C-562/24

Provisional text JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber) 29 January 2026 (*) ( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Mutual recognition of confiscation orders – Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA – Article 8(2)(d) – Reason for non-recognition or non-execution – Rights of interested parties – Bona fide third parties – Mortgage creditor – Immovable property constituting the proceeds of the offence – Procedure for recognition and execution of a confiscation order – Judgment mortgage registered before the adoption of that order ) In Case C‑562/24 [Munik (i)], REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Okrožno sodišče v Kopru (District Court, Koper, Slovenia), made by decision of 5 June 2024, received at the Court on 20 August 2024, in the proceedings S.H. d.o.o., M.A. d.o.o. THE COURT (Fifth Chamber), composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún, President of the Chamber, J. Passer, E. Regan (Rapporteur), D. Gratsias and B. Smulders, Judges, Advocate General: N. Emiliou, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the written procedure, after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: –        the Slovenian Government, by J. Morela, acting as Agent, –        the European Commission, by U. Babovič and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents, having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion, gives the following Judgment 1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 8(2)(d) of Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders (OJ 2006 L 328, p. 59), and of Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). 2        The request has been made in proceedings relating to the recognition and execution, in Slovenia, of a confiscation order issued by an Italian court in respect of S.H. d.o.o. concerning immovable properties belonging to that company.  Legal context  European Union law  Framework Decision 2006/783 3        Recitals 1, 8 and 9 of Framework Decision 2006/783 are worded as follows: ‘(1)      The European Council, meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, stressed that the principle of mutual recognition should become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters within the Union. … (8)      The purpose of this Framework Decision is to facilitate cooperation between Member States as regards the mutual recognition and execution of orders to confiscate property so as to oblige a Member State to recognise and execute in its territory confiscation orders issued by a court competent in criminal matters of another Member State. This Framework Decision is linked to Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA of 24 February 2005 on Confiscation of Crime-Related Proceeds, Instrumentalities and Property [OJ 2005 L 68, p. 49]. The purpose of that Framework Decision is to ensure that all Member States have effective rules governing the confiscation of proceeds from crime, inter alia in relation to the onus of proof regarding the source of assets held by a person convicted of an offence related to organised crime. (9)      Cooperation between Member States, based on the principle of mutual recognition and immediate execution of judicial decisions, presupposes confidence that the decisions to be recognised and executed will always be taken in compliance with the principles of legality, subsidiarity and proportionality. It also presupposes that the rights granted to the parties or bona fide interested third parties will be preserved. In this context, due consideration should be given to preventing successful dishonest claims by legal or natural persons.’ 4        Article 1 of Framework Decision 2006/783, entitled ‘Objective’, provides: ‘1.      The purpose of this Framework Decision is to establish the rules under which a Member State shall recognise and execute in its territory a confiscation order issued by a court competent in criminal matters of another Member State. 2.      This Framework Decision shall not have the effect of modifying the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 [TEU], and any obligations incumbent on judicial authorities in this respect shall remain unaffected.’ 5        Under Article 2 of Framework Decision 2006/783, entitled ‘Definitions’: ‘For the purpose of this Framework Decision, (a)      “issuing State” shall mean the Member State in which a court has issued a confiscation order within the framework of criminal proceedings; (b)      “executing State” shall mean the Member State to which a confiscation order has been transmitted for the purpose of execution; (c)      “confiscation order” shall mean a final penalty or measure imposed by a court following proceedings in relation to a criminal offence or offences, resulting in the definitive deprivation of property; (d)      “property” shall mean property of any description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, and legal documents and instruments evidencing title to or interest in such property, which the court in the issuing State has decided: (i)      is the proceeds of an offence, or equivalent to either the full value or part of the value of such proceeds, or (ii)      constitutes the instrumentalities