C-712/25

Provisional text OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL CAMPOS SÁNCHEZ-BORDONA delivered on 2 February 2026 (1) Case C‑712/25 PPU [Rastoshev] (i) Criminal proceedings v XM, Intervener: Sofiyska apelativna prokuratura (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Apelativen sad Sofia (Court of Appeal, Sofía, Bulgaria)) ( Request for a preliminary ruling – Judicial cooperation in criminal matters – Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA – European arrest warrant – Grounds for optional non-execution of surrender – Offences committed in whole or in part in the territory of the executing Member State ) 1.        On 18 September 2025, the competent authority of the French Republic transmitted to the Bulgarian authorities a European Arrest Warrant (‘EAW’) issued against a Bulgarian national suspected of having committed a series of criminal offences in several countries (including Bulgaria and France), within an organisation that allegedly manipulated sports competitions. 2.        The Bulgarian court ruling on appeal on the surrender of the requested person to the French authorities for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution has doubts as to the interpretation of Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, (2) which lays down a ground for optional non-execution of the EAW. I.      Legislative framework A.      European Union law. Framework Decision 2002/584 3.        In accordance with Article 1 (‘Definition of the [EAW] and obligation to execute it’): ‘1.      The [EAW] is a judicial decision issued by a Member State with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order. 2.      Member States shall execute any [EAW] on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition and in accordance with the provisions of this Framework Decision. …’ 4.        Article 4 (‘Grounds for optional non-execution of the [EAW]’) reads: ‘The executing judicial authority may refuse to execute the [EAW]: … 7.      where the [EAW] relates to offences which: (a)      are regarded by the law of the executing Member State as having been committed in whole or in part in the territory of the executing Member State or in a place treated as such; …’ B.      Bulgarian law. Law on Extradition and the European Arrest Warrant (3) 5.        According to Article 40(1): ‘The Okrazhen sad (Provincial Court) may refuse to execute an [EAW] where: … (5)      the criminal offence has been committed in whole or in part in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, or has been committed outside the territory of the issuing Member State and Bulgarian law does not allow prosecution for the same offence when committed outside the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria.’ II.    Facts, dispute and question referred for a preliminary ruling 6.        The sequence of events set out in the order for reference is very succinct and comprises the following: –        The French authorities are requesting the surrender for criminal prosecution of XM, a Bulgarian national residing in Bulgaria, as the alleged perpetrator of six criminal offences (4) relating to the manipulation of sports competitions within the framework of a criminal organisation. –        The arrest warrant was issued on 18 September 2025 by the tribunal judiciaire de Marseille (Court of Marseille, France). On the same day, a prosecutor attached to that court issued the EAW for the purpose of criminal prosecution. 7.        From a reading of the EAW and, in particular, from the information provided by the French Government, (5) the following facts can also be inferred: –        The criminal offences under investigation were committed in the territory of the French Republic, as well as in other countries, including Bulgaria. (6) –        The criminal investigation was initiated before the tribunal judiciaire de Marseille (Court of Marseille) and, given the cross-border nature of the offences, several national authorities cooperated in that investigation. –        Due to the nature of the facts under investigation, the proceedings in France, in which the EAW was issued, involved ‘extensive international judicial cooperation’, which resulted in the issuing, in March 2025, of several European investigation orders for Belgium, Spain, Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria. –        At the same time, at the initiative of the French authorities, a file was opened at the European Union Agency for Criminal Judicial Cooperation (‘Eurojust’). –        Two meetings were held under the auspices of Eurojust, attended by the French authorities and the authorities of the other countries to which European investigation orders had been sent, including Bulgaria. –        On 14 October 2025, a coordinated operation led to the identification and arrest of several persons in France, Romania, Spain and Bulgaria. As a result of that coordinated operation, several EAWs were issued to the latter three countries. –        During the coordination period, the French authorities were in contact with their Bulgarian counterparts in order to facilitate the execution of European investigation orders and EAWs. –        The Bulgarian judicial authorities have already executed one of the EAWs issued in relation to the same facts against another person, a Bulgarian national, who has been surrendered to the French authorities. 8.        On 15 October 2025, the Sofiyska gradska prokuratura (Sofia City Public Prosecutor’s Office, Bulgaria) filed a request for execution of the EAW against XM before the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court, Bulgaria). 9.        On 20 October 2025, the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court), acting as the ‘executing judicial authority’, found that there were no grounds for refusing surrender (7) and ordered the execution of the EAW. At the same time, it agreed that the requested person would be remanded in custody as a preventive measure. 10.      XM has appealed that decision to the Apelativen sad Sofia (Sofia Court of Appeal, Bulgaria), (8) arguing that there were grounds for refusing surrender. In particular, that individual submits that the acts were committed in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria and that, under Articles 3(1) and 4(1) of the Bulgarian Criminal Code, that code applies to all offences committed in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, as well as to acts committed abroad by Bulgarian nationals. 11.      According to the Apelativen sad Sofia (Sofia Court of Appeal), there is conflicting case-law in Bulgaria concerning the rule transposing Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 into national law. In order to dispel its doubts as to the interpretation of that provision, it referred the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘Is Article 4(7)(a) of Council Framework Decision [2002/584] consistent with the case-law of an executing State according to which the fact that the criminal activity in respect of which the [EAW] has been issued took place in whole or in part in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, as executing State, amounts to a sufficient and independent ground for refusing to execute the EAW, in the light of the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of Bulgaria to bring criminal proceedings in respect of the same criminal offence?’ III. Procedure before the Court of Justice 12.      The request for a preliminary ruling was received at the Court on 11 November 2025, accompanied by a request for application of the urgent procedure, which the Court granted. 13.      Written comments were submitted by XM and the European Commission. The Court of Justice asked the French Government to provide the necessary clarifications in writing, which the French Government did on 11 December 2025. 14.      The hearing, held on 13 January 2026, involved XM, the French Government and the Commission. IV.    Analysis A.      Preliminary comments 15.      The referring court wishes to know whether national case-law under which the commission of an offence, in whole or in part, in the territory of the executing State (in this case Bulgaria) is a ‘sufficient and independent ground’ for refusing to execute an EAW, where that State has ‘territorial jurisdiction’ (9) to bring criminal proceedings in respect of the same criminal offence, complies with Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584. 