C-679/24

Provisional text JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Ninth Chamber) 19 March 2026 (*) ( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive 93/13/EEC – Unfair terms in consumer contracts – Loan agreement denominated in foreign currency – Term placing the exchange rate risk on the consumer – Effects of a finding that the term is unfair – Action for restitution of the sums paid pursuant to the unfair term – Starting point of the limitation period for an action for restitution – Resumption of the limitation period after a period of suspension ) In Case C‑679/24, REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court, Hungary), made by decision of 9 October 2024, received at the Court on 15 October 2024, in the proceedings HL v UniCredit Bank Zrt., Momentum Credit Zrt., THE COURT (Ninth Chamber), composed of M. Condinanzi (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, N. Jääskinen and R. Frendo, Judges, Advocate General: A. Rantos, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the written procedure, after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: –        UniCredit Bank Zrt., by Z. Lajer, ügyvéd, –        the Hungarian Government, by D. Csoknyai and M.Z. Fehér, acting as Agents, –        the European Commission, by P. Kienapfel and Zs. Teleki, acting as Agents, having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion, gives the following Judgment 1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 1 and 7 of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (OJ 1993 L 95, p. 29). 2        The request has been made in proceedings between HL, a consumer, and UniCredit Bank Zrt. and Momentum Credit Zrt., two Hungarian financial institutions, concerning the request made by HL seeking, first, a finding of the invalidity of the loan agreement concluded with UniCredit Bank, on the ground that that agreement contains an unfair term and, secondly, the maintenance of the legal effects of that agreement with the exception of that term.  Legal context  European Union law 3        The tenth recital of Directive 93/13 states: ‘Whereas more effective protection of the consumer can be achieved by adopting uniform rules of law in the matter of unfair terms; …’ 4        Article 1(1) of that directive is worded as follows: ‘The purpose of this Directive is to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer.’ 5        Under point (b) of Article 2 of that directive: ‘For the purposes of this Directive: … (b) “consumer” means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession’. 6        Article 3(1) of that directive provides: ‘A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.’ 7        Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13 states: ‘Without prejudice to Article 7, the unfairness of a contractual term shall be assessed, taking into account the nature of the goods or services for which the contract was concluded and by referring, at the time of conclusion of the contract, to all the circumstances attending the conclusion of the contract and to all the other terms of the contract or of another contract on which it is dependent.’ 8        Article 6(1) of that directive provides: ‘Member States shall lay down that unfair terms used in a contract concluded with a consumer by a seller or supplier shall, as provided for under their national law, not be binding on the consumer and that the contract shall continue to bind the parties upon those terms if it is capable of continuing in existence without the unfair terms.’ 9        Article 7(1) of that directive provides: ‘Member States shall ensure that, in the interests of consumers and of competitors, adequate and effective means exist to prevent the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers.’  Hungarian law  The previous Civil Code 10      Paragraph 209(1) of the Polgári Törvénykönyvről szóló 1959. évi IV. törvény (Law No IV of 1959 establishing the Civil Code), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the previous Civil Code’), provided: ‘Any standard contract term or any term of a consumer contract which has not been individually negotiated shall be regarded as unfair if, in breach of the obligation to act in good faith and fairly, it unilaterally and unjustifiably establishes the contractual rights and obligations of the parties to the detriment of the party other than the one imposing the contractual term in question.’ 11      Under Paragraph 234(1) of the previous Civil Code: ‘Except in cases provided for by law, any person may rely on the invalidity of a void contract, without there being any time limit for doing so. There is no special procedure for declaring a contract invalid.’ 12      Paragraph 237 of that code was worded as follows: ‘1.      If a contract is invalid, the situation prevailing prior to the conclusion of that contract shall be restored. 2.      If it is impossible to restore the situation prevailing prior to the conclusion of the contract, the court may declare the contract applicable until it has given a ruling. An invalid contract may be declared valid if the cause of invalidity can be removed, in particular by eliminating the disproportionate advantage where there is a lack of proportionality between the performance required of each of the parties in usurious contracts. In such cases, the restitution of any performance outstanding shall be ordered, if need be without consideration. …’ 13      Under Paragraph 321 of that code: ‘1.      Anyone possessing a right to terminate a contract, either as a result of that contract or by operation of the law, may exercise that right by means of a declaration made to the other party. Such termination ends the effects of the contract. 2.      If termination is not immediate, the contract remains in effect until the expiry of the contractual or statutory notice period.’ 14      Paragraph 324 of that code stated: ‘1.      Unless otherwise provided, claims are time-barred after five years. 2.      If the principal claim is time-barred, all ancillary claims are also time-barred. Ancillary claims being time-barred does not affect the principal claim. …’ 15      Under Paragraph 326 of the previous Civil Code: ‘1.      The limitation period shall begin to run on the day on which the claim becomes due. 2.      Where a person entitled to bring a claim is prevented from doing so for a justifiable reason, the limitation period is ‘suspended’ and the claim may be brought within one year – or within three months, if the limitation period is one year or less – from the time when the obstacle is removed, even if the limitation period has already expired or if there is less than one year – or three months, if the limitation period is one year or less – remaining before the expiry of the limitation period. The present provision applies even if the person entitled to bring a claim grants the person owing performance, after the expiry of the limitation period, an extension of the period in which the obligation must be performed.’ 16      Paragraph 327 of that code provided: ‘1.      The limitation period is interrupted when a written request for performance of an obligation is made to the person owing it, when a claim is brought before the courts, when the obligation in question is modified by agreement (including when this is done by means of a transaction) and, lastly, when the person owing performance acknowledges his or her obligation. 2.      