T-239/23

PostanowienieTSUE2025-11-12CELEX: 62023TO0239(01)ECLI:EU:T:2025:1029

Analiza orzeczenia

Sekcja wygenerowana przez AI na podstawie treści orzeczenia — nie stanowi cytatu.

Zagadnienie prawne

W jakich okolicznościach Trybunał może sprostować swoje orzeczenie na podstawie art. 164 regulaminu postępowania, w szczególności w odniesieniu do „oczywistych nieścisłości”?

Ratio decidendi

Trybunał może sprostować swoje orzeczenie na podstawie art. 164 ust. 1 regulaminu postępowania wyłącznie w celu usunięcia błędów pisarskich, błędów rachunkowych i oczywistych nieścisłości. Wnioski o sprostowanie, które mają na celu dodanie nowych informacji lub zmianę treści, która nie stanowi oczywistej nieścisłości, są odrzucane, ponieważ Trybunał jest jedynym organem właściwym do określania istotnych faktów i informacji zawartych w swoim orzeczeniu.

Stan faktyczny

Wnioskodawcy (Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne i INAO), EUIPO oraz oriGIn złożyli wnioski o sprostowanie wyroku Sądu z dnia 25 czerwca 2025 r. w sprawie T‑239/23. Wnioskodawcy domagali się sprostowania paragrafów 31 i 39, twierdząc, że nie odzwierciedlają one wiernie art. 102 ust. 1 rozporządzenia nr 1308/2013. oriGIn i EUIPO wnioskowały o sprostowanie paragrafu 26 w celu usunięcia wzmianki o oriGIn, a oriGIn dodatkowo o dodanie zdania do tego paragrafu. EUIPO wnioskowało również o usunięcie pierwszego zdania paragrafu 46, twierdząc, że nie odzwierciedla ono jego stanowiska.

Rozstrzygnięcie

Sąd postanawia: 1. Trzecie zdanie paragrafu 26 wyroku z dnia 25 czerwca 2025 r., Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne i INAO przeciwko EUIPO – Nero Lifestyle (NERO CHAMPAGNE) (T‑239/23, EU:T:2025:638), otrzymuje brzmienie: „Na rozprawie skarżący, popierani przez Republikę Francuską, sprecyzowali swoje stanowisko, przyznając po pierwsze, że, z zastrzeżeniem pewnych warunków, ChNP może stanowić część znaku towarowego, utrzymując po drugie, że Izba Odwoławcza musi przeprowadzić analizę indywidualną w celu oceny, czy zgłoszony znak towarowy wykorzystuje renomę danej ChNP w rozumieniu art. 103 ust. 2 lit. a) ppkt (ii) tego rozporządzenia.” 2. Drugie zdanie paragrafu 31 wyroku z dnia 25 czerwca 2025 r., NERO CHAMPAGNE (T‑239/23, EU:T:2025:638), otrzymuje brzmienie: „Przeciwnie, z tego przepisu wynika, że znak towarowy, który zawiera lub składa się z ChNP, może zostać zarejestrowany z zastrzeżeniem pewnych warunków, ponieważ rejestracja takiego znaku towarowego ma zostać odmówiona lub unieważniona tylko w dwóch sytuacjach, a mianowicie po pierwsze, jeśli produkt objęty znakiem towarowym nie jest zgodny z daną specyfikacją produktu lub, po drugie, jeśli jego użycie wchodzi w zakres art. 103 ust. 2 rozporządzenia nr 1308/2013 i dotyczy produktu należącego do jednej z kategorii wymienionych w części II załącznika VII do tego rozporządzenia.” 3. Pierwsze zdanie paragrafu 39 wyroku z dnia 25 czerwca 2025 r., NERO CHAMPAGNE (T‑239/23, EU:T:2025:638), otrzymuje brzmienie: „Skarżący, popierani przez Republikę Francuską i oriGIn, twierdzą, że błędne jest wywodzenie z art. 102 ust. 1 rozporządzenia nr 1308/2013 – którego zakres jest ograniczony do znaków towarowych, które zawierają lub składają się z ChNP i które obejmują produkty niezgodne z daną specyfikacją produktu – że zakres art. 103 ust. 2 lit. a) ppkt (ii) tego rozporządzenia jest również ograniczony do używania tej ChNP w odniesieniu do produktów niezgodnych ze specyfikacją.” 4. Pozostałe wnioski o sprostowanie złożone przez Urząd Unii Europejskiej ds. Własności Intelektualnej (EUIPO) i oriGIn, organizację na rzecz międzynarodowej sieci oznaczeń geograficznych, zostają oddalone.

