C-819/25

Provisional text JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Fifth Chamber) 26 March 2026 (*) ( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Urgent preliminary ruling procedure – Border controls, asylum and immigration – Immigration policy – Directive 2003/86/EC – Right to family reunification – Article 13(1) – Obligation to grant every facility for obtaining visas – Visas granted subject to the suspensive condition of the recipients’ appearance in person for verification of their identities and of the authenticity of the documents submitted – Recipients unable to travel to a diplomatic or consular post of the Member State that granted the visas – Obligation for a Member State to ensure that such travel takes place or to facilitate such travel – None ) In Case C‑819/25 PPU [Gonrieh], (i) REQUEST for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the tribunal de première instance francophone de Brussels (Brussels Court of First Instance (French-speaking), Belgium), made by decision of 12 December 2025, received at the Court on 12 December 2025, in the proceedings X and Y, acting on their own behalf and in their capacity as legal representatives of their minor children A, B, C and D v Belgian State, THE COURT (Fifth Chamber), composed of M.L. Arastey Sahún, President of the Chamber, J. Passer (Rapporteur), E. Regan, D. Gratsias and B. Smulders, Judges, Advocate General: R. Norkus, Registrar: C. Di Bella, Administrator, having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 11 February 2026, after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: –        X and Y, acting on their own behalf and in their capacity as legal representatives of their minor children A, B, C and D, by P. Robert and J. Van Edom, avocats, –        the Belgian Government, by L. Jans, C. Pochet and M. Van Regemorter, acting as Agents, and by B. Appaerts and C. Caillet, avocats, –        the Czech Republic, by A. Edelmannová, S. Šindelková and J. Vláčil, acting as Agents, –        the Federal Republic of Germany, by J. Möller and R. Kanitz, acting as Agents, –        the Hellenic Republic, by L. Kotroni, acting as Agent, –        the French Republic, by O. Duprat-Mazaré and C. Thomas, acting as Agents, –        the Italian Republic, by S. Fiorentino, acting as Agent, –        the Kingdom of the Netherlands, by A. Hanje and P.P. Huurnink, acting as Agents, –        the European Commission, by F. Blanc, E. Cujo, J. Hottiaux and C. Ladenburger, acting as Agents, after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 5 March 2026, gives the following Judgment 1        This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification (OJ 2003 L 251, p. 12), in particular Article 13(1) thereof, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). 2        The request has been made in the proceedings between, on the one hand, Y, residing in Belgium, his wife X and four of their children, A, B, C and D, residing in the Gaza Strip and, on the other, the Belgian State concerning a request for the latter to be ordered to ensure that X and the children are evacuated from that territory or to take other steps to facilitate their departure from that territory for the purposes of family reunification.  Legal context  The FEU Treaty 3        Article 20(2)(c) TFEU provides: ‘Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia: … (c)      the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State’. 4        Under Article 23 TFEU: ‘Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State. …’  The Charter 5        Under Article 2 of the Charter, entitled ‘Right to life’: ‘1.      Everyone has the right to life. 2.      No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.’ 6        Article 4 of the Charter, entitled ‘Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, provides: ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 7        Article 7 of the Charter, entitled ‘Respect for private and family life’, is worded as follows: ‘Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.’ 8        Under Article 24 of the Charter, entitled ‘The rights of the child’: ‘1.      Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 2.      In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. 3.      Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.’ 9        Article 46 of the Charter, entitled ‘Diplomatic and consular protection’, states: ‘Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he or she is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that Member State.’  Directive 2003/86 10      Recital 13 of Directive 2003/86 reads: ‘A set of rules governing the procedure for examination of applications for family reunification and for entry and residence of family members should be laid down. Those procedures should be effective and manageable, taking account of the normal workload of the Member States’ administrations, as well as transparent and fair, in order to offer appropriate legal certainty to those concerned.’ 11      Article 2 of that directive provides: ‘For the purposes of this Directive: … (c)      “sponsor” means a third country national residing lawfully in a Member State and applying or whose family members apply for family reunification to be joined with him/her; (d)      “family reunification” means the entry into and residence in a Member State by family members of a third country national residing lawfully in that Member State in order to preserve the family unit, whether the family relationship arose before or after the resident’s entry; …’ 12      Article 5(1) of the directive is worded as follows: ‘Member States shall determine whether, in order to exercise the right to family reunification, an application for entry and residence shall be submitted to the competent authorities of the Member State concerned either by the sponsor or by the family member or members.’ 13      Article 13(1) of that directive provides: ‘As soon as the application for family reunification has been accepted, the Member State concerned shall authorise the entry of the family member or members. In that regard, the Member State concerned shall grant such persons every facility for obtaining the requisite visas.’  