C-489/24

WyrokTSUE2026-03-05CELEX: 62024CJ0489ECLI:EU:C:2026:160

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Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.

Zagadnienie prawne
Czy art. 31 ust. 3 akapit trzeci lit. b) dyrektywy 2013/32/UE, w związku z art. 4 ust. 1 tej dyrektywy, należy interpretować w ten sposób, że państwo członkowskie może wielokrotnie i kolejno przedłużać termin na rozpatrzenie wniosków o ochronę międzynarodową, a jeśli tak, to na jakich warunkach?
Ratio decidendi
Trybunał uznał, że wielokrotne i kolejne przedłużanie sześciomiesięcznego terminu na rozpatrzenie wniosków o ochronę międzynarodową jest dopuszczalne, o ile spełnione są kumulatywne warunki z art. 31 ust. 3 akapit trzeci lit. b) dyrektywy 2013/32/UE, tj. jednoczesne złożenie dużej liczby wniosków, co w praktyce bardzo utrudnia zakończenie procedury w terminie sześciu miesięcy. Kluczowe jest, aby państwo członkowskie wykazało, że pomimo podjętych wysiłków w celu sprostania napływowi wniosków, nie miało wystarczająco dużo czasu na zapewnienie organowi rozstrzygającemu odpowiednich i wystarczających środków, w tym personelu, zgodnie z art. 4 ust. 1 dyrektywy. Całkowity czas kolejnych przedłużeń nie może przekroczyć ani czasu niezbędnego do wypełnienia tego obowiązku, ani maksymalnego terminu 21 miesięcy od złożenia wniosku, a przedłużenia nie mogą służyć do radzenia sobie ze stopniowym wzrostem liczby wniosków w dłuższym okresie.
Stan faktyczny
X, obywatel Syrii, złożył wniosek o ochronę międzynarodową w Niderlandach 17 lutego 2023 r. Po upływie sześciomiesięcznego terminu na wydanie decyzji, X złożył wezwanie do usunięcia naruszenia prawa, a następnie skargę do sądu krajowego z powodu bezczynności Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid. Sąd pierwszej instancji uznał skargę za niedopuszczalną, wskazując na przedłużenie terminu na mocy krajowych przepisów (WBV 2023/3), ale ograniczył jego zastosowanie do wniosków złożonych przed 26 czerwca 2023 r. Sekretarz Stanu odwołał się od tego wyroku, twierdząc, że może wielokrotnie korzystać z możliwości przedłużenia terminu ze względu na duży napływ wniosków.
Rozstrzygnięcie
Artykuł 31 ust. 3 akapit trzeci lit. b) dyrektywy Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady 2013/32/UE z dnia 26 czerwca 2013 r. w sprawie wspólnych procedur udzielania i cofania ochrony międzynarodowej, w związku z art. 4 ust. 1 tej dyrektywy, należy interpretować w ten sposób, że państwo członkowskie może wielokrotnie i kolejno przedłużać termin na rozpatrzenie wniosków o ochronę międzynarodową złożonych przed nim, pod warunkiem że państwo to jest w stanie wykazać, po pierwsze, że pomimo podjętych wysiłków w celu sprostania jednoczesnemu napływowi wniosków o ochronę międzynarodową, nie miało wystarczająco dużo czasu na wypełnienie obowiązku zapewnienia organowi rozstrzygającemu odpowiednich i wystarczających środków, aby umożliwić mu rozpatrzenie tych wniosków w sposób odpowiedni i kompletny, a po drugie, że łączny czas kolejnych przedłużeń nie przekracza ani czasu niezbędnego do wypełnienia tego obowiązku, ani maksymalnego terminu 21 miesięcy od złożenia konkretnego wniosku o ochronę międzynarodową.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

Provisional text JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Tenth Chamber) 5 March 2026 (*) ( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Asylum policy – Directive 2013/32/EU – Point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) – Procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection – Possibility to extend the six-month time limit for taking a decision in the event of a large number of applications for international protection lodged simultaneously – Successive extension decisions – Conditions and limits – Article 4(1) – Obligation for Member States to ensure that the determining authority is provided with appropriate means to carry out its tasks ) In Case C‑489/24 [Safita], (i) REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands), made by decision of 10 July 2024, received at the Court on 11 July 2024, in the proceedings Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid v X, THE COURT (Tenth Chamber), composed of J. Passer (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, E. Regan and D. Gratsias, Judges, Advocate General: L. Medina, Registrar: A. Lamote, Administrator, having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 9 July 2025, after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: –        X, by V.M. Oliana, advocate, and S. Rafi, expert, –        the Netherlands Government, by M.K. Bulterman and A. Hanje, acting as Agents, –        the Hungarian Government, by Zs. Biró-Tóth and M.Z. Fehér, acting as Agents, –        the European Commission, by A. Azema, A. Baeckelmans, F. Blanc and M. Debieuvre, acting as Agents, having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion, gives the following Judgment 1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60), read in conjunction with Article 4(1) thereof. 2        The request has been made in proceedings between the Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (State Secretary for Justice and Security, Netherlands) and X, a Syrian national, concerning the failure of the former to take a decision, within the statutory six-month time limit, on the application for the grant of a temporary asylum residence permit.  Legal context  European Union law 3        Recitals 3 and 18 of Directive 2013/32 state: ‘(3)      The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the full and inclusive application of the … Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees [signed in Geneva on] 28 July 1951 [(United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 189, p. 150, No 2545 (1954))], as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967 (“the Geneva Convention”), thus affirming the principle of non-refoulement and ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution. … (18)      It is in the interests of both Member States and applicants for international protection that a decision is made as soon as possible on applications for international protection, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination being carried out.’ 4        Article 4 of that directive, entitled ‘Responsible authorities’, provides in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘Member States shall designate for all procedures a determining authority which will be responsible for an appropriate examination of applications in accordance with this Directive. Member States shall ensure that such authority is provided with appropriate means, including sufficient competent personnel, to carry out its tasks in accordance with this Directive.’ 