T-198/02
WyrokTSUE2004-04-01CELEX: 62002TJ0198ECLI:EU:T:2004:101
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Zagadnienie prawne
Czy decyzja Komisji o nałożeniu kary dyscyplinarnej usunięcia ze stanowiska na urzędnika była zgodna z prawem UE, w szczególności w zakresie proporcjonalności, uzasadnienia i praw do obrony, oraz czy naruszenie terminów proceduralnych w postępowaniu dyscyplinarnym rodzi odpowiedzialność instytucji?Ratio decidendi
Sąd uznał, że organ powołujący ma prawo opierać się na ustaleniach faktycznych prawomocnego wyroku karnego przy nakładaniu kary dyscyplinarnej, a postępowania karne i dyscyplinarne są odrębne. Kara usunięcia ze stanowiska została uznana za proporcjonalną. Sąd potwierdził obowiązek uzasadnienia decyzji dyscyplinarnej oraz to, że naruszenie praw do obrony prowadzi do nieważności kary tylko wtedy, gdy mogło mieć wpływ na wynik postępowania. Stwierdzono, że terminy określone w art. 7 załącznika IX do regulaminu pracowniczego nie są bezwzględne, a ich naruszenie nie wpływa na ważność kary, ale może rodzić odpowiedzialność instytucji za szkodę niematerialną, jeśli stanowi uchybienie administracyjne.Stan faktyczny
Urzędnik Komisji Europejskiej, oznaczony jako N, był przedmiotem postępowania dyscyplinarnego, które zakończyło się decyzją organu powołującego z dnia 25 lutego 2002 r. o usunięciu go ze stanowiska bez utraty praw do emerytury. Decyzja ta została podjęta na podstawie art. 86 ust. 2 lit. f) Regulaminu pracowniczego urzędników Wspólnot Europejskich. Urzędnik zakwestionował tę decyzję przed Sądem Pierwszej Instancji, domagając się jej unieważnienia oraz odszkodowania.Rozstrzygnięcie
Komisja zostaje zobowiązana do zapłaty skarżącemu kwoty 700 EUR tytułem odszkodowania za poniesioną szkodę niematerialną. Pozostała część skargi zostaje oddalona. Komisja zostaje zobowiązana do pokrycia własnych kosztów oraz jednej szóstej kosztów skarżącego w niniejszym postępowaniu i w postępowaniu w przedmiocie środków tymczasowych. Skarżący zostaje zobowiązany do pokrycia pięciu szóstych swoich kosztów w niniejszym postępowaniu i w postępowaniu w przedmiocie środków tymczasowych.Pełny tekst orzeczenia
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Third Chamber) April 2004
Case T-198/02
N
v
Commission of the European Communities
(Officials – Disciplinary measures – Removal from post without loss of pension rights – Statement of reasons – Rights of the defence – Proportionality – Failure to comply with the time-limits fixed by Article 7 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations – Article 12, first paragraph, of the Staff Regulations)
Full text in French II - 0000
Application: first, for annulment of the decision of the appointing authority of the Commission of 25 February 2002 imposing on the applicant
the disciplinary measure of removal from post without withdrawal or reduction of entitlement to retirement pension in accordance
with Article 86(2)(f) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and, second, for damages.
Held: The Commission is ordered to pay the applicant the sum of EUR 700 as compensation for the non-material damage suffered by
him. The remainder of the action is dismissed. The Commission is ordered to bear its own costs and to pay one sixth of the
applicant’s costs of the present proceedings and the proceedings for interim relief. The applicant is ordered to bear five
sixths of his costs of the present proceedings and the proceedings for interim relief.
Summary
1. Officials – Disciplinary measures – Criminal proceedings instituted against the official concerned before a national court
– Right of the appointing authority to rely on the findings of fact in the final decision of the criminal court
(Staff Regulations, Art. 88, fifth para.)
2. Officials – Disciplinary measures – Sanction – Principle of proportionality – Concept – Discretion of the appointing authority
– Judicial review – Limits
(Staff Regulations, Arts 86 to 89)
3. Officials – Rights and obligations – Duty to avoid action of such a kind as to reflect on an official’s position – Scope
(Staff Regulations, Art. 12, first para.)
4. Officials – Disciplinary measures – Disciplinary pemalty independent of criminal penalty
5. Officials – Decision adversely affecting an official – Disciplinary measure – Obligation to state reasons – Scope
(Staff Regulations, Art. 25, second para.)