16.      We should first clarify what is understood in this context by a ‘sufficient and independent ground’ for refusing to execute the EAW. The order for reference merely states that the application of Article 40(1)(5) of the Bulgarian Law on Extradition and the European Arrest Warrant has resulted in ‘inconsistent case-law’ in Bulgaria. In particular, it points out (10) that there are two lines of case-law in this respect: –        ‘According to certain judicial decisions handed down by appellate courts, some of which have been referred to in paragraph 14.1. above, [(11)] the fact that part or all of the criminal activity took place in the territory of Bulgaria is not in itself a ground for refusing to execute an [EAW], and priority must be given to the need to conduct criminal proceedings in the issuing State’. –        ‘According to other judicial decisions of appellate courts, some of which have been referred to in paragraph 14.2. above, [(12)] the fact that the criminal activity took place in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria is a sufficient ground for refusing to execute an [EAW], in view of the fact that that activity is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian authorities entrusted with criminal proceedings’. 17.      I understand, therefore, that the referring court wishes to know whether the finding, in and of itself, that the two cumulative conditions mentioned in its question, namely: (a) that the offence was committed in whole or in part in Bulgarian territory; and (b) that the Bulgarian courts have jurisdiction to initiate criminal proceedings in relation to that offence, constitute a ‘sufficient and independent’ ground for refusing to execute an EAW. 18.      The wording of the question referred for a preliminary ruling seems to leave aside, for the purposes of Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584, other considerations relating to the effectiveness of the criminal investigation in the specific case. (13) 19.      It is debatable whether the judgments of the Bulgarian courts outlined in the order for reference result in a real ‘inconsistency’ between two clear and incompatible lines of case-law. A reading of the transcribed judgments reveals, rather, a range of positions that fall between two extremes. (14) 20.      The Court of Justice should not interfere in a (supposed or real) dispute between judicial bodies of a Member State, but should provide the referring court with the interpretation of Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 that is useful to that court. 21.      For that purpose, my analysis will be structured as follows: –        First, I will review the case-law of the Court of Justice interpreting Article 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584. Even if it was delivered in relation to grounds for optional non-execution other than that laid down in paragraph 7(a), that case-law contains appropriate guidelines for the critical interpretation of that provision. –        Second, I will explain why the logic underlying Article 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584 stands in opposition to an interpretation of its paragraph 7(a) supporting the inference that the fact of an offence having been committed in the territory of the executing State of the EAW is a ‘sufficient and independent ground’ for refusing the surrender of the requested person. –        Finally, and without prejudice to the checks to be carried out by the referring court, I will suggest some criteria that could guide the executing judicial authority and rule out others that, in my view, should not be included in its assessment. B.      Case-law of the Court of Justice relating to Article 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584. 22.      Unless I am mistaken, the Court of Justice has not yet had occasion to interpret Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584. It has, however, provided interpretations of other grounds for optional non-execution of an EAW. 23.      Article 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584 establishes an exhaustive list of grounds that, once transposed into national law, entitle (the judicial authority of the executing State) to refuse the execution of an EAW issued by another Member State. 24.      In general terms, Framework Decision 2002/584 ‘seeks, by the establishment of a simplified and effective system for the surrender of persons convicted or suspected of having infringed criminal law, to facilitate and accelerate judicial cooperation with a view to contributing to the attainment of the objective set for the European Union of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice, and has as its basis the high level of trust which must exist between the Member States’. (15) 25.      In line with that priority objective, the Court of Justice has stated that the grounds for non-execution of an EAW must be interpreted from the perspective of favor executionis. Based on that rule, ‘execution of the [EAW] constitutes the rule, refusal to execute is intended to be an exception, which must be interpreted strictly …’. (16) 26.      Where an executing judicial authority contemplates invoking one of the grounds laid down in Article 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584, that authority must ‘have a margin of discretion as to whether or not it is appropriate to refuse to execute the [EAW]’, (17) based on a specific examination of the request for execution in the light of ‘the circumstances of each case’. (18) 27.      As regards the concrete approach to be taken by the executing judicial authority, the case-law on Article 4(6) of Framework Decision 2002/584 illustrates a two-step reasoning: –        In the first step, the executing judicial authority must, first of all, check whether the conditions for the application of the ground for non-execution it intends to invoke are met. (19) –        In the second step, if the outcome of the first is positive, the executing judicial authority ‘must then ascertain’ whether there is a legitimate interest to justify the refusal to surrender on the ground for optional non-execution in question. (20) 28.      In order to establish a ‘legitimate interest’ justifying the refusal of surrender, the executing judicial authority must consider the following: –        first, ‘the objective pursued by the ground for optional non-execution [in question]’; (21) and –        second, the specific purposes of Framework Decision 2002/584, for which, in accordance with Article 1(1) of that decision, the aim is to ‘enable the arrest and surrender of a requested person … so that the crime committed does not go unpunished and that that person is prosecuted …’ (22) C.      Is the fact that the offence has been committed in the territory of the executing State a ‘sufficient and independent ground’ for refusing surrender? 29.      The two-step reasoning to which I have just referred, applicable to the grounds for optional non-execution laid down in Article 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584, must also be adopted in order to correctly interpret paragraph 7(a) of that provision. 30.      The judgment as to whether the offence has been committed (in whole or in part) in the territory of the executing State (in this case Bulgaria) corresponds to the first of these two steps. The ground for non-execution laid down in Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 implies that the EAW ‘… relates to offences which … are regarded by the law of the executing Member State as having been committed in whole or in part in the territory [of that] State … or in a place treated as such’. 31.      This first condition must therefore be met in order for the ground for non-execution laid down in Article 4(7)(a) to be accepted. 32.      The referring court is asking whether that condition is sufficient. If this were the case, and since it is not disputed that Bulgarian courts can initiate criminal proceedings (in accordance with the rules of the Criminal Code defining their geographical scope) for acts committed in their territory, it would be sufficient for the offence to have been committed, in whole or in part, in Bulgaria for surrender to be refused. 