C-875/25

ORDER OF THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) 24 June 2026 (*) ( Appeal – Economic and monetary union – Banking union – Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 – Single Resolution Mechanism for credit institutions and certain investment firms (SRM) – Determination as to whether appeals should be allowed to proceed – Article 170b of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice – Request failing to demonstrate that an issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law – Refusal to allow the appeal to proceed ) In Case C‑875/25 P, APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 30 December 2025, MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG, established in Vienna (Austria), represented by M. Fernandez, avocat, N. Hohler and J. Jansen, Rechtsanwälte, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being: Single Resolution Board (SRB), defendant at first instance, THE COURT (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed), composed of T. von Danwitz, Vice-President of the Court, J. Passer and B. Smulders (Rapporteur), Judges, Registrar: A. Calot Escobar, having regard to the proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General, T. Ćapeta, makes the following Order 1        By its appeal, MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG seeks to have set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 15 October 2025, MeSoFa v SRB (T‑291/23, ‘the contested judgment’, EU:T:2025:962), by which the General Court dismissed the appellant’s action for annulment of five decisions taken following a request for access to documents of that company concerning the adoption of a resolution scheme in respect of Sberbank banka d.d. Those decisions are (i) the confirmatory decision of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) of 19 August 2022 concerning that request for access to documents (‘the first confirmatory decision’); (ii) the decision of the SRB Appeal Panel (‘the Appeal Panel’) of 8 March 2023, taken following that confirmatory decision (‘the first decision of the Appeal Panel’); (iii) the SRB’s negative reply within the meaning of Article 8(3) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43); (iv) the SRB’s confirmatory decision of 21 December 2023 concerning the same request for access to documents (‘the second confirmatory decision’); and (v) the decision of the Appeal Panel of 22 May 2024 concerning the latter decision (‘the second decision of the Appeal Panel’).  The request that the appeal be allowed to proceed 2        Under the first paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, an appeal brought against a decision of the General Court concerning a decision of an independent board of appeal of the SRB is not to proceed unless the Court of Justice first decides that it should be allowed to do so. 3        In accordance with the third paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, an appeal is to be allowed to proceed, wholly or in part, in accordance with the detailed rules set out in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where it raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 4        Under Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure, in the situations referred to in the first paragraph of Article 58a of that statute, the appellant is to annex to the appeal a request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, setting out the issue raised by the appeal that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and containing all the information necessary to enable the Court to rule on that request. 5        In accordance with Article 170b(1) and (3) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court is to rule as soon as possible on the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, in the form of a reasoned order.  Arguments of the appellant 6        In support of its request that the appeal be allowed to proceed, the appellant submits that the six grounds relied on in its appeal each raise an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law. 7        In the first place, the appellant submits that, in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the contested judgment, the General Court erred in law by replacing the first decision of the Appeal Panel by its second decision, thereby infringing the appellant’s rights of defence and exceeding its powers, as it results in particular from Article 13(2) TEU, Article 19 TEU and Articles 256 and 263 TFEU. Thus, the appellant takes the view, first, that that error of law deprived it of a proper and effective judicial remedy, by preventing an effective review of the first decision of the Appeal Panel. That error affects the General Court’s assessments of the fourth and fifth pleas raised at first instance. In that regard, the appellant states that the Court’s finding that the second decision of the Appeal Panel replaced in its entirety the first decision of the Appeal Panel in terms of its effects on the appellant is incorrect, since the conclusions of the Appeal Panel in its first decision are binding on the SRB when adopting its second confirmatory decision. That issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law. 8        Second, the appellant submits that the General Court exceeded its powers by holding that the first decision of the Appeal Panel was replaced by the second decision of the Appeal Panel, when, according to the appellant, that panel had not ruled on that matter. In that regard, the appellant submits that the division of powers between the administrative body and the EU judicature raises an important issue of a constitutional nature and that effective legal and judicial protection has a cross-cutting dimension in the EU legal order. It adds that the conditions under which a quasi-judicial decision may be regarded as having been replaced by another decision of the same nature, without any legal basis at the stage of the administrative procedure, and without any such conferral of power on the General Court, constitute a significant issue. That issue may also concern decisions of other EU agencies which are subject to a review of legality by an independent board of appeal and, subsequently, as the case may be, by the EU judicature. 