The limitation period shall resume on the day on which the limitation period was interrupted or on the date on which the proceedings which interrupted that period are fully concluded. …’  The DH1 Law 17      Under Paragraph 1 of the Kúriának a pénzügyi intézmények fogyasztói kölcsönszerződéseire vonatkozó jogegységi határozatával kapcsolatos egyes kérdések rendezéséről szóló 2014. évi XXXVIII. törvény (Law No XXXVIII of 2014 on specific matters relating to the decision of the Kúria (Supreme Court, Hungary) to ensure consistency in the interpretation of civil law provisions concerning loan agreements concluded by financial institutions with consumers), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the DH1 Law’): ‘1.      The present law applies to loan agreements concluded with consumers between 1 May 2004 and the date of its entry into force. For the purposes of the present law, “loan agreements concluded with consumers” covers any credit or loan agreement or any financial leasing agreement denominated in a foreign currency (either registered in a foreign currency or agreed in a foreign currency and paid in Hungarian forint) or in Hungarian forint, and concluded between a financial institution and a consumer, if that agreement includes a standard contractual term or a term which has not been individually negotiated and one of the stipulations referred to in Paragraph 3(1) or Paragraph 4(1) [of this law]. … 6.      For the purposes of claims arising under loan agreements concluded with consumers, the provisions of [the previous Civil Code] relating to limitation periods must be interpreted as meaning that those claims are not time-barred so long as the contract remains in effect, since the limitation period begins to run only from the day on which the contract is terminated. 7.      The limitation period for the claims referred to in subparagraph 6 is suspended from the date of entry into force of the present law until the date set in a separate law under Paragraph 3(5) and Paragraph 4(3). …’  The DH2 Law 18      Paragraph 9 of the Kúriának a pénzügyi intézmények fogyasztói kölcsönszerződéseire vonatkozó jogegységi határozatával kapcsolatos egyes kérdések rendezéséről szóló 2014. évi XXXVIII. törvényben rögzített elszámolás szabályairól és egyes egyéb rendelkezésekről szóló 2014. évi XL. törvény (Law No XL of 2014 on the rules governing the settlement of accounts provided for in Law No XXXVIII of 2014 on specific matters relating to the decision of the Kúria (Supreme Court) to ensure consistency in the interpretation of civil law provisions concerning loan agreements concluded by financial institutions with consumers, and miscellaneous other provisions), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings (‘the DH2 Law’), provides: ‘The limitation period for claims arising under the agreements concluded with consumers referred to in Paragraph 1(7) of [the DH1 Law] is suspended until the date on which the consumer is notified of the settlement provided for by the present law or until 31 December 2015.’ 19      Under Paragraph 37(1) of that law: ‘In relation to contracts falling within the scope of the present law, the parties may apply to the court for a declaration of invalidity of the contract or of specific terms thereof (“partial invalidity”) – irrespective of the ground for such invalidity – only if they also request determination of the legal consequences of invalidity (namely, a declaration of validity or effectiveness of the contract up to the time of adoption of the decision). If they do not – and if the parties fail to act on a request to remedy the defects – the court may not examine the substance of the case. A party requesting that the court determine the legal consequences of total or partial invalidity must specify the legal consequence that should apply. In that regard, the request must be express and quantitatively defined and include a settlement of accounts between the parties.’  National case-law 20      In accordance with 1/2010. (VI. 28.) PK (Legfelsőbb Bíróság Polgári Kollégiuma) vélemény az érvénytelenség jogkövetkezményeiről (Opinion No 1/2010 (VI. 28.) of the Mixed Civil Chamber of the Legfelsőbb Bíróság (Supreme Court, Hungary) on the legal consequences of invalidity (‘Opinion 1/2010’)): ‘… 2.      The general legal consequence of invalidity is that that transaction cannot create rights; that is, the legal effects intended by the parties cannot be achieved. That is the legal consequence which the court must apply of its own motion in the case of nullity and which, apart from any exception established by law, may be invoked by any person and without any time limit. Nevertheless, where a contract is capable of being annulled, that general legal consequence may only be applied if the contract is challenged successfully by someone with a legitimate interest in doing so. Both in the case of nullity and where a contract is capable of being annulled, the court will only apply the other legal consequences of invalidity (Paragraph 237 of [the previous Civil Code]) at the request of a party and respecting the limits as regards limitation periods and adverse possession. 3.      The restoration of the original situation may only be effected in kind. Where one of the parties is only able to return the thing received by means of the payment of its equivalent in money, that does not constitute restoration of the original situation. …’ 21      The 2/2014. számú PJE [Polgári jogegységi] határozat [Decision 2/2014 of the Kúria (Supreme Court) of 16 June 2014 on the consistent interpretation of the provisions of civil law], provides: ‘… In the event that the terms of the contract and the information provided by the financial institution clearly enabled a given consumer – considered to be an “average consumer” – to understand that he or she alone was assuming the exchange rate risk without limit and that changes to the exchange rate detrimental to him or her were not subject to any upper limit, that clause cannot be held to be unfair under Paragraph 209(5) of the previous Civil Code. Therefore, the fact that the consumer received the information required by law and signed the declaration that he or she was aware of the risks must be interpreted, until proven otherwise, as meaning that it was or should have been clear and comprehensible to the consumer that the exchange rate risk lay with him or her alone and without limit. It is for the financial institution to prove that the consumer was informed in this manner. However, if the term providing for the assumption of an unlimited exchange rate risk was not clearly and comprehensibly discernible by the consumer through the fault of the financial institution, the conditions for finding that the contract is unfair are met. … It is for the consumer to prove that the information was inadequate and that, consequently, the drafting of the contractual term relating to the exchange rate risk was not clear and comprehensible to him or her.’ 22      Judgment Gfv.VI.30.382/2023/3 of the Kúria (Supreme Court), of 14 February 2024, states: ‘26.      