T-297/16

ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber) 26 September 2017 (*) (Appeal — Civil service —Temporary staff — EMCDDA staff — Decision not to renew a contract of employment — Termination of the contract — Psychological harassment — Request for assistance — Administrative inquiry — Impartiality of the inquiry) In Case T‑297/16 P, APPEAL against the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 18 May 2015, Gyarmathy v EMCDDA (F‑79/13, EU:F:2015:49), seeking the setting aside of that judgment, Valéria Anna Gyarmathy, former member of the temporary staff of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, residing in Győr (Hungary), represented by A. Véghely, lawyer, appellant, the other party to the proceedings being European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), represented by D. Storti and F. Pereyra, acting as Agents, and B. Wägenbaur, lawyer, defendant at first instance, THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber), composed of M. Jaeger (Rapporteur), President, M. Prek and G. Berardis, Judges, Registrar: E. Coulon, makes the following Order 1        By her appeal, brought under Article 9 of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the appellant, Ms Valéria Anna Gyarmathy, seeks to have set aside the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal (Second Chamber) of 18 May 2015, Gyarmathy v EMCDDA (F‑79/13, EU:F:2015:49) (‘the judgment under appeal’), by which the Civil Service Tribunal dismissed her action as inadmissible.  The facts of the dispute, the proceedings at first instance and the judgment under appeal 2        The background to the dispute is set out in paragraphs 2 to 19 of the judgment under appeal, as follows: ‘2      The applicant was recruited by the EMCDDA on 1 May 2008 as a member of the temporary staff at grade AD 8 within the meaning of Article 2(a) of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union, for a five-year term, in order to perform the functions of a drug analyst and scientific writer. She was initially assigned to the Interventions, Law and Policies unit of the EMCDDA, then, from 1 October 2010, to the Policy, Evaluation and Content Coordination unit (“the POL unit”), of which Mr A had been appointed Head of Unit on 2 September 2010. 3      On 22 February 2012, the applicant received her appraisal report in respect of 2011. However, given that, on account of a number of periods of sick leave and a period of maternity leave, she had worked only 34 days in 2011, Mr A, her line manager, and Mr B, the Director of the Monitoring Centre, decided to carry out a fresh assessment of her performance in mid-2012. 4      On 20 July 2012, the applicant received her mid-term appraisal report covering the first six months of 2012 (“the contested appraisal report”), drawn up by Mr A. 5      On 27 July 2012, the applicant sent an e-mail to the Director of the EMCDDA expressing her disagreement with the appraisal of her performance as set out in the contested appraisal report. In addition, the applicant reported the existence of a hostile working environment and, in particular, a very difficult relationship with Mr A and requested her immediate transfer to a different unit (“the e-mail of 27 July 2012”). On 31 July 2012, she sent the same comments to Mr A. 6      By letter of 11 September 2012, the Director of the EMCDDA informed the applicant that he had discussed her allegations against Mr A and her request to be transferred to a different unit with the Scientific Director of the Monitoring Centre, with Mr A and with the Head of the Administration unit, and that it was not possible to give a positive follow-up to her request for a transfer (“the decision of 11 September 2012”). 7      The applicant submits that, at a meeting on 14 September 2012, the Director of the EMCDDA informed her of his decision not to renew her contract as a member of the temporary staff, which would expire on 30 April 2013. By a note of the same day, the Head of the Human Resources Management Sector of the Administration unit of the Monitoring Centre reminded the applicant that, in accordance with the information communicated by the Director at the meeting of 14 September 2012, her contract would expire on 30 April 2013 (“the note of 14 September 2012”). 8      On 10 December 2012, the applicant sent a letter entitled “[C]omplaint” to the Director of the EMCDDA, in which, first, she again complained of conduct constituting psychological harassment on the part of Mr A and, secondly, she criticised the Director for not taking appropriate action following her verbal and written requests concerning the mistreatment to which she had allegedly been subject on the part of Mr A. She alleged in particular that the Director had neither initiated an inquiry into Mr A’s behaviour nor adopted appropriate measures to ensure that she was treated with dignity and respect. Thirdly, she challenged the decision not to renew her contract as a member of the temporary staff (“the letter of 10 December 2012”). 9      By letter of 19 December 2012, the Director of the EMCDDA first informed the applicant of his intention to initiate, as soon as it was convenient, an inquiry into all her allegations. Next, he informed her of his decision to transfer her, with immediate effect, to a different unit. Lastly, he explained to her that the reason for the decision not to renew her contract as a member of the temporary staff was “the level of [her] performance, as documented in [her] … appraisal reports[,] and the difficulties identified in performing [her] tasks at the level required by the [EMCDDA], combined with the level of importance of the role of scientific writer … for the EMCDDA” (“the letter of 19 December 2012”). 