33.      For the reasons set out below, it is my view that, in the terms stated, this argument is not correct and that the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling must therefore be in the negative. 34.      Before discussing this analysis, it is appropriate to clear up certain doubts regarding the reference to national law in Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 and the impact that must be recognised in terms of the sovereignty of the executing State. 1.      Scope of the reference to national law 35.      Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 contains an express reference to the national law of the executing Member State. The judicial authority of that State may refuse to execute the EAW where it ‘… relates to offences which … are regarded by the law of the executing Member State as having been committed … in [its] territory … or in a place treated as such’. 36.      This reference does not, in my view, support an interpretation that would allow the Bulgarian judicial authority to refuse the surrender of the requested person on the sole ground that the offence (committed in its territory) falls, under national law, within the jurisdiction of Bulgaria. It is irrelevant for the purposes of the present case that such a rule is, under national law itself, non-derogable. 37.      When Article 4 of Framework Decision 2002/584, in defining the conditions of application of the grounds for non-execution of the EAW, refers to the rules of jurisdiction of a Member State, it does so unequivocally. This is the case, for example, in paragraph 4. (23) 38.      By contrast, Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 attributes a more limited scope to the reference to national law. In particular, it only entrusts national law with the regulation of two specific issues: –        first, the determination of the place where the offence was committed, in order to determine whether the offence may be regarded as having been committed, in whole or in part, in the territory of the executing State; (24) –        second, the identification of places treated as national territory. 39.      This is confirmed by the preparatory work for Framework Decision 2002/584, (25) which identifies Article 7(1) of the 1957 European Extradition Convention as the source of inspiration for the European legislature in this area. (26) 40.      It is clear from the Explanatory Report to the Convention (27) that the reference in Article 7(1) of the Convention to national law is limited to the identification of the locus commissi delicti. (28) Such a reference is not intended to cover other types of domestic rules or to exclude circumstances of a different nature that must be weighed by the authority of the executing State. (29) 41.      In particular, the reference to national law excludes domestic rules by virtue of which, if it is established that the offence was committed within national territory, the criminal code of the State concerned would automatically become applicable and its judicial authorities would be obliged to refuse the execution of an EAW as a corollary of the public policy nature of the non-derogable national rules on the jurisdiction of criminal courts. (30) 42.      In my view, neither Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 nor the reference to national law provided for in that decision authorises that argument, which cannot be supported either by arguments based on State sovereignty in criminal matters, to which I refer immediately below. 2.      State sovereignty and jurisdiction in criminal matters 43.      The State’s jurisdiction in criminal matters and its ius puniendi have, by definition, a territorial dimension. While the possibility of a State extending the application of its laws and the jurisdiction of its courts to persons, property and acts outside its territory has historically been questioned, its sovereign prerogative to prevent, investigate and prosecute all offences committed within its territory has not been challenged. 44.      This postulate makes the locus commissi delicti the basic criterion for the allocation of jurisdiction in criminal matters, present in all contemporary legal systems. 45.      State sovereignty in criminal matters is referred to both in the Bulgarian case-law discussed in the question referred for a preliminary ruling and in the Commission’s written observations. Both agree that the sovereignty of the State executing an EAW forms the basis of the ground laid down in Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584. They disagree, however, as to the ‘sufficient and independent’ nature of that basis. 46.      As regards Bulgarian case-law, as I have already explained, some decisions of national courts derive – from the sovereignty of the Republic of Bulgaria – the consequence that its jurisdiction to judge offences committed within its territory ‘cannot be derogated from’. Such ‘territorial jurisdiction’ would therefore be a ‘sufficient and independent’ ground for non-execution of the EAW. (31) 47.      Conversely, the Commission starts from the premiss that ‘Article 4(7)(a) reflects the sovereign right of Member States to judge the criminal consequences of acts committed in their territory’ and derives from that provision a very broad exception to the general principle of favor executionis. 48.      According to the Commission, in this line of reasoning, ‘the executing Member State may decide to refuse the execution of the [EAW] and take over the criminal prosecution itself, even if it is objectively not in the best position to do so’, provided that the necessary measures are taken to exclude the risk of impunity. (32) 49.      This argument, which is at odds with others advanced by the Commission, (33) seems to give priority to abstract considerations (based on the idea of sovereignty) over others that focus on cooperation between Member States, inspired by the mutual trust that underpins the area of freedom, security and justice. 50.      Not only Framework Decision 2002/584, but also other policy instruments, such as Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA, contribute to the creation of the area of freedom, security and justice. (34) This latter decision seems to me particularly relevant in the context of the reference for a preliminary ruling, since, as I will explain below, the legal problem underlying the application of the ground for non-execution laid down in Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 could be conceived as an ‘abstract’ conflict of jurisdiction between the executing State and the issuing State of the EAW. 51.      It is true that, in the absence of horizontal harmonisation at EU level of the criteria governing the (possibly concurrent) exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the Member States, judicial cooperation in criminal matters cannot ignore the general principle of respect for State sovereignty. (35) 52.      However, the deferential attitude towards State sovereignty must be balanced against the need to coordinate the actions of the different Member States, if a certain coherence in the administration of criminal justice in the European Union is to be preserved. (36) 53.      A national judicial body invoking the State’s sovereign prerogatives in this area cannot therefore confine itself to invoking an ‘absolute reservation of sovereignty’ when faced with competing and equally legitimate claims of other Member States, channelled through the EAWs. 54.      In relation to Framework Decision 2002/584, the Court of Justice has pointed out that ‘… the duty of sincere cooperation laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 4(3) TEU entails a dialogue between the executing and issuing judicial authorities. It follows in particular from that principle that the Member States are, in full mutual respect, to assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties …’. (37) 55.      Dialogue and sincere cooperation (38) should therefore guide the implementation of Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584. State sovereignty in criminal matters is the legislative basis on which the EU legislature relies when considering the ground, at issue here, for optional non-execution of an EAW, but not the ultimate or sole justification for its application to the specific case. 56.      