Directive (EU) 2015/637 14      Article 5 of Directive (EU) 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and repealing Decision 95/553/EC (OJ 2015 L 106, p. 1) provides: ‘Consular protection shall be provided to family members, who are not themselves citizens of the Union, accompanying unrepresented citizens in a third country, to the same extent and on the same conditions as it would be provided to the family members of the citizens of the assisting Member State, who are not themselves citizens of the Union, in accordance with its national law or practice.’  The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 15      Y and X, as indicated by the referring court, are married and parents to five children, A, B, C, D and E, born between 2013 and 2021. They are not Union citizens. On an unspecified date, Y was granted a visa allowing him to reside in Belgium, where he also holds a work permit. According to the referring court, Y also submitted to the competent Belgian authorities an application for refugee status, the examination of which, according to the information provided by the lawyer for the applicants in the main proceedings at the hearing before the Court, was still ongoing at the date of that hearing. 16      On 7 October 2023, Hamas conducted from the Gaza Strip several terrorist attacks on Israeli territory. Following those events, the State of Israel imposed a blockade on the Gaza Strip and carried out military action there. 17      On 3 May 2024, Y left the Gaza Strip with one of the children, E, and they entered Egypt via the Rafah Border Crossing. 18      On 5 May 2024, that crossing point was closed, which prevented X and the other children from, in turn, entering Egypt. It is apparent from the order for reference that, four days before the order was made, that crossing point was still closed. 19      In that context, the Kingdom of Belgium established a process for evacuation from the Gaza Strip to Belgium for the benefit of Belgian citizens, those recognised as refugees in Belgium and members of their nuclear families if they themselves hold a visa or residence permit for Belgium. Evacuations took place from November 2023, but they had to be interrupted in March 2024. 20      After March 2025, the Kingdom of Belgium, the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan agreed on a new process for evacuation from the Gaza Strip, under which the Kingdom of Belgium is to assume responsibility for transporting the same categories of persons as those mentioned in the preceding paragraph from that territory to Belgium, via Israel and Jordan. 21      On an unspecified date, X and the couple’s five children each submitted an application for entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification to the Office des étrangers (Office for Foreigners, Belgium). The application in respect of E was submitted to the Belgian Embassy in Egypt, where he remains, whereas the other applications were submitted remotely. 22      On 23 May 2025, those six applications were rejected. 23      On an unspecified date, but after 26 May 2025, Y left Egypt and arrived alone in Belgium. 24      Following an application by the lawyer for the applicants in the main proceedings seeking to have the Office des étrangers (Office for Foreigners) reconsider its decision to reject the applications referred to in paragraph 22 above, that office, on 6 October 2025, granted visas for the purposes of family reunification to X and the five children concerned, subject to the suspensive condition that the identities of the persons concerned and the authenticity of the documents included with their applications for entry and residence be verified. In order to carry out that verification, it was necessary to appear in person at a Belgian embassy or consulate. 25      E was able to collect his passport with a visa from the Belgian Embassy in Egypt on 16 October 2025. By contrast, X and the other children, residing in the Gaza Strip, were unable to travel to a Belgian embassy or consulate. 26      On 21 October 2025, the applicants in the main proceedings brought an action against the Belgian State before the tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles (Brussels Court of First Instance (French-speaking), Belgium), which is the referring court hearing the application for interim measures. 27      They requested, primarily, an order requiring the Belgian State to place X and the four children still in the Gaza Strip on the list of persons to be evacuated as part of the process referred to in paragraph 20 above and to make practical arrangements for their evacuation once the formalities have been completed. In the alternative, they requested, in essence, an order requiring the Belgian State to inform the authorities of Israel, Egypt, Jordan or any other authorities concerned that the persons concerned have a visa for Belgium and that they wish to be authorised to leave the Gaza Strip in order to travel to Belgium. 28      The Belgian State contended that the action is inadmissible, raising a plea alleging a lack of jurisdiction, which was rejected by the referring court. 29      Furthermore, that court found that the living conditions of X and her four children in the Gaza Strip satisfied the condition of urgency laid down by the Belgian procedural rules relating to interim relief. 30      That court observed, moreover, that, in accordance with national law, the Belgian State, when conducting an evacuation procedure, has some latitude in determining who will qualify for that procedure, which latitude it found had not been manifestly disregarded. 31      However, the referring court observed that the extent of the obligations of the Belgian State under EU law was the subject of disputes between the parties to the main proceedings which were not resolved in the existing case-law of the Court and the resolution of which by the Court could also benefit other similar disputes pending before the Belgian courts. 32      In those circumstances, the tribunal de première instance francophone de Bruxelles (Brussels Court of First Instance (French-Speaking)) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling: ‘1.      