10      On 18 January 2013, the Chairman of the EMCDDA Management Board decided to open an administrative inquiry into the applicant’s allegations against Mr B, the Director of the Monitoring Centre. 11      On 21 January 2013, Mr B decided, for his part, to open an administrative inquiry into the applicant’s allegations against Mr A. 12      On 11 April 2013, the applicant received extracts from the reports of the two abovementioned administrative inquiries. So far as the inquiry into Mr A’s conduct towards the applicant is concerned, the investigator found that some of Mr A’s conduct constituted psychological harassment with respect to the applicant. So far as the inquiry into Mr B’s conduct was concerned, the investigator concluded that, even though the Director of the EMCDDA had not immediately granted the applicant’s request for transfer or opened an inquiry into her allegations of mistreatment on the part of Mr A, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Mr B had breached his obligations. Moreover, according to the investigator, it was not possible to establish that the applicant was the victim of gender discrimination or retaliatory measures. 13      On 29 April 2013, the applicant submitted her observations on the extracts of the inquiry reports which she had received. 14      On 30 April 2013, the applicant’s employment contract expired and was not renewed. 15      On 6 May 2013, the Director of the EMCDDA decided to remove Mr A from his post of Head of the POL unit and to reassign him to a post without managerial duties reporting directly to the Scientific Director of the Monitoring Centre. 16      By letter of 13 May 2013, received by the applicant on 17 May 2013, the Chairman of the EMCDDA Management Board informed the applicant of his decision to close without follow-up the administrative inquiry into the allegations against Mr B, stating that “no failure to comply with the statutory and regulatory obligations [on the part of the Director of the Monitoring Centre]” had been established. Nevertheless, he stated in the same letter that he considered it opportune to call Mr B’s attention to the need to make “additional efforts” to improve the gender balance in managerial positions. In the same letter, he sent the applicant the conclusions of the report of the administrative inquiry. 17      By letter of 25 June 2013, which the applicant received on 12 August 2013, the Director of the EMCDDA informed the applicant that he had concluded that: –        there was no conclusive evidence that she had been the victim of mistreatment and harassment by Mr A; –        there was sufficient evidence that Mr A had had to deal with and redress a clearly existing and proven situation of professional underperformance by the applicant; –        the administrative inquiry had raised some concerns as regards the managerial capacity and performance of Mr A in respect of the sound, effective and efficient functioning of the POL unit and the management of some of its staff who reported to him. That situation fell beyond the scope of the inquiry and was likely to require that prudential and corrective measures be implemented separately. 18      On 13 August 2013, the applicant submitted an application for legal aid for the purposes of bringing the present action. 19      By order of 4 November 2013 in Gyarmathy v EMCDDA (F‑79/13 AJ), notified to the applicant on 7 November 2013, the President of the Tribunal acceded to her application, granting her a maximum amount of EUR 3 000 in respect of legal aid.’ 3        By application lodged at the Registry of the Civil Service Tribunal on 12 November 2013, the appellant brought an action, registered as Case F‑79/13, seeking, in essence, first, the annulment of various decisions adopted by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) concerning a request for assistance in respect of alleged psychological harassment and the decision not to renew her contract as a member of the temporary staff and, second, compensation for the material and non-material harm which the appellant claims she has suffered as a result of the contested decisions. 4        By the judgment under appeal, the Civil Service Tribunal dismissed the applicant’s action as inadmissible and ordered each of the parties to bear their own costs. 5        In the first place, with regard to the annulment of the letter of 11 September 2012 rejecting the appellant’s request for assistance and transfer, the Civil Service Tribunal found that the EMCDDA had responded favourably to the appellant’s complaint of 10 December 2012 in respect of that letter, in so far as she was transferred to another unit, having been informed of that decision by letter of 19 December 2012, and two inquiries were initiated, by decisions of 18 and 21 January 2013 respectively, to investigate the various allegations made by the appellant. Accordingly, the Civil Service Tribunal rejected the claim seeking annulment of the letter of 11 September 2012 as inadmissible, in the absence of any act adversely affecting the appellant. 