C-824/25

ORDER OF THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) 14 April 2026 (*) ( Appeal – EU trade mark – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed ) In Case C‑824/25 P, APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 12 December 2025, Frutaria Innovation SL, established in Zaragoza (Spain), represented by M. Anadón Giménez and J. Learte Álvarez, abogados, appellant, the other parties to the proceedings being: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), defendant at first instance, Markus Schneider, residing in Bonn (Germany), intervener at first instance, THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed), composed of T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, F. Schalin and M. Gavalec (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, R. Norkus, makes the following Order 1        By its appeal, Frutaria Innovation SL asks the Court of Justice to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 15 October 2025, Frutaria Innovation v EUIPO – Schneider (Frutaria) (T‑381/24, ‘the contested judgment’, EU:T:2025:960), by which the General Court dismissed Frutaria Innovation’s action for annulment of the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 27 May 2024 (Case R 1377/2023-2), as corrected on 17 July 2024, concerning invalidity proceedings between Frutaria Innovation and Mr Markus Schneider.  The request that the appeal be allowed to proceed 2        Under the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal of EUIPO is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so. 3        In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 4        Under Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court of Justice to rule on that request. 5        In accordance with Article 170b(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court’s decision on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed is to be taken as soon as possible in the form of a reasoned order.  Arguments of the appellant 6        In support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant submits that the single ground of its appeal, alleging, in essence, infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark (OJ 1994 L 11, p. 1) and of Article 2 TEU, raises issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law. 7        In the first place, the appellant claims, in essence, that the General Court erred in law, in paragraph 40 of the contested judgment, by giving an extensive interpretation to Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, based on the judgment of 26 April 2018, Pfalzmarkt für Obst und Gemüse v EUIPO (100% Pfalz) (T‑220/17, EU:T:2018:229, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited), which adversely affects citizens’ rights. Under that interpretation, where the word element of a mark is descriptive, the mark should, as a whole, be regarded as descriptive if the graphic elements of that mark do not divert the relevant public’s attention from the descriptive message conveyed by the word element. According to the appellant, such an extensive interpretation is not only contrary to the literal meaning of that provision, in so far as it does not in any way provide that, in such circumstances, a mark has descriptive character, but also disregards fundamental principles of the rule of law, including the principles of legality, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations. 8        The appellant states that it is essential for the unity, consistency and development of EU law that all courts within the European Union apply EU law as it has been enacted by the EU legislature. It submits, in particular, that, by disregarding the clear wording of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94, the General Court infringed the fundamental principle that the EU judicature is bound by EU law and is required to exercise its powers within the limits defined by the EU legislature. In addition, the appellant submits that the issue raised by the appeal is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, in so far as it affects or could affect invalidity proceedings concerning EU trade marks and those relating to national trade marks in the Member States. 9        In the second place, the appellant submits that the General Court, while stating in the contested judgment that the assessment of the descriptive character of the mark at issue had to be made by reference to the date of 22 May 2007, nevertheless based its reasoning on the judgment of 26 April 2018, Pfalzmarkt für Obst und Gemüse v EUIPO (100% Pfalz) (T‑220/17, EU:T:2018:229), which is subsequent to that assessment. According to the appellant, it is apparent from the judgment of 6 March 2007, Meilicke and Others (C‑292/04, EU:C:2007:132), and from the case-law cited therein, that, in application of the general principle of legal certainty which is inherent in the EU legal order, the Court of Justice may restrict the temporal effects of the interpretation of a legal provision relied on with a view to calling into question legal relationships established in good faith. In that regard, the appellant refers to the judgment of 22 June 2021, Latvijas Republikas Saeima (Penalty points) (C‑439/19, EU:C:2021:504), from which it is apparent that two conditions must be satisfied before such a restriction is imposed, namely that those concerned must have acted in good faith and that there must be a risk of serious difficulties. In the present case, according to the appellant, those conditions are fully satisfied. The appellant’s good faith has been established, given that the registration of the mark at issue, granted by EUIPO, has been maintained for more than 15 years and a decision of the Cancellation Division has confirmed that the figurative elements of that mark possessed sufficient distinctive character to justify maintaining its registration. Therefore, according to the appellant, the approach adopted by the General Court in the contested judgment, which would lead to an absolute loss of legal certainty, affects the substance of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94 and Article 2 TEU, as well as the case-law of the Court of Justice. 10      In that context, the appellant reiterates its claim that it is essential, with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, that all courts within the European Union apply EU law as enacted by the EU legislature and interpret it in accordance with the case-law, without departing from the case-law existing at the date of the application for registration of a sign as an EU trade mark, and in particular from the judgment of 5 April 2001, Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft v OHIM (EASYBANK) (T‑87/00, EU:T:2001:119, paragraph 39). Last, the appellant adds that, in the contested judgment, the General Court disregarded the existence of divergent lines of case-law and did not explain the approach taken for the assessment of absolute grounds for refusal, within the meaning of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94. According to the appellant, that very circumstance raises, in itself, an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law.  Findings of the Court 11      As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that it is for the appellant to demonstrate that the issues raised by its appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 20, and of 3 February 2026, Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health v EUIPO, C‑619/25 P, EU:C:2026:65, paragraph 16). 