In other words, to use the terms of the referral decision, the appeal to national sovereignty cannot be classified as ‘sufficient and independent ground for refusing to execute the [EAW]’. 57.      Understanding Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 in this abstract sense would not – I repeat – fit in with the approach adopted by the Court of Justice in relation to the grounds for optional non-execution of EAWs. On the contrary, a detailed and individual analysis of the circumstances of the case is absolutely crucial. 58.      The above considerations would be enough to give a negative answer to the referring court’s question, as it has been put: the fact that the offence has been committed (in whole or in part) in the territory of the executing State, combined with the mere existence, in the abstract sense, of the jurisdiction of that State to initiate criminal proceedings, is not, I must repeat, sufficient reason to refuse to execute the EAW. 59.      A contrary interpretation would transform the ground laid down in Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 into a systematic and automatic exception to the principle of favor executionis provided under Article 1(2) of the same instrument. 60.      In terms of the systematic nature of that exception, the systems of criminal law reserve for each State, as a reflection of its sovereignty, the power to prevent, investigate and prosecute, before its own courts and applying its own law, offences committed within its territory. To infer from this premiss that, in any case, the territorial competence (jurisdiction) of the executing State necessarily prevails would be tantamount to establishing a very broad exception in its favour, the sole objective of which would be to preserve its territorial monopoly of ius puniendi. 61.      In terms of the automatic nature of that exception, if the executing judicial authority were obliged to limit its analysis to the finding that the offence occurred in the territory of the executing State and that that State recognises the territorial jurisdiction of its courts to adjudicate on that offence, there would not in fact be any discretion in assessing the specific case. The optional ground for non-execution of the EAW would thus be transmuted into a mandatory ground. 62.      Moreover, an interpretation of Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 that would lead to ‘… the impunity of the requested person would be incompatible with the objective pursued both by Framework Decision 2002/584 … and by Article 3(2) TEU …’. (39) 63.      The mere existence, in the abstract, of territorial competence (jurisdiction) of the executing State to prosecute is not in itself sufficient to exclude the risk that the offence committed in its territory will go unpunished, where that competence is not exercised in practice. 64.      The referring court has stated that one of the lines of case-law it cites could lead to this outcome, as it is not established that ‘any criminal proceedings [have been] brought in the Republic of Bulgaria following the refusals [based on that ground] such as to result in the filing of bills of indictment in court against the persons in respect of whom EAWs were issued’. (40) In these circumstances, the answer to the question referred for a preliminary ruling should be negative, if the non-execution of the EAW would lead to impunity for the acts for which surrender is requested. 65.      However, I have already mentioned that the case-law of the Bulgarian courts varies significantly. The problem seems to be rather the degree of detail of the analysis of the specific case or of the assessment of the risk of impunity. 66.      A reading of the order for reference shows that there is no uniformity in terms of the selection of the criteria that the executing judicial authority should use when deciding whether to accept this optional ground for refusal of the EAW. I will now turn to these criteria. D.      Criteria for application of Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 67.      All the parties to the proceedings for a preliminary ruling, including the requested person, agree that the application of Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 requires a case-by-case analysis of the request for execution of the EAW, in the light of the particular circumstances of each case. They disagree, however, in identifying the criteria that should be given more weight in this analysis. 68.      Some Bulgarian court decisions cited in the order for reference (41) link the ground for non-execution laid down in Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 to problems arising from the coexistence of concurrent jurisdictions. 69.      I think this approach is the right one. Indeed, it is possible that the executing judicial authority might have to consider the application of that provision in situations where: –        criminal proceedings have not yet been initiated in the executing Member State in relation to the offence that is the subject of the EAW; (42) and –        the judicial authority of the executing State is considering refusing surrender, so that it, or another judicial authority of that Member State, may exercise its criminal jurisdiction in relation to the offence committed in its territory. 70.      This situation is in fact similar to the scenario that would determine an (abstract) conflict of jurisdiction in criminal matters between, on the one hand, the executing State, which has jurisdiction by virtue of locus commissi delicti, and, on the other hand, the issuing State, where proceedings in which an EAW has been issued for the purpose of criminal prosecution are under way. 71.      I agree with the Commission (43) that this conflict should be resolved on the basis of criteria similar to those used in other instruments of secondary EU law. On this point, the Commission refers both to the guidelines developed by Eurojust, (44) to which Framework Decision 2009/948 refers, (45) and to Regulation (EU) 2024/3011 on the transfer of proceedings in criminal matters. (46) 72.      Although inapplicable ratione temporis to the present case, Regulation 2024/3011 will, as a general rule, intervene at a later stage than that provided for by Framework Decision 2009/948, (47) presupposing, inter alia, that a consensus on the concentration of proceedings in the ‘most appropriate jurisdiction’ has already been reached, following consultation in accordance with that Framework Decision or ‘otherwise’. (48) 73.      In relation to these ‘other ways’ of reaching consensus on the concentration of criminal proceedings, recital 28 of Regulation 2024/3011 states that ‘such agreements could be reached in coordination meetings of [Eurojust]’. (49) 74.      As the course of the present proceedings reveals, there is nothing to prevent Eurojust coordination meetings from taking place at a very early stage of the investigation, when parallel proceedings do not yet exist in different Member States. Such meetings could lead to an informal (implicit) consensus on the concentration of criminal proceedings, thus avoiding from the outset a situation of lis pendens and keeping the conflict at a purely ‘abstract’ level. 75.      Along these lines, the early application of the criteria used by Framework Decision 2009/948 or Regulation 2024/3011 to the ground for optional non-execution of an EAW: –        would prevent the executing State wishing to prosecute the offence committed in its territory from having to proceed to the direct consultations provided for in Framework Decision 2009/948, with the sole objective of reaching a formal consensus, when an implicit consensus had already been expressed at an earlier stage; (50) –        would also avoid the situation where the State issuing the EAW has to respond to a refusal to surrender by requiring the transfer of the entire criminal proceeding. (51) 76.      The Eurojust Guidelines can be taken into account, to the extent that they ‘… are meant to be a flexible tool to guide and remind the competent authorities of the factors to be considered …’, attributing to each of those factors a different priority and weight depending on the case, ‘… for deciding the best place to prosecute …’. They therefore respond to the requirement for the proper administration of justice in criminal matters. 