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf, 166/73, EU:C:1974:3, paragraphs 4 and 5; of 5 October 2010, Elchinov, C‑173/09, EU:C:2010:581, paragraphs 30 and 31; of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 75; and of 26 September 2024, Energotehnica, C‑792/22, EU:C:2024:788, paragraph 61). 59      That obligation applies where an ordinary court is bound by a decision of a national constitutional court that it considers to be contrary to EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 15 January 2013, Križan and Others, C‑416/10, EU:C:2013:8, paragraphs 70 and 71; of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C‑430/21, EU:C:2022:99, paragraph 76, and of 26 September 2024, Energotehnica, C‑792/22, EU:C:2024:788, paragraph 62). 60      That obligation applies in so far as it follows from well-established case-law that rules of national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the unity and effectiveness of EU law (see, to that effect, judgments of 17 December 1970, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 11/70, EU:C:1970:114, paragraph 3; of 8 September 2010, Winner Wetten, C‑409/06, EU:C:2010:503, paragraph 61; and of 15 January 2013, Križan and Others, C‑416/10, EU:C:2013:8, paragraph 70). 61      Furthermore, as the Advocate General stated, in essence, in point 95 of his Opinion, the provisions of Bulgarian law at issue in the main proceedings appear to lend themselves to an interpretation consistent with the solution adopted by the Court in paragraph 56 of the present judgment. After all, it follows from the abovementioned judgments of the European Court of Human Rights of 9 July 2020, Y.T. v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2020:0709JUD004170116, § 24 to 30) and of 27 September 2022, P.H. v. Bulgaria (CE:ECHR:2022:0927JUD004650920, § 6), that, prior to the delivery of the interpretative decision, a line of case-law interpreted Bulgarian law as allowing for the recognition of legal sex reassignment. 62      From that point of view, it should also be borne in mind that the requirement to interpret national law in conformity with EU law entails the obligation for national courts to change their established case-law, where necessary, if it is based on an interpretation of national law that is incompatible with EU law, even if that case-law emanates from a higher court. Accordingly, the national court cannot validly claim in the main proceedings that it is impossible for it to interpret the national provisions at issue in a manner that is consistent with EU law by mere reason of the fact that those provisions have been consistently interpreted by the constitutional court of the Member State in question in a manner that is incompatible with that law (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 April 2016, DI, C‑441/14, EU:C:2016:278, paragraphs 33 and 34). 63      Lastly, it should also be stated that both and Article 21(1) TFEU and Article 7 of the Charter are sufficient in themselves and do not need to be made more specific by provisions of EU or national law to confer on individuals rights which they may rely on as such. Accordingly, if the referring court were to find that it is not possible to interpret its national law in conformity with EU law, it would be required to ensure, within its jurisdiction, the judicial protection for individuals flowing from those articles, and to ensure the full effectiveness of that article by disapplying, if need be, the national provisions concerned (see judgment of 25 November 2025, Wojewoda Mazowiecki, C‑713/23, EU:C:2025:917, paragraph 76). 64      In view of the foregoing reasons, the answer to the fourth question is that EU law must be interpreted as precluding a court of a Member State from being bound by the interpretation of national legislation, given by the constitutional court of that Member State, capable of constituting a legal impediment to the recording of a change of gender data in the civil status registers of the Member State in question, in contradiction with the interpretation of EU law given by the Court of Justice.  Costs 65      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules: 1.      Article 21 TFEU and Article 4(3) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, read in the light of Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State which does not permit the amendment of gender data, such as the sex, family name, patronymic, first name and personal identification number, recorded in the civil status registers of that Member State, of a national of that Member State who has exercised his or her right to move and reside freely in another Member State. 2.      EU law must be interpreted as precluding a court of a Member State from being bound by the interpretation of national legislation, given by the constitutional court of that Member State, capable of constituting a legal impediment to the recording of a change of gender data in the civil status registers of the Member State in question, in contradiction with the interpretation of EU law given by the Court of Justice. [Signatures] *      Language of the case: Bulgarian. i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any of the parties to the proceedings.