12      Furthermore, as is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read together with Article 170a(1) and Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must contain all the information necessary to enable the Court to give a ruling on whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed and to specify, where the appeal is allowed to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. Given that the objective of the mechanism provided for in Article 58a of that statute whereby the Court determines whether an appeal should be allowed to proceed is to restrict review by the Court to issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 21, and of 3 February 2026, Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health v EUIPO, C‑619/25 P, EU:C:2026:65, paragraph 17). 13      Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the contested judgment or order, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the contested judgment or order. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the contested judgment or order which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the specific reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 22, and of 3 February 2026, Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health v EUIPO, C‑619/25 P, EU:C:2026:65, paragraph 18). 14      A request that an appeal be allowed to proceed which does not contain the information mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present order cannot be capable of demonstrating that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that justifies the appeal being allowed to proceed (see, to that effect, orders of 24 October 2019, Porsche v EUIPO, C‑613/19 P, EU:C:2019:905, paragraph 16, and of 3 February 2026, Guangzhou Wanglaoji Grand Health v EUIPO, C‑619/25 P, EU:C:2026:65, paragraph 19). 15      In the present case, as regards, in the first place, the appellant’s arguments, summarised in paragraphs 7 to 10 of the present order, relating to an infringement of Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94 and Article 2 TEU, it must be stated that the appellant merely asserts, first, that the General Court infringed the fundamental principle that the EU judicature is bound by EU law and is required to exercise its powers within the limits defined by the EU legislature and, second, that the issues raised by the appeal affect or could affect invalidity proceedings concerning EU trade marks and those relating to national trade marks in the Member States. 16      In accordance with the burden of proof which lies with an appellant requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant must demonstrate that, independently of the issues of law invoked in its appeal, the appeal raises one or more issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, the scope of that criterion going beyond the contested judgment and, ultimately, its appeal. In order to demonstrate that that is the case, it is necessary to establish both the existence and significance of such issues by means of concrete evidence specific to the particular case, and not simply arguments of a general nature (order of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraphs 27 and 28 and the case-law cited). 17      Furthermore, as regards the appellant’s arguments relating to the infringement of the principles of the rule of law, legality, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, it should be noted that, without prejudice to the significant place occupied within the EU legal order by those principles, those arguments do not meet the requirements set out in paragraph 13 of the present order. Although the appellant identifies the errors of law allegedly committed by the General Court, it does not explain to the requisite standard or, in any event, show how such errors of law, assuming that they are established, raise an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that would justify the appeal being allowed to proceed (see, to that effect, order of 2 February 2024, Apart v EUIPO, C‑598/23 P, EU:C:2024:110, paragraph 18 and the case-law cited). 18      Furthermore, in so far as the appellant seeks, by those arguments, to call into question the General Court’s assessment of certain facts, such arguments cannot demonstrate that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (order of 8 March 2023, Hijos de Moisés Rodríguez González v EUIPO, C‑605/22 P, EU:C:2023:199, paragraph 19 and the case-law cited). 19      In the second place, as regards the arguments summarised in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the present order, by which the appellant alleges, in essence, that the General Court failed to have regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice and to its own case-law, it is sufficient to recall that such arguments are not, in themselves, sufficient to establish, in accordance with the burden of proof which lies with the person requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed, that that appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. Although it identifies the contested paragraphs of the contested judgment and the relevant paragraphs of the judgments of the Court of Justice and the General Court on which it relies in support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant does not provide, in breach of the requirements set out in paragraph 13 of this order, any indication as to the similarity between the situation at issue, which gave rise to the contested judgment, and the situations referred to in the case-law that would make it possible to establish the existence of the contradiction relied on or as to the specific reasons why that contradiction raises such an issue (see, to that effect, order of 14 January 2026, Gómez Jiménez and Others v EUIPO, C‑665/25 P, EU:C:2026:23, paragraph 15). 20      In the third and last place, as regards the arguments relating to the General Court’s infringement of its obligation to state reasons, it must be borne in mind that, although, as is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice, a failure to state reasons or an inadequate statement of reasons for a decision of the General Court constitutes an error of law which may be relied on in the context of an appeal, the determination as to whether the appeal is allowed to proceed nevertheless remains subject to the specific conditions set out in paragraph 13 of the present order, consisting in demonstrating that the appeal raises one or more issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (order of 3 February 2026, Guangzhou Wangyoji Grand Health v EUIPO, C‑619/25 P, EU:C:2026:65, paragraph 22). In order to demonstrate that that is the case, it is necessary to establish both the existence and significance of such issues by means of concrete evidence specific to the particular case, and not simply arguments of a general nature. In the present case, the appellant has not demonstrated to the requisite legal standard how the failure to state reasons or inadequate statement of reasons for the contested judgment, assuming it to be established, raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity and consistency of EU law. 21      In those circumstances, the appellant’s request that the appeal be allowed to proceed is not capable of establishing that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 22      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.  Costs 23      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 24      Since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other parties to the proceedings and, therefore, before they could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders: 1.      The appeal is not allowed to proceed. 2.      Frutaria Innovation SL shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 14 April 2026. A. Calot Escobar   T. von Danwitz Registrar   President of the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed *      Language of the case: English.