9        In the second place, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law, in paragraphs 35 to 60 of the contested judgment, by not properly examining the pleas of illegality which it had raised on the basis of Article 277 TFEU. It submits that since those pleas of illegality were not examined by the Appeal Panel and, subsequently, by the General Court, but were merely examined by the latter, they do not fall within the scope of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, since the filtering objective pursued by Article 58a was ineffective. According to the appellant, as those pleas of illegality were considered only once, and not twice, the Court of Justice is required to examine them in order to ensure its effective judicial protection. 10      In the third place, the appellant criticises the General Court for having, in paragraphs 61 to 68 of the contested judgment, circumvented the issue of the period of time which elapsed after the case had been referred back to the SRB by the Appeal Panel. It thus failed to take account of the fact that the defects vitiating an administrative procedure are not limited to the grounds for refusal laid down in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001. It notes that the Appeal Panel found that that period was not reasonable, while taking the view that a decision that might be favourable to the appellant, following the referral, would be ‘devoid of purpose’ or ‘counterproductive’, and that the issue of that period had to be decided by the courts. According to the appellant, the Appeal Panel failed to conduct a proper, impartial, fair and effective review to protect its rights. It adds that, since the excessive nature of that period of time, which is not disputed, was examined only once by the Appeal Panel, it should be reviewed by the Court of Justice in order to ensure its effective judicial protection. Last, it submits that, in any event, that issue is of particular significance, not only in order to prevent such an approach from serving as a precedent when decisions are adopted by other EU agencies and from depriving appellants of effective judicial review, but also because of the lack of an effective two-tier review, which Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union requires. 11      In the fourth place, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law, in paragraphs 115 to 128 of the contested judgment, in its assessment of the ‘policy exception’ provided for in the fourth indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001. It submits that, since the Appeal Panel had, in its first decision, rejected the ground for refusal relied on by the SRB on the basis of that provision, the SRB could not again rely on that ground in its second confirmatory decision without infringing Article 85(8) of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (OJ 2014 L 225, p. 1), Articles 41 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and the appellant’s rights of defence. Moreover, it argues that the General Court could not hold that the first decision of the Appeal Panel was replaced by the second decision of that panel. According to the appellant, should the SRB still be able to rely on the same legal ground for refusal after the referral of the case by the Appeal Panel, pursuant to Article 85(8) of Regulation No 806/2014, the appeal procedure provided for in that provision would be deprived of its substance and effectiveness. That issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, since the decisions of independent boards of appeal cannot be disregarded by the EU body concerned. 12      In the fifth place, the appellant maintains that the General Court, in paragraphs 142 to 149 of the contested judgment, erred in law by refusing to recognise the existence of an overriding public interest justifying the disclosure of the information requested. It criticises the General Court for having failed to take account of the first decision of the Appeal Panel and its findings. The appellant states that, first, that information is of public interest and is such as to strengthen the European Union’s banking resolution policy, particularly where that public interest forms a part of EU law, as is the case in the context of Article 18 of Regulation No 806/2014. In that connection, it refers to the judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 March 2024, Public.Resource.Org and Right to Know v Commission and Others (C‑588/21 P, EU:C:2024:201, paragraphs 69, 70 and 80). Second, the appellant argues that the SRB itself took the view, in other earlier decisions, that the disclosure of the resolution documents met a clear overriding public interest. According to the appellant, the issue raised is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, since it concerns the conditions in which the binding effects of provisions similar to those of Article 85(8) of Regulation No 806/2014 must be implemented by independent boards of appeal covered by Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the scope of the decisions of those boards in order to ensure the effectiveness of the review and the safeguard of the rights of individuals under the filtering mechanism provided for in Article 58a. 13      In the sixth place, the appellant complains that the General Court erred in law by failing to examine of its own motion the existence of parallel proceedings directed against the second confirmatory decision, brought simultaneously by the appellant before the Appeal Panel and before the General Court, even though it is apparent from paragraphs 11 to 13 of the contested judgment that it was aware of that situation. The appellant submits that, in the second confirmatory decision, the SRB had informed it that it had two parallel remedies against that decision, namely an appeal before the Appeal Panel and an action for annulment before the General Court, and that it had brought those two actions in parallel. However, that ‘parallel review’ of the second confirmatory decision by the Appeal Panel and by the General Court is incompatible with the division of the respective powers of the General Court and the Appeal Panel, and with the fundamental principles of the EU legal order. The appellant maintains that the General Court did not examine that issue of its own motion or address it when examining the pleas of illegality, in paragraphs 35 to 68 of the contested judgment. The appellant refers, in that connection, to the arguments put forward in the context of the second and third grounds of appeal. 