C-718/24

Provisional text JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Second Chamber) 5 February 2026 (*) ( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Area of freedom, security and justice – Asylum policy – Directive 2013/32/EU – Common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection – Article 33 – Grounds of inadmissibility – Article 38 – Concept of ‘safe third country’ – Conditions for implementation – Connection between the applicant and the third country concerned – Criteria – Assessment methods – Article 46 – Right to an effective remedy – Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union ) In Case C‑718/24 [Aleb], (i) REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Administrative Court, Sofia City, Bulgaria), made by decision of 9 October 2024, received at the Court on 22 October 2024, in the proceedings NP v Predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite, THE COURT (Second Chamber), composed of K. Jürimäe (Rapporteur), President of the Chamber, K. Lenaerts, President of the Court, acting as Judge of the Second Chamber, F. Schalin, M. Gavalec and Z. Csehi, Judges, Advocate General: J. Richard de la Tour, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the written procedure, after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: –        NP, by T.A. Iliev, advokat, –        the Bulgarian Government, by S. Ruseva and T. Tsingileva, acting as Agents, –        the Polish Government, by B. Majczyna and D. Lutostańska, acting as Agents, –        the European Commission, by A. Azéma, M. Debieuvre and I. Zaloguin, acting as Agents, having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to proceed to judgment without an Opinion, gives the following Judgment 1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 33(2)(c) and Article 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 60), read in conjunction with recital 46 of that directive. 2        The request has been made in proceedings between NP, a Syrian national, and the Predsedatel na Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite (Chairperson of the National Refugee Agency, Bulgaria) (‘the DAB’), concerning the legality of the decision by which that chairperson rejected NP’s application for international protection.  Legal context  European Union law  Directive 2011/95/EU 3        Article 2(f) of Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (OJ 2011 L 337, p. 9) provides: ‘For the purposes of this Directive the following definitions shall apply: … (f)      “person eligible for subsidiary protection” means a third-country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) does not apply, and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country …’ 4        Under Article 15(c) of that directive: ‘Serious harm consists of: … (c)      serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.’  Directive 2013/32 5        Recitals 18, 43, 44 and 46 of Directive 2013/32 state: ‘(18)      It is in the interests of both Member States and applicants for international protection that a decision is made as soon as possible on applications for international protection, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination being carried out. … (43)      Member States should examine all applications on the substance, i.e. assess whether the applicant in question qualifies for international protection in accordance with Directive [2011/95], except where this Directive provides otherwise, in particular where it can reasonably be assumed that another country would do the examination or provide sufficient protection. In particular, Member States should not be obliged to assess the substance of an application for international protection where a first country of asylum has granted the applicant refugee status or otherwise sufficient protection and the applicant will be readmitted to that country. (44)      Member States should not be obliged to assess the substance of an application for international protection where the applicant, due to a sufficient connection to a third country as defined by national law, can reasonably be expected to seek protection in that third country, and there are grounds for considering that the applicant will be admitted or readmitted to that country. Member States should only proceed on that basis where that particular applicant would be safe in the third country concerned. In order to avoid secondary movements of applicants, common principles should be established for the consideration or designation by Member States of third countries as safe. … (46)      Where Member States apply safe country concepts on a case-by-case basis or designate countries as safe by adopting lists to that effect, they should take into account, inter alia, the guidelines and operating manuals and the information on countries of origin and activities, including [European Asylum Support Office (EASO)] Country of Origin Information report methodology, referred to in Regulation (EU) No 439/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office [(OJ 2010 L 132, p. 11)], as well as relevant [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)] guidelines.’ 6        Chapter II of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘Basic principles and guarantees’, contains Articles 6 to 30 of that directive. 7        Chapter III of that directive, entitled ‘Procedures at first instance’, contains Articles 31 to 43 thereof. 8        Article 32 of that directive, entitled ‘Unfounded applications’, provides: ‘1.      Without prejudice to Article 27, Member States may only consider an application to be unfounded if the determining authority has established that the applicant does not qualify for international protection pursuant to Directive [2011/95]. 2.      In cases of unfounded applications in which any of the circumstances listed in Article 31(8) apply, Member States may also consider an application to be manifestly unfounded, where it is defined as such in the national legislation.’ 9        Article 33 of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘Inadmissible applications’, states: ‘1.      In addition to cases in which an application is not examined in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 [of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (OJ 2013 L 180, p. 31)], Member States are not required to examine whether the applicant qualifies for international protection in accordance with Directive [2011/95] where an application is considered inadmissible pursuant to this Article. 2.      Member States may consider an application for international protection as inadmissible only if: … (c)      a country which is not a Member State is considered as a safe third country for the applicant, pursuant to Article 38; …’ 10      Article 38 of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘The concept of safe third country’, provides, in paragraphs 1 and 4 thereof: ‘1.      