T-260/25

ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) 9 February 2026 (*) ( Action for annulment – Approximation of laws – Harmonised radio spectrum – No locus standi – Lack of direct concern – Act not open to challenge – Preparatory act – Inadmissibility – Application for an order – Lack of jurisdiction ) In Case T‑260/25, Leidos, Inc., established in Wilmington, Delaware (United States), Leidos Security Detection & Automation, Inc., established in Wilmington, Delaware, Leidos Security Detection & Automation UK Ltd, established in Bedford (United Kingdom), represented by K. van Haastrecht, J. van den Biggelaar, M. de Graef, J. Schouten and W. Seinen, lawyers, applicants, v European Commission, represented by G. Conte and O. Gariazzo, acting as Agents, defendant, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber), composed of K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, President, I. Reine (Rapporteur) and T. Pavelin, Judges, Registrar: V. Di Bucci, having regard to the written part of the procedure, makes the following Order 1        By their action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicants, Leidos Inc., Leidos Security Detection & Automation, Inc. and Leidos Security Detection & Automation UK Ltd, seek annulment of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2025/105 of 22 January 2025 amending Decision 2006/771/EC updating harmonised technical conditions in the area of radio spectrum use for short-range devices and repealing Implementing Decision 2014/641/EU on harmonised technical conditions of radio spectrum use by wireless audio programme making and special events equipment in the Union (OJ L, 2025/105; ‘the contested decision’), or, in the alternative, annulment of Report 85 of the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunication Administrations (‘CEPT Report 85’) and Report 344 of the Electronic Communications Committee (ECC) (‘ECC Report 344’) and an order that the European Commission ‘include [them] in the Working Groups’.  Background to the dispute 2        The applicants manufacture security scanners which they market and sell into the EU market from the United States and the United Kingdom and their branches established in the European Union, in particular in the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. Those security scanners are, in particular, used in airports to screen passengers. 3        The current generation of the technology developed by the applicants uses the 20 gigahertz (GHz) – 40 GHz frequency range. 4        The objective of Decision No 676/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision) (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 1), is to establish a policy and legal framework in the European Union in order to ensure coordination of policy approaches and, where appropriate, harmonised conditions with regard to the availability and efficient use of the radio spectrum necessary for the establishment and functioning of the internal market in various areas such as electronic communications, transport and research and development. That decision is intended to coordinate, with the European Union, the policy on the availability of the radio spectrum and the technical conditions for its efficient use. 5        Under Article 4(2) of the Radio Spectrum Decision, the Commission conferred on the CEPT a permanent mandate concerning the development of technical implementing measures with a view to ensure harmonised conditions with regard to the availability and efficient use of the radio spectrum. 6        Commission Decision 2006/771/EC of 9 November 2006 on harmonisation of the radio spectrum for use by short-range devices (OJ 2006 L 312, p. 66) is intended to harmonise the technical conditions for making available the radio spectrum in the European Union, in order to improve the free movement of short-range devices. That decision includes an annex which is regularly updated on the basis of the work of the CEPT which, in the context of the mandate referred to in paragraph 5 above, submits to the Commission an annual report on the need to revise that annex. 7        As is apparent from Article 1 of Decision 2006/771, the harmonisation of the frequency bands must allow the short-range devices envisaged to benefit from ‘Class 1’ classification under Commission Decision No 2000/299 of 6 April 2000 establishing the initial classification of radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment and associated identifiers (OJ 2000 L 97, p. 13). Under Article 1 of that decision, radio equipment and telecommunications terminal equipment in ‘Class 1’ can be placed on the market and put into service in the European Union without restrictions. 8        On 21 October 2021, the Commission issued a guidance letter for the ninth update cycle of Decision 2006/771. In the context of the permanent mandate conferred on the CEPT and in accordance with that guidance letter, the CEPT submitted Report 85 to the Commission on 8 March 2024. The CEPT proposed, in that respect, to add new entries to Table 2 of the annex to Decision 2006/771, to allow the use, on a harmonised basis, of frequencies for certain security scanners. Those entries corresponded to band numbers 97 and 99 of that table. 9        Following CEPT Report 85, and on the basis of ECC Report 344, the Commission, by the contested decision, amended Decision 2006/771 to harmonise certain frequency bands for security scanners, by introducing band numbers 97 and 99 into Table 2 of the annex to that decision.  Forms of order sought 10      The applicants claim, in essence, that the Court should: –        annul the contested decision; –        in the alternative, annul CEPT Report 85 and ECC Report 344 and order the Commission to ‘include [them] in the Working Groups’; –        order the Commission to pay the costs. 