The Kúria (Supreme Court) holds that, even if, under Paragraph 234(1) of the previous Civil Code and except in cases provided for by law, any person may rely on the invalidity of a void contract, without there being any time limit for doing so and there is no special procedure for declaring a contract invalid, the court is only to apply the other legal consequences of invalidity [(Paragraph 237 of the previous Civil Code)] at the request of a party and respecting the limits as regards limitation periods and adverse possession [(Opinion 1/2010, paragraph 2, second sentence)]. Since the entry into force on 1 November 2014 of Paragraph 37(1) of the DH2 Law, parties may, in relation to contracts falling within the scope of that provision, apply to the court for a declaration of invalidity of the contract only if they also request determination of the legal consequences of invalidity. An action requesting that the court declare a contract invalid and determine the legal consequences of that invalidity does not contain multiple requests but a single request for an order for payment which arises from case-law [judgment Gfv.VII.30.758/2017/10 of the Kúria (Supreme Court)]. In proceedings with that aim, it is not necessary for the court to rule by interim judgment on the legal basis of the request. 27.      Under the specific legislation applicable to the loan agreement denominated in a foreign currency in question, namely Paragraph 1(6) of the DH1 Law, the starting point of the limitation period corresponds to the end of the contract and not to the possibility of the person entitled to bring a claim bringing the claim arising under that agreement. Under that provision, the rules of the previous Civil Code relating to limitation periods must be interpreted as meaning that claims arising under loan agreements concluded with consumers are not time-barred so long as the contract remains in effect, since the limitation period begins to run only from the day on which the contract is terminated. Where the agreement comes to an end on account of its performance, the financial institution no longer possesses, by definition, from the date of performance, any claim in respect of the person who owed that performance, however, if it is terminated with immediate effect [Paragraph 321(1) of the previous Civil Code], the claim logically survives past the end of the contract. … 40.      Where the question whether an action is time-barred is raised, it shall be examined before the substance of the claim, since a request for performance which is time-barred cannot be made in court. The limitation period for claims arising under agreements concluded with consumers runs uniformly, pursuant to a specific legislative provision, from the day on which the contract is terminated. The limitation period for the action of a consumer seeking a determination by the court of the legal consequences of the invalidity of a contract is to be assessed separately from the limitation period for the claim of the financial establishment.’  The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 23      On 14 February 2008, HL concluded with UniCredit Bank a mortgage loan agreement denominated in Swiss francs (CHF), for a sum corresponding to 5 100 000 Hungarian forint (HUF) (approximately EUR 12 750), to be repaid over a period of 360 months, in Hungarian forint. 24      That agreement contained a term under which the risk associated with an appreciation of the foreign currency against the Hungarian forint was placed entirely on the consumer (‘the term relating to the exchange rate risk’). 25      On 17 May 2012, UniCredit Bank terminated the loan agreement on the basis of the late payment of the monthly instalments due since 15 November 2011. 26      On 28 December 2012, UniCredit Bank obtained an order for performance on the basis of which it brought enforcement proceedings against HL, which are still ongoing. On 17 March 2017, UniCredit Bank assigned its claim arising under the loan agreement to Momentum Credit. 27      On 4 April 2023, HL, before the court of first instance having jurisdiction, sought to obtain, on account of the failure of the bank to fulfil its obligation of information and the insufficient nature of the information provided concerning the exchange rate risk, a finding of the invalidity of the loan agreement and, in respect of the necessary legal consequences of that finding, the maintenance of the legal effects of that agreement, with the exception of the term relating to the exchange rate risk deemed not to have been agreed. HL also requested that a settlement of accounts between the parties be drawn up, in accordance with Paragraph 3 of the DH2 Law and in the light of the judgment of 31 March 2022, Lombard Lízing (C‑472/20, EU:C:2022:242), while committing to repay, following the final decision, his outstanding debt as at 5 September 2012, namely HUF 5 223 492 (approximately EUR 13 058), together with interest. 28      In the alternative, HL requested that that court find the loan agreement invalid and, in respect of the legal consequences of that finding, declare that that agreement is effective only until the date of delivery of the judgment to be adopted, in accordance with Paragraph 37(1) of the DH2 Law. 29      UniCredit Bank and Momentum Credit raised an objection that HL’s action was time-barred and contended that the action should be dismissed. 30      The court of first instance dismissed HL’s action on the ground that it was time-barred. It did not rule on the invalidity of the agreement, finding that, in any event, the request of the interested party that the court determine the legal consequences of invalidity was time-barred. 31      HL brought an appeal against the judgment at first instance before the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court, Hungary), which is the referring court, claiming in particular that the loan agreement at issue is invalid on account of the insufficient nature of the information provided by the bank regarding the exchange rate risk. In addition, he takes the view that his claim is not time-barred and, referring to the judgments of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance (C‑609/19, EU:C:2021:469), and of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance (C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, EU:C:2021:470), he argued that, for repayment of sums paid but not due on the basis of an unfair term, no limitation period may be relied upon against a consumer who is unaware of the unfairness of such a clause in a loan agreement. 32      UniCredit Bank and Momentum Credit contended that the judgment at first instance should be upheld. 33      The referring court states that it is called upon to determine what should happen to a loan agreement denominated in a foreign currency, where a term of that agreement, which places the exchange rate risk on the consumer alone, is held to be unfair because that consumer was insufficiently informed of the nature of that risk, and where the removal of that term, which defines the main subject matter of that agreement, results in the invalidity of the entire agreement. 34      It specifies that it harbours doubts as to how it should calculate the limitation period which applies to the action by which the consumer requests the court to determine the legal consequences of the invalidity of the loan agreement. 35      The referring court states that, under Hungarian law, in particular Paragraph 1(6) of the DH1 Law, the limitation period for claims arising under an agreement concluded with a consumer starts to run, in principle, from the date on which the agreement is terminated. 36      In that respect, the court of first instance, by relying on paragraph 2 of Opinion 1/2010 and on judgment Gfv.VI.30.382/2023/3 of the Kúria (Supreme Court), of 14 February 2024, found, first, that the request brought by HL that the court determine the legal consequences of the invalidity of the loan agreement at issue was covered by the provisions on limitation periods, in particular Paragraph 324(1) of the previous Civil Code under which claims are time-barred after five years. 