6. Officials – Disciplinary measures – Disciplinary proceedings – Infringement of the rights of the defence – Effects
(Staff Regulations, Annex IX)
7. Officials – Disciplinary measures – Sanction – Aggravating circumstances – Circumstances beyond the control of the official
concerned – Precluded
(Staff Regulations, Annex IX)
8. Officials – Disciplinary measures – Proceedings before the Disciplinary Board – Time-limits set by Article 7 of Annex IX –
Not mandatory – Failure to comply – Effects
(Staff Regulations, Annex IX, Art. 7)
9. Officials – Non-contractual liability of the institutions – Conditions – Administrative fault – Damage – Causal link
1. In order to establish the truth of the facts on the basis of which it imposes a disciplinary sanction on an official, the
appointing authority is entitled to rely on the findings of fact in a criminal decision which has become final.
(see paras 42-43)
See: 228/83 F v Commission [1985] ECR 275, para. 34; T-12/94 Daffix v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I‑A‑453 and II‑1197, para. 64; T-23/00 A v Commission [2000] ECR-SC I‑A‑263 and II‑1211, para. 37; T-277/01 Stevens v Commission [2002] ECR-SC I‑A‑253 and II‑1273, para. 76
2. The application of the principle of proportionality in disciplinary matters has two aspects. First, the choice of the appropriate
disciplinary measure is for the appointing authority where the truth of the facts alleged against the official is established,
and the Court cannot criticise the choice of disciplinary measure by the appointing authority unless the measure imposed is
disproportionate in comparison with those facts.
Second, the determination of the disciplinary measure to be imposed is based on a comprehensive appraisal by the appointing
authority of all the particular facts and circumstances in each individual case. Articles 86 to 89 of the Staff Regulations
do not specify any fixed relationship between the disciplinary measures which they lay down and the various kinds of breach
of duties by officials and do not specify the extent to which the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances is
to affect the choice of disciplinary measure.
The Court’s role is therefore limited to considering whether the weight given to aggravating or mitigating circumstances by
the appointing authority was proportionate, and the Court cannot assume the role of the appointing authority as regards that
authority’s value judgments in this matter.
(see paras 51-54)
See: 13/69 Van Eick v Commission [1970] ECR 3, paras 24 and 25; 46/72 De Greef v Commission [1973] ECR 543, paras 43 to 46; F v Commission, cited above, para. 34; 403/85 F v Commission [1987] ECR 645, para. 26; T-146/94 Williams v Court of Auditors [1996] ECR-SC I‑A‑103 and II‑329, paras 107 and 108; T-74/96 Tzoanos v Commission [1998] ECR-SC I‑A‑129 and II‑343, para. 352, confirmed by C-191/98 P Tzoanos v Commission [1999] ECR I‑8223
3. The first paragraph of Article 12 of the Staff Regulations requires officials to abstain from any action which may reflect
upon their position, and is intended to ensure that Community officials, in their conduct, present a dignified image in keeping
with the particularly correct and respectable behaviour which one is entitled to expect from members of an international civil
service.
(see para. 55)
See: T-273/94 N v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I‑A‑97 and II‑289, para. 127
4. Criminal and disciplinary proceedings are separate from one another and pursue different aims, so that the appointing authority
cannot be bound by the weight accorded to aggravating or mitigating circumstances by the criminal court. In addition, a disciplinary
measure may be imposed even where the applicant is not found guilty of any criminal offence. Consequently, the fact that the
same facts incur a disciplinary measure but not a criminal conviction does not show that the disciplinary measure is disproportionate
or manifestly incorrect.
Criminal proceedings concern compliance with rules for the maintenance of law and order which are enacted in order to guarantee
the proper working of society as a whole. Disciplinary proceedings, on the other hand, relate only to compliance with rules
intended to guarantee the proper working of an institution. Because of their different purposes, those rules have different
sanctions. Thus, although the same conduct may infringe both rules of criminal law and disciplinary rules, the disciplinary
measure is appraised in relation to the disciplinary system, not the criminal sanction. The disciplinary authority cannot
therefore be required to take account, when choosing the appropriate disciplinary measure, of the criminal sanctions imposed
in criminal proceedings involving the same person.
(see paras 57-58, 98)
See: T-144/96 Y v Parliament [1998] ECR-SC I‑A‑405 and II‑1153, para. 38
5. The obligation to state reasons laid down in Article 253 EC and in the second paragraph of Article 25 of the Staff Regulations
constitutes an essential principle of Community law which is intended, firstly, to allow the person concerned to ascertain
whether the decision is well founded and, secondly, to enable the Court to review its legality.
Furthermore, the statement of reasons for a measure must be considered with reference not only to its wording but also to
its context and the whole body of legal rules governing the matter in question. Thus the grounds stated for a decision are
sufficient if the measure was adopted in circumstances known to the official concerned which enable him to understand its
scope.