11      By separate document lodged at the General Court Registry on 8 July 2025, the Commission pleads that the Court lacks jurisdiction and that the action is inadmissible on the basis of Article 130(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, and claims that the Court should: –        dismiss the action; –        order the applicants to pay the costs. 12      In their observations, lodged at the Court Registry on 8 September 2025, the applicants claim, in essence, that the Court should reject the plea of lack of jurisdiction and the plea of inadmissibility raised by the Commission.  Law 13      Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure, the Court may, if the defendant so requests, give a decision on inadmissibility or lack of competence, by way of an order, without going to the substance of the case. 14      In the present case, since the Commission has applied for a decision on the Court’s jurisdiction and on the admissibility of the action, the Court, finding that it has sufficient information from the documents in the case file, has decided to rule on that application without taking further steps in the proceedings. 15      The Commission claims, first, that the first head of claim for annulment directed against the contested decision is inadmissible. In its view, the applicants do not have locus standi for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. Secondly, the Commission maintains that the second head of claim, raised in the alternative, against CEPT Report 85 and ECC Report 344 is also inadmissible since those reports are only preparatory acts. Thirdly, the Commission states that the Court does not have jurisdiction to rule on the next request, which features in the second head of claim and would have the Court order a new preparatory process with the addition of the applicants’ involvement, since that request, it argues, constitutes an application for an order.  The applicants’ first head of claim, seeking annulment of the contested decision 16      The Commission contends, first of all, that the contested decision does not directly affect the legal situation of the applicants since it does not regulate in any way the use of frequency bands different from those harmonised and does not limit the possibility of using other bands for security scanners. Next, it maintains that Article 3(3) of Decision 2006/771 leaves the Member States some discretion as regards the implementation of the harmonisation measures adopted by the Commission. Lastly, it contends that the contested decision entails the adoption of implementing measures by the national authorities, as is apparent from Article 3(1) of that decision. 17      Furthermore, according to the Commission, the applicants do not show that they are individually concerned by the contested decision, in the sense that their position on the market concerned would be substantially affected by that decision. 18      The applicants claim that their application is admissible. In particular, they argue that the contested decision directly affects their legal situation. First, in their view, that decision clarifies, if not fundamentally alters, the regulatory framework in which they operate. Accordingly, it follows from that decision that security scanners currently fall within the scope of Directive 2014/53/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to the making available on the market of radio equipment and repealing Directive 1999/5/EC (OJ 2014 L 153, p. 62). That clarification prevents the applicants from continuing to benefit from a legal ‘grey area’. Therefore, the use of the radio spectrum for their devices, which are short-range devices, will now be subject to harmonised conditions. 19      It follows that, to be authorised in the European Union, the applicants’ security scanners must now either use the frequency harmonised by the contested decision, or be specifically authorised in each Member State following an amendment of the national frequency use plan, which was not the case before the contested decision was adopted. 20      In the applicants’ opinion, it is very unlikely that the Member States would agree to grant such specific authorisation. In that regard, they claim to have no means of requiring national authorities to adopt such a decision. As is apparent from Articles 36 and 46 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (OJ 2018 L 321, p. 36), harmonisation of the use of the radio spectrum for security scanners would ‘decrease the willingness’ of Member States to open an alternative, non-harmonised spectrum band for the use of such scanners. 21      In addition, the applicants argue that the contested decision limits their capacity for innovation since it implies that they must request authorisation for their experimental and demonstration models. 22      Secondly, in the applicants’ view, the contested decision excludes their security scanners from the market since they do not operate within the harmonised frequency band and it would now be necessary to amend the national frequency plans to authorise their scanners. The applicants may also lose their ‘CE’ certification under Directive 2014/53 if no Member State were to authorise the use, by security scanners, of the frequency band in which their scanners operate, as Article 10(2) of that directive shows. 23      It must be borne in mind that, under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs of that article, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures. 24      In the present case, in the first place, it is not disputed that the applicants, who are not named in the contested decision, are not the addressees of that decision. 