C-89/97

Avis juridique important | 61997O0089 Order of the President of the Court of 30 April 1997. - Moccia Irme SpA v Commission of the European Communities. - Application for interim measures - Suspension of operation of an act - Interest in bringing proceedings - State aid. - Case C-89/97 P(R). European Court reports 1997 Page I-02327 Summary Keywords Appeals - Pleas in law - Erroneous assessment of the facts - Inadmissibility - Dismissal - Legal characterization of the facts - Legal assessment of the applicant's interest in obtaining suspension of operation of a decision - Admissibility (ECSC Statute of the Court of Justice, Art. 51(1)) 2 Applications for interim measures - Suspension of operation of an act - Interim measures - Conditions for granting - Serious and irreparable harm - Applicant's interest in obtaining the suspension sought - Negative administrative decision (ECSC Treaty, Art. 39, second para.) Summary Although, by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 51 of the ECSC Statute of the Court of Justice, the grounds of an appeal must be confined to points of law, to the exclusion of any findings on the facts of the case, this does not, however, prevent pleas being raised in support of an appeal which relate to the legal assessment of such facts and seek to establish that the Court of First Instance committed an error in law. In that regard, an appeal against an order on an application for interim relief, in which it is claimed that the applicant's interest in obtaining suspension of operation of the decision at issue was inadequately examined, is not confined to contesting the findings of fact made by the judge hearing the application for interim relief but must be understood as seeking to establish that the contested order contains an error in law as regards the legal assessment of the facts in point. 4 The judge hearing an application for interim relief may order suspension of operation of an act, or order other interim measures, only if it is established, inter alia, that such an order is urgent inasmuch as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant's interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Interim measures which would not serve to prevent the serious and irreparable harm feared by the applicant cannot a fortiori be necessary for that purpose. If the applicant does not have any interest in obtaining the interim measures sought, those measures cannot, therefore, satisfy the criterion of urgency. An application for suspension of operation cannot, in principle, be envisaged against a negative administrative decision, since the grant of suspension could not have the effect of changing the applicant's position.