37      Secondly, as regards the starting point of the limitation period for that request, it found that it had begun to run on the date on which the loan agreement was concluded since the causes of invalidity relied upon already existed from the time it was drawn up. More specifically, the court of first instance held that Paragraph 1(6) of the DH1 Law was not applicable in the present case, on the ground that an agreement that is invalid – and, accordingly, void ab initio – must, in principle, be regarded as never having had legal effect, and is therefore distinct from an agreement which, one day, is terminated or ceases to apply. 38      As regards the suspension of the limitation period, the referring court notes that, in the judgment at first instance, it is stated that that suspension lasts only for the period defined in Paragraph 1(7) of the DH1 Law and Paragraph 9 of the DH2 Law, namely until the date on which the consumer is notified of the settlement provided for by the DH2 Law or until 31 December 2015 at the latest, assuming that those provisions are held to apply to claims deriving from the invalidity of an agreement. 39      The referring court notes that, according to the court of first instance, there was no interruption of the limitation period since, although Paragraph 1(6) of the DH1 Law had to be interpreted as meaning that the limitation period applied to claims deriving from the invalidity of an agreement and did not begin to run until that agreement ended, it had to be found that the time limit of five years, laid down by the previous Civil Code, had expired, that period having elapsed between the date on which the agreement was terminated, which occurred on 17 May 2012, and the date on which the action in the main proceedings was brought, namely 4 April 2023. 40      The referring court itself finds that, in a situation such as the one in the main proceedings where the unfair term concerns the main subject matter of the loan agreement and brings about the invalidity of the whole agreement, that time limit of five years runs from 14 February 2008, the date on which the agreement was concluded, without it being possible to extend that time limit by means of a potential suspension of the limitation period laid down by the DH1 and DH2 laws, and, moreover, that it runs until 31 December 2015 at the latest. In its view, had there been such an extension, it would have enabled the consumer to become aware of the unfairness of the contractual term relating to the exchange rate risk. 41      It is unsure, consequently, whether, in the light of Decision 2/2014 of 16 June 2014 of the Kúria (Supreme Court) and of the case-law of the Court of Justice concerning the level of information which must be provided by the bank to the consumer, that limitation period is sufficient to enable the consumer to become aware of the unfairness of that term and to assert his or her rights, when the starting point is the day on which the agreement was concluded. 42      In those circumstances, the Fővárosi Törvényszék (Budapest High Court) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1)      Are the objectives laid down in Articles 1 and 7 of [Directive 93/13] achieved where, in the case of a claim made by a consumer in proceedings brought by that consumer and based on the unfair nature of the main subject matter of a loan agreement concluded with the consumer ([concerning] information about the exchange rate risk), the financial claim is subject to the limitation period of five years laid down in the [previous] Hungarian Civil Code, calculated from the point in time at which the claim may be brought – also taking into account the provisions of DH1 és DH2 törvényeknek (the DH 1 and DH 2 Laws), which provide for the possibility that the limitation period can be suspended – notwithstanding the fact that the unfair nature of the main subject matter of the agreement means that the agreement as a whole is invalid, and that the unilateral termination of that agreement cannot therefore result in its termination, with the result that the date on which the agreement was concluded determines the starting point of the limitation period? (2)      Are the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union on limitation periods for asserting a consumer’s claims, and the decisions of the Kúria (Supreme Court …)[, which follow those decisions of the Court of Justice and bind the Hungarian courts (even if only as guidelines which put consumer in a position to recognise the unfair nature of the main subject matter of the agreement he or she has concluded),] relevant for the purposes of achieving the objectives laid down in [Directive 93/13]? If the answer is in the affirmative, can [the date of] such decisions be regarded as the starting point of the limitation period for asserting the claim for a declaration that an agreement is unfair or can the limitation period only be regarded as having been suspended between the time when the agreement was concluded and the date on which such decisions are given? (3)      In addition to the date on which the decisions referred to in the second question were given, should the point in time when the consumer became aware of those decisions be taken as the starting point of the limitation period or should this be taken as the end of the period – which began with the conclusion of the [agreement] – during which the limitation period [was] suspended? (4)      In the case of a consumer’s claim based on the unfair nature of the main subject matter of an agreement, if the limitation period begins to run at the time when the agreement is concluded, is it justified to grant the consumer the possibility of asserting his or her claim until the end of the term of the agreement concluded by that consumer, where the term of the agreement exceeds the limitation period of five years currently in force?’  The jurisdiction of the Court 43      UniCredit Bank contends that the Court does not have jurisdiction to answer the questions referred since, by those questions, the referring court does not ask the Court to interpret a provision of EU law. In its view, since Directive 93/13 does not contain any rule on limitation periods, the questions concern, in fact, the interpretation of relevant national civil law rules, which fall under the jurisdiction of the Member States. 44      In that regard, it should be noted that the argument made by UniCredit Bank is based on the incorrect premiss that the exercise by the Member States of their right to define the detailed rules under which a term contained in an agreement is found to be unfair and the specific legal effects of that finding fall outside the scope of EU law (judgment of 14 December 2023, Getin Noble Bank (Limitation period for actions for restitution), C‑28/22, EU:C:2023:992, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited). 45      The Court has already held that the regulation by national law of the protection guaranteed to consumers by Directive 93/13 may not alter the scope and, therefore, the substance of that protection and thus affect the strengthening of the effectiveness of that protection by the adoption of uniform rules of law in respect of unfair terms, which was the intention of the EU legislature, as stated in the tenth recital of Directive 93/13 (judgment of 14 December 2023, Getin Noble Bank (Limitation period for actions for restitution), C‑28/22, EU:C:2023:992, paragraph 51 and the case-law cited). 