25      In the second place, the admissibility of an action brought by a natural or legal person against an act which is not addressed to them, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, is subject to the condition that they be accorded standing to bring proceedings, which arises in two situations. First, such proceedings may be instituted if the act is of direct and individual concern to them. Secondly, such persons may bring proceedings against a regulatory act not entailing implementing measures if that act is of direct concern to them (judgment of 17 September 2015, Mory and Others v Commission, C‑33/14 P, EU:C:2015:609, paragraphs 59 and 91). 26      According to the case-law, the condition that the act forming the subject matter of the action must be of direct concern to a natural or legal person, as laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, requires that two cumulative criteria be met, namely that the contested measure, first, directly affect the legal situation of the individual and, secondly, leave no discretion to the addressees entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules without the application of other intermediate rules (judgment of 5 May 1998, Dreyfus v Commission, C‑386/96 P, EU:C:1998:193, paragraph 43; see also, to that effect, judgment of 13 February 2025, Swissgrid v Commission, C‑121/23 P, EU:C:2025:83, paragraph 60 and the case-law cited). 27      In addition, as the condition that an applicant must be directly concerned by the act being challenged appears, in identical terms, both in the second limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU and in the third limb of that provision, it must have the same meaning for each of those limbs of that provision. The objective assessment of that condition cannot vary depending on which of the different limbs of that provision is being considered (judgment of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C‑348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 73). 28      Lastly, it is apparent from the case-law that a provision directly affects the legal situation of an individual where it restricts their rights or imposes obligations on them (judgment of 7 July 2015, Federcoopesca and Others v Commission, T‑312/14, EU:T:2015:472, paragraph 36, and order of 20 August 2020, FL Brüterei M-V and Others v Commission, T‑755/18, not published, EU:T:2020:370, paragraph 25). 29      Therefore, the mere fact that a measure may exercise an influence on an applicant’s substantive position cannot suffice to allow it to be regarded as directly concerned by that measure (order of 9 November 2016, Biofa v Commission, T‑746/15, EU:T:2016:658, paragraph 38 and the case-law cited). In addition, it has been held that repercussions on the marketing possibilities of an applicant’s product are economic consequences that do not affect the applicant’s legal situation, but only its factual situation (see, to that effect, order of 9 November 2016, Biofa v Commission, T‑746/15, EU:T:2016:658, paragraph 37). 30      In the present case, the contested decision, adopted under Article 4(3) of the Radio Spectrum Decision, amends, inter alia, Table 2 of the annex to Decision 2006/771 to include two new band numbers (97 and 99) for security scanners. It thus harmonises the use of frequency bands 69.8-79.9 GHz and 76.5-80.5 GHz for those devices. 31      In that regard, it is apparent from recital 2 of Decision 2006/771 that differences in radio spectrum access conditions prevent the free movement of short-range devices, increase production costs and create risks of harmful interference with other radio applications and services. In the light of that finding, the purpose of that decision, in accordance with Article 1 thereof, is to harmonise frequency bands and the related technical parameters to ensure the availability and efficient use of the radio spectrum for short-range devices, as defined in Article 2(1) of that decision. 32      It should be noted that the harmonisation of a frequency band in the annex to Decision 2006/771 has several effects. 33      First, under Article 3(1) of Decision 2006/771, Member States are required to make available, on a non-exclusive basis, the frequency bands for categories of short-range devices subject to the specific conditions and by the implementation deadline laid down in the annex to that decision. 34      Secondly, it is apparent from recital 3 of Decision 2006/771 that the use of short-range devices which operate in the harmonised frequency bands should not be subject to individual authorisation pursuant to Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (OJ 2002 L 108, p. 21), which was repealed and replaced by Directive 2018/1972. In other words, as regards use of the radio spectrum, the short-range devices affected by a harmonising measure may use the frequency band concerned without needing to obtain, for that purpose, individual authorisation in every Member State. 35      Thirdly, Directive 2014/53 establishes a regulatory framework for the making available on the market and putting into service in the European Union of radio equipment. Under Articles 6 and 7 of that directive, to be made available on the EU market, radio equipment must comply with that directive. Compliant equipment accordingly bears ‘CE marking’ and benefits from the principle of free movement in the European Union, as provided for in Article 9 of that directive. 36      In order to be regarded as compliant with Directive 2014/53, the radio equipment referred to must be designed and manufactured in accordance with the essential requirements laid down in Article 3 of that directive. One of those requirements, which is provided for in Article 3(2) of that directive, is that that equipment must be ‘so constructed that it both effectively uses and supports the efficient use of radio spectrum in order to avoid harmful interference’. 