Member States may apply the safe third country concept only where the competent authorities are satisfied that a person seeking international protection will be treated in accordance with the following principles in the third country concerned: (a)      life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; (b)      there is no risk of serious harm as defined in Directive [2011/95]; (c)      the principle of non-refoulement in accordance with the [Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol 189, p. 150, No 2545 (1954)) as supplemented and amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, concluded in New York on 31 January 1967, which entered into force on 4 October 1967 (‘the Geneva Convention’)] is respected; (d)      the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as laid down in international law, is respected; and (e)      the possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention. 2.      The application of the safe third country concept shall be subject to rules laid down in national law, including: (a)      rules requiring a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country; (b)      rules on the methodology by which the competent authorities satisfy themselves that the safe third country concept may be applied to a particular country or to a particular applicant. Such methodology shall include case-by-case consideration of the safety of the country for a particular applicant and/or national designation of countries considered to be generally safe; (c)      rules in accordance with international law, allowing an individual examination of whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant which, as a minimum, shall permit the applicant to challenge the application of the safe third country concept on the grounds that the third country is not safe in his or her particular circumstances. The applicant shall also be allowed to challenge the existence of a connection between him or her and the third country in accordance with point (a). 3.      When implementing a decision solely based on this Article, Member States shall: (a)      inform the applicant accordingly; and (b)      provide him or her with a document informing the authorities of the third country, in the language of that country, that the application has not been examined in substance. 4.      Where the third country does not permit the applicant to enter its territory, Member States shall ensure that access to a procedure is given in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees described in Chapter II.’ 11      Chapter V of Directive 2013/32, entitled ‘Appeals procedures’, includes Article 46 of that directive, entitled ‘The right to an effective remedy’. Under paragraphs 1 to 3 of that article: ‘1.      Member States shall ensure that applicants have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following: (a)      a decision taken on their application for international protection, including a decision: (i)      considering an application to be unfounded in relation to refugee status and/or subsidiary protection status; (ii)      considering an application to be inadmissible pursuant to Article 33(2); … 3.      In order to comply with paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive [2011/95], at least in appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of first instance.  Bulgarian law  The ZUB 12      Article 9(1) of the Zakon za ubezhishteto i bezhantsite (Law on Asylum and Refugees) (DV No 54 of 31 May 2002), in the version applicable to the main proceedings (‘the ZUB’), provides: ‘Humanitarian status is granted to foreign nationals who do not qualify for refugee status and who cannot or do not wish to obtain protection from their country of origin because they may be exposed to a real risk of serious harm, such as: (1)      the death penalty or execution; or (2)      torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or (3)      serious threats to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.’ 13      Point 14 of Article 13(1) and Article 13(4) and (5) of the ZUB provide: ‘(1)      An application for international protection by a foreign national shall be rejected as manifestly unfounded when the conditions laid down in Article 8(1) and (9) or in Article 9(1), (6) and (8) are not met and the foreign national: … 14.      comes from a safe third country provided that he or she is admitted to that country; … (4)      The circumstance referred to in point 14 of paragraph 1 may constitute an independent ground for rejecting the application as manifestly unfounded only if the following conditions are met: 1.      there is a connection between the foreign national and the third country concerned justifying his or her return as part of an individual assessment of the safety of that country for the foreign national concerned; 2.      a document is provided to the foreign national in the language of the safe third country in order to inform the authorities of that third country that his or her application has not been examined on its merits. (5)      If the foreign national is not admitted to the territory of the safe third country, access to a procedure for granting international protection in Bulgaria is granted.’ 14      Article 98(1) and (2) of the ZUB reads as follows: ‘(1)      The Chairperson of the DAB, in coordination with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, may, where appropriate, submit to the Council of Ministers national lists of safe countries of origin and safe third countries. (2)      When adopting the lists, the Council of Ministers, referring to information sources from other Member States of the European Union, the [EASO], the [UNHCR], the Council of Europe and other international organisations, shall take into account the extent to which the State offers protection against persecution and inhuman or degrading treatment through: 1.      the relevant laws and regulations of the country and the manner in which they are applied; 2.      respect for the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 …, or in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, [adopted on 16 December 1966 by the United Nations General Assembly and entered into force on 23 March 1976], or in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted on 10 December 1984 by the United Nations General Assembly [and entered into force on 26 June 1987]; 3.      respect for the principle of non-refoulement, in accordance with the [Geneva Convention]; 4.      the provision of a system of effective remedies against violations of those rights and freedoms.’ 15      Under Article 99 of the ZUB: ‘A foreign national who has submitted an application for international protection may rebut the presumption of security of the country listed in Article 98.’ 16      Point 9 of paragraph 1 of the supplementary provisions of the ZUB contains the following definition: ‘“Safe third country” means: a country other than the country of origin, in which the foreign national who has applied for international protection has resided, and: (a)      has no reason to fear for his or her life and liberty on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; (b)      is protected against return to the territory of a State where there are conditions of persecution and threat to his or her rights; (c)      is not exposed to a risk of persecution or serious harm, such as torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; (d)      has the possibility of applying for refugee status and, if granted, of benefiting from international protection as a refugee; (e)      there are sufficient grounds to believe that he or she will be admitted to the territory of that State.’  