5        Article 31 of that directive, entitled ‘Examination procedure’, provides: ‘1.      Member States shall process applications for international protection in an examination procedure in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II. 2.      Member States shall ensure that the examination procedure is concluded as soon as possible, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination. 3.      Member States shall ensure that the examination procedure is concluded within six months of the lodging of the application. Where an application is subject to the procedure laid down in Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31)], the time limit of six months shall start to run from the moment the Member State responsible for its examination is determined in accordance with that Regulation, the applicant is on the territory of that Member State and has been taken in charge by the competent authority. Member States may extend the time limit of six months set out in this paragraph for a period not exceeding a further nine months, where: … (b)      a large number of third-country nationals or stateless persons simultaneously apply for international protection, making it very difficult in practice to conclude the procedure within the six-month time limit; … By way of exception, Member States may, in duly justified circumstances, exceed the time limits laid down in this paragraph by a maximum of three months where necessary in order to ensure an adequate and complete examination of the application for international protection. … 5.      In any event, Member States shall conclude the examination procedure within a maximum time limit of 21 months from the lodging of the application. 6.      Member States shall ensure that, where a decision cannot be taken within six months, the applicant concerned shall: (a)      be informed of the delay; and (b)      receive, upon his or her request, information on the reasons for the delay and the time frame within which the decision on his or her application is to be expected. …’  Netherlands law  The Law on Foreign Nationals of 2000 6        Article 42 of the Wet tot algehele herziening van de Vreemdelingenwet (Vreemdelingenwet 2000) (Law on the general revision of the Law on foreign nationals (Law on foreign nationals of 2000)) of 23 November 2000 (Stb. 2000, No 495) provides: ‘1.      A decision on an application for the grant of a temporary residence permit as referred to in Article 28 or a residence permit of unlimited duration as referred to in Article 33 shall be adopted within six months of receipt of the application. … 4.      The time limit referred to in the paragraph 1 may be extended for a period not exceeding a further nine months, where: … b.      a large number of third-country nationals or stateless persons simultaneously apply for international protection, making it very difficult in practice to conclude the procedure within the six-month time limit; … …’  The WBV 2022/22 7        On 21 September 2022, the State Secretary for Justice and Security adopted the Besluit houdende wijziging van de Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 (Decree amending the Circular on foreign nationals of 2000; ‘the WBV 2022/22’), which entered into force on 27 September 2022. 8        The WBV 2022/22 amended the Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 (Circular on foreign nationals of 2000) so as, inter alia, to extend the time limit for the examination of asylum applications laid down in the Law on foreign nationals of 2000. That circular now provided as follows: ‘… 2.13      The Decision The time limit for taking a decision The [Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst (Immigration and Naturalisations Service, Netherlands) (“the IND”)] shall take a decision on the application within six months of the lodging of the application for the grant or extension of a temporary asylum residence permit. That time limit may be extended under Article 42 of the [Law on foreign nationals of 2000]. With effect from the entry into force of the WBV 2022/22, the IND shall make use of the option provided for in Article 42(4)(b) of the [Law on foreign nationals of 2000] to extend by nine months the time limit for taking an asylum decision. This means that the IND shall extend by nine months the statutory time limit for deciding on all applications for the grant of a temporary asylum residence permit if the statutory time limit for taking a decision on an application has not yet expired on the date of entry into force of the WBV 2022/22. That extension of the time limit for taking a decision applies to applications lodged until 1 January 2023. …’  The WBV 2023/3 9        On 26 January 2023, the State Secretary for Justice and Security adopted the Besluit houdende wijziging van de Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 (Decree amending the Circular on foreign nationals of 2000; ‘the WBV 2023/3’), which again amended the Circular on foreign nationals of 2000 as follows: ‘… 2.13      Issuance of the Decision The IND shall take a decision on the application within six months of the lodging of the application for the grant or extension of a temporary asylum residence permit. That time limit may be extended under Article 42 of [the Law on foreign nationals of 2000]. … Following the publication of the WBV 2023/3, the extension of the time limit for taking a decision by nine months also applies to asylum applications lodged between 1 January 2023 and 1 January 2024. …’  The WBV 2023/26 10      On 27 December 2023, the State Secretary for Justice and Security adopted the Besluit houdende wijziging van de Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000 (Decree amending the Circular on foreign nationals of 2000; ‘the WBV 2023/26’),which again amended the Circular on foreign nationals of 2000 as follows: ‘… 2.13      Issuance of the Decision [The IND] shall take a decision on the application within six months of the lodging of the application for the grant or extension of a temporary asylum residence permit. That time limit may be extended under Article 42 of [the Law on foreign nationals of 2000]. … Following the publication of the WBV 2023/26, the extension of the time limit for taking a decision by nine months also applies to asylum applications lodged between 1 January 2024 and 1 January 2025. …’  The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 11      On 17 February 2023, X lodged an application for international protection in the Netherlands. 