46      From that point of view, it must be recalled that the procedure provided for by Article 267 TFEU is an instrument for cooperation between the Court and the national courts by means of which the Court provides national courts with the criteria of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them. In the context of that cooperation, it is for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, which alone has direct knowledge of the facts giving rise to the dispute and must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine, in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court. Consequently, where the questions submitted by the national court concern the interpretation of EU law, the Court is, in principle, bound to give a ruling (judgment of 7 December 2023, mBank (Consumer declaration), C‑140/22, EU:C:2023:965, paragraph 47). 47      In addition, in the context of the procedure established by Article 267 TFEU, the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the interpretation of provisions of national laws or regulations or on their conformity with EU law. It is settled case-law that, in a request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, the Court may interpret EU law only within the parameters of the jurisdiction conferred on the European Union (judgment of 14 December 2023, Getin Noble Bank (Limitation period for actions for restitution), C‑28/22, EU:C:2023:992, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). 48      In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the referring court harbours doubts as to how it should calculate the limitation period of five years which applies to the action by which the consumer requests that the national court determine the legal consequences of the invalidity of the loan agreement. 49      In that respect, the referring court asks, in essence, the Court whether Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding or not precluding an interpretation of national law according to which that limitation period of five-years laid down by the previous Civil Code runs from the date on which the loan agreement was concluded with the consumer, where a term of that agreement is held to be unfair and where the removal of that term, which defines the main subject matter of that agreement, results in the invalidity of the entire agreement. In addition, the referring court raises, before the Court, additional questions concerning how to identify the starting point of that limitation period, in the event that the Court finds that calculating it from the date on which the agreement at issue was concluded does not comply with the objectives and the purposes of Directive 93/13. 50      Accordingly, it cannot be accepted that the request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Hungarian law and, therefore, UniCredit Bank’s argument alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Court must be rejected. 51      It follows from the foregoing that the Court has jurisdiction to rule on the request for a preliminary ruling.  Admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling 52      UniCredit Bank also disputes the admissibility of the request for a preliminary ruling on the ground that, first, the referring court has not shown that there is a link between Hungarian law and EU law. Secondly, it contends that the legal issues underlying the questions submitted for a preliminary ruling are hypothetical since it is not necessary to answer them in order to enable the referring court to rule on the dispute in the main proceedings. In that respect, UniCredit Bank submits that nothing prevents the referring court from following the case-law of the Kúria (Supreme Court), which is, moreover, not correctly represented in the request. 53      According to settled case-law, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court (judgment of 24 July 2023, Lin, C‑107/23 PPU, EU:C:2023:606, paragraph 61 and the case-law cited). 54      It follows that questions relating to EU law enjoy a presumption of relevance. The Court may refuse to rule on a question referred by a national court for a preliminary ruling only where it is quite obvious that the interpretation of EU law that is sought bears no relation to the actual facts of the main action or its purpose, where the problem is hypothetical, or where the Court does not have before it the factual or legal material necessary to give a useful answer to the questions submitted to it (judgment of 24 July 2023, Lin, C‑107/23 PPU, EU:C:2023:606, paragraph 62 and the case-law cited). 55      In the present case, it is apparent from the request for a preliminary ruling that the interpretation of EU law sought by the referring court appears necessary for the purpose of ruling on the dispute before it. 56      The referring court expresses doubt as to how to calculate the limitation period, in particular in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice relating to Directive 93/13 and, more specifically, as to the level of information which the bank must ensure the consumer has regarding the exchange rate risk. 57      Furthermore, as regards the references made by the referring court to the case-law of the Kúria (Supreme Court), it is not for the Court, in the context of the judicial cooperation established in Article 267 TFEU, to call back into question or to verify the accuracy of the interpretation of national law made by the national court, as such interpretation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of that court. In addition, when hearing a reference for a preliminary ruling from a national court, the Court of Justice must base its reasoning on the interpretation of national law as described to it by that court (judgment of 12 December 2024, Volvo Group Belgium, C‑436/23, EU:C:2024:1023, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). 58      It follows that the request for a preliminary ruling is admissible.  Consideration of the questions referred  The first question 59      By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 1 and 7 of Directive 93/13, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national law according to which, where a loan agreement is invalid and cannot continue in existence without the unfair term on the ground that that term relates to the main subject matter of the agreement, the consumer can rely, in court, on the legal consequences of the finding of the invalidity of that agreement only within a limitation period of five years from the date on which that agreement was concluded. 60      As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that, under Article 1(1) of Directive 93/13, the purpose of that directive is to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer. 61      In that context, Article 7(1) of that directive requires Member States to provide adequate and effective means of preventing the continued use of unfair terms in contracts concluded with consumers by sellers or suppliers. 62      According to settled case-law, in the absence of EU rules on the matter, it is for the national legal order of each Member State, in accordance with the principle of procedural autonomy, to establish procedural rules for actions intended to safeguard the rights that individuals derive from EU law, provided, however, that those rules are no less favourable than the rules governing similar situations subject to domestic law (the principle of equivalence) and do not render impossible in practice or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by EU law (the principle of effectiveness) (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2022, D.B.P. and Others (Mortgage loans denominated in foreign currency), C‑80/21 to C‑82/21, EU:C:2022:646, paragraph 86 and the case-law cited). 