14      Consequently, the appellant complains that the General Court did not annul of its own motion the second decision of the Appeal Panel, even though that panel had exceeded its powers. The same is true of the SRB, in view of remedies being incorrectly suggested in the second confirmatory decision. According to the appellant, the SRB and its Appeal Panel exceeded their powers by gathering information to conduct a procedure relating to a second appeal, where proceedings against the same decision were pending before the General Court. It submits that the General Court’s failure to examine that issue of its own motion caused it harm, since such an examination could have led it to annul the second decision of the Appeal Panel and not to replace the first decision by the second decision. 15      In that regard, the appellant submits that that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, in that that ground is an example of a breach of the principle of legal certainty and the right to an effective judicial remedy, as established in Article 47 of the Charter and Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The issue of an ex officio examination also raises the issues of the structure of an effective judicial review system comprising several levels of scrutiny, of the delimitation of the respective exclusive powers of the quasi-judicial boards of appeal and of the General Court, and of respect for the primacy of EU law.  Findings of the Court 16      As a preliminary point, it must be recalled that it is for the appellant to demonstrate that the issues raised by its appeal are significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 20, and of 18 November 2025, EUIPO v Versiontech, C‑411/25 P, EU:C:2025:943, paragraph 20). 17      Furthermore, as is apparent from the third paragraph of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, read together with Article 170a(1) and Article 170b(4) of the Rules of Procedure, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must contain all the information necessary to enable the Court to give a ruling on whether the appeal should be allowed to proceed and to specify, where the appeal is allowed to proceed in part, the pleas in law or parts of the appeal to which the response must relate. Given that the objective of the mechanism provided for in Article 58a of that statute whereby the Court determines whether an appeal should be allowed to proceed is to restrict review by the Court to issues that are significant with respect to the unity, consistency and development of EU law, only grounds of appeal that raise such issues and that are established by the appellant are to be examined by the Court in an appeal (orders of 10 December 2021, EUIPO v The KaiKai Company Jaeger Wichmann, C‑382/21 P, EU:C:2021:1050, paragraph 21, and of 18 November 2025, EUIPO v Versiontech, C‑411/25 P, EU:C:2025:943, paragraph 21). 18      Accordingly, a request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must, in any event, set out clearly and in detail the grounds on which the appeal is based, identify with equal clarity and detail the issue of law raised by each ground of appeal, specify whether that issue is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law and set out the specific reasons why that issue is significant according to that criterion. As regards, in particular, the grounds of appeal, the request that an appeal be allowed to proceed must specify the provision of EU law or the case-law that has been infringed by the judgment or order under appeal, explain succinctly the nature of the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court, and indicate to what extent that error had an effect on the outcome of the judgment or order under appeal. Where the error of law relied on results from an infringement of the case-law, the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must explain, in a succinct but clear and precise manner, first, where the alleged contradiction lies, by identifying the paragraphs of the judgment or order under appeal which the appellant is calling into question as well as those of the ruling of the Court of Justice or the General Court alleged to have been infringed, and, second, the concrete reasons why such a contradiction raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law (orders of 24 October 2019, Porsche v EUIPO, C‑613/19 P, EU:C:2019:905, paragraph 15, and of 18 November 2025, EUIPO v Versiontech, C‑411/25 P, EU:C:2025:943, paragraph 22). 19      A request that an appeal be allowed to proceed which does not contain the information mentioned in the preceding paragraph of the present order cannot be capable of demonstrating that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law that justifies the appeal being allowed to proceed (orders of 24 October 2019, Porsche v EUIPO, C‑613/19 P, EU:C:2019:905, paragraph 16, and of 19 January 2026, Hesse v Ferrari and EUIPO, C‑598/25 P, EU:C:2026:25, paragraph 14). 20      In the present case, as regards, first, the arguments summarised in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the present order, it is true that the appellant states that those errors of law consist in the General Court having, in essence, exceeded its judicial powers to the detriment of those of the Appeal Panel and infringed the appellant’s rights of defence and right to an effective judicial remedy. However, the appellant has not specifically set out the reasons why those errors of law raise an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 21      By simply maintaining that the division of powers is a significant issue of a constitutional nature, that effective legal and judicial protection is cross-cutting in nature in the EU legal order, and that the judicial powers of the General Court to rule that a quasi-judicial decision has been replaced by another decision of the same nature is a significant issue in so far as it is not restricted to the field of banking resolution governed by Regulation No 806/2014, but could also concern decisions of other EU agencies which are subject to review by an independent board of appeal and subsequently, as the case may be, to that of the EU judicature, the appellant merely relies on arguments of a general nature. The appellant does not explain to the requisite standard why the errors of law allegedly committed by the General Court when assessing its interest in bringing proceedings against the first confirmatory