of such an offence, … (e)      “proceeds” shall mean any economic advantage derived from criminal offences. It may consist of any form of property; (f)      “instrumentalities” shall mean any property used or intended to be used, in any manner, wholly or in part, to commit a criminal offence or criminal offences; …’ 6        Article 7 of Framework Decision 2006/783, entitled ‘Recognition and execution’, provides, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘The competent authorities in the executing State shall without further formality recognise a confiscation order which has been transmitted in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, and shall forthwith take all the necessary measures for its execution, unless the competent authorities decide to invoke one of the grounds for non-recognition or non-execution provided for in Article 8, or one of the grounds for postponement of execution provided for in Article 10.’ 7        Article 8 of that framework decision, entitled ‘Reasons for non-recognition or non-execution’, states, in paragraphs 2 and 4 thereof: ‘2.      The competent judicial authority of the executing State, as defined in the law of that State, may also refuse to recognise and execute the confiscation order if it is established that: … (d)      the rights of any interested party, including bona fide third parties, under the law of the executing State make it impossible to execute the confiscation order, including where this is a consequence of the application of legal remedies in accordance with Article 9; … 4.      The competent authorities of the executing State shall give specific consideration to consulting, by any appropriate means, the competent authorities of the issuing State before deciding not to recognise and execute a confiscation order pursuant to paragraph 2 … Consultation is obligatory where the decision is likely to be based on: … –        paragraph 2(d) and information is not being provided under Article 9(3), …’ 8        Article 9 of Framework Decision 2006/783, entitled ‘Legal remedies in the executing State against recognition and execution’, provides: ‘1.      Each Member State shall put in place the necessary arrangements to ensure that any interested party, including bona fide third parties, has legal remedies against the recognition and execution of a confiscation order pursuant to Article 7, in order to preserve his or her rights. The action shall be brought before a court in the executing State in accordance with the law of that State. The action may have suspensive effect under the law of the executing State. … 3.      If [an] action is brought before a court in the executing State, the competent authority of the issuing State shall be informed thereof.’ 9        Article 10 of that framework decision concerns, in accordance with its title, the postponement of execution.  Legislation on common minimum rules on confiscation orders –       Framework Decision 2005/212 10      Recital 3 of Framework Decision 2005/212 states: ‘Pursuant to paragraph 50(b) of the [Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice (OJ 1999 C 19, p. 1)], within five years of the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, national provisions governing seizures and confiscation of the proceeds from crime must be improved and approximated where necessary, taking account of the rights of third parties in bona fide.’ 11      Article 1 of that framework decision, entitled ‘Definitions’, provides: ‘For the purposes of this Framework Decision, –        “proceeds” means any economic advantage from criminal offences. It may consist of any form of property as defined in the following indent, –        “property” includes property of any description, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to or interest in such property, –        “instrumentalities” means any property used or intended to be used, in any manner, wholly or in part, to commit a criminal offence or criminal offences, …’ –       Directive 2014/42/EU 12      Recitals 24 and 33 of Directive 2014/42/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union (OJ 2014 L 127, p. 39) state: ‘(24)      The practice by a suspected or accused person of transferring property to a knowing third party with a view to avoiding confiscation is common and increasingly widespread. The current Union legal framework does not contain binding rules on the confiscation of property transferred to third parties. It is therefore becoming increasingly necessary to allow for the confiscation of property transferred to or acquired by third parties. Acquisition by a third party refers to situations where, for example, property has been acquired, directly or indirectly, for example through an intermediary, by the third party from a suspected or accused person, including when the criminal offence has been committed on their behalf or for their benefit, and when an accused person does not have property that can be confiscated. Such confiscation should be possible at least in cases where third parties knew or ought to have known that the purpose of the transfer or acquisition was to avoid confiscation, on the basis of concrete facts and circumstances, including that the transfer was carried out