C-766/25

ORDER OF THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) 24 March 2026 (*) ( Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed ) In Case C‑766/25 P, APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 27 November 2025, Capella EOOD, established in Sofia (Bulgaria), represented by A. Auer-Reinsdorff, Rechtsanwältin, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, Richemont International SA, established in Villars-sur-Glâne (Switzerland), intervener at first instance, THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed), composed of T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, J. Passer and E. Regan (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, M. Campos Sánchez-Bordona, makes the following Order 1        By its appeal, Capella EOOD seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 8 October 2025, Capella v EUIPO – Richemont International (COLORATURA) (T‑562/24, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2025:940), whereby the General Court dismissed its action seeking annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 29 August 2024 (Case R 1358/2022-2), in relation to opposition proceedings between Capella and Richemont International SA.  The request that the appeal be allowed to proceed 2        Under the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal of EUIPO is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so. 3        The third paragraph of Article 58a of that statute provides that an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 4        Under Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court to rule on that request. 5        In accordance with Article 170b(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court’s decision on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed is to be taken as soon as possible in the form of a reasoned order.  Arguments of the appellant 6        In support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant submits that its single ground of appeal, alleging infringement of Article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (OJ 2017 L 154, p. 1), raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law. 7        In the first place, the appellant submits that it is apparent from the judgment of 27 February 2024, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann (C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2024:172), that the Court has already recognised, in so far as concerns Community designs, that the right of priority raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law. The appellant maintains that the right of priority is at least as important for the purpose of interpreting and applying Article 34 of Regulation 2017/1001 in opposition proceedings concerning an EU trade mark. 8        In the second place, the appellant criticises the General Court for erring in law, in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal, since it based its reasoning, in proceedings concerning relative grounds for refusal of registration of an EU trade mark, on judgment of 25 June 2015, Copernicus-Trademarks v OHIM – Maquet (LUCEA LED) (T‑186/12, EU:T:2015:436), even though that judgment concerned absolute grounds for refusal of registration of an EU trade mark. That error of law raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, since it results, in the appellant’s view, from a conflation, as regards the provisions of Regulation 2017/1001, of distinct procedural regimes. That conflation is capable of affecting the development of procedures concerning EU trade marks and creating legal uncertainty regarding the system of priorities. 9        In the third place, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in law, in paragraphs 53 to 71 of the judgment under appeal, by incorrectly interpreting the concept of ‘first application’ within the meaning of Article 34(4) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 34(1) thereof. It claims that, in accordance with the last sentence of Article 34(4), only an application which is still capable of conferring a right of priority can be classified as a ‘first application’, within the meaning of that provision. A national trade mark application in respect of which the right of priority lasting six months, which runs from the date on which that application was filed, has expired by the date of the subsequent application concerning that trade mark does not meet that condition. In the present case, the appellant submits that the General Court was therefore incorrect to classify the national trade mark application filed on 21 February 2017 as a ‘first application’ because, on the date on which the subsequent identical application was filed, 28 September 2017, the right of priority connected with its previous application had expired on 21 August 2017. Accordingly, by finding, in paragraph 69 of the judgment under appeal, that the expiry of the six-month time limit does not alter the classification of the previous application as the first application, the General Court adopted, in the appellant’s view, an incorrect interpretation of Article 34(1) and (4) of Regulation 2017/1001, of such a kind as to introduce inconsistency into the system and temporal logic of priority rights, which undermines the intention of the EU legislature and the stability of the priority mechanism. 10      In the fourth place, the appellant maintains that, in paragraph 66 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court has not complied with its own case-law, as set out in the judgment of 15 November 2001, Signal Communications v OHIM (TELEYE) (T‑128/99, EU:T:2001:266, paragraph 42), in which, in respect of Article 34(1) and (4) of Regulation 2017/1001, the General Court classified an initial national trade mark application as a ‘previous application’ rather than a ‘first application’. By finding, in the judgment under appeal, the classification as a ‘first application’, the General Court failed to have regard to the spirit of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (OJ 1994 L 336, p. 214) and the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, signed in Paris on 20 March 1883, last revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967 and amended on 28 September 1979 (United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 828, No 11851, p. 305). Accordingly, the appellant argues, the General Court extended the scope of that provision beyond the temporal limit of