6        In the second place, with regard to the claim seeking annulment of the note of 14 September 2012, by which the administration informed the appellant that her contract was not to be renewed, the Civil Service Tribunal considered that note to be an act adversely affecting the appellant and the letter of 19 December 2012 to be a rejection of the complaint lodged in respect of that note on 10 December 2012. Moreover, the Civil Service Tribunal found that the appellant should have brought an action within a period of three months and ten days of 19 December 2012, that is to say by 29 March 2013 at the latest. It added that, when the appellant submitted her application for legal aid on 13 August 2013, she was already time-barred from challenging the decision rejecting her complaint, of which she had been informed by the letter of 19 December 2012. Therefore, the Civil Service Tribunal rejected the claim directed against the decision not to renew the appellant’s contract as inadmissible. 7        In the third place, as regards the application for the annulment of the decisions of the Chairman of the EMCDDA Management Board of 13 May 2013 and of the Director of the EMCDDA of 25 June 2013, by which they decided to close without follow-up the inquiries initiated in accordance with the decisions of 18 and 21 January 2013, the Civil Service Tribunal concluded that a decision to close without follow-up an inquiry opened on the basis of a request for assistance affected the appellant adversely inasmuch as it constituted a decision to reject the request for assistance. Having established that the appellant had lodged a complaint against the decision of the Chairman of the EMCDDA Management Board of 13 May 2013 on 12 August 2013 and a complaint against the decision of the Director of the EMCDDA of 25 June 2013 on 25 October 2013 and that the four-month period allowed to the administration under Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union (‘the Staff Regulations’) for the purpose of replying to those two complaints expired after the proceedings had been brought before it, the Civil Service Tribunal rejected as inadmissible the claim seeking annulment of the decisions of 13 May 2013 and 25 June 2013 as that claim was premature. 8        In the fourth place, the Civil Service Tribunal rejected the claim that a new investigation should be conducted, on the basis of established case-law that it is not for the Tribunal, in an action brought under Article 90 of the Staff Regulations, to issue injunctions to the EU institutions. 9        In the fifth place, the Civil Service Tribunal rejected the claim seeking compensation, in accordance with settled case-law that, where an application for damages is closely linked with an application for annulment, the rejection of the latter, either as inadmissible or as unfounded, also results in the rejection of the application for damages.  The appeal  Procedure before the General Court and forms of order sought by the parties 10      By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 15 July 2015, the appellant submitted an application for legal aid pursuant to Article 147 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, with a view to filing an appeal against the judgment under appeal. 11      That application was registered by the Court as Case T‑409/15 P-AJ. However, in accordance with Article 69(c) of the Rules of Procedure, at the request of the appellant and with the agreement of the EMCDDA, the President of the General Court stayed the proceedings with a view to enabling the dispute to be settled out of court. 12      The out-of-court settlement between the appellant and the EMCDDA was concluded on 11 February 2016. 13      By letter of 25 March 2016, the appellant informed the Court Registry that she intended to withdraw the application for legal aid submitted in Case T‑409/15 P-AJ.  14      By order of 30 May 2016, Gyarmathy v EMCDDA (T‑409/15 P-AJ), Case T‑409/15 P-AJ was removed from the General Court register. 15      By document lodged at the Court Registry on 9 June 2016, the appellant brought the present appeal, on the basis of Article 9 of Annex I to the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 16      On 1 December 2016, the EMCDDA lodged a response. 17      On 22 December 2016, the appellant sought leave to file a reply, which was refused by the President of the Appeal Chamber on 30 January 2017. 18      The appellant claims that the Court should: –        set aside in its entirety the judgment under appeal; –        refer the case back to the Civil Service Tribunal for further first instance proceedings or, if the Court decides not to refer the case back to the court of first instance, examine the substantive pleas, and; –        annul the decision of the Director of the EMCDDA of 11 September 2012 rejecting her request for assistance; –        annul the note of 14 September 2012 with regard to the decision not to renew her employment contract; –        set aside the judgment of the Civil Service Tribunal in so far as it considers the decision of the Director of the EMCDDA 19 December 2012 to be an express decision concerning her employment contract and thus a rejection of her complaint of 10 December 2012; –        dismiss the appellant’s claim for compensation for material damage, in accordance with the out-of-court settlement reached between the parties; –        dismiss the appellant’s claim for compensation for non-material damage as inadmissible and refer the matter to a national court with jurisdiction; –        order the parties, in accordance with the settlement agreement, to bear their own costs. 19      The EMCDDA contends that the Court should: –        dismiss the appeal as manifestly inadmissible; –        in the alternative, in the event that the Court considers the appeal admissible, grant it an opportunity to state its case at a hearing; –        order the appellant to pay all the costs.  