C-56/75
WyrokTSUE1977-10-13CELEX: 61975CJ0056(01)ECLI:EU:C:1977:150
Analiza orzeczenia
Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.
Zagadnienie prawne
Czy orzeczenie sądu krajowego wydane po wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości może stanowić „nowy fakt o decydującym znaczeniu” w rozumieniu art. 41 Statutu Trybunału Sprawiedliwości, jeśli jedynie potwierdza wcześniejsze orzeczenia znane stronom i Trybunałowi?Ratio decidendi
Trybunał orzekł, że sam fakt wydania orzeczenia sądu krajowego po wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości nie wyklucza uznania go za odkrycie nowego faktu. Jednakże, takie orzeczenie nie stanowi odkrycia nowego faktu, jeśli jedynie potwierdza wcześniejsze orzeczenia, które były już znane Trybunałowi i stronom w momencie wydania pierwotnego wyroku, i wyciąga z tego potwierdzenia przewidywalne konsekwencje prawne. W takim przypadku nie spełnia ono warunku bycia „faktem o decydującym znaczeniu”, nieznanym Trybunałowi i stronie wnoszącej o rewizję.Stan faktyczny
Raymond Elz złożył wniosek o rewizję wyroku Trybunału Sprawiedliwości z dnia 24 czerwca 1976 r. w sprawie 56/75, w której stroną była Komisja Europejska. Jako podstawę rewizji wskazał orzeczenie Tribunal de Première Instance w Brukseli z dnia 14 kwietnia 1977 r., twierdząc, że stanowi ono nowy fakt o decydującym znaczeniu. Komisja argumentowała, że orzeczenie to nie może być uznane za nowy fakt, ponieważ zostało wydane po wyroku Trybunału i jedynie potwierdzało wcześniejsze orzeczenia, które były już przedmiotem dyskusji w pierwotnym postępowaniu.Rozstrzygnięcie
1. Oddala wniosek o rewizję jako niedopuszczalny.
2. Nakazuje stronom pokrycie własnych kosztów.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
Avis juridique important
|
61975J0056(01)
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 13 October 1977. - Raymond Elz v Commission of the European Communities. - Case 56-75 - Rev.
European Court reports 1977 Page 01617
Greek special edition Page 00483
Portuguese special edition Page 00565
Summary
Parties
Subject of the case
Grounds
Decision on costs
Operative part
Keywords
PROCEDURE - JUDGMENT OF THE COURT - REVISION - JUDGMENT OF A COURT SUBSEQUENT TO JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE - NEW FACT - ABSENCE IN CASE OF CONFIRMATION OF EARLIER JUDGMENTS
STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EEC , ARTICLE 41
Summary
THE MERE FACT THAT THE JUDGMENT OF A COURT IS SUBSEQUENT TO THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE CANNOT OF ITSELF PREVENT THE FIRST-MENTIONED JUDGMENT FROM BEING CONSIDERED AS THE DISCOVERY OF A NEW FACT . SUCH A JUDGMENT DOES NOT AMOUNT TO THE DISCOVERY OF A NEW FACT IF IT ONLY CONFIRMS EARLIER JUDGMENTS AND DRAWS THE FORESEEABLE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FROM THAT CONFIRMATION .
Parties
IN CASE 56/75 - REV .,
RAYMOND ELZ , REPRESENTED BY MARCEL SLUSNY , ADVOCATE , OF THE BRUSSELS BAR , WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE CHAMBERS OF E . ARENDT , ADVOCATE , CENTRE LOUVIGNY , 34/B/IV , RUE PHILIPPE II ,
APPLICANT ,
V COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES , REPRESENTED BY RAYMOND BAEYENS , PRINCIPAL LEGAL ADVISER , ACTING AS AGENT , WITH AN ADDRESS FOR SERVICE IN LUXEMBOURG AT THE OFFICES OF MARIO CERVINO , JEAN MONNET BUILDING ,
DEFENDANT ,
Subject of the case
APPLICATION FOR THE REVISION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 24 JUNE 1976 IN CASE 56/75 ( 1976 ) ECR 1097 ,
Grounds THE APPLICANT HAS APPLIED FOR REVISION OF THE JUDGMENT OF 24 JUNE 1976 , GIVEN IN CASE 56/75 BETWEEN HIMSELF AND THE COMMISSION , ALLEGING THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL DE PREMIERE INSTANCE , BRUSSELS , OF 14 APRIL 1977 CONSTITUTES A NEW FACT WHICH IS OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO BE A DECISIVE FACTOR . UNDER ARTICLE 38 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE ECSC , ARTICLE 41 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EEC AND ARTICLE 42 OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EAEC , THE TERMS OF WHICH ARE IDENTICAL , AN APPLICATION FOR REVISION MAY BE MADE TO THE COURT ONLY ON DISCOVERY OF A FACT WHICH IS OF SUCH A