37      In that regard, under Article 16 of Directive 2014/53, radio equipment which is in conformity with harmonised standards or parts thereof the references of which have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union are to be presumed to be in conformity with the essential requirements set out in Article 3 covered by those standards or parts thereof. Accordingly, the harmonisation of frequency bands in the annex to Decision 2006/771 permits the assumption that the short-range devices referred to, which use the frequency band in question, meet the condition laid down in Article 3(2) of Directive 2014/53. 38      The fact that a short-range device does not use a frequency band harmonised under Decision 2006/771 does not, however, have the effect of precluding it from obtaining ‘CE marking’ and thus benefiting from the principle of free movement set out in Article 9 of Directive 2014/53. Article 17(4) of that directive provides for compliance assessment procedures in cases where the manufacturer has not applied or has applied only in part harmonised standards, or where such harmonised standards do not exist. Those procedures are set out in Annexes III and IV to that directive. 39      In the present case, it is not disputed that the applicants’ security scanners do not operate in the frequency bands harmonised by the contested decision. It is also not disputed that, to be able to be used in their own frequency band, namely 20-40 GHz, those security scanners must, where necessary, be granted individual authorisation in relation to the use of the radio spectrum from each of the Member States concerned. In addition, in order to benefit from ‘CE marking’ and from free movement in the European Union under Directive 2014/53, they must be subject to the compliance assessment procedures provided for in Article 17(4) of that directive. The applicants’ security scanners, therefore, do not benefit from the advantages connected with the harmonisation of the radio spectrum. 40      In that regard, it has been held that an EU act, which had the effect of excluding all possibility of placing a product on the market, that is to say, going beyond mere consequences on the marketing possibilities for that product, directly affected the legal situation of the manufacturer (see, to that effect, judgment of 25 October 2011, Microban International and Microban (Europe) v Commission, T‑262/10, EU:T:2011:623, paragraph 28). That also applies to an act which entails exclusion from the benefits of a legal regime governing the free movement of products in the European Union under which the Member States may not object to those products being made available on the market (see, to that effect, order of 11 September 2024, Fachverband Eisenhüttenschlacken v Commission, T‑560/22, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2024:610, paragraph 32). 41      However, as the Commission contends, Decision 2006/771, as amended by the contested decision, does not regulate the use of frequency bands other than those which are harmonised. 42      The contested decision, which concerns only security scanners operating in the harmonised frequency bands, does not preclude other security scanners, including those of the applicants, from using non-harmonised bands. It also does not have the effect of obliging all security scanners to operate in the harmonised frequency bands in order to be able to benefit from free movement in the European Union. Such movement remains possible if it is shown that those scanners comply with the essential requirements laid down in Article 3 of Directive 2014/53, as is apparent from paragraph 38 above. 43      In other words, the contested decision does not have the effect of either authorising or prohibiting the use of the applicants’ security scanners in the European Union. It also does not preclude those scanners from benefiting from a legal regime relating to the free movement in the European Union of short-range devices, since it does not concern those scanners and does not preclude them from obtaining ‘CE marking’ for that purpose. 44      It is true that the applicants have stated that they participated, by phone, in a meeting of the ECC in December 2020, during which the ECC’s draft report on security scanners was discussed. They also assert that they were, at their request, included in the working group of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) in October 2022, with the objective of obtaining the inclusion of the 20-40 GHz frequency band in the ongoing review and in the proposed EU legislation. Despite the arguments they put forward, the inclusion of that frequency band was nevertheless refused. 45      However, the contested decision, which concerns only the harmonised frequency bands in the present case, cannot be regarded as a refusal to harmonise other frequency bands, in particular the 20-40 GHz frequency band used by the applicants’ security scanners. 46      Furthermore, the fact that an applicant has participated in the administrative procedure leading to the adoption of the contested act does not, in itself, support the conclusion that the act in question directly affects an applicant (order of 28 September 2016, PAN Europe and Others v Commission, T‑600/15, EU:T:2016:601, paragraph 44). 