Decision No 247 17      Point 2 of Decision No 247 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria of 3 April 2024, adopting the list of safe countries of origin and the list of safe third countries for asylum seekers (‘Decision No 247’), is worded as follows: ‘Adopts the list of safe third countries for applicants for [international] protection in accordance with Annex No 2 … Asia: People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Islamic Republic of Iran, Southeast Europe: Republic of Türkiye.’  The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 18      On 2 November 2023, NP, an unaccompanied minor Syrian national, submitted an application for international protection in Bulgaria. 19      During the interview conducted on 1 December 2023, NP stated that he used to live in the province of Aleppo (Syria) and that he had left that province two to three months earlier with two of his brothers because of the war. NP is believed to have stayed in Türkiye for about a month before illegally entering the Bulgarian territory. His brothers are believed to have remained in Türkiye, where three of his sisters also live with their respective husbands. 20      By a decision dated 18 June 2024, the Chairperson of the DAB rejected NP’s application, refusing to grant him both refugee status and humanitarian status. The Chairperson of the DAB found that, although NP did not meet the conditions to be regarded as a refugee, he was, due to the internal armed conflict and indiscriminate violence in Syria, exposed to a real threat to his life or person. However, the Chairperson of the DAB considered the Republic of Türkiye to be a ‘safe third country’ in which NP could safely settle. NP had reportedly lived in the Turkish territory for a month without risk to his safety, and some of his brothers and sisters are still believed to be living there. NP had the legal possibility to register with the Turkish services and regularise his stay, which he did not do. In those circumstances, the Chairperson of the DAB inferred from the information gathered from publicly available sources that stateless persons and refugees from Syria who arrived in Türkiye due to events in Syria since 28 April 2011 were receiving temporary protection from the Turkish Government. The beneficiaries of that protection are protected against a forced return to Syria. Furthermore, their basic needs are satisfied. 21      NP brought an action before the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Administrative Court, Sofia City, Bulgaria), which is the referring court, for the annulment of the decision of 18 June 2024. 22      In response to a request for further information made by the referring court, the Chairperson of the DAB informed the latter, first, that the DAB was applying Decision No 247, under which the Republic of Türkiye was considered to be a safe third country. Secondly, he stated that the DAB had not developed a methodology under Article 38(2)(b) of Directive 2013/32. Thirdly, the chairperson acknowledged that NP had not been expressly informed of the possibility of challenging the application of the concept of a safe third country for him nor the existence of a connection between himself and the third country concerned. 23      In that context, the referring court submits that it is necessary to obtain clarification on the interpretation of the provisions of Directive 2013/32 relating to the concept of ‘safe third country’. Article 38 of that directive has not been fully transposed into Bulgarian law and that concept gives rise to divergent applications at national level. 24      More specifically, in the first place, the referring court wonders whether the provisions of that directive allow for the rejection of an application for international protection based on that concept in the context of an ordinary procedure under Chapter III of that directive, when, during the substantive examination of that application, the competent authority found that the applicant meets the conditions to be granted the status conferred by subsidiary protection. That court explains that the case-law of the Varhoven administrativen sad (Supreme Administrative Court, Bulgaria) allows such a practice. 25      In the second place, the referring court is unsure about the conditions for the application of the concept of ‘safe third country’ provided for in Article 38(2)(a) and (b) of Directive 2013/32. First, that court notes that, under Article 38(2)(b) of that directive, Member States are required to develop and implement ‘a methodology’ to ensure that that concept can be applied to a particular country or a particular applicant. That court asks whether, where, as in the main proceedings, national law does not provide for such methodology, that concept can be applied, where appropriate, on the basis of information from publicly available sources and of an act of the executive such as Decision No 247. Secondly, that court notes that Bulgarian law does not provide criteria for considering that there is a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned, on the basis of which it would be reasonable for the applicant to travel to that country, and that Article 38(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32 does not specify those criteria either. That court then wonders whether that provision requires Member States to include such criteria in their national law. 26      In the last place, the referring court wishes to obtain clarification on the required judicial review. Under Article 38(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32, Member States should allow the applicant to challenge in court the existence of a connection between him or her and a third country considered to be safe for that applicant. However, Bulgarian law does not provide for such judicial review. That court therefore questions whether, in the context of the examination of an action against a decision based on the concept of ‘safe third country’, it is required to declare itself competent and to examine whether there is such a connection on the basis of that provision. 