free of charge or in exchange for an amount significantly lower than the market value. The rules on third party confiscation should extend to both natural and legal persons. In any event the rights of bona fide third parties should not be prejudiced. … (33)      This Directive substantially affects the rights of persons, not only of suspected or accused persons, but also of third parties who are not being prosecuted. It is therefore necessary to provide for specific safeguards and judicial remedies in order to guarantee the preservation of their fundamental rights in the implementation of this Directive. This includes the right to be heard for third parties who claim that they are the owner of the property concerned, or who claim that they have other property rights (“real rights”, “ius in re”), such as the right of usufruct. The freezing order should be communicated to the affected person as soon as possible after its execution. Nevertheless, the competent authorities may postpone communicating such orders to the affected person due to the needs of the investigation.’ 13      Article 6 of that directive, entitled ‘Confiscation from a third party’, provides: ‘1.      Member States shall take the necessary measures to enable the confiscation of proceeds, or other property the value of which corresponds to proceeds, which, directly or indirectly, were transferred by a suspected or accused person to third parties, or which were acquired by third parties from a suspected or accused person, at least if those third parties knew or ought to have known that the purpose of the transfer or acquisition was to avoid confiscation, on the basis of concrete facts and circumstances, including that the transfer or acquisition was carried out free of charge or in exchange for an amount significantly lower than the market value. 2.      Paragraph 1 shall not prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties.’  Slovenian law 14      Article 210 of the Zakon o sodelovanju v kazenskih zadevah z državami članicami Evropske unije (Law on judicial cooperation in criminal matters with the Member States of the European Union) (‘the Law on judicial cooperation in criminal matters’), entitled ‘Reasons for non-recognition or non-execution’, states, in paragraph 1 thereof: ‘A judicial authority shall not execute a confiscation order in respect of instrumentalities or proceeds of crime, adopted by a competent court of another Member State, where: … 8.      the execution prejudices the rights of bona fide third parties; …’  The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling 15      S.H., a company governed by Croatian law, and two natural persons, Italian nationals, were convicted in Italy by final judgment in respect of the crimes of participating in a criminal organisation, serious fraud and money laundering, misleading persons by promising them to invest their money in the Forex platform, whereas in actual fact that money was used for private purposes, in particular in respect of the acquisition of various immovable properties situated in Italy, Slovenia and Croatia. 16      On 15 October 2018, insolvency proceedings were brought against S.H. before the Trgovački sud v Pazinu (Commercial Court, Pazin, Croatia). 17      On 18 October 2018 and 12 February 2019, M.A. d.o.o registered, in the context of enforcement proceedings conducted in the Republic of Slovenia against S.H., two judgment mortgages over an immovable property owned by S.H., in Plavje (Slovenia), for the purpose of securing two claims, in the amounts of EUR 42 861.00 and EUR 5 335.12, respectively, together with interest and related costs, arising from the enforcement orders of the Okrajno sodišče v Ljubljani (Local Court, Ljubljana, Slovenia) adopted on 4 June and 24 September 2018, respectively. 18      By judgment of 9 March 2019 (‘the confiscation order’), which became final on 18 April 2019, the giudice per le indagini preliminari del Tribunale di Pordenone (judge responsible for preliminary investigations at the Pordenone District Court, Italy) ordered the confiscation of the immovable properties constituting the proceeds from the criminal offences in respect of which S.H had been convicted, including, inter alia, an immovable property in Koper (Slovenia) and an immovable property situated in Plavje, by registering the right of ownership relating to those properties in favour of the Republic of Slovenia and, failing that, the confiscation of any property, money or other proceeds from crime held by the convicted persons up to the value of the proceeds from crime. That confiscation order also ordered the preventive seizure of the properties in Slovenia. 19      The confiscation order was forwarded to the competent Slovenian authorities for the purposes of its recognition and execution. In accordance with that confiscation order, a freezing order together with a prohibition on the sale of the properties and subjecting those properties to new charges was entered, during the criminal proceedings pending in Italy, in the land register of the Republic of Slovenia in favour of that Member State. 