47      Lastly, the fact that the contested decision may potentially place the applicants at a competitive disadvantage in relation to manufacturers of security scanners which operate in the harmonised frequency bands does not, in itself, allow the view to be taken that their legal situation is affected by the contested decision and that, accordingly, that decision is of direct concern to them (see, to that effect and by analogy, judgment of 17 September 2015, Confederazione Cooperative Italiane and Others v Anicav and Others, C‑455/13 P, C‑457/13 P and C‑460/13 P, not published, EU:C:2015:616, paragraphs 48 and 49). In any event, the applicants have not adduced any specific evidence capable of showing that their competitive position is affected by the contested decision. 48      Accordingly, the contested decision cannot be regarded as directly affecting the legal situation of the applicants within the meaning of the jurisprudence referred to in paragraph 26 above. 49      That conclusion is in no way called into question by the other arguments put forward by the applicants. 50      Firstly, the contested decision could not, in itself, have had the effect of including security scanners in the scope of Directive 2014/53. Indeed, it is apparent from Article 1 of that directive that it establishes a regulatory framework for the making available on the market and putting into service in the European Union of ‘radio equipment’. ‘Radio equipment’ is defined in point 1 of Article 2(1) of that directive as being ‘an electrical or electronic product, which intentionally emits and/or receives radio waves for the purpose of … radiodetermination’. In addition, point 3 of Article 2(1) of that directive defines the concept of ‘radiodetermination’ as ‘the determination of the position, velocity and/or other characteristics of an object … by means of the propagation properties of radio waves’. The contested decision does not alter those definitions. 51      Although the contested decision may be the first EU act which has explicitly designated security scanners as radiodetermination devices, the inclusion of those scanners in the scope of Directive 2014/53 would stem from the definition contained in that directive, and not from the contested decision. That directive does not contain any list of devices which fall within its scope, but does provide a broad definition of radiodetermination devices, as referred to in paragraph 50 above. It also does not make its application conditional on the adoption of individual decisions that define its scope in a more specific manner. The rights and obligations resulting from that directive in respect of security scanners have thus applied from the moment of its entry into force, and not on account of the contested decision. 52      Secondly, the contested decision has the objective of harmonising a single frequency band, with the result that use of that band is now possible without individual authorisation. As for the rest, that decision does not alter the existing regime for security scanners, including those of the applicants. 53      Thirdly, as regards the argument relating to Articles 36 and 46 of Directive 2018/1972, the applicants have not adduced any specific evidence that the Member States would be prevented from opening an alternative, non-harmonised spectrum band for the use of their security scanners. Furthermore, Article 36 of that directive concerns only the harmonised assignment of the radio spectrum, without affecting the substantive conditions of granting individual authorisations. As for Article 46 of Directive 2018/1972, it is contained in Part II of that directive which specifically concerns networks, and governs authorisation to use the radio spectrum in that context. Accordingly, those two provisions are irrelevant in the present case. 54      Fourthly, as regards the potential impossibility, for the applicants’ security scanners, of obtaining in the future ‘CE marking’ in view of the requirement laid down in Article 10(2) of Directive 2014/53, it must be borne in mind that, under that provision, manufacturers shall ensure that radio equipment shall be so constructed that it can be operated in at least one Member State without infringing applicable requirements on the use of radio spectrum. In that regard, in so far as the frequency band used by the applicants’ security scanners has not been harmonised, the Member States remain at liberty to authorise the use of that band in relation to various requests. If one or more Member States refused the use of that frequency band for the applicants’ security scanners, that refusal would stem not from the contested decision, but from national decisions which the applicants could dispute before the courts of the relevant State. 55      Fifthly, as for the argument that the contested decision limits the applicants’ capacity for innovation since it implies that they must continue to request authorisation for their experimental and demonstration models, it is sufficient to note that Article 9(2) of Directive 2014/53 expressly provides for the possibility of displaying such models at trade fairs and exhibitions, even if they do not comply with the requirements of that directive, including the requirement laid down in Article 3(2) thereof. In any event, even if such authorisation were required, it is in no way imposed by the effect of the contested decision itself. 56      Consequently, since the contested decision does not directly affect the legal situation of the applicants, that decision cannot be regarded as being of direct concern to them, for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. The applicants’ first head of claim, seeking annulment, in whole or in part, of that decision must therefore be rejected as inadmissible.  