27      In those circumstances, the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Administrative Court, Sofia) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1)      Adopting a broad interpretation of recital 46 and of point (c) of Article 33(2) [of Directive 2013/32], read in conjunction with Article 38 [of that directive], can it be assumed that the rules set out in those provisions, which permit an application for international protection to be regarded as inadmissible and which concern the concept of a safe third country within the meaning of Article 38 of [that directive], must be applied in a procedure under Chapter III of that Directive in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II of that Directive, that is to say, when an application for international protection is examined in substance? (2)      Are recital 46 and point (c) of Article [33](2) [of Directive 2013/32], read in conjunction with Article 38 [of that directive], to be interpreted as permitting national legislation, such as that in Article 75(2) of the Zakon za ubezhishteto i bezhantsite (Law on Asylum and Refugees), and administrative and judicial practice, under which an application for international protection examined in substance may be rejected without the application being declared as manifestly unfounded or inadmissible, solely on the grounds that the applicant has the possibility of benefiting from the protection of a safe third country, without the methodology envisaged by point (b) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 having been developed and applied in national law, and if the administrative authority recognises that there is armed conflict in the applicant’s country of origin and the qualification criteria laid down in point (c) of Article 15 of Directive 2011/95 are met? (3)      Is point (b) of Article 38(2) [of Directive 2013/32], read in conjunction with recital 46 of [that directive], to be interpreted as meaning that an administrative authority examining an application for international protection in substance may apply the safe third country concept to a particular country and to a particular applicant solely on the basis of information from publicly available sources and a decision of an executive body (Council of Ministers) in which a particular third country is deemed to be a “safe third country”, without a methodology within the meaning of that provision being provided for in national law, by application of which the administrative authority satisfies itself that the safe third country concept may be applied to a particular country and a particular applicant? (4)      Is point (a) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32 to be interpreted as meaning that it is mandatory for Member States to lay down in their national law criteria which, if met, it can be assumed that there is a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for that person to go to that country? (5)      Is point (c) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32, which sets out the possibility for an applicant to challenge before the courts the existence of a connection between himself or herself and a third country recognised as being safe, as referred to in point (a) [of Article 38(2) of that directive], to be interpreted as meaning that, in the absence of national legislation providing for judicial review of the lawfulness of the existence of a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned, the court hearing an action against the administrative decision refusing the applicant international protection on the grounds that a third country is recognised as being safe for the applicant, must necessarily declare that it has jurisdiction and rule on the lawfulness of the existence of such a connection, as found by the administrative authority?’  Consideration of the questions referred  The first and second questions 28      At the outset, it should be recalled that, according to settled case-law, the procedure provided for in Article 267 TFEU is an instrument of cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts by means of which the Court provides the national courts with the points of interpretation of EU law which they need in order to decide the disputes before them (see order of 26 January 1990, Falciola, C‑286/88, EU:C:1990:33, paragraph 7, and judgment of 15 April 2021, État belge (Circumstances subsequent to a transfer decision), C‑194/19, EU:C:2021:270, paragraph 21). 29      According to equally settled case-law, in that procedure providing for cooperation, it is for the Court of Justice to provide the referring court with an answer which will be of use to it and enable it to determine the case before it. To that end, the Court of Justice may have to reformulate the questions referred to it (see judgments of 17 July 1997, Krüger, C‑334/95, EU:C:1997:378, paragraphs 22 and 23; of 28 November 2000, Roquette Frères, C‑88/99, EU:C:2000:652, paragraph 18; and of 3 June 2025, Kinsa, C‑460/23, EU:C:2025:392, paragraph 34). 30      In the light of that case-law, it is necessary to examine together the first and second questions, which essentially overlap. Furthermore, in so far as the second question refers to the definition, in national law, of the methodology relating to the application of the concept of ‘safe third country’, it is identical to the third question, which concerns that methodology. Therefore, it is not necessary to address that aspect under the second question. 31      Accordingly, the first and second questions should be understood as meaning that the referring court is asking, in essence, whether Article 33(2)(c) and Article 38 of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that, first, the ground for inadmissibility set out in Article 33(2)(c) of that directive must necessarily be applied when examining the merits of an application for international protection and that, second, an application under substantive examination may be rejected without being declared manifestly unfounded or inadmissible on the grounds that a third country is considered to be a safe third country for the applicant, even though the competent authority has found that the applicant meets the conditions for being granted international protection laid down in Directive 2011/95. 32      In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, under Article 33(1) of Directive 2013/32, in addition to cases in which an application is not examined in accordance with Regulation No 604/2013, Member States are not required to examine whether the applicant qualifies for international protection in accordance with Directive 2011/95 where an application is considered inadmissible pursuant to that article. Article 33(2) of Directive 2013/32 sets out an exhaustive list of situations in which the Member States may consider an application for international protection to be inadmissible (judgments of 19 March 2019, Ibrahim and Others, C‑297/17, C‑318/17, C‑319/17 and C‑438/17, EU:C:2019:219, paragraph 76, and of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 29). 33      Among those situations, Article 33(2)(c) of that directive includes the situation in which a third country is found to be a safe third country for the applicant under Article 38 thereof. 34      It is apparent from the actual wording of Article 33(1) and (2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 that Member States are not obliged to verify whether the applicant fulfils the conditions to claim international protection under Directive 2011/95 where such protection is already provided in another Member State (see, by analogy, judgment of 22 February 2022, Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides (Family unity – Protection already granted), C‑483/20, EU:C:2022:103, paragraph 24). 35      That interpretation is consistent with the purpose of Article 33(2) of Directive 2013/32, which seeks, as is apparent from recital 43 of that directive, to relax the obligation on the part of the Member States to examine any application for international protection by defining the cases in which such an application is considered to be inadmissible (judgments of 17 March 2016, Mirza, C‑695/15 PPU, EU:C:2016:188, paragraph 43; of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 30; and of 18 June 2024, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Effect of a decision granting refugee status), C‑753/22, EU:C:2024:524, paragraph 50). 