77.      In setting out the ‘main factors’ applicable in these cases, the Eurojust Guidelines emphasise that ‘a preliminary presumption should be made that, if possible, a prosecution should take place in the jurisdiction in which the majority – or the most important part – of the criminality occurred or in which the majority – or the most important part – of the loss was sustained …’. 78.      The basis of this ‘preliminary presumption’ is not so much (or not only) ‘the sovereign right of Member States to judge the criminal consequences of acts committed in their territory’, but rather the will to promote the proper administration of justice. 79.      The locus commissi delicti, when used as a criterion for jurisdictional attribution, is able to achieve, both in civil and commercial matters (52) and in criminal matters, the objectives of proximity and availability of evidence. 80.      Framework Decision 2002/584 shares this same ‘preliminary presumption’ by allowing, in Article 4(7)(a), the executing judicial authority to assess whether to derogate from the general principle that an EAW will be executed. That authority may opt to bring a criminal prosecution itself, taking into account the abovementioned objectives, if the requested person is in its territory and the criminal conduct of which that person is accused took place (in whole or in part) in its territory. 81.      In such cases, Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 starts from the premiss that the executing State: (a) will, as a general rule, have jurisdiction to prosecute acts committed in its territory; and (b) will normally, from the point of view of the proper administration of criminal justice, be in an adequate position to exercise that jurisdiction, for reasons of proximity to the dispute and ease of taking evidence. 82.      It can happen, however (as this case shows), that a criminal proceeding involves offences with a significant transnational dimension, committed electronically and/or as part of a complex international criminal network or organisation. 83.      In dealing with criminal offences with a complex transnational dimension: –        The criterion of locus commissi delicti has intrinsic limitations. In order to avoid an uncoordinated proliferation of parallel proceedings, the resolution of the ‘conflict of jurisdiction’ cannot be achieved without sincere cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States involved, and it may not be based exclusively on that criterion, common to several States. –        A judicial authority considering invoking Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 may assess whether the executing State is in a position that, while not necessarily the best position, is at least sufficiently adequate to prosecute the offence that is the subject of the EAW. (53) 84.      Information on the situation of the requested person and on the criminal proceedings already completed (in the issuing and executing Member States) will make it possible to assess both whether the factors mentioned in the Eurojust Guidelines apply and the priority and weight attributable to each. 85.      For these purposes, the executing judicial body could take the following into account: –        The quantitative (‘the majority’) and qualitative (‘the most important part’) dimensions of the conduct resulting in the offences contemplated in the EAW. At the hearing, the Commission and the French Government agreed that, where the requested person is charged with an offence committed as part of a criminal organisation, the assessment must be made in respect of the offence as a whole, and not in respect of the individual contribution of the requested person. (54) –        The nationality or place of residence of the requested person, as well as his or her personal links with other Member States, in particular the issuing State. (55) –        The availability and admissibility of evidence, including the taking of testimony from witnesses, experts and victims. –        The interests and location of victims. –        The stage of development of criminal proceedings in the issuing State, as well as the steps already taken – where appropriate through the involvement of Eurojust – with a view to coordinating the investigation, which might have led to a (still implicit) consensus on the concentration of criminal proceedings. (56) 86.      Conversely, I believe that other factors mentioned in the order for reference or in the parties’ observations are not relevant: –        In assessing the appropriateness of the surrender, it is not for the executing judicial body to assess the degree of involvement of the person in the criminal conduct with which he or she is charged, or the existence of sufficient evidence or indicia of guilt. (57) This assessment is the sole responsibility of the authority issuing the EAW. –        Any linguistic difficulties that the requested person might have in exercising his or her right of defence, (58) a right that is safeguarded in any event by EU rules, (59) are of no significant weight for the purposes of the decision on surrender. –        Unless there are systemic or widespread deficiencies in the issuing Member State’s supervisory functions, it is the responsibility of the issuing Member State to protect the right of suspected or accused persons to participate effectively in criminal proceedings. (60) E.      Impunity 87.      The decision of the executing authority under Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 should not lead to a risk of impunity for the criminal offence. (61) 88.      At the hearing there was discussion as to whether Framework Decision 2002/584 requires that the refusal to execute an EAW on the basis of Article 4(7)(a) of the EAW must be followed in all cases by criminal prosecution by the competent authority of the executing State, according to the rule aut dedere, aut iudicare. 89.      The French Government argued that such a requirement would be contrary to the principle of discretionary prosecution, a principle recognised by the laws of several Member States. From this perspective, a State that decides to refuse to execute an EAW under Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 would only be obliged to ‘bring the matter before its judicial authorities’: the latter would retain the power to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether to bring criminal proceedings. (62) 90.      This interpretation, which creates some tension with the case-law of the Court of Justice, (63) nevertheless seems to be supported by the preparatory work for Framework Decision 2002/584. In the phase prior to its adoption, a formula was envisaged that made the application of this optional ground for non-execution conditional on a formal commitment to prosecute by the competent authority of the executing State. However, this requirement was not included in the final version of the provision. (64) 91.      If we accept that the EU legislature has thus supported the continuation of the principle of discretionary prosecution (in the States where it is recognised), it must be agreed that it has tolerated a certain risk of impunity in practice. This risk could arise when the Public Prosecutor’s Office in the executing State, which alone has powers to bring criminal prosecutions, takes advantage of the principle of discretionary prosecution in order to refrain from prosecuting the person whose surrender to the issuing State is refused. 92.      To minimise this risk, Framework Decision 2002/584 provides the judicial authority executing the EAW with mechanisms enabling it to enter into a dialogue with the competent authorities of its own State and of the issuing State. 93.      In relation to the authorities of its own State (including the Public Prosecutor’s Office), the judicial body responsible for executing the EAW may request the necessary information from those authorities in order to take a decision assessing the risk of impunity, which entails: –        Determining whether there is a reasonable likelihood that a criminal investigation will be initiated. –        Establishing whether there have been prior contacts with the authorities of other States with a view to reaching a common position on the concentration of criminal proceedings either in the executing State or in the issuing State. 