63      As regards the principle of effectiveness, which is the only principle at issue in the present proceedings, it should be noted that every case in which the question arises as to whether a national procedural provision makes the application of EU law impossible or excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national bodies. In that context, it is necessary to take into consideration, where relevant, the principles which lie at the basis of the national legal system, such as the protection of the rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of the proceedings (judgment of 25 April 2024, Caixabank (Limitation period), C‑484/21, EU:C:2024:360, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 64      In addition, the Court has stated that the obligation on the Member States to ensure the effectiveness of the rights that individuals derive from EU law, particularly the rights deriving from Directive 93/13, implies a requirement for effective judicial protection, also guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which applies, inter alia, to the definition of detailed procedural rules relating to actions based on such rights (judgment of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, EU:C:2021:470, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). 65      As regards the application of a limitation period to a claim brought by a consumer for repayment of sums paid but not due, based on the unfair nature of a contractual term, for the purposes of Directive 93/13, the Court has confirmed on several occasions that Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13 do not preclude national legislation which, while providing that an action for a declaration of nullity of an unfair term in an agreement concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is not subject to a time limit, subjects the request of the consumer seeking to enforce the restitutory effects of that finding to a limitation period, provided that the principle of effectiveness, in particular, is observed (judgment of 25 January 2024, Caixabank (Limitation period for the repayment of mortgage charges), C‑810/21 to C‑813/21, EU:C:2024:81, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). 66      Accordingly, it must be held that the application of a limitation period to claims for restitution brought by consumers in order to enforce rights which they derive from Directive 93/13 is not, in itself, contrary to the principle of effectiveness, provided that its application does not make it in practice impossible or excessively difficult to exercise the rights conferred by that directive (judgment of 25 April 2024, Caixabank (Limitation period), C‑484/21, EU:C:2024:360, paragraph 27 and the case-law cited). 67      As regards the analysis of the characteristics of a limitation period such as that at issue in the main proceedings, the Court has stated that that analysis must cover the duration of the limitation period and the detailed rules for its application, including the mechanism adopted to start the period running (judgment of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, EU:C:2021:470, paragraph 30 and the case-law cited). 68      As regards the starting point of the limitation period, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the application of a five-year limitation period that begins to run from the conclusion of the agreement at issue, in so far as it means that the consumer may seek the refund of payments made pursuant to a contractual term held to be unfair only during the first five years following the signing of the agreement, irrespective of whether he or she was or could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of that term, may make it excessively difficult for that consumer to exercise his or her rights under Directive 93/13, and, consequently, run counter to the principle of effectiveness read in conjunction with the principle of legal certainty (judgment of 16 July 2020, Caixabank and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, C‑224/19 and C‑259/19, EU:C:2020:578, paragraph 91). 69      Accordingly, the date of conclusion of the agreement containing the unfair term cannot, as such, constitute the starting point of the limitation period (judgment of 25 April 2024, Caixabank (Limitation period), C‑484/21, EU:C:2024:360, paragraph 31). 70      In that regard, it is necessary to take account of the weaker position of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or supplier as regards both bargaining power and level of knowledge, which leads the consumer to accept terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier, without being able to influence their content. Similarly, it is important to note that consumers may be unaware of the unfairness of a term in a mortgage loan agreement or not appreciate the extent of their rights under Directive 93/13 (judgment of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, EU:C:2021:470, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). 71      It should also be borne in mind that the Court has held that loan agreements, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, are generally performed over long periods of time and, therefore, it cannot be ruled out that, at least in respect of some of the payments made, the limitation period will run even before the agreement in question comes to an end, so that such a limitation period regime is liable systematically to deprive consumers of the possibility of claiming the return of payments made under terms contrary to Directive 93/13 (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 September 2022, D.B.P. and Others (Mortgage loans denominated in foreign currency), C‑80/21 to C‑82/21, EU:C:2022:646, paragraph 95 and the case-law cited). 72      Therefore, as regards the starting point of the limitation period at issue in the main proceedings, there is a non-negligible risk that, in view of the way in which that period is determined by national case-law, the consumer will not be able to assert his or her rights under Directive 93/13 effectively. 73      As is apparent from the order for reference, if the judicial interpretation of national law, which led the court of first instance to set the dies a quo of the limitation period at the date on which the loan agreement was concluded between UniCredit Bank and HL, namely 14 February 2008, had to be upheld, that period would have begun to run irrespective of whether HL had been aware or in a position to become aware of the unfairness of the term relating to the exchange rate risk and, therefore, to assert his rights under Directive 93/13 effectively. In that respect, nothing in the order for reference indicates that, at the time the agreement was concluded, the consumer was aware or in a position to become aware of the unfairness of the term relating to the exchange rate risk and, accordingly, in a position to assert his rights under that directive effectively, which is, in any event, a matter for the referring court to ascertain. 