36      It follows that the examination of the ground for inadmissibility set out in Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 is intended to precede the examination on the merits of an application for international protection and therefore does not necessarily have to take place during that examination. That interpretation is even more compelling in the light of the objective of that directive, highlighted in recital 18 thereof, to the effect that, in the interests, in particular, of applicants for international protection, applications for such protection should be made as soon as possible, without prejudice to an adequate and complete examination being carried out (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Elliniko Symvoulio gia tous Prosfyges and Ypostirixi Prosfygon sto Aigaio, C‑134/23, EU:C:2024:838, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited). 37      In the absence of any provision to the contrary in Directive 2013/32, the abovementioned considerations similarly imply that an application for international protection may be declared inadmissible for a ground set out in Article 33(2) of that directive in a case where the conditions for granting international protection would otherwise be met, or even after the determining authority has carried out a substantive examination of the protection needs. 38      The interpretation drawn from paragraphs 36 and 37 of the present judgment is supported by the context of Article 33 of Directive 2013/32. 39      In that respect, it should be emphasised that that article, which governs the cases of inadmissibility of an application for international protection, is preceded by Article 32 of that directive, which deals with unfounded applications. Under Article 32(1) of that directive, Member States may only consider an application to be unfounded if the determining authority has established that the applicant does not qualify for international protection pursuant to Directive 2011/95. Furthermore, under Article 32(2) of Directive 2013/32, an application may be considered to be manifestly unfounded, where it is defined as such in national legislation, in the situations listed in Article 31(8) of that directive. Those situations do not relate to the grounds for inadmissibility set out in Article 33(2) of that directive. 40      A combined reading of Articles 32 and 33 of Directive 2013/32 thus reveals the unequivocal intention of the EU legislature to make a clear distinction between the grounds for inadmissibility of an application for international protection and the grounds for rejecting such an application on the merits. That distinction is also taken up in Article 46(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of that directive, which relates to the right to an effective remedy against, respectively, decisions considering an application for international protection to be unfounded and decisions considering such an application to be inadmissible. 41      It follows that, under Article 32 of Directive 2013/32, it is only after a substantive examination of the application for international protection that that application may, where appropriate, be rejected as being unfounded or manifestly unfounded. By contrast, the application of a ground for inadmissibility, within the meaning of Article 33(2) of that directive, can only lead to the rejection of the application as inadmissible, regardless of any such examination of the application. 42      In the present case, it is apparent from the elements of national law available to the Court that point 14 of Article 13(1) of the ZUB provides for the rejection of an application for international protection as being ‘manifestly unfounded’ on the grounds that the foreign national ‘comes from a safe third country’, in other words, on grounds of inadmissibility, within the meaning of Article 33(2) of Directive 2013/32, in breach of the requirements arising from Articles 32 and 33 thereof. However, it is for the referring court, which alone has jurisdiction to rule on national law, to ascertain whether that is the case. 43      In the light of the foregoing reasons, the answer to the first and second questions referred is that Article 33(2)(c) and Article 38 of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that: –        the ground for inadmissibility set out in Article 33(2)(c) of that directive does not necessarily have to be applied when examining the merits of an application for international protection; –        an application under substantive examination may be rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that a third country is considered to be a safe third country for the applicant, even when the competent authority has found that the applicant meets the conditions for granting international protection laid down in Directive 2011/95. By contrast, such an application may be rejected as unfounded, or even manifestly unfounded, only under the conditions set out in Article 32 of Directive 2013/32 and may not, in any event, be rejected as unfounded on the grounds of inadmissibility provided for in Article 33(2)(c) of that directive.  The third and fourth questions  Preliminary observations 44      Since the third and fourth questions concern the interpretation of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32, it is therefore appropriate to recall, at the outset, that it follows from Article 38 of that directive that the application of the concept of ‘safe third country’, for the purposes of Article 33(2)(c) of that directive, is subject to compliance with the conditions laid down in Article 38(1) to (4). 45      In particular, in the first place, Article 38(1) of Directive 2013/32 requires the competent authorities of the Member States to be satisfied that the third country concerned complies with the principles explicitly set out in that provision. 46      In the second place, Article 38(2) of that directive makes the application of the concept of ‘safe third country’ subject to rules laid down in national law. Those rules must include, in particular, first, rules requiring the existence of a connection between the applicant for international protection and the third country concerned to such an extent that it makes the movement of that applicant to that country reasonable. Secondly, those rules must include those relating to the methodology applied by the competent authorities to ensure that the concept of ‘safe third country’ can be applied to a particular country or a particular applicant for international protection, it being specified that that methodology must include case-by-case consideration of the safety of the country for such an applicant and/or the designation by the Member State of countries considered to be generally safe. Thirdly, they must include those, in accordance with international law, allowing an individual examination in order to determine whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant for international protection and allowing that applicant to challenge both the application of the concept of ‘safe third country’ in the light of his or her particular situation and the existence of a connection between him or her and that country. 