94.      As for the authorities of the issuing State of the EAW, the executing authority may ask them for any additional information it requires before taking its decision on the surrender of the requested person (Article 15(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584). 95.      After taking account of the information I referred to, the court that is to decide on the surrender of the requested person will have to consider: –        In abstract terms, it is not essential that, in the absence of ongoing criminal proceedings in the executing State, ‘priority must be given to the need to conduct criminal proceedings in the issuing State’. (65) –        However, where the authorities of the executing State decide not to institute criminal proceedings against the requested person, the impact of this factor on the response to the EAW could become decisive, as Framework Decision 2002/584 aims to end areas of impunity in judicial cooperation in criminal matters. 96.      The information provided to the Court in this case shows that, in the context of the judicial cooperation already in place, the French judicial authorities were in contact with their Bulgarian counterparts in order to facilitate the execution of the European investigation orders and the EAWs. 97.      From the same information (in particular the details provided by the French Government), it appears that the Bulgarian judicial authorities have not expressed an intention to prosecute the acts committed within their territory. There is also no record of any criminal investigation having been opened in Bulgaria at the present time, although the offences under the EAW were reported to the Bulgarian authorities at the time. (66) 98.      Without prejudice to the checks to be carried out by the referring court, these circumstances could be relevant in terms of agreeing to the surrender of the requested person, thus avoiding impunity and making it easier for him to be tried in the Member State that has already initiated a criminal prosecution against him. V.      Conclusion 99.      In the light of the above, I suggest replying to the Apelativen sad Sofia (Court of Appeal, Sofia, Bulgaria) in the following terms: ‘Article 4(7)(a) of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009, should be interpreted as meaning that the fact that a criminal offence was committed, in whole or in part, in the territory of the State requested to execute a European Arrest Warrant does not constitute a ‘sufficient and independent ground’ for refusing the execution of that warrant, even if the judicial bodies of the executing State are, according to their own national rules, competent to institute criminal proceedings for the same offence. When applying the optional ground for non-execution of the European arrest warrant laid down in Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584, the executing judicial authority must make an assessment of the circumstances of the case in order to evaluate whether the judicial authorities of the issuing State are in a better position to prosecute the requested person, taking into account the interests of the proper and efficient administration of justice and the prevention of impunity.’ 1      Original language: Spanish. i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings. 2      Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1), as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24). 3      Zakon za ekstraditsiyata i Evropeyskata zapoved za arest, in the version applicable to the facts of the present case. 4      These are: (1) fraud committed as part of a criminal organisation; (2) active corruption: an offer made to a participant in a sports competition, in relation to betting activities, of an advantage for the purpose of altering the normal and fair course of the event; (3) misappropriation by a criminal organisation of the proceeds of crime; (4) aggravated money laundering, aiding and abetting, as part of a criminal organisation, in unlawfully hiding the source of assets or income of the perpetrator of a criminal offence; (5) aggravated money laundering, participation in a criminal organisation when carrying out an operation to invest, conceal or convert the proceeds of crime; and (6) participation in a criminal organisation for the purposes of crime preparation. Each of these offences is punishable by a maximum custodial sentence of ten years, with the exception of active corruption, which is punishable by a custodial sentence not exceeding five years. 5      Paragraphs 16 to 25 of the clarifications provided by the French Government at the request of the Court of Justice. 6      In addition to Bulgaria and France, the EAW mentions Romania, Germany, Canada, Egypt, the United States, Spain, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Serbia and Turkey as places where criminal offences were committed. 7      That court held that: ‘there are no grounds for refusing the execution of the [EAW], since, according to the information provided by the unified information system of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Bulgaria, there are no criminal proceedings pending against the requested person, and therefore it is established that [the requested person] has not been charged or indicted in the Republic of Bulgaria …’. 8      The appeal had a suspensive effect on the decision of the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court) ordering the execution of the EAW, but not on the order for remand in custody. 9      I will employ the terms used in the order for reference, although it would perhaps be more accurate to say that the judicial bodies of the State have ‘jurisdiction’ to hear the offence, irrespective of which judicial body of the same State has territorial jurisdiction (competence). 10      Paragraph 17 of the order for reference. 11      A reading of these judgments shows that the executing judicial authority, in assessing whether to refuse to execute the EAW in the respective cases, did not limit itself to establishing whether the offences were committed, in whole or in part, in Bulgarian territory. It also weighed other factors: on the one hand, the absence of ongoing criminal prosecution in relation to the same activities in Bulgaria; on the other hand, the circumstances of each case, assessing – overall and comparatively – the effectiveness of the investigation, by evaluating whether the issuing authority was in an adequate position, or even better placed than that of the executing State, to conduct the criminal prosecution. 12      These decisions, along with those mentioned in paragraph 14.3 of the order for reference, which are ‘along the same lines’, are quite heterogeneous, although they coincide in not making such a detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the investigation in the specific case. They prioritise general and abstract arguments, focusing on Bulgaria’s ‘territorial jurisdiction’ to prosecute, often presented as non-derogable and linked to the sovereignty of the State. 13      These considerations are, however, part of the approach adopted by the first of the two lines of case-law, as I have already explained. 14      It is not easy to find judgments that are limited exclusively to establishing that the two conditions mentioned in the question referred for a preliminary ruling are met. In most cases, they put forward additional arguments, either related to the sovereignty of the State in criminal matters or to other features of the specific case. 15      Judgment of 4 September 2025, C.J. (Enforcement of a sentence further to an EAW) (C‑305/22, ‘the judgment in C.J’, EU:C:2025:665), paragraph 39, and the case-law cited. 16      Judgment of 29 April 2021, X (European Arrest Warrant – Ne bis in idem) (C‑665/20 PPU, ‘the judgment in X’, EU:C:2021:339), paragraph 39. Paragraph 38 states that: ‘… the principle of mutual recognition, which … constitutes the “cornerstone” of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, is put into practice in Article 1(2) of that Framework Decision, which lays down the rule that Member States are to execute any [EAW] on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition …’. 