T-267/24

Provisional text ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, sitting with five judges) 26 February 2026 (*) ( Action for annulment – Civil service – EIB staff – Period within which proceedings must be commenced – Article 41a of the Staff Regulations of the EIB – Calculation of time limits – Not admissible ) Case T‑267/24, Christofer Edge, residing in Athens (Greece), represented by G. Karampoulia, lawyer, applicant, v European Investment Bank (EIB), represented by K. Carr and A. Geppert-Luciani, acting as Agents, and by A. Makri, lawyer, defendant, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, sitting with five judges), composed of S. Papasavvas, President, G. De Baere, J. Svenningsen, R. Meyer (Rapporteur) and D. Jočienė, Judges, Registrar: V. Di Bucci, having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular: –        the plea of inadmissibility raised by the EIB by separate document lodged at the Court Registry on 22 April 2025, –        the applicant’s observations on the plea of inadmissibility, lodged at the Court Registry on 18 June 2025, makes the following Order 1        By his action under Article 270 TFEU and Article 50a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the applicant, Mr Christofer Edge, seeks, first, the annulment of the decisions of the European Investment Bank (EIB) of 4 and 13 October 2023 rejecting his claims for reimbursement of his children’s school fees and also of the EIB’s decision of 6 February 2024 rejecting the requests for administrative review of those decisions and, secondly, an order for the EIB to pay him the sum of EUR 16 400.  Background to the dispute 2        By a fixed-term contract of 22 November 2021, the applicant, the father of two children, joined the EIB as a member of the contract staff. 3        He submitted a claim for education allowance to cover the school fees of his elder daughter for the year 2023/2024. By a decision of 4 October 2023, the EIB rejected his claim. On 9 October 2023, the applicant submitted a request for administrative review of that decision. 4        On 13 October 2023, the EIB decided to recover the education allowance previously paid for the applicant’s younger daughter. On 28 November 2023, the applicant submitted a request for administrative review of that decision. 5        By decision of 6 February 2024, the EIB examined the applicant’s two requests for administrative review jointly and rejected them. 6        By application lodged at the Court Registry on 17 May 2024, the applicant brought the present action.  Form of order sought 7        The applicant claims, in essence, that the Court should: –        annul the decisions of the EIB of 4 and 13 October 2023 and 6 February 2024; –        order the EIB to pay his daughters’ school fees, in the amount of EUR 16 400; –        order the EIB to pay the costs. 8        In its plea of inadmissibility, the EIB contends that the Court should: –        dismiss the action as manifestly inadmissible; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. 9        In his observations on the plea of inadmissibility, the applicant claims that the Court should: –        reject the plea of inadmissibility; –        order the EIB to pay the costs, even if the Court upholds the plea of inadmissibility.  Law 10      Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, on application by the defendant, the Court may decide on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case. In the present case, since the EIB has requested a ruling on the inadmissibility of the action, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file, has decided to rule on that application without taking further steps in the proceedings. 11      In support of its plea of inadmissibility, the EIB puts forward two grounds of inadmissibility, alleging infringement of: –        Article 56a(4) of the Rules of Procedure; –        Article 41a of the EIB’s Staff Regulations and Article 58(1) of the Rules of Procedure. 12      As regards the second ground of inadmissibility, the EIB submits that the action is manifestly inadmissible because the application was submitted out of time, in breach of Article 41a of the EIB’s Staff Regulations and Article 58(1) of the Rules of Procedure. 13      The applicant argues that his action is admissible because, under Article 58(1)(a) of the Rules of Procedure, the day on which notification of the contested decision takes place should not be taken into account when calculating the time limit. 14      In that regard, Article 41a of the EIB’s Staff Regulations provides that disputes between the EIB and its members of staff are to be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union within three months of the date of notification of the reasoned decision rejecting the request for review. 15      It must be noted that the rules for the calculation of time limits provided for by Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure, relied on by the parties, apply only to procedural time limits prescribed by the Treaties, the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Rules of Procedure themselves (see, by analogy, order of 13 March 1998, Lonuzzo-Murgante v Parliament, T‑247/97, EU:T:1998:55, paragraph 35). 