47      In the third place, Article 38(3) and (4) of that directive requires Member States implementing a decision based solely on the concept of ‘safe third country’ to inform the applicant accordingly and provide him or her with a document informing the authorities of the third country, in the language of that country, that the application has not been examined on the merits. Member States must ensure that that applicant can initiate proceedings in accordance with the basic principles and guarantees set out in Chapter II of that directive when the third country does not allow him or her to enter its territory. 48      The conditions laid down in Article 38 of Directive 2013/32 are cumulative, with the effect that the ground of inadmissibility laid down in Article 33(2)(c) of that directive cannot be applied where one of those conditions has not been satisfied (judgment of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited). 49      It is in the light of those preliminary observations that the fourth and then the third question, which relate, respectively, to point (a) and point (b) of Article 38(2) of Directive 2013/32, must be examined in turn.  The fourth question 50      By its fourth question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 38(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that Member States must make provision, in their national law, for criteria for considering that there is a connection between the applicant for international protection and the third country concerned. 51      As recalled in paragraph 46 of the present judgment, that provision states that the application of the concept of ‘safe third country’ is subject to the rules laid down in national law requiring the existence of a connection between the applicant for international protection and the third country concerned to such an extent that it makes the movement of that applicant to that country reasonable. 52      It thus follows from that provision, read also in the light of recital 44 of Directive 2013/32, that it is for Member States to define, in their national law, the required connection between an applicant for international protection and a safe third country. To that end, and in the absence of any definition of the concept of ‘connection’ in that directive, Member States must determine the relevant criteria for the purpose of determining such a connection. 53      In that regard, it is also apparent from recital 44 that that connection must be sufficient to make that applicant’s return to that country reasonable (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 46). 54      In that context, the Court has further held that the fact that an applicant for international protection has transited through the territory of a third country cannot alone constitute a valid reason for considering that that applicant could reasonably return to that country (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 47). 55      In the present case, it is for the referring court to ascertain whether Bulgarian law defines the ‘connection’ within the meaning of Article 38(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32, it being noted that it would appear from paragraph 1, point 9, of the supplementary provisions of the ZUB that Bulgarian law determines the existence of such a connection by a criterion relating to the ‘stay’ of the applicant for international protection in the third country concerned. If that were the case, it would still be up to that court to determine whether, having regard to all the circumstances characterising a possible previous stay of the applicant concerned in the third country at issue, such as the length and reasons for that stay and the presence, in that third country, of members of the applicant’s close family, such a stay is sufficient to consider that there is a connection between that applicant and that third country such that that applicant could reasonably return to that country. 56      In the light of the foregoing reasons, the answer to the fourth question is that Article 38(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that Member States must make provision, in their national law, for criteria for considering that there is a connection between the applicant for international protection and the third country concerned, it being specified that that connection must be sufficient to make the applicant’s movement to that country reasonable.  The third question 57      By its third question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 38(2)(b) of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that the determining authority may apply the concept of ‘safe third country’ on the basis of information from publicly available sources and a decision of the executive which draws up a list of safe third countries, without national law defining a ‘methodology’ within the meaning of that provision. 58      In the first place, as recalled in paragraph 46 of the present judgment, Article 38(2)(b) of Directive 2013/32 makes the application of the concept of ‘safe third country’ subject to the rules laid down in national law relating to the methodology applied by the competent authorities to ensure that that concept can be applied to a particular country or to a particular applicant for international protection. Furthermore, such methodology is to include a case-by-case consideration of the safety of the country for a particular applicant and/or national designation of countries considered to be generally safe. 59      It thus follows from the wording of that provision itself, and in particular from the reference to national law, as well as from the phrase ‘and/or’ appearing in the second sentence of that provision, that it grants Member States the possibility of choosing between different methods to apply the concept of ‘safe third country’, which it is for them to define in their national law. Thus, it is apparent that Member States can, in principle, provide either for a case-by-case consideration of the safety of the country for any applicant for international protection, or the designation of countries considered to be generally safe, or a combination of those two methods. 60      More specifically, as regards the methodology for ensuring the designation of countries considered to be generally safe, the Court has held that Article 38 of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of recitals 44 and 46 of that directive, authorises a Member State to designate, by an act of general application, a country as a generally safe third country for certain applicants for international protection (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Elliniko Symvoulio gia tous Prosfyges and Ypostirixi Prosfygon sto Aigaio, C‑134/23, EU:C:2024:838, paragraphs 43 and 45). 