12      On 23 August 2023, X served a notice of default on the State Secretary for Justice and Security for failure to take a decision within the six-month time limit provided for in Article 42(1) of the Law on foreign nationals of 2000. 13      With no reaction from the State Secretary for Justice and Security in the two weeks following that notice of default, X brought an action before the rechtbank Den Haag (District Court, The Hague, Netherlands). 14      By judgment of 12 December 2023, that court declared the action inadmissible in so far as it concerned the failure to take a decision in good time, pointing out that the six-month time limit for taking a decision applicable to that application had been duly extended by nine months following the adoption of the WBV 2023/3. However, that court held that the duration of that extension was limited to nine months after the entry into force of the WBV 2022/22. It follows that the WBV 2023/3 and the extension of the time limit provided for therein do not apply to asylum applications lodged after 26 June 2023. 15      The State Secretary for Justice and Security brought an appeal against that judgment before the Raad van State (Council of State, Netherlands), which is the referring court. X brought a cross-appeal against that judgment. 16      Before the referring court, the State Secretary for Justice and Security submits that the rechtbank Den Haag (District Court, The Hague) incorrectly held, first, that the WBV 2023/3 was contrary to point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32 as regards asylum applications lodged after 26 June 2023, that is nine months after the entry into force of the WBV 2022/22 and, second, that successive extensions should be limited in time, in the light of Article 4(1) of Directive 2013/32. The State Secretary for Justice and Security takes the view that it may make use of the option of extending the time limit for taking a decision by nine months even if it has already done so before, provided that the inflow of asylum seekers is such that that extended time limit is necessary for the adequate and complete processing of asylum applications. It relies on an increase in the number of asylum applications in 2023 when compared with 2022 and claims that it is still faced with delays in processing asylum applications, despite the measures adopted to reduce the time taken to process those applications and to increase the number of decisions taken. 17      In support of his cross-appeal, X submits that the rechtbank Den Haag (District Court, The Hague) erred in holding that point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32 could apply to the situation with which the State Secretary for Justice and Security claims to be faced. Indeed, a gradual increase in the number of asylum applications does not fall within the scope of that provision. Therefore, in his view, the extension of the time limit for taking a decision on the basis of both WBV 2022/22 and WBV 2023/3 is unlawful. 18      The referring court considers that, although the request for a preliminary ruling which it previously made to the Court, which gave rise to the judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir (C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326), concerned the interpretation of the same provisions of EU law, it is necessary to refer additional questions to the Court in order to ascertain whether the State Secretary for Justice and Security is authorised to extend, again, by means of the WBV 2023/3, the time limit for taking a decision on asylum applications. 19      More specifically, the referring court asks whether, and if so under what conditions, a Member State may make use, on several occasions and consecutively, of the option provided for in point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32, to extend the time limit for taking a decision on asylum applications, having regard in particular to its obligation, laid down in Article 4(1) of that directive, to ensure that the authority responsible for examining applications for asylum has appropriate means, including a sufficient number of competent personnel, to carry out its tasks. It observes in that regard that the circumstances which led to the extension of the time limit for taking a decision on the basis of WBV 2022/22 and WBV 2023/3 will probably not change in the near future and states that the State Secretary for Justice and Security has in the meantime adopted taken a third extension decision by adopting WBV 2023/26. 20      In those circumstances the Raad van State (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1)      May the determining authority apply point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of [Directive 2013/32] repeatedly and consecutively? (2)      If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, (a)      Under what conditions may the determining authority apply point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of [Directive 2013/32] repeatedly and consecutively, and is the total duration of the period over which the determining authority may apply that provision repeatedly and consecutively subject to any restrictions? (b)      In answering the question whether the determining authority was permitted to extend the time limit for making its decision following, and consecutive to, a previous decree extending that time limit, to what extent can or must the court take account of the increase in the number of asylum applications, including relative to the period preceding the previous decree extending the time limit, and the determining authority’s efforts (if any) to improve the shortfall in its decision-making capacity in order to ensure – against the backdrop of Article 4(1) of [Directive 2013/32] – an adequate and complete examination of asylum applications?’  