Law 20      In accordance with Article 208 of the Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly unfounded, the Court may, at any time, decide by reasoned order to dismiss the appeal, even if one of the parties has requested a hearing (orders of 24 September 2008, Van Neyghem v Commission, T‑105/08 P, EU:T:2008:402, paragraph 21, and of 26 June 2009, Marcuccio v Commission, T‑114/08 P, EU:T:2009:221, paragraph 10). In this instance, the Court considers that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings. 21      The appellant relies on four grounds of appeal, alleging: (i) distortion of the facts, in so far as that the Civil Service Tribunal incorrectly described the letter of 19 December 2012 as a ‘positive follow-up’ to the complaint of 10 December 2012 against the letter of 11 September 2012 rejecting the request for assistance and transfer; (ii) distortion of the facts, in so far as the Civil Service Tribunal incorrectly described the letter of 19 December 2012 as a rejection of the complaint against the decision not to renew the appellant’s employment contract; (iii) a lack of impartiality on the part of the Civil Service Tribunal in a number of instances; and (iv) that the Civil Service Tribunal erred in law in the examination of the claims for compensation. 22      The EMCDDA contends that the appeal is manifestly inadmissible in so far as, first, an out-of-court settlement has been reached between it and the appellant, second, the appellant failed to comply with the time limit for lodging the present appeal and, third, the appellant has no interest in bringing the proceedings. 23      In view of the established case-law that the EU Courts may assess whether, in the circumstances of each individual case, the proper administration of justice justifies the dismissal of an action on the merits without first ruling on a plea of inadmissibility raised against the action (judgments of 26 February 2002, Council v Boehringer, C‑23/00 P, EU:C:2002:118, paragraphs 51 and 52; of 23 October 2007, Poland v Council, C‑273/04, EU:C:2007:622, paragraph 33; and of 24 June 2015, Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission and Commission v Fresh Del Monte Produce, C‑293/13 P and C‑294/13 P, EU:C:2015:416, paragraphs 193 and 194), it is appropriate to examine at the outset the substantive pleas raised by the appellant, without first ruling on the objection of inadmissibility put forward by the EMCDDA, as the appeal is in any event, for the reasons set out below, in part manifestly unfounded and in part manifestly inadmissible.  The first ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the facts, in so far as that the Civil Service Tribunal incorrectly described the letter of 19 December 2012 as a ‘positive follow-up’ to the complaint of 10 December 2012 against the letter of 11 September 2012 rejecting the request for assistance and transfer 24      By the first ground of appeal, the appellant takes issue with the Civil Service Tribunal for describing, in her view incorrectly, the letter of 19 December 2012 as a ‘positive follow-up’ to her complaint of 10 December 2012 against the letter of 11 September 2012 rejecting her request for assistance and transfer. 25      In that regard, the appellant submits that the Civil Service Tribunal did not carry out a correct assessment or take account of a vital item of evidence, namely, the investigation report, and dismissed, incorrectly, her application for annulment of the letter of 11 September 2012 rejecting her request for assistance and transfer. Moreover, in the first ground of appeal, the appellant maintains that all the measures adopted by the EMCDDA following her complaint of 10 December 2012 were preparatory to the final decisions taken by the EMCDDA to close without follow-up the inquiries into the conduct of Mr B and Mr A, which were adopted on 13 May 2013 and 25 June 2013 respectively. The appellant therefore considers that she brought proceedings for the annulment of those two decisions in good time and that the Civil Service Tribunal was incorrect to find that the appellant’s action was premature and, therefore, inadmissible. 26      It is settled case-law that the court of first instance has exclusive jurisdiction, first, to find the facts, except where the substantive inaccuracy of its findings is apparent from the documents submitted to it, and, second, to assess those facts. The appraisal of the facts by the court of first instance therefore does not, except in the case of distortion of the evidence submitted to that court, constitute a question of law which, as such, is subject to review by the appeal court. When the court of first instance has found or assessed the facts, the court hearing the appeal has jurisdiction to review the legal characterisation of those facts by the court of first instance and the legal conclusions it has drawn from them (see judgment of 4 December 2013, ETF v Schuerings, T‑107/11 P, EU:T:2013:624, paragraph 57 and the case-law cited). 27      Moreover, it should be noted that, where the appellant alleges that the court of first instance distorted the facts, he is required, pursuant to Article 256 TFEU, the first paragraph of Article 58 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 195(2) of the Rules of Procedure, to identify precisely the evidence allegedly distorted by the court of first instance and to indicate the errors of analysis which, in his view, led that court to distort the evidence. Furthermore, it is established case-law that distortion of the evidence must be obvious from the documents on the Court’s file, without there being any need to carry out a new assessment of the facts and the evidence (judgment of 15 March 2017, Fernández González v Commission, T‑455/16 P, not published, EU:T:2017:169, paragraph 25). 