When a Member State, under [Directive 2003/86] and in accordance with the [judgment of 18 April 2023, Afrin (C‑1/23 PPU; “the judgment in Afrin”, EU:C:2023:296)], grants a visa in the context of family reunification and requires the recipient of the visa to be present in person when the visa is issued (in-person delivery) so that their identity can be verified, does the implementation of EU law under Article 51 of the [Charter] extend beyond granting the visa – for example to issuing it (in-person delivery)? 2.      If the answer to the first question is yes, should Article 13[(1)] of [Directive 2003/86], read in isolation or in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the [Charter] be interpreted as requiring a Member State that has granted a visa as described in the first question, where the recipient of the visa (a third country national) is unable to leave the third country where they reside alone and their life is clearly in danger, to provide that recipient with assistance enabling them to leave that country and have the visa issued to them (delivered in person)? 3.      If the answer to the second question is yes, should the assistance to be provided pursuant to the aforementioned legislation consist of: –        including the recipient of the visa (third country national) in an evacuation process established by the Member State concerned for categories of persons determined by that Member State, under the same conditions as those persons and even if the recipient does not fall into those categories; or at the very least of –        informing the authorities of any third country preventing the recipient from entering the [European Union] that that recipient wishes to reside there and has the required visa to do so, even if that information falls outside the aforementioned evacuation process?’  Request for the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure 33      The referring court requested that the present reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in the first paragraph of Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice. 34      It follows from those provisions that the application of that procedure is subject to two cumulative conditions. First, the reference for a preliminary ruling must raise questions of interpretation relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, which is the subject of Title V of Part Three of the FEU Treaty. Second, the circumstances of the dispute in the main proceedings, as described by the referring court, must be characterised by the existence of a situation of urgency. 35      As regards the first condition, it should be noted that the present request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86, which was adopted on the basis of point 3(a) of the first paragraph of Article 63 EC, now Article 79(2)(a) TFEU. Thus, that directive comes under Title V of Part Three of the FEU Treaty, on the area of freedom, security and justice. In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 107(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the request may therefore be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure. 36      As regards the second condition, it should be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, the fact that a child is separated from a parent may, since continued separation is liable seriously to harm that child and his or her relationship with that parent, form the basis for a finding that there is urgency for the purposes of applying the urgent preliminary ruling procedure (see, to that effect, judgments of 22 December 2010, Mercredi, C‑497/10 PPU, EU:C:2010:829, paragraph 39; and of 19 November 2015, P, C‑455/15 PPU, EU:C:2015:763, paragraph 32; and the judgment in Afrin, paragraph 26 and the case-law cited). 37      In the present case, it is apparent from the order for reference that children A, B, C and D, born between 2013 and 2021, have been separated from their father for almost two years and that the continuation of that situation could seriously harm those children’s future relationship with their father. 38      In those circumstances, on 12 January 2026 the Fifth Chamber of the Court decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to grant the referring court’s request that the reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure.  Consideration of the questions referred 39      By its questions referred for a preliminary ruling, which it is appropriate to examine together, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86, read in isolation or in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State, in the case of a third-country national who has been granted a visa for the purposes of family reunification subject to verification of that person’s identity and of the authenticity of the documents included with the visa application submitted remotely, for which verification it is necessary to appear in person at a diplomatic or consular post of that Member State, is required to make arrangements for the transfer of that person and to ensure that that person is transferred to that place or to contact one or more third countries in order to facilitate that transfer, in a situation where it is impossible for that person to travel to that place. 40      Article 13(1) of that directive provides that, as soon as the application for family reunification has been accepted, the Member State concerned must authorise the entry of the family member or members. In that regard, the Member State concerned must grant such persons every facility for obtaining the requisite visas. 41      In the present case, the referring court is uncertain, in particular, as to the interpretation of the second sentence of that provision in circumstances such as those of the dispute in the main proceedings, namely that of the evacuation process referred to in paragraph 20 above. 42      Although they do not fall within the categories of persons eligible for that evacuation process, the applicants in the main proceedings requested that X and the four children in the Gaza Strip be included in that process, relying on Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86 and the interpretation of that directive given by the Court in the judgment in Afrin, which concerned primarily the interpretation of Article 5 of that directive, laying down the rules governing the submission and examination of applications for family reunification. 