61      Furthermore, under recital 46 of that directive, where Member States apply the concept of ‘safe third country’ on a case-by-case basis or by means of designating such countries as safe by acts of general application, those Member States should take into account, inter alia, the guidelines and operating manuals and the information on countries of origin and activities, including the methodology of the European Union Agency for Asylum, which succeeded the EASO, used for the Country of Origin Information report, as well as relevant UNHCR guidelines. 62      That non-exhaustive list of information includes information having the common characteristic of being publicly accessible. Accordingly, it must be stated that, for the purpose of applying the concept of ‘safe third country’, Member States may take into account information from publicly available sources. 63      It follows that, in principle, nothing prevents the determining authority from applying the concept of ‘safe third country’ on the basis of information from publicly available sources and a decision of the executive which draws up, under national law, a list of safe third countries. 64      In the second place, account should, however, also be taken of Article 38(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32. Under that provision, Member States must lay down rules allowing an individual examination of whether the third country concerned is safe for a particular applicant, ensuring, inter alia, the possibility of challenging the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept in the light of his or her particular circumstances and the existence of a connection between that applicant and that third country (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Elliniko Symvoulio gia tous Prosfyges and Ypostirixi Prosfygon sto Aigaio, C‑134/23, EU:C:2024:838, paragraph 44). 65      Consequently, even where, under Article 38(2)(b) of Directive 2013/32, a Member State chooses, with regard to the methodology for applying the concept of a ‘safe third country’, to designate safe third countries by means of an act of general application, it is still incumbent upon that Member State, under Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of that directive, to define the methodology applicable for assessing, on a case-by-case basis, according to the particular circumstances of the applicant for international protection concerned, whether the third country at issue satisfies the conditions for being regarded as safe for that applicant, as well as the possibility for that applicant to challenge the existence of a connection within the meaning of that provision (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 48). 66      In the light of the foregoing reasons, the answer to the third question is that Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that the determining authority may apply the concept of ‘safe third country’ on the basis of information from publicly available sources and a decision of the executive which draws up a list of safe third countries, provided that national law also defines the methodology applicable for assessing, on a case-by-case basis, according to the particular circumstances of the applicant for international protection, whether the third country concerned satisfies the conditions for being regarded as safe for that applicant and the possibility for that applicant to challenge the existence of a connection, within the meaning of Article 38(2)(a) of that directive.  The fifth question 67      At the outset, it should be recalled that, in the procedure laid down by Article 267 TFEU providing for cooperation between national courts and the Court of Justice, the latter may be required to consider provisions of EU law which the national court has not referred to in its questions (see judgments of 20 March 1986, Tissier, 35/85, EU:C:1986:143, paragraph 9, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 44). 68      The fact that the referring court has formally referred, in its questions, to certain specific provisions of EU law does not prevent the Court from providing it with all the elements of interpretation which may be useful for the judgment of the dispute in the main proceedings, by extracting from the body of material provided by that court, and in particular from the statement of reasons for the order for reference, the elements of EU law which require interpretation in the light of the subject matter of the dispute (see judgments of 29 November 1978, Redmond, 83/78, EU:C:1978:214, paragraph 26, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 45). 69      In the present case, it should be noted that the fifth question formally concerns the interpretation of Article 38(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32 alone. However, it is undoubtedly apparent from the grounds in the order for reference and from the wording of the question itself that the referring court wishes to be informed about the implications of the right to effective judicial protection for an applicant for international protection whose application has been rejected on the grounds that there is a safe third country for him. 70      Accordingly, in order to provide a useful answer to the referring court, account should also be taken of the provisions of Article 46(1) and (3) of that directive, and of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), relating to the right to effective judicial protection. 71      Under those circumstances, the fifth question must be understood as meaning that, by that question, the referring court is asking, in essence, whether Article 38(2)(c) and Article 46(1) and (3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the national court hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection on the basis of the ground of inadmissibility relating to a safe third country, referred to in Article 33(2)(c) of that directive, must verify whether there is a connection, within the meaning of Article 38(2)(a) of that directive, between the applicant and the third country concerned, even if its national law does not grant it such a power. 72      In that regard, it must be recalled that Article 46(1) of Directive 2013/32 guarantees applicants for international protection a right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against decisions taken on their application. Article 46(3) of that directive defines the scope of the right to an effective remedy by specifying that Member States bound by that directive must ensure that a court or tribunal before which the decision relating to the application for international protection concerned is contested carries out ‘a full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to Directive [2011/95]’ (judgment of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 76 and the case-law cited). 73      Furthermore, it is apparent from the Court’s case-law that the characteristics of the remedy provided for in Article 46 of Directive 2013/32 must be determined in a manner that is consistent with Article 47 of the Charter, which constitutes a reaffirmation of the principle of effective judicial protection. Article 47 of the Charter is sufficient in itself and does not need to be made more specific by provisions of EU or national law in order to confer on individuals a right which they may rely on as such. The same must hold true for Article 46(3) of that directive, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter (judgments of 4 October 2024, Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, C‑406/22, EU:C:2024:841, paragraph 86, and of 1 August 2025, Alace and Canpelli, C‑758/24 and C‑759/24, EU:C:2025:591, paragraph 77). 