decision and the first decision of the Appeal Panel affect the unity of EU law, or even its consistency. Nor does it explain to what extent those errors may have an impact on the development of EU law. 22      As regards, second, the line of argument summarised in paragraph 9 of the present order, it must be borne in mind that, under Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the determination as to whether an appeal may proceed depends not on whether an issue of law has been raised for the first time before the General Court, but on whether the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. Thus, the person requesting that an appeal be allowed to proceed remains bound to demonstrate that significance by providing detailed information not only on the novelty of the issue concerned, but also on the reasons why that issue is significant in relation to those criteria (see, to that effect, order of 15 December 2023, Sanity Group v EUIPO, C‑533/23 P, EU:C:2023:1002, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). However, the appellant does not explain why the errors allegedly committed by the General Court in the assessment of the pleas of illegality which it had put forward raise an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 23      Third, as for the line of argument summarised in paragraph 10 of the present order, contrary to what the appellant claims, the application of Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union does not depend on the fact that a legal issue has been assessed by a board of appeal and not by the General Court, or vice versa, but on whether the appellant has demonstrated that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. Accordingly, the fact that the unreasonable nature of the period of time that elapsed after the case had been referred back to the SRB following the first decision of the Appeal Panel and that the consequences of that period of time were assessed by the Appeal Panel and not by the General Court is not sufficient to justify the appeal being allowed to proceed. That assessment as to whether the appellant’s appeal should be allowed to proceed does not infringe the principle of effective judicial protection guaranteed in Article 47 of the Charter, since that principle does not afford a right of access to a second level of jurisdiction but only to a court or tribunal (judgment of 21 December 2023, Scuola europea di Varese, C‑431/22, EU:C:2023:1021, paragraph 93 and the case-law cited). 24      Fourth, as regards the arguments summarised in paragraph 11 of the present order, it should be noted, as is apparent from the case-law cited in paragraph 18 of the present order, that the request that the appeal be allowed to proceed must indicate to what extent the error of law allegedly committed by the General Court had an effect on the outcome of the contested judgment. As regards the alleged error of law concerning the exception relating to ‘the protection of … the financial, monetary or economic policy’, provided for in the fourth indent of Article 4(1)(a) of Regulation No 1049/2001, the General Court considered, in paragraph 120 of the contested judgment, that it was unnecessary to examine whether the arguments relating to that provision were well founded because, in the case before it, the exception set out in the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, relating to the protection of commercial interests, was in itself capable of justifying non-disclosure of the requested information. However, the appellant does not explain why that finding was incorrect in law. 25      Fifth, as regards the line of argument summarised in paragraph 12 of the present order, including the reference to other previous decisions of the Appeal Panel, clearly made by the appellant in order to strengthen the argument based on the first decision of the Appeal Panel, it relates to the General Court’s failure to examine the first decision of the Appeal Panel and presupposes, therefore, that the appellant has demonstrated an interest in bringing proceedings against that decision. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the present order, it has not been demonstrated that the assessment by which the General Court found that the appellant had no interest in bringing proceedings against that decision raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law, capable of calling into question that assessment. Therefore, the line of argument summarised in paragraph 12 of the present order is ineffective for the purposes of allowing the present appeal to proceed. 26      Sixth and last, as regards the arguments summarised in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the present order, the appellant does not establish, contrary to the requirements recalled in paragraph 18 of the present order, how the findings made by the General Court in paragraphs 11 to 14 of the contested judgment should have led it to examine of its own motion the issue of actions conducted in parallel. 27      Therefore, the sixth ground of appeal, alleging that the General Court failed to examine of its own motion whether a ‘parallel review’ of the second confirmatory decision was conducted by the General Court itself and by the Appeal Panel does not satisfy the requirement of precision necessary to justify the appeal being allowed to proceed. 28      In those circumstances, the request submitted by the appellant is not such as to establish that the appeal raises an issue that is significant with respect to the unity, consistency or development of EU law. 29      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the appeal should not be allowed to proceed.  Costs 30      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to proceedings on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. 31      Since the present order was adopted before the appeal was served on the other party to the proceedings and, therefore, before that party could have incurred costs, it is appropriate to decide that the appellant is to bear its own costs. On those grounds, the Court (Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed) hereby orders: 1.      The appeal is not allowed to proceed. 2.      MeSoFa Vermögensverwaltungs AG shall bear its own costs. Luxembourg, 24 June 2026. A. Calot Escobar   T. von Danwitz Registrar   President of the Chamber determining whether appeals may proceed *      Language of the case: English.