20      By order of 5 April 2019, insolvency proceedings were initiated in the Republic of Slovenia, at the request of M.A., before the Okrožno sodišče v Kopru (District Court, Koper, Slovenia), against S.H., for the purpose of establishing the insolvency estate, M.A. taking the view that the immovable properties which had been entered in the land register as owned by S.H. had to form part of that estate. In the course of those proceedings, M.A. declared its preferential right. By contrast, the Republic of Slovenia did not declare its claim. In the course of those proceedings, that court had authorised the sale of the immovable properties, but the procedure for the sale of the two properties was annulled. 21      By judgment of 3 July 2019 of the giudice per le indagini preliminari del Tribunale di Pordenone (judge responsible for preliminary investigations at the Pordenone District Court), those properties were confiscated. 22      On 9 December 2020, the insolvency proceedings brought against S.H. before the Trgovački sud v Pazinu (Commercial Court, Pazin, Croatia) reached a final conclusion. S.H was removed from the Croatian Commercial Register on 8 February 2021. 23      By order of 30 November 2022, the investigating judge in Koper ordered the recognition and execution of the confiscation order, which lead to the entry in the land register of the ownership of the immovable properties in Koper and Plavje in favour of the Republic of Slovenia. 24      Both the liquidator of S.H., and M.A. brought an appeal against that order before the Okrožno sodišče v Kopru (District Court, Koper). That liquidator submitted that that order prejudiced the ownership rights and other rights in rem and the rights of third parties, since the Republic of Slovenia should have declared its claim or its preferential right in the course of the insolvency proceedings. M.A. submitted that it was a bona fide third party, since it had registered the mortgages on one of the immovable properties at issue, with the result that the reason for refusing recognition or execution stated in Article 210(1)(8) of the Law on judicial cooperation in criminal matters was applicable as regards the confiscation order. 25      By order of 31 January 2023, the Okrožno sodišče v Kopru (District Court, Koper) dismissed those appeals. That court held, inter alia, that the fact that M.A. had registered judgment mortgages against the immovable property situated in Plavje, of which S.H. is the owner, before the prohibition on the sale of that property and subjecting that property to new charges had been entered in favour of the Republic of Slovenia in the land register, had no effect on the lawfulness of the order recognising and executing the confiscation order. In so far as that order did not prejudice the rights of third parties, the reason for refusing recognition or execution laid down in Article 210(1)(8) of the Law on judicial cooperation in criminal matters is not applicable. 26      M.A. lodged a constitutional complaint against that order before the Ustavno sodišče (Constitutional Court, Slovenia). By decision of 19 October 2023, that court set aside that order and referred the case back to the Okrožno sodišče v Kopru (District Court, Koper), which is the referring court, for reconsideration. 27      In that regard, it is also clear from the order for reference that, according to the Ustavno sodišče (Constitutional Court), the referring court found, incorrectly, that the mortgage creditors are not ‘bona fide third parties’ within the meaning of Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783, without making a reference to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU. 28      According to the Ustavno sodišče (Constitutional Court), the question concerning the circumstances in which mortgage creditors may be regarded as ‘bona fide third parties’ within the meaning of that provision, has not yet been decided by the Court. The interpretation of the concept of ‘bona fide third parties’ depends on the objectives pursued by that framework decision, such as the improvement of the execution of confiscation measures, in particular for the purpose of restoring the victim of an offence to the position they were in prior to the commission of that offence. In a situation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, it is sufficient, in order to protect the interests of a mortgage creditor, to enable that mortgage creditor to obtain the preferential payment of the secured claim against the confiscated properties, with the result that it is not necessary to refuse the execution of the confiscation order in its entirety. 29      In those circumstances, the Okrožno sodišče v Kopru (District Court, Koper) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Must Article 8(2)(d) of [Framework Decision 2006/783] and Article 17(1) of the [Charter] be interpreted as meaning that even holders of judicial mortgages registered prior to the recognition of a decision of a court of another Member State or prior to the freezing of property for the purposes of execution are to be regarded as third parties whose rights must be taken into account in the proceedings for the execution of an order to confiscate property of unlawful origin?’  