NATURE AS TO BE A DECISIVE FACTOR , AND WHICH , WHEN THE JUDGMENT WAS GIVEN , WAS UNKNOWN TO THE COURT AND TO THE PARTY CLAIMING THE REVISION . ACCORDING TO THE SAID PROVISIONS THE REVISION SHALL BE OPENED BY A JUDGMENT OF THE COURT EXPRESSLY RECORDING THE EXISTENCE OF A NEW FACT , RECOGNIZING THAT IT IS OF SUCH A CHARACTER AS TO LAY THE CASE OPEN TO REVISION AND DECLARING THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE ON THIS GROUND . IN EXECUTION OF THE LATTER PROVISIONS ARTICLE 100 ( 1 ) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE PROVIDES THAT : WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ITS DECISION ON THE MERITS , THE COURT SITTING IN THE DELIBERATION ROOM SHALL , AFTER HEARING THE ADVOCATE GENERAL AND HAVING REGARD TO THE WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS OF THE PARTIES , GIVE IN THE FORM OF A JUDGMENT ITS DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION . THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION MUST THEREFORE BE EXAMINED . THE COMMISSION HAS TAKEN THE VIEW THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL DE PREMIERE INSTANCE , BRUSSELS , CANNOT CONSTITUTE A NEW FACT BECAUSE IT WAS SUBSEQUENT TO THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT , AND ALSO CANNOT BE DECISIVE BECAUSE IT MERELY CONFIRMS EARLIER JUDGMENTS WHICH WERE FULLY DISCUSSED DURING THE PROCEEDINGS IN CASE 56/75 , AND IT HAS CONTENDED THAT THE APPLICATION IS INADMISSIBLE . THE MERE FACT THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIBUNAL WAS SUBSEQUENT TO THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT CANNOT OF ITSELF PREVENT THE FIRST-MENTIONED JUDGMENT FROM BEING CONSIDERED AS THE DISCOVERY OF A NEW FACT . HOWEVER , THAT JUDGMENT ONLY CONFIRMED THE EARLIER JUDGMENTS OF THE JUGE DE PAIX , AND DREW THE FORESEEABLE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FROM THAT CONFIRMATION . IT APPEARS FROM THE JUDGMENT OF 24 JUNE 1976 THAT THE JUDGMENTS OF THE JUGE DE PAIX WERE KNOWN TO THE COURT AND THE PARTIES , AND THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL BROUGHT AGAINST THOSE JUDGMENTS WAS TO BE FORESEEN . IN FACT , IN THE WORDS OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE (( 1976 ) ECR 1105 , FIRST COLUMN ), THE APPLICANT STATED IN HIS REPLY : ' AS REGARDS THE COSTS OF THE OBJECTION AND THE ALLOWANCE TO COVER THOSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IT IS NOT YET KNOWN WHETHER THE APPLICANT WILL BE ORDERED TO BEAR THESE COSTS OR WHETHER HE WILL BE AWARDED AN ALLOWANCE TO COVER THEM . THE INCREASE IN FEES , ON THE OTHER HAND , AMOUNTS TO CERTAIN DAMAGE , BUT AS IN THE OTHER CASES IT IS NOT POSSIBLE AT PRESENT TO ASSESS IT . WISHING TO EXERCISE ' TACT BOTH IN RELATION TO HIS EMPLOYER AND HIS COUNSEL ' THE APPLICANT FINALLY SEEKS TOKEN DAMAGES OF BF 1 , AND IN THE EVENT OF THE COURT ' S RECOGNIZING HIS RIGHTS HE RENOUNCES THE POSSIBILITY OF SUBSEQUENTLY CLAIMING THE COSTS OF THE OBJECTION AND THE AWARD TO COVER THE COSTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS . '
11 IT FOLLOWS THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO REGARD THE FACTS RELIED UPON IN THE APPLICATION FOR REVISION AS FACTS OF THE KIND REFERRED TO IN THE AFOREMENTIONED PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOLS ON THE STATUTE OF THE COURT . THE APPLICATION IS THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE .
Decision on costs
COSTS
13 THE APPLICANT HAS FAILED IN HIS SUBMISSIONS
14 UNDER ARTICLE 69 ( 2 ) OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE THE UNSUCCESSFUL PARTY SHALL BE ORDERED TO PAY THE COSTS . HOWEVER , UNDER ARTICLE 70 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE , IN PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED BY SERVANTS OF THE COMMUNITIES , INSTITUTIONS SHALL BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS .
Operative part
ON THOSE GROUNDS ,
THE COURT ( FIRST CHAMBER )
HEREBY :
1 . DISMISSES THE APPLICATION FOR REVISION AS INADMISSIBLE ; . ORDERS THE PARTIES TO BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS .
© Unia Europejska, źródło: EUR-Lex (eur-lex.europa.eu), pozyskano 13.07.2026. Autentyczne są wyłącznie wersje opublikowane w Dz. Urz. UE. · Źródło