C-499/19
PostanowienieTSUE2019-09-05CELEX: 62019CO0499ECLI:EU:C:2019:683
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Zagadnienie prawne
Czy odwołanie wniesione na podstawie art. 58a Statutu Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Unii Europejskiej jest dopuszczalne, jeśli nie towarzyszy mu wniosek o dopuszczenie odwołania do rozpoznania, zgodnie z art. 170a ust. 1 Regulaminu postępowania Trybunału Sprawiedliwości?Ratio decidendi
Trybunał stwierdził, że zgodnie z art. 170a ust. 1 Regulaminu postępowania Trybunału Sprawiedliwości, odwołanie wchodzące w zakres art. 58a Statutu Trybunału musi być zaopatrzone we wniosek o dopuszczenie odwołania do rozpoznania. Brak takiego wniosku skutkuje niedopuszczalnością odwołania. Ponieważ skarżący, pomimo dwukrotnego wezwania przez sekretariat Trybunału, nie złożył wymaganego wniosku w terminie, jego odwołanie zostało uznane za niedopuszczalne.Stan faktyczny
Pan Victor Lupu wniósł odwołanie od wyroku Sądu Unii Europejskiej z dnia 30 kwietnia 2019 r. (T‑558/18), którym Sąd oddalił jego skargę o stwierdzenie nieważności decyzji Piątej Izby Odwoławczej EUIPO dotyczącej postępowania w sprawie sprzeciwu między nim a Et Djili Soy Dzhihangir Ibryam w sprawie unijnego znaku towarowego. Odwołanie zostało wniesione 28 maja 2019 r. i wpłynęło do Trybunału 28 czerwca 2019 r.Rozstrzygnięcie
Odwołanie zostaje odrzucone jako niedopuszczalne.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
ORDER OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT
5 September 2019 (*)
(Appeal — EU trade mark — Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — No request that the appeal be allowed to proceed — Appeal inadmissible)
In Case C‑499/19 P,
APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 28 May 2019,
Victor Lupu, residing in Bucharest (Romania), represented by P.A. Acsinte, avocat,
appellant,
the other parties to the proceedings being:
European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),
defendant at first instance,
Et Djili Soy Dzhihangir Ibryam, established in Dulovo (Bulgaria),
intervener at first instance,
THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COURT
makes the following
Order
1 By his appeal, Mr Victor Lupu requests that the Court set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 30 April 2019, Lupu v EUIPO — Et Djili Soy Dzhihangir Ibryam (Djili DS) (T‑558/18, not published, EU:T:2019:268), by which the General Court dismissed his action seeking the annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 5 June 2018 (Case R 2391/2017-5), relating to opposition proceedings between the appellant and Et Djili Soy Dzhihangir Ibryam.
2 The appeal falls within the scope of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Statute’).
3 It follows from the last sentence of Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice that, where an appeal falls within the scope of Article 58a of the Statute, it must be accompanied by a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, as the absence of such a request results in the inadmissibility of the appeal.
4 In the present case, the General Court’s judgment was notified to the appellant on 2 May 2019 and the appeal against that judgment was received at the Court Registry on 28 June 2019.
5 On 2 July 2019, the appellant was requested by the Court Registry to put his appeal in order by filing, before the expiry of the time limit for lodging the appeal, that being 12 July 2019 at the latest, the request prescribed by Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
6 By letter of 3 July 2019, the appellant disputed the need to file such a request on the ground that the mechanism established by Article 58a of the Statute did not apply to his appeal, since the contested decision was delivered by the General Court on 30 April 2019, the day before the entry into force of the new mechanism.
7 By letter of 4 July 2019, the Court Registry reminded the appellant that the preliminary admission mechanism for appeals applied to all appeals lodged as from 1 May 2019 and, consequently, the appellant was again asked to put his appeal in order by filing the request referred to in Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure before the expiry of the time limit for appeal.
8 As at 12 July 2019, the date of expiry of the time limit for appeal, no request for the appeal to be allowed to proceed had been filed by the appellant.
9 Consequently, the appeal must be dismissed as inadmissible pursuant to the last sentence of Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
On those grounds, the Vice-President of the Court declares:
The appeal is dismissed as inadmissible.
Luxembourg, 5 September 2019.
A. Calot Escobar
R. Silva de Lapuerta
Registrar
Vice-President of the Court
* Language of the case: English.
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