43      In that judgment, the Court held that Article 5(1) of Directive 2003/86, read in conjunction with Article 7 and paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 24 of the Charter, precludes national legislation which makes the submission of an application for entry and residence for the purposes of family reunification subject to the requirement that the sponsor’s family members appear in person at a diplomatic or consular representation, including in a situation where it is impossible or excessively difficult for them to appear there. However, the Court expressly stated that that interpretation of EU law does not prevent a Member State from requiring the sponsor’s family members to appear in person later on in the family reunification procedure, which takes place in stages, adding, in paragraph 58 of that judgment, that the purpose of such an appearance may be to verify the family ties and the identities of the persons concerned. In that regard, in paragraph 59 of that judgment, the Court stated that the Member State must facilitate such an appearance, notably by issuing consular documents or laissez-passers. 44      As the Advocate General observed in point 45 of his Opinion, the Kingdom of Belgium complied, in the present case, with the case-law of the Court arising from the judgment in Afrin by providing for the appearance of the persons concerned, for the purposes of verifying their identities and the authenticity of the documents included with their applications for entry and residence, after the application for family reunification was submitted. 45      That stage of the procedure is governed by Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86, according to which the Member State concerned is required, after accepting an application for family reunification, to authorise the entry of the family member or members and to grant them ‘every facility for obtaining the requisite visas’. 46      Since that directive does not define the scope of that obligation to grant every facility for obtaining the requisite visas, it is necessary to seek its meaning by considering the wording and context of Article 13(1) and the objectives of that directive. 47      It is apparent from settled case-law that the interpretation of a provision of EU law requires account to be taken not only of its wording, but also of its context, and the objectives and purpose pursued by the act of which it forms part. The legislative history of a provision of EU law may also reveal elements that are relevant to its interpretation (judgment of 8 May 2025, Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen and Sogent, C‑236/24, EU:C:2025:321, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 48      As regards the wording of the second sentence of Article 13(1), it should be noted that, in everyday language, the term ‘facility’ refers to the means by which something can be obtained without difficulty, and that the term ‘obtaining’ means securing the grant of something. Thus, the phrase ‘every facility for obtaining the requisite visas’ refers to all the means by which the grant of visas can be secured without difficulty. 49      As regards the context of Article 13(1), it should be noted that, in accordance with recital 13 of Directive 2003/86, the rules governing the procedure for examination of applications for family reunification and for entry and residence of family members must be effective and manageable, taking account of the normal workload of the Member States’ administrations. 50      It is also apparent from point 5.1 of the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council of 3 April 2014 on guidance for the application of Directive 2003/86 (COM(2014) 210 final), which the Court takes into account for the purposes of interpreting that directive (see, to that effect, judgment of 2 September 2021, État belge (Right of residence in the event of domestic violence), C‑930/19, EU:C:2021:657, paragraph 64), that the obligation to grant every facility for obtaining visas implies that ‘Member States should ensure a speedy visa procedure, reduce additional administrative burdens to a minimum and avoid double-checks on the fulfilment of the requirements for family reunification’. It is specified in that point 5.1 that, ‘in exceptional circumstances, for instance, in the context of a failed state or a country with high internal security risks, [Member States] are encouraged to accept emergency travel documents issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), to issue a national one-way laissez-passer, or offer family members the possibility of being issued a visa upon arrival in the [Member State].’ 51      As regards the legislative history of that directive, it should be noted that the commentary on the articles in the Proposal for a Council Directive on the right to family reunification, submitted by the Commission on 1 December 1999 (COM(1999) 638 final, p. 19), states that, where an application for family reunification has been accepted and the recipient ‘needs a visa to enter the Member State where the applicant resides, that Member State must facilitate the issuance of the visa and, in particular, issue it without delay’. 52      In the light of those contextual elements and of the legislative history of Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86, and as the Advocate General observed, in essence, in points 48, 49 and 51 of his Opinion, it must be held that the second sentence of that provision imposes on Member States the obligation to remove unjustified administrative obstacles and to apply rapid and effective administrative procedures for the purpose of issuing visas. By contrast, neither that provision nor any other provision of that directive imposes any obligation in diplomatic or consular relations between a Member State and a third country. 53      Such an interpretation is consistent with the objective pursued by that directive, which, as the Court has repeatedly held, is to promote family reunification and to grant protection to third-country nationals, in particular minors (the judgment in Afrin, paragraph 42 and the case-law cited). 