If the penalty imposed by the appointing authority is more severe than that suggested by the Disciplinary Board, the decision
must state in detail the reasons why the appointing authority has not followed the opinion of the Disciplinary Board.
The obligation incumbent on the appointing authority to state reasons also means that it is bound to mention the facts, law
and considerations which have led it to adopt its decision. That obligation does not, however, mean that it is required to
discuss all the issues of fact and law which the official concerned has raised during the proceedings.
(see paras 69-70, 95, 109)
See: 195/80 Michel v Parliament [1981] ECR 2861, para. 22; 43/82 and 63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission [1984] ECR 19, para. 22; 69/83 Lux v Court of Auditors [1984] ECR 2447, para. 16; 228/83 F v Commission, cited above, para. 35; T-1/90 Pérez-Mínguez Casariego v Commission [1991] ECR II‑143, para. 73; Y v Parliament, cited above, para. 23; T-203/98 Tzikis v Commission [2000] ECR-SC I‑A‑91 and II‑393, para. 32; T-51/01 Fronia v Commission [2002] ECR‑SC I‑A‑43 and II‑187, para. 66; T-103/01 Cwik v Commission [2002] ECR‑SC I‑A‑229 and II‑1137, para. 63
6. In connection with the rights of the defence, an official involved in disciplinary proceedings is generally entitled to comment
on the documents used by the appointing authority. However, if he has not been given an opportunity to exercise that right,
such a breach of the rights of the defence cannot result in the annulment of the penalty imposed on him unless the procedure
might have had a different outcome without the irregularity.
(see para. 103)
See: 209 to 215 and 218/78 Van Landewyck and Others v Commission [1980] ECR 3125, para. 47; C-142/87 Belgium v Commission [1990] ECR I‑959, para. 48; C-241/00 P Kish Glass v Commission [2001] ECR I‑7759, para. 36
7. The aggravation of a disciplinary measure may not depend on a factor that is beyond the control of the person who is the subject
of that measure and over which he has no influence, such as the publicity given to certain acts by the popular press. Basing
the aggravation of a disciplinary measure on that would effectively make the penalty imposed by the appointing authority dependent
on a purely fortuitous factor, and thus allow an arbitrary element to sway the decision.
(see para. 103)
8. The period prescribed by Article 7 of Annex IX to the Staff Regulations is not a mandatory time-limit. It constitutes a rule
of sound administration the purpose of which is to avoid, in the interests both of the administration and of officials, undue
delay in adopting the decision terminating the disciplinary proceedings. It follows that the disciplinary authorities are
obliged to conduct disciplinary proceedings diligently and to ensure that each procedural step is taken within a reasonable
period following the previous step.
Failure to comply with that time-limit may render the institution concerned liable for any harm caused to those concerned
but does not in itself affect the validity of a disciplinary measure imposed after it has expired. Article 7 of Annex IX to
the Staff Regulations is intended to limit the period of uncertainty surrounding the administrative situation of the person
who is the subject of disciplinary proceedings. It is only where particular conditions are satisfied, such as where the rights
of the defence are breached, that exceeding that time-limit may entail the nullity of a measure adopted after its expiry.
(see paras 124-125, 135)
See: Van Eick v Commission, cited above, paras 3 to 7; 228/83 F v Commission, cited above, para. 30; 175/86 and 209/86 M v Council [1988] ECR 1891, para. 16; T-26/89 de Compte v Parliament [1991] ECR II‑781, para. 88; T-242/97 Z v Parliament [1999] ECR-SC I‑A‑77 and II‑401, paras 40 and 41, confirmed by C‑270/99 P Z v Parliament [2001] ECR I‑9197; T‑24/98 and T‑241/99 E v Commission [2001] ECR-SC I‑A‑149 and II‑681, paras 52 and 56; T-197/00 Onidi v Commission [2002] ECR-SC I‑A‑69 and II‑325, para. 96
9. The Community can only be held liable for damages if a number of conditions are satisfied as regards the illegality of the
allegedly wrongful act committed by the institutions, the actual harm suffered, and the existence of a causal link between
the act and the damage alleged to have been suffered.
(see para. 134)
See: C‑136/92 P Commission v Brazzelli Lualdi and Others [1994] ECR I‑1981, para. 42; T-36/93 Ojha v Commission [1995] ECR-SC I‑A‑161 and II‑497, para. 130; T-35/96 Rasmussen v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I‑A‑61 and II‑187, para. 82; T-142/95 Delvaux v Commission [1997] ECR-SC I‑A‑477 and II‑1247, para. 109
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