74      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 1(1) and Article 7(1) of Directive 93/13, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national law according to which, where a loan agreement is invalid and cannot continue in existence without the unfair term on the ground that that term relates to the main subject matter of the agreement, the consumer can rely, in court, on the legal consequences of the finding of the invalidity of that agreement only within a limitation period of five years from the date on which that agreement was concluded, if, on that date, the consumer was not aware or was not in a position to become aware of the unfairness of the contractual term concerned and, therefore, was not in a position to assert his or her rights under Directive 93/13 effectively.  The second and third questions 75      By its second and third questions, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding the date on which the Court of Justice ruled on the interpretation of that directive or the date on which the national court of last instance ruled on the unfairness of terms included in agreements concluded with consumers from being used to determine the starting point of the limitation period for the action brought by a consumer seeking restitution of sums paid on the basis of a term similar to the term which gave rise to the interpretation of that directive provided by the Court of Justice or to the term that was the subject of the decision of the national courts, or for the purpose of resuming that limitation period following its suspension. 76      In order to provide the referring court with a useful answer to the questions referred, and in the light of the background to the dispute as described in the order for reference, it is appropriate to limit the analysis solely to a situation in which a consumer submits a claim with a view to enforcing the restitutory effects stemming from a finding that a contractual term is unfair. 77      It should be borne in mind that, in order in particular to ensure effective protection of the rights which the consumer derives from Directive 93/13, he or she must be able to raise, at any time, the unfairness of a contractual term not only as a means of defence, but also in order to obtain a declaration by the court that a contractual term is unfair, with the result that an application brought by a consumer for a declaration that a term in an agreement concluded between a seller or supplier and a consumer is unfair cannot be subject to any limitation period (judgment of 10 June 2021, BNP Paribas Personal Finance, C‑776/19 to C‑782/19, EU:C:2021:470, paragraph 38). 78      That being the case, the Court has ruled that the fixing of the starting point of the limitation period for an action for restitution brought by a consumer, on the basis of an unfair contractual term, at the date on which the national court of last instance delivered judgments declaring standard terms corresponding to the term included in the agreement at issue unfair, would in many cases allow the seller or supplier to keep the sums wrongly obtained to the detriment of that consumer on the basis of the unfair term, which would be incompatible with the requirement arising from the case-law referred to in paragraph 68 above that that starting point cannot be set irrespective of whether that consumer was or could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of that term giving rise to the right to restitution and without imposing on the seller or supplier an obligation of diligence and information in relation to the consumer, thus exacerbating the latter’s position of weakness that Directive 93/13 seeks to redress (judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run), C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraph 47). 79      Furthermore, in the absence of an obligation of information in that regard on the part of the seller or supplier, it cannot be assumed that the consumer may reasonably be aware of the fact that a term contained in his or her agreement is equivalent in scope to a term that has been found to be unfair by the national court of last instance. Admittedly, such case-law, if it receives adequate publicity, may enable an average consumer to become aware of the unfairness of a standard term included in his or her agreement with a seller or supplier. However, that consumer, whom Directive 93/13 seeks to protect in the light of his or her weaker position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, cannot be expected to take steps which fall within the scope of legal research (judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run), C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraphs 48 and 49 and the case-law cited). 80      In that regard, it must be recalled that it is apparent from the wording of Article 2(b) of Directive 93/13 that the protection afforded by that directive depends on the purposes for which a natural person is acting, that is to say, those which are outside his or her trade, business or profession. Although sellers or suppliers may be required to keep themselves informed of legal matters relating to the terms which they take the initiative to insert in agreements which they conclude with consumers in the course of ordinary commercial activity, in particular in the light of national case-law relating to such terms, a similar attitude cannot be expected of consumers, given the occasional, or even exceptional, nature of the conclusion of an agreement containing such a term (judgment of 25 January 2024, Caixabank (Limitation period for the repayment of mortgage charges), C‑810/21 to C‑813/21, EU:C:2024:81, paragraph 60). 81      In addition, it should be noted that such national case-law is not necessarily such as to make it possible automatically to declare unfair all terms of that type included in all agreements between a seller or supplier and a consumer in that Member State. Where a standard term has been declared unfair by the national court of last instance, it is still necessary, in principle and in accordance with Article 3(1) and Article 4(1) of Directive 93/13, to determine, on a case-by-case basis, to what extent a term included in a particular agreement corresponds to that standard term and is, like the latter, to be held to be unfair (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run), C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraphs 50 and 51). 82      It follows from those considerations that an average consumer who is reasonably observant and circumspect cannot be required not only to keep himself or herself regularly informed, on his or her own initiative, of decisions of the national court of last instance relating to standard terms contained in agreements of a similar nature to those which he or she has concluded with sellers or suppliers, but also to determine, on the basis of a judgment of a national court of last instance, whether terms included in a particular agreement are unfair (judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run), C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraph 52). 83      Accordingly, Directive 93/13 precludes that, in order to determine the starting point of the limitation period for the consumer’s action for restitution of sums unduly paid under an unfair contractual term, the existence of national case-law – even if it is well established – relating to the invalidity of similar terms may be regarded as establishing that the condition relating to the consumer concerned being aware of the unfair nature of that term and of the legal consequences thereof is satisfied (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 January 2024, Caixabank (Limitation period for the repayment of mortgage charges), C‑810/21 to C‑813/21, EU:C:2024:81, paragraph 61). 