54      That interpretation cannot be called into question by the Court’s interpretation in the judgment in Afrin. It is true that, in paragraphs 50 and 51 of that judgment, the Court noted that, in situations where appearance in person is impossible or excessively difficult, in particular those in which the sponsor’s family members live in a conflict area and by travelling risk exposing themselves to inhuman or degrading treatment, and indeed putting their lives in danger, it is essential, in order to attain the objective pursued by that directive, that the Member States show the necessary flexibility to enable those concerned to be able in practice to submit their application for family reunification. 55      That said, as is apparent from paragraphs 58 and 59 of that judgment, the requisite flexibility on the part of the Member States only requires them to allow the appearance in person to take place at a later stage in the procedure, or even at the final stage, rather than at the stage when the application for family reunification is submitted, or indeed to facilitate such an appearance, possibly by issuing consular documents or laissez-passer, and to reduce the number of appearances to what is strictly necessary. It must be noted these are all, by their very nature, distinct from any obligation in diplomatic or consular relations between a Member State and a third country. 56      It follows that, in a context marked by a general obligation to remove unjustified administrative obstacles and to apply rapid and effective administrative procedures, the specific obligations on Member States in the context of the implementation of Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86 may concern, for example, the accessibility of their consular services or the issuance to the person concerned of documents likely to facilitate that person’s travel to their consular post, such as an invitation to appear before the consular authorities. 57      As the Advocate General observed in point 51 of his Opinion, the inclusion of Y’s family members in the process for evacuation from the Gaza Strip mentioned in paragraph 20 above or the provision of assistance consisting of informing the authorities of third countries of their wish to be authorised to leave that territory in order to travel to Belgium would require the adoption of measures which go beyond the requirements laid down in Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86. This would require diplomatic or consular action on the part of the Kingdom of Belgium in respect of one or of several third countries, such action falling outside the scope of that directive, and coming under that Member State’s international relations with third countries, in this case the State of Israel, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and, as the case may be, the Arab Republic of Egypt. 58      Moreover, as regards the field of diplomatic and consular protection, it should be noted that, as the Advocate General observed in points 60 and 61 of his Opinion, Article 20(2)(c) and Article 23 TFEU and Article 46 of the Charter apply only to Union citizens who are in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented and, according to Article 5 of Directive 2015/637, to their accompanying family members who are not Union citizens, but not to third-country nationals who are entitled to family reunification under Directive 2003/86. 59      Lastly, as regards the possible relevance of Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter, according to Article 51(1) and (2) of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter apply to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law and do not in any way extend the powers of the European Union as defined in the Treaties. 60      As is apparent from paragraph 57 above, the measures requested by the applicants in the main proceedings, as set out in paragraph 27 above, fall outside the scope of Directive 2003/86, with the result that the refusal to grant such requests does not constitute the implementation of EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Consequently, those requests cannot be based on the provisions of that Charter either. 61      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the questions referred is that Article 13(1) of Directive 2003/86, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter, must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State, in the case of a third-country national who has been granted a visa for the purposes of family reunification subject to verification of that person’s identity and of the authenticity of the documents included with the visa application submitted remotely, for which verification it is necessary to appear in person at a diplomatic or consular post of that Member State, is not required to make arrangements for the transfer of that person and to ensure that that person is transferred to that place or to contact one or more third countries in order to facilitate that transfer, in a situation where it is impossible for that person to travel to that place.  Costs 62      Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the referring court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable. On those grounds, the Court (Fifth Chamber) hereby rules: Article 13(1) of Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 4, 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that a Member State, in the case of a third-country national who has been granted a visa for the purposes of family reunification subject to verification of that person’s identity and of the authenticity of the documents included with the visa application submitted remotely, for which verification it is necessary to appear in person at a diplomatic or consular post of that Member State, is not required to make arrangements for the transfer of that person and to ensure that that person is transferred to that place or to contact one or more third countries in order to facilitate that transfer, in a situation where it is impossible for that person to travel to that place. [Signatures] *      Language of the case: French. i      The name of the present case is a fictitious name. It does not correspond to the real name of any party to the proceedings.