The applicants’ second head of claim, seeking annulment of CEPT Report 85 and ECC Report 344, and an order that the Commission include the applicants in the working groups 57      The Commission takes the view that CEPT Report 85 and ECC Report 344 are preparatory acts without binding effects. Since they are not intended to produce binding legal effects capable of affecting the applicants’ interests by bringing about a distinct change in their legal situation, it argues, those reports are not open to challenge. The action against those reports is therefore inadmissible. 58      Furthermore, the Commission argues that the Court does not have jurisdiction to order the Commission to resume the work initiated in the ETSI working group concerning the applicants’ security scanners. Such an application for an order is therefore inadmissible. In addition, since that application is based on the request for annulment of CEPT Report 85 and ECC Report 344, the inadmissibility of the action against those reports should entail the inadmissibility of the application for an order. 59      The applicants claim that CEPT Report 85 was adopted on the basis of a permanent mandate conferred on the CEPT by the Commission. The contested decision, they argue, reproduced the content of that report without any modification. Moreover, since, in their view, that report and ECC Report 344 contain all the technical analysis on which that decision was based, they were essential to the adoption of the contested decision. Accordingly, those reports played a substantial role in its adoption and cannot be examined separately from the contested decision, of which they, in fact, form part. 60      In the first place, it should be recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, only measures which produce binding legal effects capable of affecting an applicant’s interests by bringing about a distinct change in his or her legal situation are acts or decisions against which an action for annulment may be brought under Article 263 TFEU. More specifically, in the case of acts adopted by a procedure involving several stages, in particular where they are the culmination of an internal procedure, it is clear from that same case-law that, in principle, an act is open to review only if it is a measure definitively laying down the position of the institution on the conclusion of that procedure, and not a provisional measure intended to pave the way for the final decision (see judgment of 18 October 2018, Terna v Commission, T‑387/16, EU:T:2018:699, paragraphs 30 and 31 and the case-law cited). 61      In the present case, it is apparent from the contested decision that the Commission relied on Report 85 of the CEPT and Report 344 of the ECC, which is a committee of the CEPT, in order to adopt that decision. However, under Article 4(3) of the Radio Spectrum Decision, it is for the Commission to decide whether the results of the work carried out pursuant to the mandates conferred on the CEPT are to apply in the European Union. It is also apparent from recital 7 of the contested decision that the CEPT merely made a proposal to add new entries to the annex to Decision 2006/771. 62      Consequently, CEPT Report 85 and ECC Report 344 are only preparatory acts which do not definitively lay down the position of the Commission, since they are simply intended to pave the way for the Commission’s final decision. 63      It is true that, in so far as a decision purely and simply confirms a preparatory and non-binding opinion, the content of that opinion forms an integral part of the statement of reasons for that decision, with regard, in particular, to the scientific or technical assessment which it contains. However, such opinions cannot be subject to a separate and self-standing action for annulment (see, to that effect, judgment of 19 December 2019, Vanda Pharmaceuticals v Commission, T‑211/18, EU:T:2019:892, paragraphs 32 and 33 and the case-law cited). 64      Accordingly, the second head of claim, to the extent that it seeks annulment of CEPT Report 85 and ECC Report 344 must be rejected as inadmissible. 65      In the second place, as regards the application for an order from the Court to have the Commission resume the work of the ETSI concerning the applicants’ security scanners, it is sufficient to note that, according to the case-law, it is not for the EU judicature to issue directions to the institutions when exercising its power of judicial review. Under Article 266 TFEU, it is for the institution which adopted the act to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the EU courts (judgment of 22 January 2004, Mattila v Council and Commission, C‑353/01 P, EU:C:2004:42, paragraph 15; see also, to that effect, judgment of 25 September 2024, Kirimova v EUIPO, T‑727/20 RENV, EU:T:2024:646, paragraph 11 and the case-law cited). 66      Consequently, the applicants’ application to the Court for an order that, in essence, the Commission resume the work of the ETSI and include the applicants in that work, must be rejected on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 67      It follows from all of the foregoing that the action must be dismissed, in part, as inadmissible and, in part, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.  Costs 68      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 69      Since the applicants have been unsuccessful, they must be ordered to bear their own costs in addition to those of the Commission, in accordance with the latter’s pleadings. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Third Chamber) hereby orders: 1.      The action is dismissed, in part, as inadmissible and, in part, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 2.      Leidos Inc., Leidos Security Detection & Automation, Inc. and Leidos Security Detection & Automation UK Ltd shall bear their own costs and pay those incurred by the European Commission. Luxembourg, 9 February 2026. V. Di Bucci   K. Kowalik-Bańczyk Registrar   President *      Language of the case: English.