six months. In so doing, it gave expired rights of priority, stemming from previous applications, a permanent blocking effect to the detriment of the temporal structure of the international system of priority, the principle of legal certainty and the consistency of the priority mechanism in EU trade mark law. 11      In the fifth place, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in law, in paragraphs 64 to 69 of the judgment under appeal, in so far as it relies, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conditions laid down in Article 34(4) of Regulation 2017/1001 have been met, on German procedural law concerning trade marks. The appellant submits that, in the light of the autonomous nature of EU law, it must be interpreted and applied independently from national legislation. In its view, the disparity between the national procedural rules in question results in inconsistencies capable of undermining legal certainty and the unity and consistency of EU law. 12      In the sixth place, the appellant maintains that, in paragraphs 50, 54 and 60 of the judgment under appeal, the General Court, failing to comply with the case-law established in the judgment of 27 February 2024, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann (C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2024:172, paragraph 70), interpreted Article 34(4) of Regulation 2017/1001 in a manner that is not consistent with either the objective pursued by the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as referred to in paragraph 10 above, which is to avoid chain priorities, or the wording of Article 4 of that convention, which refers not to a ‘first application’ but to a ‘subsequent application’. In particular, the General Court indicated, incorrectly, in the appellant’s view, that the national trade mark at issue had been filed twice in a period of six months, whereas the two applications were filed seven months and seven days apart, which precludes a chain priority or an extension of the six-month time limit. According to the appellant, the interpretation adopted by the General Court makes it possible for withdrawn or expired national trade mark applications to have a permanent blocking effect to the detriment of legal certainty and the unity, consistency and predictability of EU trade mark law. 13      In the seventh place, the appellant is of the opinion that the General Court erred in law, in paragraph 36 of the judgment under appeal, by finding – failing to have regard to its own case-law, as set out in the judgment of 15 November 2001, Signal Communications v OHIM (TELEYE) (T‑128/99, EU:T:2001:266, paragraph 44) – that EUIPO can call into question, in opposition proceedings, an established priority date. Since EUIPO is required to assess, when the national trade mark application is filed, whether a claim of priority meets the applicable substantive and formal conditions, it must necessarily ascertain, in order to determine the risk of there being chain priorities, whether that application is a ‘first application’, within the meaning of Article 34(4) of Regulation 2017/1001. 14      In the eighth and last place, the appellant submits that the General Court erred in law, in paragraphs 60 and 61 of the judgment under appeal, in that it adopted reasoning based on an absolute ground for refusal for registration of an EU trade mark, whereas the opposition proceedings are based on relative grounds for refusal for registration of an EU trade mark. It concludes that the General Court exceeded the limits of those proceedings and that the conflation of distinct procedural regimes undermines the system established by Regulation 2017/1001 by creating systemic inconsistency in its procedural architecture and legal uncertainty concerning trade mark law in the European Union.  Findings of the Court 15      As a preliminary point, it must be borne in mind that it is for the appellant to demonstrate that the issues raised by its appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 20, and of 14 January 2026, Gómez Jiménez and Others v EUIPO, C‑665/25 P, EU:C:2026:23, paragraph 10). 16      Furthermore, as is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read together with Article 170a(1) and Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must contain all the information necessary to enable the Court to give a ruling on whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed and to determine, where the appeal is allowed to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. Given that the objective of the mechanism provided for in Article 58a of that statute whereby the Court determines whether an appeal should be allowed to proceed is to restrict review by the Court to issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 21, and of 14 January 2026, Gómez Jiménez and Others v EUIPO, C‑665/25 P, EU:C:2026:23, paragraph 11). 17      Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the judgment or order under appeal, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the judgment or order under appeal. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the judgment or order under appeal which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, secondly, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 22, and of 14 January 2026, Gómez Jiménez and Others v EUIPO, C‑665/25 P, EU:C:2026:23, paragraph 13). 18      A request that an appeal be allowed to proceed which does not contain the information referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present order cannot be capable of demonstrating that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that justifies the appeal being allowed to proceed (orders of 24 October 2019, Porsche v EUIPO, C‑613/19 P, EU:C:2019:905, paragraph 16, and of 14 January 2026, Gómez Jiménez and Others v EUIPO, C‑665/25 P, EU:C:2026:23, paragraph 13). 