Consideration of the questions referred 21      By its two questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 4(1) of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may, and, if so, under what conditions, decide, on several occasions and consecutively, to extend by a maximum period of nine months the time limit applicable to the procedure for examining applications for international protection lodged before it. 22      Point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32 provides that Member States may extend the six-month time limit for the examination of applications for international protection where a large number of third-country nationals or stateless persons simultaneously apply for international protection, making it very difficult in practice to conclude the procedure within the six-month time limit provided for in the first subparagraph of Article 31(3) of that directive. 23      Accordingly, for Member States to be able to extend the six-month time limit for the examination of applications for international protection, under that provision, three closely linked and cumulative conditions must be satisfied, namely (i) the applications for international protection must be lodged ‘simultaneously’, (ii) those applications must be lodged by ‘a large number’ of third-country nationals or stateless persons, and (iii) it must then be ‘very difficult in practice to conclude the procedure within the six-month time limit’. These conditions are interdependent and must be interpreted in conjunction with each other (judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir, C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraph 33). 24      The Court has repeatedly held that in accordance with point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32, the six-month time limit laid down for the examination of applications for international protection, referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 31(3) of that directive, may be extended by a period of nine months by a Member State in the event of a significant increase in the number of those applications, within a short period, compared to the normal and foreseeable trend in that Member State, which excludes a situation characterised by a gradual increase in the number of those applications over an extended period (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir, C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraph 49). 25      With regard to the question whether and under what conditions point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32 allows a Member State to decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the examination procedure, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part (see judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 11 December 2025, GKV-Spitzenverband, C‑743/23, EU:C:2025:954, paragraph 41). 26      In that regard, it should be noted that the wording of point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32 does not, as such, make it possible to determine whether a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit applicable to the examination procedure, provided that the three conditions set out in paragraph 23 of the present judgment are satisfied. 27      With regard to the context of that provision, it should be noted that, under Article 31(2) of Directive 2013/32, Member States are to ensure that the examination procedure is concluded as soon as possible, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination. In addition, under the first subparagraph of Article 31(3) of that directive, Member States are to ensure that the examination procedure is concluded within six months of the lodging of the application. In addition, the fourth subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32 states that Member States may, in duly justified circumstances, exceed the established time limits by a maximum of three months where necessary in order to ensure an adequate and complete examination of the application for international protection. In any event, Article 31(5) of that directive provides that Member States are to conclude the examination procedure within a maximum time limit of 21 months from the lodging of the application. 28      Account should also be taken of Article 4(1) of Directive 2013/32, according to which Member States are to ensure that the authority they designate, in order to carry out an appropriate examination of applications for international protection, is provided with appropriate means, including sufficient competent personnel, to carry out its tasks in accordance with that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir, C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraph 40). 29      With regard to the objective pursued by Directive 2013/32, it follows from recitals 3 and 18 thereof that it seeks to establish a Common European Asylum System, in which a decision should be made as soon as possible on applications for international protection after an adequate and complete examination of those applications has been carried out, without prejudice to the possibility of extending, in accordance with the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of that directive, the six-month time limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 31(3) to respond to specific situations which justify a longer examination time limit, in order to be able to ensure such an adequate and complete examination (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir, C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraphs 43 and 44). 