Pełny tekst orzeczenia

ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) 12 November 2025 ( *1 ) (Procedure – Rectification of judgment) In Cases T‑239/23 REC, T‑239/23 REC II and T‑239/23 REC III, Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne, established in Épernay (France), Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité (INAO), established in Montreuil (France), represented by E. Varese, G. Righini and V. Mazza, lawyers, applicants, supported by French Republic, represented by E. Timmermans and B. Travard, acting as Agents, by Italian Republic, represented by S. Fiorentino, acting as Agent, and by G. Caselli, avvocato dello Stato, and by oriGIn, organization for an International Geographical Indication network, established in Geneva (Switzerland), represented by O. Vrins and N. Clarembeaux, lawyers, interveners, v European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Gája, acting as Agent, defendant, the other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court, being Nero Lifestyle Srl, established in Milan (Italy), represented by E. Cammareri and B. Marone, lawyers, THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition), composed, at the time of the deliberations, of G. De Baere, acting as President, K. Kecsmár (Rapporteur) and D. Petrlík, Judges, Registrar: V. Di Bucci, makes the following Order The Court adopted the judgment of 25 June 2025, Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne and INAO v EUIPO – Nero Lifestyle (NERO CHAMPAGNE) (T‑239/23, the judgment at issue, EU:T:2025:638). By document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 8 July 2025, the applicants, the Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne and the Institut national de l’origine et de la qualité (INAO), requested the Court, pursuant to Article 164 of its Rules of Procedure, to rectify paragraphs 31 and 39 of the judgment at issue. By document lodged at the Court Registry on 9 July 2025, the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) requested the Court to rectify paragraphs 26 and 46 of the judgment at issue. By document lodged at the Court Registry on 8 July 2025, oriGIn, organization for an International Geographical Indication network (‘oriGIn’), requested the Court to rectify paragraph 26 of the judgment at issue. By letter of 15 September 2025, EUIPO stated that it had no objections to the applications for rectification submitted by the applicants and oriGIn. By letters of 23 September 2025, the applicants did not oppose the applications for rectification submitted by EUIPO and oriGIn. Under Article 164(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the General Court may, of its own motion or on application by a party, rectify clerical mistakes, errors in calculation and obvious inaccuracies. In the first place, the applicants submit that paragraphs 31 and 39 of the judgment at issue do not faithfully reflect the meaning of Article 102(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1308/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 922/72, (EEC) No 234/79, (EC) No 1037/2001 and (EC) No 1234/2007 (OJ 2013 L 347, p. 671). The applicants’ application for rectification of paragraphs 31 and 39 of the judgment at issue must be granted, since they contain obvious inaccuracies. The second sentence of paragraph 31 of the judgment at issue should read ‘if the product covered by the trade mark does not comply with the product specification concerned’ instead of ‘if the PDO does not comply with the product specification concerned’. The first sentence of paragraph 39 of the judgment at issue should read ‘trade marks that contain or consist of a PDO and that cover products which do not comply with the product specification concerned’ instead of ‘trade marks that contain or consist of a PDO which does not comply with the product specification concerned’. In the second place, oriGIn and EUIPO request that oriGIn not be mentioned in the third sentence of paragraph 26 of the judgment at issue, in order faithfully to reflect the position expressed by oriGIn at the hearing on 18 September 2024. Paragraph 26 of the judgment at issue must be rectified in so far as it contains an obvious inaccuracy in that it does not reflect the position expressed by oriGIn at the hearing. In the third sentence of paragraph 26 of the judgment at issue, the words ‘and oriGIn’ should be deleted. In the third place, oriGIn requests that a fourth sentence be added to paragraph 26 of the judgment at issue that reflects the position it expressed at the hearing on 18 September 2024. That request is not intended to correct a clerical mistake or an obvious inaccuracy and must therefore be rejected. In that regard, it should be noted that the Court alone is competent to determine the relevant facts and, more generally, the information relevant to the resolution of the dispute, which will be mentioned in the decision closing the proceedings (see order of 17 March 