19      In the present case, as regards the line of argument set out in paragraph 7 above, it must be found that, in that line of argument, the appellant does not identify the paragraphs of the judgment under appeal which it intends to criticise and does not rely on an error of law. It merely, in essence, makes reference to an appeal in another case which related to priority rights concerning Community designs which was allowed to proceed by the Court of Justice. Such a fact cannot suffice to demonstrate that the present appeal, on the sole ground that it has, in the appellant’s opinion, a similar aim in the field of EU trade marks, also raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 20      As regards the line of argument set out in paragraph 8 above, it must be found that, although the appellant identifies an error of law allegedly made by the General Court by referring to the disputed paragraphs of the judgment under appeal, it simply, in that respect, puts forward arguments of a general nature – referring, at most, to a risk of legal uncertainty – without, however, stating concrete reasons for which that error of law, assuming that it is established, raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that justifies the appeal being allowed to proceed (order of 14 January 2026, Gómez Jiménez and Others v EUIPO, C‑665/25 P, EU:C:2026:23, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited). The appellant also does not indicate the extent to which an error of the type alleged had an effect on the outcome of the judgment under appeal, which does not satisfy the requirements set out in paragraph 17 above (see, to that effect, order of 8 March 2023, Hijos de Moisés Rodríguez González v EUIPO, C‑605/22 P, EU:C:2023:199, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 21      As regards the line of argument set out in paragraph 9 above, it should be noted that the appellant criticises the General Court, in essence, for incorrectly interpreting Article 34(4) of Regulation 2017/1001, which lays down the cumulative conditions which a national trade mark application must meet in order to be regarded as a ‘first application’. However, it disputes the General Court’s assessment only in respect of the condition contained in the last sentence of that provision, without calling into question the interpretation adopted as regards the other conditions laid down in that provision. Since the appellant does not specify the extent to which the error of law thus relied upon, assuming that it is established, had an effect on the outcome of the judgment under appeal, that line of argument cannot, in accordance with the case-law restated in the previous paragraph, raise an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 22      As regards the line of argument in paragraphs 11 and 14 above, it is sufficient to recall that, in accordance with the burden of proof which lies with an appellant requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant must demonstrate that, independently of the issues of law invoked in its appeal, the appeal raises one or more issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, the scope of that criterion going beyond the judgment under appeal and, ultimately, its appeal. In order to demonstrate that that is the case, it is necessary to establish both the existence and significance of such issues by means of concrete evidence specific to the particular case, and not simply arguments of a general nature (order of 15 December 2025, Abacus Research v EUIPO, C‑610/25 P, EU:C:2025:974, paragraph 14 and the case-law cited). However, the present request that the appeal be allowed to proceed does not appear to demonstrate the above, since the appellant has not specified concrete reasons why the issues raised by its appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 23      As regards the line of argument set out in paragraph 12 above, in so far as the appellant relies on the General Court’s failure to have regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it must be found that, although it identifies the disputed paragraphs of the judgment under appeal and the paragraph of a judgment of the Court of Justice which, in its view, was disregarded, it does not, however, provide any relevant information capable of establishing the existence of the contradiction relied on or explain, with clarity and detail, the reasons why that alleged contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (see, to that effect, order of 10 June 2025, Domingo Alonso Group v EUIPO, C‑32/25 P, EU:C:2025:426, paragraph 18). Furthermore, in so far as that appellant seeks, by that line of argument, to call into question the General Court’s assessment of certain facts, such a line of argument cannot demonstrate that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (order of 8 March 2023, Hijos de Moisés Rodríguez González v EUIPO, C‑605/22 P, EU:C:2023:199, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). 24      As regards, lastly, the line of argument set out in paragraphs 10 and 13 above, by which the appellant relies on, in essence, a failure, by the General Court, to have regard to its own case-law, it suffices to recall that such a line argument is not, in itself, sufficient to establish, in accordance with the burden of proof which lies with the appellant requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed, that that appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. Even though the appellant identifies the disputed paragraphs of the judgment under appeal and the relevant paragraphs of the judgments of the General Court on which it relies in support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, it does not provide – thus failing to satisfy the requirements set out in paragraph 17 above – any indication as to (i) the similarity between the situation at issue, which gave rise to the judgment under appeal, and the situations to which that case-law of the General Court relates, which would make it possible to establish the existence of the contraction relied upon, or (ii) the specific reasons why that contradiction raises such an issue (see, to that effect, order of 14 January 2026, Gómez Jiménez and Others v EUIPO, C‑665/25 P, EU:C:2026:23, paragraph 15). 25      In those circumstances, it must be held that the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed submitted by the appellant is not such as to establish that that appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 26      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.  Costs 27      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 28      Since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties to the proceedings and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders: 1.      The appeal is not allowed to proceed. 2.      Capella EOOD shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 24 March 2026. A. Calot Escobar   T. von Danwitz Registrar   President of the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed *      Language of the case: English.