Consideration of the question referred 30      By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783, read in the light of Article 17(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the competent judicial authority of the executing Member State may refuse to recognise and execute a confiscation order issued in another Member State in respect of an immovable property which constitutes the ‘proceeds’ of a criminal offence, as defined in Article 2(e), of that framework decision, for the reason that the rights of a mortgage creditor make it impossible, on account of his or her status as a ‘bona fide third [party]’, within the meaning of Article 8(2)(d), to execute that order, where that creditor has registered a judgment mortgage against that immovable property in the executing Member State before the proceedings for recognition and execution of that order were brought in that Member State. 31      In order to answer that question, it is necessary to establish the scope of the concept of ‘bona fide third parties’ referred to in Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783. 32      In that regard, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part (judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck, 292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12, and of 19 June 2025, Lietuvos bankas, C‑671/23, EU:C:2025:457, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). 33      As regards, in the first place, the wording of Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783, it should be borne in mind that, according to the wording of that provision, the competent judicial authority of the executing Member State may refuse to recognise or execute a confiscation order if ‘the rights of any interested party, including bona fide third parties’, make it impossible under the law of the executing Member State to execute that confiscation order, ‘including where this is a consequence of the application of legal remedies in accordance with Article 9’ of that framework decision. 34      In accordance with the wording of paragraph 1 of that Article 9, the Member States must put in place the necessary arrangements to ensure that ‘any interested party, including bona fide third parties’, has legal remedies against the recognition and execution of a confiscation order, ‘in order to preserve his or her rights’. 35      It is thus clear from the wording of Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783, read in conjunction with Article 9(1) of that framework decision, that, while those provisions do not explain either the concept of ‘interested party’ or that, as part of it, of ‘bona fide third parties’, the persons whose rights are liable to prevent the recognition and execution of a confiscation order, within the meaning of the first of those provisions, correspond, as the European Commission submitted in its written observations, to those who must have an effective remedy to challenge such a decision, in accordance with the second of those provisions. 36      It is apparent from the case-law of the Court that those persons include, in addition to those convicted of a criminal offence, third parties whose property is affected or concerned by a confiscation order (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgments of 14 January 2021, Okrazhna prokuratura – Haskovo and Apelativna prokuratura – Plovdiv, C‑393/19, EU:C:2021:8, paragraph 61; of 21 October 2021, Okrazhna prokuratura – Varna, C‑845/19 and C‑863/19, EU:C:2021:864, paragraph 76; and of 12 May 2022, RR and JG (Freezing of third-party property), C‑505/20, EU:C:2022:376, paragraph 34). 37      As regards, in the second place, the context in which Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783 occurs, it should be noted that, as is apparent from recital 8 thereof, that framework decision is closely linked to the common minimum rules on confiscation orders set out in Framework Decision 2005/212 and in Directive 2014/42, which replaced Framework Decision 2005/212 in part. By ensuring that all the Member States have effective rules governing the confiscation of proceeds of crime, those common rules strengthen the mutual trust necessary for the recognition and execution of confiscation orders. 38      It should be noted that Article 6(1) of Directive 2014/42, relating to confiscation from a third party, requires the Member States to take the necessary measures to enable the confiscation of ‘proceeds’ or other ‘property’, as defined in Article 2(1) and (2) of that directive, the value of which corresponds to proceeds, which, directly or indirectly, were transferred by a suspected or accused person to third parties, or which were acquired by third parties from a suspected or accused person, ‘at least if those third parties knew or ought to have known that the purpose of the transfer or acquisition was to avoid confiscation’, since that Article 6(1), according to Article 6(2) of Directive 2014/42, cannot prejudice ‘the rights of bona fide third parties’. 39      As stated in recital 24 of Directive 2014/42, it is common for perpetrators of criminal offences to seek to use a third party to prevent the confiscation of their property. As recital 33 of that directive states, the holding of rights in rem, which include mortgage rights, may be used for that purpose. 