28      It is apparent from the judgment under appeal that the Civil Service Tribunal found that, by the letter of 11 September 2012, the Director of the EMCDDA expressly rejected the request for assistance and transfer submitted by the appellant on 27 July 2012. The Civil Service Tribunal went on to observe that, by letter of 10 December 2012, the appellant took issue with the Director of the EMCDDA for not granting her request. That letter constituted a complaint against the letter refusing the appellant’s request for assistance and transfer of 11 September 2012. 29      The Civil Service Tribunal also observed that, by decision of 19 December 2012, the EMCDDA immediately transferred the appellant to another unit and informed her of its decision to initiate two inquiries, which was implemented by decisions of 18 and 21 January 2013 respectively, concerning her various allegations. Accordingly, in paragraph 40 of the judgment under appeal, the Civil Service Tribunal concluded that the EMCDDA had acted on the appellant’s complaint against the letter of 11 September 2012 refusing her request for assistance and transfer. 30      Thus, the Civil Service Tribunal found, correctly, without clearly distorting the evidence before it, that the EMCDDA had provided a positive follow-up to the appellant’s complaint against the letter of 11 September 2012 refusing her request for assistance, and therefore rejected as inadmissible the claim seeking annulment of that letter. 31      In that regard, it should be noted that the appellant’s argument that all the measures adopted by the EMCDDA following her complaint of 10 December 2012 were preparatory to the final decisions taken by the EMCDDA to close without follow-up the inquiries into the conduct of Mr B and Mr A, which were adopted on 13 May 2013 and 25 June 2013 respectively, is based on an incorrect premiss. Contrary to what the appellant maintains, a request to initiate an inquiry concerning allegations of harassment is different from a complaint lodged against the decision of an administration to close that inquiry without follow-up. If the administration refuses the request for assistance in the form of an inquiry, the person who made the request is entitled to lodge a complaint against that decision. If the administration decides to act on the complaint, initiate an inquiry and, at the end of the inquiry, decides not to take the matter further, the person who made the request is entitled to lodge a complaint against that decision, as a decision to close without follow-up an inquiry opened on the basis of a request for assistance affects that person adversely. Accordingly, one the one hand, a decision by the administration to uphold the complaint against the decision not to initiate an inquiry closes a pre-litigation procedure in a manner that is favourable to the complainant, and, on the other hand, a decision by the administration not to pursue the inquiry further offers the complainant the possibility of submitting an independent complaint, pursuant to Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. 32      It follows that, while the Civil Service Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the administration had, essentially, upheld the appellant’s complaint, it was also entitled to find that the two decisions of 13 May 2013 and 25 June 2013, by which the EMCDDA decided to close the inquiries without follow-up, were measures adversely affecting the appellant within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations and that the latter should therefore have lodged a complaint against those decisions, pursuant to that article, and challenged before the court any decision, be it express or implicit, rejecting her complaint before bringing the action which gave rise to the judgment under appeal. 33      Therefore, the first ground of appeal must be rejected as manifestly unfounded.  The second ground of appeal, alleging distortion of the facts, in so far as the Civil Service Tribunal incorrectly described the letter of 19 December 2012 as a rejection of the complaint against the decision not to renew the appellant’s contract 34      First, the appellant submits, in essence, that the Civil Service Tribunal distorted the facts of the case by describing the letter of 19 December 2012 as an express decision rejecting the complaint made in the letter of 10 December 2012 against the decision not to renew her contract. The appellant maintains that the letter of 19 December 2012 cannot be interpreted as a decision rejecting her complaint of 10 December 2012, in view of the fact that, in that letter, the Director of the EMCDDA implicitly denied having taken any decision in that regard, referring to the termination of her employment as a ‘natural conclusion’, not a decision made by him in his capacity as Appointing Authority. The appellant adds that there is no indication of any possible reconsideration of the interests of the service or her interests in the letter of 19 December 2012. Lastly, according to the appellant, as the Director of the EMCDDA left open the possibility of a subsequent review, depending on the outcome of the administrative inquiries, the letter of 19 December 2012 was not the final decision on the renewal of her contract, but a measure preparatory to the initiation of administrative inquiries to establish whether the appellant’s complaint of 10 December 2012 was justified. 