84      The reasons set out in paragraphs 78 and 81 above, according to which the existence of judgments issued by a national court of last instance, which find certain standard terms to be unfair, cannot, in itself, mean that a consumer is or may reasonably be aware of the unfairness of a similar term in an agreement that he or she has concluded with a seller or supplier, apply, mutatis mutandis, as regards preliminary rulings of the Court on the interpretation of Directive 93/13. 85      In that respect, it should be noted that, although preliminary rulings of the Court on the interpretation of EU law are published in such a manner as to facilitate access to them, including for consumers, the Court does not determine whether particular terms are unfair and consistently leaves the specific examination of those terms to the national court, since that examination does not, in principle, fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. It follows that a consumer, even if he or she is directly concerned by the main proceedings, cannot infer from such a decision of the Court any certainty as to the unfairness of a contractual term contained in an agreement that he or she has concluded with a seller or supplier, with the result that judgments of the Court cited by the referring court cannot be regarded as a source of information for the average consumer as to the unfairness of a particular contractual term (judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run), C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraphs 58 and 59). 86      However, a judicial decision which has the force of res judicata, finding that a contractual term is unfair, and which is duly notified to the consumer concerned, in accordance with the applicable national rules, as an addressee of that decision, may constitute the starting point of the limitation period. Since such a decision has become final, the consumer is deemed to be fully aware of the unfairness of the term and is therefore in a position to assess himself or herself whether it is appropriate to bring an action for restitution of sums paid pursuant to the unfair term within the time limit prescribed by national law (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run), C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraphs 36 and 37). 87      That being the case, it must be stated that, although Directive 93/13 precludes the limitation period for an action for restitution of the sums paid by a consumer pursuant to an unfair contractual term from beginning to run irrespective of whether that consumer was or could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of that term, that directive does not preclude the seller or supplier from having the right to prove that that consumer was or could reasonably have been aware of that fact before the delivery of a judgment finding that term to be void (judgment of 25 April 2024, Caixabank (Limitation period), C‑484/21, EU:C:2024:360, paragraph 35). 88      In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that there is no final judicial decision finding that the term relating to the exchange rate risk is unfair and invalid. 89      In those circumstances, even assuming that HL had been aware of the relevant decisions of the Kúria (Supreme Court) or the judgments of the Court of Justice, neither the date on which those decisions or judgments were handed down nor the day on which HL actually became aware of them could constitute the starting point of the limitation period. 90      It is, if necessary, for the referring court to ascertain whether UniCredit Bank and Momentum Credit have produced evidence that HL had been or could reasonably have been aware of the unfairness of the term relating to the exchange rate risk (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 April 2024, Banco Santander (Point from which the limitation period starts to run), C‑561/21, EU:C:2024:362, paragraph 38). 91      Lastly, as regards the question relating to the resumption of the limitation period following its suspension, it should be noted that the suspension of a limitation period is intended to ensure that that period, the purpose of which is specifically to penalise the inaction of a person possessing a right, has no effect in a situation where that inaction is justified. Suspension is thus intended to safeguard cases where, for objective reasons provided for by law, a rightholder is placed in an objectively difficult situation which precludes him or her from exercising that right, by preventing the passage of time from resulting in the extinction of that right. 92      It follows that the resumption of the limitation period after a period of suspension must be subject to the same guarantees as those laid down in respect of the determination of the dies a quo of that limitation period. 93      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second and third questions is that Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding the date on which the Court of Justice ruled on the interpretation of that directive or the date on which the national court of last instance ruled on the unfairness of terms included in agreements concluded with consumers from being used to determine the starting point of the limitation period for the action brought by a consumer seeking restitution of sums paid on the basis of a term similar to the term which gave rise to the interpretation of that directive provided by the Court of Justice or to the term that was the subject of the decision of the national courts, or for the purpose of resuming that limitation period following its suspension.  The fourth question 94      In the light of the answer to the first question, there is no need to answer the fourth question.  Costs 95      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Ninth Chamber) hereby rules: 1.      Article 1(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, read in the light of the principle of effectiveness, must be interpreted as precluding a judicial interpretation of national law according to which, where a loan agreement is invalid and cannot continue in existence without the unfair term on the ground that that term relates to the main subject matter of the agreement, the consumer can rely, in court, on the legal consequences of the finding of the invalidity of that agreement only within a limitation period of five years from the date on which that agreement was concluded, if, on that date, the consumer was not aware or was not in a position to become aware of the unfairness of the contractual term concerned and, therefore, was not in a position to assert his or her rights under Directive 93/13 effectively. 2.      Directive 93/13 must be interpreted as precluding the date on which the Court of Justice ruled on the interpretation of that directive or the date on which the national court of last instance ruled on the unfairness of terms included in agreements concluded with consumers from being used to determine the starting point of the limitation period for the action brought by a consumer seeking restitution of sums paid on the basis of a term similar to the term which gave rise to the interpretation of that directive provided by the Court of Justice or to the term that was the subject of the decision of the national courts, or for the purpose of resuming that limitation period following its suspension. [Signatures] *      Language of the case: Hungarian.