40      It is thus apparent from those provisions of Directive 2014/42 that confiscation of the proceeds of an offence which has been transferred to a third party or acquired by such a third party may be prevented only if it is established that that third party was not aware of the fact that the purpose of that transfer or acquisition was, for the suspected or accused person, to avoid confiscation (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 October 2021, Okrazhna prokuratura – Varna, C‑845/19 and C‑863/19, EU:C:2021:864, paragraph 69). 41      It follows from the foregoing that a mortgage creditor may be regarded as an ‘interested party’ having the status of a ‘bona fide third [party]’, within the meaning of Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783, the rights of which may be affected by a confiscation order relating to an immovable property constituting the proceeds of a criminal offence, where that creditor has registered a judgment mortgage against that property before the adoption of that order and, therefore, before the proceedings for recognition of that order were brought, provided that it is demonstrated that that third party did not know or could not know that the purpose of that judgment mortgage was, for the suspected or accused person, to avoid confiscation by the transfer of a right in rem in respect of that property to that third party. 42      That interpretation is entirely consistent with the objectives pursued by that framework decision. 43      In that regard, it should be recalled that that framework decision is intended, as is apparent from Article 1(1) thereof, read in the light of recitals 1 and 8 thereof, in accordance with the principle of mutual recognition, which is a cornerstone of judicial cooperation between the Member States in criminal matters, and in order to facilitate that cooperation, to establish the rules according to which a Member State recognises and executes in its territory an order for confiscation made by a court or tribunal with jurisdiction in criminal matters of another Member State (see, to that effect, judgments of 10 January 2019, ET, C‑97/18, EU:C:2019:7, paragraph 16, and of 19 March 2020, ‘Agro In 2001’, C‑234/18, EU:C:2020:221, paragraph 55). 44      As is clear from the Court’s case-law, both the principle of mutual trust between the Member States and the principle of mutual recognition, which is itself based on the mutual trust between the latter are, in EU law, of fundamental importance given that they allow an area without internal borders to be created and maintained (judgment of 10 January 2019, ET, C‑97/18, EU:C:2019:7, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). 45      Therefore, pursuant to Article 7 of Framework Decision 2006/783, the executing Member State’s competent judicial authorities are required to recognise a confiscation order which has been transmitted in accordance with the provisions of that framework decision, without any further formality being required, and must take all the measures necessary for its execution without delay (judgment of 10 January 2019, ET, C‑97/18, EU:C:2019:7, paragraph 18). 46      Thus, only the grounds explicitly provided for by that framework decision, including that set out in Article 8(2)(d) thereof, enable, should the case arise, those authorities to refuse to recognise or execute the confiscation order (see, to that effect, judgment of 10 January 2019, ET, C‑97/18, EU:C:2019:7, paragraph 19). 47      The principle of mutual recognition must be reconciled, as is apparent from Article 1(2) of that framework decision, with the observance of the fundamental rights, enshrined, in particular, by the Charter. 48      As is clear from the Court’s case-law, the confiscation of property substantially affects the rights of persons, in that it results in the definitive deprivation of the right of ownership in respect of that property, which is a fundamental right enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter, paragraph 1 of which provides, inter alia, that everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 January 2021, Okrazhna prokuratura – Haskovo and Apelativna prokuratura – Plovdiv, C‑393/19, EU:C:2021:8, paragraphs 52 and 55). 49      Thus, in order to strike a fair balance between the principle of mutual recognition and the observance of that fundamental right, Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783 seeks to ensure the protection of the rights of bona fide interested third parties, in the same way as is apparent from recital 3 of Framework Decision 2005/212 and recital 33 of Directive 2014/42, the common minimum rules on confiscation orders provided for by those EU acts (see, to that effect, judgment of 21 October 2021, Okrazhna prokuratura – Varna, C‑845/19 and C‑863/19, EU:C:2021:864, paragraph 77). 50      It follows that the competent judicial authority of the executing Member State may refuse, pursuant to Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783, to recognise or execute a confiscation order, issued in another Member State, relating to an immovable property which constitutes the proceeds of a criminal offence, where that execution prejudices the rights of a mortgage creditor who has registered a judgment mortgage against that property before the proceedings for recognition of that order were brought in that Member State, provided that that creditor has the status of a third party and is capable of being regarded as ‘bona fide’, within the meaning of that provision. 