35      Second, the appellant argues that the Appointing Authority was not in a position to review the decision not to renew her contract before obtaining all relevant information necessary for the adoption of a well-founded decision, that is to say, before the final report on the harassment inquiry was submitted. The appellant thus argues that the decision not to renew her employment contract amounts to misuse of power, as her unsatisfactory performance was used as a pretext to justify that decision. In so doing, according to the appellant, the Director used his powers as Appointing Authority for reasons other than those for which those powers were conferred on him. Moreover, in paragraph 45 of her appeal, the appellant draws attention to the investigator’s analysis, in paragraph 44 of the investigation report, that ‘concerning the accusation of use of reprisal measures against the complainant … it is true that the sequence of events was unfortunate and very badly managed, giving the clear impression that the decision not to renew her contract … was directly connected or even a consequence of her complaint for mistreatment and request for transfer’. 36      Third, the appellant contends that the meeting of 14 September 2012 between her and the Director of the EMCDDA was a ‘one-to-one meeting’, at odds with the internal protocol of the agency. 37      As a preliminary point, it should be noted that, in a situation in which the contract of a temporary member of staff may be renewed, the Appointing Authority’s decision not to renew the contract, adopted at the conclusion of a procedure specifically provided for that purpose (see, to that effect, judgment of 1 March 2005, Smit v Europol, T‑143/03, EU:T:2005:71, paragraphs 28 to 31), or in response to a request submitted by the person concerned pursuant to Article 90(1) of the Staff Regulations as a person to whom the Staff Regulations apply (see, to that effect, judgment of 14 September 2006, Commission v Fernández Gómez, C‑417/05 P, EU:C:2006:582, paragraph 38), constitutes an act adversely affecting the person concerned, separate from the contract in question, which may form the subject matter of a complaint or an action before the court pursuant to Article 270 TFEU within the time limits laid down by the Staff Regulations (judgment of 15 October 2008, Potamianos v Commission, T‑160/04, EU:T:2008:438, paragraph 21, confirmed on appeal by order of 23 October 2009, Commission v Potamianos and Potamianos v Commission, C‑561/08 P and C‑4/09 P, EU:C:2009:656, paragraph 46). 38      In that regard, a letter which merely reminds a member of staff about the provisions of his contract relating to the date of its expiry and contains no new factor relating to those provisions is not an act adversely affecting that staff member. However, if the letter indicating the date of expiry of the contract is sent after a meeting at which the Appointing Authority has already explained the decision not to renew the contract and the letter refers to that meeting, that letter must be regarded as an act adversely affecting the staff member concerned. In that case, if that letter did not adversely affect that person, he would be obliged to apply for a renewal of his contract, knowing full well that the administration had already decided not to renew it. 39      In the present case, it should be noted that, after classifying the note of 14 September 2012 as an act adversely affecting the appellant and the letter of 19 December 2012 as a rejection of her complaint, the Civil Service Tribunal concluded, in paragraphs 51 and 52 of the judgment under appeal, that the appellant should have brought an action against the decision rejecting her complaint within a period of three months and ten days of 19 December 2012, that is to say by 29 March 2013 at the latest. The Civil Service Tribunal added that, when the appellant submitted her application for legal aid on 13 August 2013, she was already time-barred from challenging the decision, of which she had been informed by the letter of 19 December 2012, rejecting her complaint. Therefore, the Civil Service Tribunal rejected the appellant’s claim for annulment of the decision not to renew her contract as inadmissible 40      It should also be noted that, although it is not clear from the second ground of appeal what effect the alleged incorrect classification of the note of 14 September 2012 and the letter of 19 September 2012 as an express rejection of the complaint might have on the admissibility of the action at first instance for annulment of the decision rejecting the appellant’s request for the renewal of her contract, it is appropriate, in any event, to examine the appellant’s first argument. 41      First, with regard to the Civil Service Tribunal’s interpretation of the letter from the Director of the EMCDDA of 19 December 2012 as an express decision rejecting the complaint of 10 December 2012, the Civil Service Tribunal recognised, in paragraphs 47 of the judgment under appeal, that the note of 14 September 2012 simply reminded the appellant that her contract would expire on 30 April 2013, while at the same time referring to the information given to the appellant by the Director of the EMCDDA on the meeting held the same day. The Civil Service Tribunal added that, as it was apparent from the letter of 19 December 2012 that the appellant’s contract was not to be renewed because of her unsatisfactory performance, that meant that the Director of the EMCDDA had examined the issue of whether or not that contract should be renewed. The Civil Service Tribunal concluded that that letter constituted an act adversely affecting the appellant within the meaning of Article 90(2) of the Staff Regulations. 