17      ‘It is therefore clear from the wording of Article 4 of the Framework Decision – in particular from the use of the verb “may” together with the infinitive of the verb “refuse”, the subject of which is the executing judicial authority – that that authority must, itself, have a margin of discretion as to whether or not it is appropriate to refuse to execute the [EAW] on the grounds referred to in Article 4’: judgment in X, paragraph 43. See also, on the existence of a ‘certain margin of discretion’, the judgment of 6 October 2009, Wolzenburg (C‑123/08, EU:C:2009:616, paragraphs 60 and 61). 18      Judgment in X, paragraph 59. 19      Judgment in C.J., paragraph 43; and judgment of 17 July 2008, Kozlowski (C‑66/08, EU:C:2008:437, paragraph 49). Such a check involves a more or less broad margin of appreciation, depending on the wording of the ground in question: where the wording includes concepts that must be given a uniform interpretation in all Member States, the executing judicial authority may be called upon to carry out an overall assessment of a set of factual circumstances (see, in relation to the terms ‘staying’ and ‘resident’ used in paragraph 6, judgment of 17 July 2008, Kozlowski (C‑66/08, EU:C:2008:437), paragraphs 43, 46, 48, 49 and 54]. 20      Judgment in C.J., paragraph 44. 21      Judgment of 24 June 2019, Popławski (C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraph 99). 22      Judgment of 6 December 2018, IK (Enforcement of an additional sentence) (C‑551/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:991, paragraph 39). See also judgment in X, paragraph 57, and the case-law cited. 23      The executing judicial authority may refuse surrender ‘where the criminal prosecution or punishment of the requested person is statute-barred according to the law of the executing Member State and the acts fall within the jurisdiction of that Member State under its own criminal law’ (my emphasis). 24      In other words, it refers not so much to the (substantive or procedural) rules of criminal law that delimit in geographical terms the criminal jurisdiction of the State by resorting to the criterion of locus commissi delicti, but rather to those rules that establish, either by legislation or case-law, the locus commissi delicti in relation to various types of offences. These rules specify the geographical point at which a given offence is to be considered as having been committed, according to the theories of activity, result or ubiquity, as the case may be. 25      See document No 2001/0215 (CNS) of 4 December 2001, available at https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST‑14867-2001-INIT/en/pdf, page 13, footnote 2. 26      European Extradition Convention, concluded in Paris on 13 December 1957 (ETS No 24). 27      Available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?module=treaty-detail&treatynum= 024. 28      In relation to Article 7(1) of that Convention, the Report states that: ‘under this paragraph it is for the requested Party to determine in accordance with its law whether the act was committed in whole or in part within its territory or in a place considered as its territory. Thus, for example, offences committed on a ship or aircraft of the nationality of the requested Party may be considered as offences committed on the territory of that Party’. 29      The Explanatory Notes on the Convention (available at https://rm.coe.int/168048bd42) state that ‘[Article 7(1)] should not however be invoked in the case where proceedings and judgment in the territory of the requesting State are warranted in order to arrive at the truth, or by the possibility of applying an appropriate sanction or of effecting the social rehabilitation of the person concerned …’. 30      Argument in Judgment No 88 of 29 January 2025 of the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court), referred to in paragraph 14.3 of the order for reference: ‘… Pursuant to the territorial principle, the Criminal Code of the Republic of Bulgaria is to apply to all criminal offences committed in the territory of the Republic of Bulgaria, and there is no provision for that rule to be derogated from in the case of an international legal instrument or treaty ratified by the Bulgarian State. That is a fundamental principle for the administration of criminal justice in the Republic of Bulgaria, which cannot be derogated from, and the court always takes account of it of its own motion in all judicial proceedings, since that rule affects public order and is an integral part of the sovereignty of the Republic of Bulgaria. …’ (emphasis added). 31      See Judgment No 88 of 29 January 2025 of the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court), transcribed in footnote 30. 32      Paragraph 8 of the Commission’s written observations. 33      In the same paragraph, and in paragraph 16 of its written observations, the Commission states that Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584 requires the executing authority to assess, on the basis of objective criteria and taking into account the interests of effective justice and the prevention of impunity, ‘which State is best placed to prosecute the requested person’. At the hearing, the Commission confirmed this position, stating that a certain degree of subjectivity on the part of the executing judicial authority cannot be excluded, and is even unavoidable. 34      Council Framework Decision 2009/948/JHA of 30 November 2009 on prevention and settlement of conflicts of exercise of jurisdiction in criminal proceedings (OJ 2009 L 328, p. 42). Framework Decision 2009/948 deals with specific conflicts of jurisdiction that arise ‘when a competent authority in a Member State has reasonable grounds to believe that parallel criminal proceedings are being conducted in another Member State in respect of the same facts involving the same person’ (recital 5). In order to prevent or resolve such conflicts, Framework Decision 2009/948 does not establish rigid criteria for the attribution of jurisdiction, but simply imposes an ‘obligation … to enter into direct consultations’ for the Member States involved (recital 10), in order to strive ‘to reach consensus on any effective solution aimed at avoiding the adverse consequences arising from parallel proceedings being conducted in two or more Member States’ (recital 9). For this purpose, it expressly refers to the ‘Guidelines which were published in the Eurojust Annual Report 2003’, revised in 2016, to which footnote 44 of this Opinion refers. 35      See, for example, as an expression of this principle, recital 11 of Framework Decision 2009/948: ‘no Member State should be obliged to waive or to exercise jurisdiction unless it wishes to do so …’. 36      According to recitals 2 and 12, the ‘very aim’ of Framework Decision 2009/948 is to ‘prevent unnecessary parallel criminal proceedings which could result in an infringement of the principle of ne bis in idem’, contributing to ‘increasing the efficiency of prosecutions while guaranteeing the proper administration of justice, so as to complete the comprehensive programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters’. 37      Judgment in C.J., paragraph 68 and the case-law cited. 38      See, in relation to Framework Decision 2009/948, Articles 5 and 6, which impose on the competent authorities of the Member States concerned an ‘obligation to contact’ and an ‘obligation to reply’. 39      Judgment of 24 June 2019, Popławski (C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraph 82). 40      Order for reference, paragraph 17, final sentence. 41      Judgment No 267 of 29 July 2024 of the Apelativen sad Sofia (Sofia Court of Appeal) expressly adopts this argument. 42      The current existence of a criminal prosecution (against the requested person) in the executing Member State for the same act for which the EAW has been issued, irrespective of whether this was committed within its territory, would also make it possible to refuse the EAW under Article 4(2) of Framework Decision 2002/584. At the hearing, the Commission argued that the difference between this optional ground for non-execution and the ground laid down in paragraph 7(a) is that the latter presupposes that a criminal prosecution is not yet under way in the executing State. 43      Paragraph 9 of the Commission’s written observations. 