2022, Covestro Deutschland v Commission, T‑745/18 REC, not published, EU:T:2022:160, paragraph 4 and the case-law cited). In the fourth place, EUIPO requests that paragraph 46 of the judgment at issue be rectified by deleting the first sentence of that paragraph, which, in its view, does not reflect the position it expressed in its response. It must be found that, contrary to EUIPO’s submission, the General Court did not make a clerical mistake or obvious inaccuracy in stating in the first sentence of paragraph 46 of the judgment at issue that, ‘when questioned at the hearing, EUIPO was unable to clarify whether that theory consisted of a rebuttable or a non-rebuttable presumption and whether, in the contested decision, the Board of Appeal applied the first or the second type of presumption.’ The sentence which EUIPO seeks to have deleted concerns the position expressed by EUIPO at the hearing and not that set out in its response. Furthermore, it is apparent from the recordings of the hearing of 18 September 2024 that EUIPO was unable to provide such clarification at the hearing. The application for rectification of paragraph 46 of the judgment at issue must therefore be rejected. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber, Extended Composition) hereby orders: 1. The third sentence of paragraph 26 of the judgment of 25 June 2025, Comité interprofessionnel du vin de Champagne and INAO v EUIPO – Nero Lifestyle (NERO CHAMPAGNE) (T‑239/23, EU:T:2025:638), should read: ‘At the hearing, the applicants, supported by the French Republic, qualified their position by admitting, first, that, subject to certain conditions, a PDO may form part of a trade mark, while maintaining, secondly, that the Board of Appeal must carry out a case-by-case analysis in order to assess whether the mark applied for exploits the reputation of the PDO in question within the meaning of Article 103(2)(a)(ii) of that regulation.’ instead of: ‘At the hearing, the applicants, supported by the French Republic and oriGIn, qualified their position by admitting, first, that, subject to certain conditions, a PDO may form part of a trade mark, while maintaining, secondly, that the Board of Appeal must carry out a case-by-case analysis in order to assess whether the mark applied for exploits the reputation of the PDO in question within the meaning of Article 103(2)(a)(ii) of that regulation.’ 2. The second sentence of paragraph 31 of the judgment of 25 June 2025, NERO CHAMPAGNE (T‑239/23, EU:T:2025:638), should read: ‘On the contrary, it follows from that provision that a mark which contains or consists of a PDO may be registered subject to certain conditions, since registration of such a mark is to be refused or invalidated only in two situations, namely, first, if the product covered by the trade mark does not comply with the product specification concerned or, secondly, if its use falls under Article 103(2) of Regulation No 1308/2013 and relates to a product falling under one of the categories listed in Part II of Annex VII to that regulation.’ instead of: ‘On the contrary, it follows from that provision that a mark which contains or consists of a PDO may be registered subject to certain conditions, since registration of such a mark is to be refused or invalidated only in two situations, namely, first, if the PDO does not comply with the product specification concerned or, secondly, if its use falls under Article 103(2) of Regulation No 1308/2013 and relates to a product falling under one of the categories listed in Part II of Annex VII to that regulation.’ 3. The first sentence of paragraph 39 of the judgment of 25 June 2025, NERO CHAMPAGNE (T‑239/23, EU:T:2025:638), should read: ‘The applicants, supported by the French Republic and oriGIn, argue that it is incorrect to infer from Article 102(1) of Regulation No 1308/2013 – the scope of which is limited to trade marks that contain or consist of a PDO and that cover products which do not comply with the product specification concerned – that the scope of Article 103(2)(a)(ii) of that regulation is also limited to use of that PDO in respect of products which do not comply with the specification.’ instead of: ‘The applicants, supported by the French Republic and oriGIn, argue that it is incorrect to infer from Article 102(1) of Regulation No 1308/2013 – the scope of which is limited to trade marks that contain or consist of a PDO which does not comply with the product specification concerned – that the scope of Article 103(2)(a)(ii) of that regulation is also limited to use of that PDO in respect of products which do not comply with the specification.’ 4. The applications for rectification submitted by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) and oriGIn, organization for an International Geographical Indication network, are dismissed as to the remainder. Luxembourg, 12 November 2025. V. Di Bucci Registrar G. De Baere Acting President ( *1 ) Language of the case: English.