30      It is thus apparent both from the context of point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32 and from the objective pursued by that directive that there is nothing to preclude a priori the possibility that a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit for the procedure for examining applications for international protection lodged before it, provided that the three conditions set out in paragraph 23 above are satisfied and that the procedure for examining a particular application for international protection is concluded within a maximum time limit of 21 months from the lodging of the application. 31      However, as has been recalled in paragraph 24 of the present judgment, an interpretation of point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32 allowing a Member State to extend that time limit in the event of a gradual increase in the number of those applications over an extended period would undermine the objective pursued by that directive. 32      In addition, if the number of applications for international protection remains continuously high over an extended period, it is for the Member State concerned to allocate to the determining authority appropriate and sufficient means to enable it to process applications for international protection in compliance with Directive 2013/32, in accordance with the obligation referred to in Article 4(1) thereof (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir, C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraph 55). 33      Accordingly, although a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit applicable to the procedure for examining applications for international protection lodged before it, the cumulative duration of those successive extensions may nevertheless not exceed the time necessary for that Member State to comply with the obligation referred to in Article 4(1) of Directive 2013/32 and to make more means available to the determining authority, so that that authority is again able to process applications for international protection within the six-month time limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 31(3) of that directive. The time needed must be assessed in the light of the time required to recruit and train competent personnel to process applications for international protection received in an adequate and complete manner (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 May 2025, Zimir, C‑662/23, EU:C:2025:326, paragraph 48). 34      Thus, after having first extended the time limit applicable to the examination procedure on the basis of point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32, the Member State concerned will be able to make use of that option to extend that time limit again, in order, inter alia, to take into account the increase, even if not significant, in the number of asylum applications compared with the period covered by the previous extension decision, only if it is able to demonstrate, by duly stating the reasons for its decision in that regard by means of specific evidence, that, despite its efforts to deal with the simultaneous inflow of applications for international protection, it did not have sufficient time to allocate appropriate and sufficient means to the determining authority, in particular through the recruitment and training of competent staff, to enable it to process applications for international protection in an adequate and complete manner within the six-month time limit laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 31(3) of that directive. 35      Furthermore, in accordance with Article 31(6) of Directive 2013/32, the applicants for international protection concerned must, first, be informed by the determining authority of the fact that its Member State has decided to extend the time limit for examining their application and, second, be provided, when they make the application, with all information concerning the reasons for that extension and the time frame within which the decision on their application is to be expected. 36      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32, read in conjunction with Article 4(1) of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit applicable to the procedure for examining applications for international protection lodged before it, provided that that Member State is able to demonstrate, first, that, despite its efforts to deal with the simultaneous inflow of applications for international protection, it did not have sufficient time to fulfil its obligation to provide the determining authority with appropriate and sufficient means to enable it to process those applications in an adequate and complete manner and, second, that the cumulative duration of successive extensions does not exceed either the time necessary for it to comply with that obligation or the maximum time limit of 21 months from the lodging of a particular application for international protection.  Costs 37      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Tenth Chamber) hereby rules: Point (b) of the third subparagraph of Article 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, read in combination with Article 4(1) of that directive, must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State may decide on several occasions and consecutively to extend the time limit applicable to the procedure for examining applications for international protection lodged before it, provided that that Member State is able to demonstrate, first, that, despite its efforts to deal with the simultaneous inflow of applications for international protection, it did not have sufficient time to fulfil its obligation to provide the determining authority with appropriate and sufficient means to enable it to process those applications in an adequate and complete manner and, second, that the cumulative duration of successive extensions does not exceed either the time necessary for it to comply with that obligation or the maximum time limit of 21 months from the lodging of a particular application for international protection. [Signatures] *      Language of the case: Dutch. i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.

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