44      Eurojust, Guidelines for deciding ‘Which jurisdiction should prosecute?’, available in all official EU languages at https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/publication/guidelines-deciding-which-jurisdiction-should-prosecute; ‘the Eurojust Guidelines’. 45      See above, footnote 34. 46      Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 (OJ L, 2024/3011). This Regulation will apply from 1 February 2027. In laying down, in Article 5(2), the ‘criteria for requesting the transfer of criminal proceedings’, this regulation refers to factors that are, for the most part, substantially equivalent to those included in the Eurojust Guidelines. 47      According to the Commission proposal of 5 April 2023, COM(2023) 185 final, the new regulation would complement Framework Decision 2009/948 and other similar instruments that merely facilitate an agreement on the concentration of criminal proceedings in a single Member State, without regulating ‘the procedure for the transfer of criminal proceedings, which may be a necessary solution in such cases’. The complementary relationship now follows from recital 8 of Regulation 2024/3011. 48      See Article 5(2)(k). 49      Recital 28 also states that ‘… a transfer of criminal proceedings might also be justified … for example in cases of prosecution of cross-border criminal organisations, where different co-accused persons might be prosecuted in different Member States. …’. 50      See below, points 96 and 97. 51      Recital 4 of Regulation 2024/3011 states that ‘such common rules [in relation to the transfer of criminal proceedings] also aim to ensure that it is possible for a transfer of criminal proceedings to take place if the surrender of a person for criminal prosecution under [an EAW], pursuant to [Framework Decision 2002/584], is delayed or refused for reasons such as the existence of ongoing parallel criminal proceedings in another Member State for the same criminal offence, in order to avoid impunity of the person being prosecuted’ (emphasis added). 52      This is confirmed by settled case-law of the Court of Justice in relation to the use of locus commissi delicti as a connecting factor by Article 7(2) of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2012 L 351, p. 1): see, for example, judgment of 10 March 2022, BMA Nederland (C‑498/20, EU:C:2022:173, paragraphs 29 and 30), and the case-law cited. 53      The Commission stated (paragraph 8 of its written observations) that, due to its sovereignty in criminal matters, the executing State could decide to refuse to execute the EAW and take over the criminal prosecution itself, ‘even if objectively it would not be in the best position to do so’. I do not fully support this position. In my view, surrender may not be refused where the link between the executing State and the offence is very tenuous. This would be the case if only a minimal part of the offending conduct was committed in its territory and the other factors clearly shifted the centre of gravity of the offence to another State. 54      According to XM (paragraph 5 of his written observations), the criminal conduct of which he is accused consists of five money transfers to different persons in the French Republic. However, as the French Government pointed out at the hearing, the criminal conduct attributed to XM is part of a wider organised criminal network and is not limited to the five transfers mentioned by his defence. 55      According to XM (paragraph 15 of his written observations), ‘the French judicial authorities have given assurances that, once the proceedings are concluded, XM will be returned to the Republic of Bulgaria’. However, the French Government stated at the hearing that it was not aware that its authorities had granted the guarantee referred to in Article 5(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584. If granted, such a guarantee would reduce the weight to be attributed to the ‘nationality’ factor in the assessment required by Article 4(7)(a) of Framework Decision 2002/584. 56      As pointed out by the French Government (see point 7 of this Opinion), the proceedings in France, to which the Bulgarian authorities who participated in the Eurojust coordination meetings are no strangers, are at an advanced stage. It is therefore not surprising that the Bulgarian Public Prosecutor’s Office has requested the execution of the EAW before the Sofiyski gradski sad (Sofia City Court). 57      According to XM (paragraphs 12 and 14 of his written observations), a proceeding was initiated in Bulgaria to verify who was responsible for the five transfers mentioned in footnote 54 and the authenticity of the signature of the drawer. We should add that for the time being, only one of these transfers has been found to be attributable to the requested person. 58      According to XM (paragraph 16 of his written observations), the fact that the requested person does not know the language of the issuing State argues in favour of refusing surrender. 59      Directive 2010/64/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings (OJ 2010 L 280, p. 1), establishes common minimum standards in the fields of translation and interpretation in criminal proceedings, in order to ‘… ensure that there is free and adequate linguistic assistance, allowing suspected or accused persons who do not speak or understand the language of the criminal proceedings fully to exercise their right of defence and safeguarding the fairness of the proceedings’ (recital 17). 60      ‘The high level of trust between Member States on which the [EAW] mechanism is based is … founded on the premiss that the criminal courts of the other Member States – which, following execution of [an EAW], will have to conduct the criminal procedure for the purpose of prosecution … and the substantive criminal proceedings – meet the requirements of effective judicial protection …’: judgment of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) (C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraph 58). 61      Judgment of 24 June 2019, Popławski (C‑573/17, EU:C:2019:530, paragraph 82). From the other extreme, such a decision must not lead to a duplication of criminal proceedings (infringement of the ne bis in idem principle), as stated in recital 4 of Regulation 2024/3011. 62      According to the French Government, in order to exclude the risk of impunity, it is sufficient that the executing State carries out an assessment of whether it is appropriate to initiate proceedings. The Commission, for its part, argued that, in the first instance, the executing State may allow its judicial authorities to assess the appropriateness of initiating criminal proceedings in that State. However, where those authorities choose not to prosecute the requested person, the issuing judicial authority could, according to the Commission, repeat its request for execution of the EAW, and the executing authority would no longer be able to refuse that request. But, as the French Government pointed out at the hearing, this interpretation (in itself debatable) does not, by itself, exclude the risk of impunity, since the executing State would still have the possibility of refusing to execute the EAW under Article 4(3) of Framework Decision 2002/584. 63      Judgment of 6 December 2018, IK (Enforcement of an additional sentence) (C‑551/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:991, paragraph 39): ‘… in accordance with Article 1(1) of [Framework Decision 2002/584], the aim of the mechanism of the [EAW] is to enable the arrest and surrender of a requested person, in the light of the objective pursued by the framework decision, so that the crime committed does not go unpunished and that that person is prosecuted’ (Emphasis added). 64      See the document cited in footnote 25. 65      These are the terms used by the referring court to describe the first line of case-law mentioned in paragraph 17 of the order for reference. 66      Written observations of the French Government, paragraphs 22 to 25. XM alleges the existence of a prosecution in Bulgaria. However, at the hearing, it was made clear that the subject matter of that prosecution differs from the proceedings in France, as it concerns a document forgery offence, possibly attributable to third parties, of which XM is the victim, not the perpetrator. The criminal prosecution in France addresses XM’s possible criminal liability for all the offences under the EAW for which his surrender is requested.