42      The Civil Service Tribunal did not thereby manifestly distort the facts of the case in the manner indicated by the case-law cited in paragraph 27 above. While it is true that the Civil Service Tribunal appears to have based its decision on the content of the letter of 19 December 2012, rather than on the fact that a meeting had taken place prior to the note of 14 September 2012, in concluding that that note adversely affected the appellant, it was, in any event, correct to classify that note as an act adversely affecting the appellant and the letter of 19 December 2012 as an express decision rejecting the complaint she made in the letter of 10 December 2012 against the decision not to renew her contract. 43      In that regard, first, contrary to what the appellant contends, it is not apparent from the letter of 19 December 2012 that the Director of the EMCDDA simply informed her that her contract was about to come to its natural conclusion without adopting a position on its renewal. Indeed, it is clear from that letter that, after referring to the expiry of the appellant’s contract as a natural event, the Director of the EMCDDA specified the reason why, in her case, the contract would not be renewed, namely on account of her unsatisfactory performance. The Civil Service Tribunal did not therefore distort the evidence before it when, in paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, it classified the letter of 19 December 2012 as a rejection of the complaint of 10 December 2012, observing that that letter gave the reason for the decision not to renew the appellant’s contract, namely her unsatisfactory performance. Second, the appellant’s argument that that letter did not weigh up her interests and those of the service cannot succeed either, because it has no effect on the alleged distortion of the facts by the Civil Service Tribunal, which classified the letter of 19 December 2012 as an express rejection of the complaint, but, rather, on the substantive legality of the decision not to renew her contract. Moreover, contrary to what the appellant argues, in the light of the considerations set out above, it must be found that that letter set out the reasons why the EMCDDA decided not to renew her contract as a temporary staff member. 44      Furthermore, contrary to the appellant’s assertions, it is not apparent from the letter of 19 December 2012 that the Director of the EMCDDA suggested that his decision not to renew her contract might be reviewed in the light of the outcome of the administrative inquiries. The fact that the administration decided to open administrative inquiries, in response to the appellant’s complaint, related only to the request for assistance and had no effect on the decision not to renew her contract. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that administrative inquiries were initiated, the Civil Service Tribunal was entitled to conclude, without distorting the evidence before it, that the letter of 19 December 2012 was final in so far as concerns the decision not to renew the appellant’s contract. This part of the second ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as manifestly unfounded. 45      As the Civil Service Tribunal was correct to classify the note of 14 September 2012 as an act adversely affecting the appellant and the letter of 19 December 2012 as an express rejection of the complaint of 10 December 2012, it is clear that the conclusion it reached in paragraphs 51 and 52 of the judgment under appeal, namely that the action for annulment of the decision not to renew the appellant’s contract was inadmissible, cannot be called into question. Therefore, without there being any need to examine them, all the other arguments put forward by the appellant in relation to the decision not to renew her contract must be rejected as manifestly inadmissible. 46      If follows from the foregoing that the second ground of appeal must be rejected.  The third ground of appeal, alleging that the Civil Service Tribunal failed to have regard to the requirement of impartiality 47      In the third plea, the appellant claims, first, that the Civil Service Tribunal failed to have regard to the requirement of impartiality laid down by Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, by distorting the evidence before it and ascribing to it a meaning and giving it an interpretation that could not be inferred from the documents concerned. According to the appellant, the Civil Service Tribunal distorted the content of the letters of 11 September 2012 and 19 December 2012. Second, the appellant contends that the Civil Service Tribunal delayed the delivery of a judgment by default before giving its decision in Case F‑79/13, which gave rise to the judgment under appeal, thereby giving the EMCDDA an opportunity to lodge a defence in the case which gave rise to the order of 27 June 2016, Gyarmathy v EMCDDA (F‑22/14, EU:F:2016:135). Moreover, the Civil Service Tribunal used the defence lodged in Case F‑22/14 in order to classify the letter of 19 December 2012 as a decision reaffirming the note of 14 September 2012. The Civil Service Tribunal also waited for the exchange of written pleadings in Case F‑22/14 to be closed before delivering the judgment under appeal. Accordingly, according to the appellant, the legal arguments put forward by the EMCDDA in the defence lodged in Case F‑22/14 had a decisive influence on the Civil Service Tribunal’s deliberations in the case which gave rise to the judgment under appeal. Third, the appellant claims that the Civil Service Tribunal’s lack of impartiality is further illustrated by the amount of the out-of-court settlement the EMCDDA offered her, which was exactly the same as the amount proposed by the Civil Service Tribunal as the basis for negotiations for an amicable settlement in the case which gave rise to the order of 27 June 2016, Gyarmathy v EMCDDA (F‑22/14, EU:F:2016:135). According to the appellant, such a coincidence is indicative of the fact that there was communication between the Civil Service Tribunal and the EMCDDA and, therefore, of the Tribunal’s partiality. Furthermore, the appellant claims that she has in her possession an unauthorised communication between the EMCDDA’s lawyer and her former lawyer, which, while not constituting proof of partial conduct on the part of the Civil Service Tribunal, raises legitimate doubts in that regard. 