16      As the EIB’s Staff Regulations do not specify the method for calculating the time limit prescribed by Article 41a of those regulations, which is expressed in months and which runs from the notification of the contested decision, it is necessary to apply the method which affords any party the full benefit of the time limit, regardless of the time at which notification of the act in question occurred. Under that method, where a period expressed in days, weeks, months or years is to be calculated from the occurrence of an event or an action, the day during which that event occurs or that action takes place is not counted as falling within the period in question. 17      That method expresses the Latin adage dies a quo non computatur in termino which is a rule of law recognised by many of the Member States’ legal systems (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 2004, Toeters and Verberk, C‑171/03, EU:C:2004:714, paragraph 31). 18      The aforementioned method corresponds to the rule provided for in Article 3(1) of the European Convention on the Calculation of Time-Limits, signed in Basel on 16 May 1972, according to which ‘time limits expressed in days, weeks, months or years shall run from the dies a quo at midnight to the dies ad quem at midnight’. 19      The method referred to in paragraph 16 above also corresponds to the rule used for calculating procedural time limits in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and of the General Court (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 2004, Toeters and Verberk, C‑171/03, EU:C:2004:714, paragraph 35), which applies to appeals brought under Article 91 of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union, by virtue of Article 91(5) of those regulations (see, to that effect, order of 13 March 1998, Lonuzzo-Murgante v Parliament, T‑247/97, EU:T:1998:55, paragraphs 33 and 36). 20      Lastly, that method corresponds to the rule laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1182/71 of 3 June 1971 determining the rules applicable to periods, dates and time limits (OJ, English Special Edition 1971 (II), p. 354), which, save as otherwise provided, applies to the calculation of time limits in acts of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission (see, to that effect, judgment of 11 November 2004, Toeters and Verberk, C‑171/03, EU:C:2004:714, paragraph 33). 21      Since, under Article 41a of the EIB’s Staff Regulations, proceedings must be brought before the EU courts within three months of the date of notification, application of the method referred to in paragraph 16 above means that the time limit begins to run at the end of the day of notification at midnight and expires on the last day of the three-month period, at midnight. It therefore expires at the end of the day which, in the month indicated in the time limit, bears the same number as the day from which time was set running, that is to say the day of notification (see, to that effect, judgment of 15 January 1987, Misset v Council, 152/85, EU:C:1987:10, paragraph 8, and order of 17 May 2002, Germany v Parliament and Council, C‑406/01, EU:C:2002:304, paragraph 14). 22      Furthermore, it should be noted that the rule established in Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure, pursuant to which procedural time limits are extended on account of distance by a single period of 10 days, applies to all procedural time limits unless otherwise specified in those rules. It therefore applies to the time limits for disputes between the EIB and the members of its staff brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union pursuant to Article 41a of the EIB’s Staff Regulations. 23      In the present case, it is not disputed that the EIB’s decision rejecting the requests for administrative review was notified to the applicant on 6 February 2024. The time limit prescribed by Article 41a of the EIB’s Staff Regulations therefore began to run on 6 February at midnight or, to put it another way, at 00:00 on 7 February 2024, and expired three months later, in other words on 6 May 2024 at midnight. That time limit is extended on account of distance by the single period of 10 days provided for by Article 60 of the Rules of Procedure. The applicant therefore had until midnight on 16 May 2024 to bring proceedings. 24      In his observations, the applicant relies on a combined application of Article 58(1)(a) and Article 58(1)(b) of the Rules of Procedure, resulting in the time limit expiring on 17 May 2024. Aside from the fact that the applicant relies on Article 58 of the Rules of Procedure, which is not applicable in his case, his calculation results in him having a period of three months and one day, which is not consistent with the wording of Article 41a of the EIB’s Staff Regulations. 25      As a result of the foregoing considerations, the application, lodged on 17 May 2024, was made out of time, and the action must be dismissed as inadmissible, without there being any need to rule on the first ground of inadmissibility.  Costs 26      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 27      Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, he must be ordered to bear his own costs and to pay those incurred by the EIB, in accordance with the form of order sought by the EIB. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Fourth Chamber, sitting with five judges) hereby orders: 1.      The action is dismissed as inadmissible. 2.      Christofer Edge shall bear his own costs and pay those incurred by the European Investment Bank (EIB). Luxembourg, 26 February 2026. V. Di Bucci      S. Papasavvas Registrar   President *      Language of the case: Greek.