74      Furthermore, the Court has held that, even in the case of an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection as inadmissible, the court hearing such an appeal is required to carry out the full and ex nunc examination referred to in Article 46(3) of Directive 2013/32 (judgment of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 66). The words ‘where applicable’, contained in the limb of the sentence ‘including, where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs pursuant to directive [2011/95]’, underline the fact that the full and ex nunc examination to be carried out by the court need not necessarily involve a substantive examination of the need for international protection and may accordingly concern the admissibility of the application for international protection, where national law allows pursuant to Article 33(2) of Directive 2013/32 (judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraph 115, and of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 67). 75      In that context, as regards, in particular, an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection as inadmissible on the basis of the grounds of inadmissibility relating to the safe third country, referred to in Article 33(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32, in the full and up-to-date examination which is to be carried out by the court hearing such an appeal, the latter is required, inter alia, to determine whether the third country at issue can be regarded as a safe third country for the applicant for international protection concerned (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 68). 76      For the purposes of that determination, that court must examine thoroughly whether each of the cumulative conditions to which the application of that ground of inadmissibility is subject – such as those referred to in Article 38 of Directive 2013/32 – is satisfied, by asking, where necessary, the determining authority to produce any documents and any factual evidence that may be relevant, and to satisfy itself, before giving a decision, that the applicant has had the opportunity to set out his or her point of view in person on the applicability of the ground of inadmissibility to his or her specific situation (see, to that effect, judgments of 25 July 2018, Alheto, C‑585/16, EU:C:2018:584, paragraphs 121 and 124, and of 19 March 2020, Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal (Tompa), C‑564/18, EU:C:2020:218, paragraph 69). 77      The existence of a connection, within the meaning of Article 38(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32, constitutes one of those cumulative conditions. Moreover, Article 38(2)(c) of that directive requires that any applicant for international protection, whose application is rejected on the grounds that there is a safe third country for him or her, be allowed to challenge the existence of a connection between himself or herself and that third country under the first of those provisions. 78      With regard to the dispute in the main proceedings, it is therefore for the referring court to examine, in particular, the existence of a connection between NP and the Republic of Türkiye. In the light of the case-law recalled in paragraph 73 of the present judgment, that court must conduct that examination even if, as it notes in the order for reference, Bulgarian law does not grant it such a power. 79      In the light of the foregoing reasons, the answer to the fifth question is that Article 38(2)(c) and Article 46(1) and (3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that the national court hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection on the basis of the ground of inadmissibility relating to a safe third country, referred to in Article 33(2)(c) of that directive, must verify whether there is a connection, within the meaning of Article 38(2)(a) of that directive, between the applicant and the third country concerned, even if its national law does not grant it such a power.  Costs 80      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Second Chamber) hereby rules: 1.      Article 33(2)(c) and Article 38 of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection must be interpreted as meaning that: –        the ground for inadmissibility set out in Article 33(2)(c) of that directive does not necessarily have to be applied when examining the merits of an application for international protection; –        an application under substantive examination may be rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that a third country is considered to be a safe third country for the applicant, even when the competent authority has found that the applicant meets the conditions for granting international protection laid down in Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted. By contrast, such an application may be rejected as unfounded, or even manifestly unfounded, only under the conditions set out in Article 32 of Directive 2013/32 and may not, in any event, be rejected as unfounded on the grounds of inadmissibility provided for in Article 33(2)(c) of that directive. 2.      Article 38(2)(a) of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that Member States must provide in their national law criteria for considering that there is a connection between the applicant for international protection and the third country concerned, it being specified that that connection must be sufficient to make the applicant’s movement to that country reasonable. 3.      Article 38(2)(b) and (c) of Directive 2013/32 must be interpreted as meaning that the determining authority may apply the concept of ‘safe third country’ on the basis of information from publicly available sources and a decision of the executive which draws up a list of safe third countries, provided that national law also defines the methodology applicable for assessing, on a case-by-case basis, according to the particular circumstances of the applicant for international protection, whether the third country concerned satisfies the conditions for being regarded as safe for that applicant and the possibility for that applicant to challenge the existence of a connection, within the meaning of Article 38(2)(a) of that directive. 4.      Article 38(2)(c) and Article 46(1) and (3) of Directive 2013/32, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that the national court hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting an application for international protection on the basis of the ground of inadmissibility relating to a safe third country, referred to in Article 33(2)(c) of that directive, must verify whether there is a connection, within the meaning of Article 38(2)(a) of that directive, between the applicant and the third country concerned, even if its national law does not grant it such a power. [Signatures] *      Language of the case: Bulgarian. i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.