48      According to settled case-law, there are two aspects to the requirement of impartiality. In the first place, a tribunal must be subjectively impartial, that is, none of its members must show bias or personal prejudice, there being a presumption of personal impartiality in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In the second place, a tribunal must be objectively impartial, that is to say, it must offer guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect (order of 15 December 2011, Altner v Commission, C‑411/11 P, not published, EU:C:2011:852, paragraph 15). 49      It must be noted that the appellant has adduced no evidence which might call into question the personal impartiality of the members of the Civil Service Tribunal or raises doubt as to the impartiality of the Tribunal. 50      First, as regards the argument alleging distortion of the content of the letters of 11 September 2012 and 19 December 2012, which, according to the appellant, demonstrates the partiality of the Civil Service Tribunal, it is sufficient to note that there is no factual basis for that argument, as it is apparent from the examination of the first and second grounds of appeal that the Civil Service Tribunal did not clearly distort the content of those letters. 51      Second, with regard to the argument concerning the chronology of the lodging of the pleadings in the cases which gave rise to the judgment under appeal and the order of 27 June 2016, Gyarmathy v EMCDDA (F‑22/14, EU:F:2016:135), the appellant has failed to show that the judges at first instance were influenced by factors extraneous to the case, the mere fact that certain documents were lodged at the same time being insufficient in that regard. 52      Third, the same applies with regard to the appellant’s argument that it is clear that the Civil Service Tribunal was partial because, in the case which gave rise to the order of 27 June 2016, Gyarmathy v EMCDDA (F‑22/14, EU:F:2016:135), the Tribunal proposed the same amount as that proposed by the EMCDDA in connection with the out-of-court settlement. It is sufficient to note in that regard that the appellant has failed to adduce any evidence to show that there was communication between the EMCDDA and the Civil Service Tribunal capable of calling into question the Tribunal’s impartiality. Lastly, as regards the allegedly unauthorised communication between the EMCDDA’s lawyer and the appellant’s former lawyer, it should be noted that the appellant, first, acknowledges herself that such communication does not constitute, in itself, proof of the Civil Service Tribunal’s partiality, and, second, fails to explain how that communication, which was not placed on the court file, would give rise to legitimate doubts as to the Tribunal’s impartiality. 53      Accordingly, the third ground of appeal must be rejected as clearly unfounded.  The fourth ground of appeal, alleging that the Civil Service Tribunal erred in law in the examination of the claims for compensation 54      The appellant requests that her claim for compensation for non-material damage be referred to a national court, in accordance with Article 24 of the Staff Regulations and, in particular, the judgment of 18 September 2012, Allgeier v FRA (F‑58/10, EU:F:2012:130). 55      With regard to the fourth ground of appeal, even if it could be regarded as being directed against the Civil Service Tribunal’s decision dismissing the appellant’s claims for damages as inadmissible, it is sufficient to note that the appellant has not put forward any evidence or argument to show that the Civil Service Tribunal erred in dismissing her claim for non-material damage as inadmissible. That ground of appeal must therefore be rejected as manifestly unfounded. 56      In the light of the foregoing considerations, the appeal must be dismissed as being in part manifestly unfounded and in part manifestly inadmissible.  Costs 57      In accordance with Article 211(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, where an appeal is unfounded, the Court is to make a decision as to costs. 58      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 211(1) thereof, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 59      Since the appellant has been unsuccessful in her claims in the appeal and the EMCDDA has applied for costs, the appellant must bear her own costs and pay those incurred by the EMCDDA in the present proceedings. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Appeal Chamber) hereby orders: 1.      The appeal is dismissed. 2.      Ms Valéria Anna Gyarmathy is to bear her own costs and to pay the costs incurred by the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) in the appeal proceedings. Luxembourg, 26 September 2017. E. Coulon  M. Jaeger Registrar  President *      Language of the case: English.