51      In the present case, it is ultimately for the referring court to rule on the latter point, by examining the circumstances surrounding the issue, in the executing Member State, of the enforcement orders that give rise to M.A.’s mortgage claim, which result from two judicial decisions referred to in paragraph 17 above. 52      Indeed, it must be borne in mind that the Court is empowered not to apply rules of EU law to a particular case, but only to rule on the interpretation of those rules. According to settled case-law, the Court may, however, in the framework of the judicial cooperation provided for by Article 267 TFEU and on the basis of the material presented to it, provide the national court with an interpretation of EU law which may be useful to it in assessing the effects of one or other of its provisions (judgment of 18 May 2021, Asociaţia ‘Forumul Judecătorilor din România’ and Others, C‑83/19, C‑127/19, C‑195/19, C‑291/19, C‑355/19 and C‑397/19, EU:C:2021:393, paragraph 201 and the case-law cited). 53      In that regard, it should be noted that the fact that the judgment mortgages at issue in the main proceedings were registered by M.A. not only before the proceedings for recognition of the confiscation order were brought in the executing Member State, but also before the adoption of that order in the issuing Member State, could constitute evidence capable of demonstrating the absence of fraudulent behaviour and, therefore, the bona fides of that creditor. 54      However, it is for the referring court, by consulting, where appropriate, in accordance with Article 8(4) of Framework Decision 2006/783, the competent authorities of the issuing Member State, to consider all the circumstances of the case, and in particular the fact that those judgment mortgages were registered in the executing Member State after the insolvency proceedings against the debtor were brought in the Member State in which that debtor is established and even though conceivably the proceedings which led to the adoption of that confiscation order were already ongoing in the issuing Member State. Such evidence could be capable of demonstrating the existence of fraudulent behaviour and, therefore, the lack of bona fides of the creditor. 55      In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the question referred is that Article 8(2)(d) of Framework Decision 2006/783, read in the light of Article 17(1) of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the competent judicial authority of the executing Member State may refuse to recognise or execute a confiscation order issued in another Member State in respect of immovable property which constitutes the ‘proceeds’ of a criminal offence, as defined in Article 2(e) of that framework decision, for the reason that the rights of a mortgage creditor make it impossible, on account of his or her status as a ‘bona fide third [party]’, within the meaning of Article 8(2)(d), to execute that order, where that creditor has registered a judgment mortgage against that immovable property in the executing Member State before the proceedings for recognition and execution of that order were brought in that Member State, it being understood that it is for the referring court to ascertain whether that creditor may be regarded as ‘bona fide’, within the meaning of that provision, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the issue, in the executing Member State, of the enforcement order that gives rise to the mortgage claim.  Costs 56      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules: Article 8(2)(d) of Council Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA of 6 October 2006 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to confiscation orders, read in the light of Article 17(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that the competent judicial authority of the executing Member State may refuse to recognise or execute a confiscation order issued in another Member State in respect of immovable property which constitutes the ‘proceeds’ of a criminal offence, as defined in Article 2(e) of that framework decision, for the reason that the rights of a mortgage creditor make it impossible, on account of his or her status as a ‘bona fide third party’, within the meaning of Article 8(2)(d), to execute that order, where that creditor has registered a judgment mortgage against that immovable property in the executing Member State before the proceedings for recognition and execution of that order were brought in that Member State, it being understood that it is for the referring court to ascertain whether that creditor may be regarded as ‘bona fide’, within the meaning of that provision, taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the issue, in the executing Member State, of the enforcement order that gives rise to the mortgage claim. [Signatures] *      Language of the case: Slovenian. i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any of the parties to the proceedings.