T-305/25

ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT 27 October 2025 (*) ( Interim relief – Access to documents – Regulation (EU) No 649/2012 – Export notifications for hazardous chemicals that are banned or severely restricted within the European Union – Documents concerning the applicants held by ECHA – Decision to grant a third party access to the documents – Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Exception relating to the protection of the commercial interests of a third party – Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 – Concept of ‘information [relating] to emissions into the environment’ – Application for interim measures – No prima facie case ) In Case T‑305/25 R, DLF Beet Seed ApS, established in Lolland (Denmark), United Beet Seeds, established in Tirlemont (Belgium), represented by B. Creve, T. Kölsch and J. Lefevre Olsen, lawyers, applicants, v European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), represented by C. Buchanan and B. Áder, acting as Agents, defendant, THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT having regard to the order of 16 May 2025, DLF Beet Seed and United Beet Seeds v ECHA (T‑305/25 R, not published), makes the following Order 1        By their application under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU, the applicants, DLF Beet Seed ApS and United Beet Seeds, request, first, suspension of the operation of the decision of the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) in Case ATD/009/2025, of 4 March 2025, by which ECHA informed the applicants of its intention to grant full access to a document requested under Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents (OJ 2001 L 145, p. 43) (‘the contested decision’) and, second, an order for any other interim measure that the President of the General Court considers appropriate.  Background to the dispute and forms of order sought 2        The first applicant, DLF Beet Seed, is a company that manufactures active substances for plant protection products, including ‘Imidacloprid’, ‘Thiamethoxam’ and ‘Thiram’. 3        The second applicant, United Beet Seeds, is a joint venture specialising in all aspects of sugar beet seed. 4        On 5 February 2025, an application for access to documents under Regulation No 1049/2001 was submitted to ECHA, concerning a document containing information from three export notifications for the active substances ‘Imidacloprid’, ‘Thiamethoxam’ and ‘Thiram’. 5        The application for access to documents sought to obtain information to be extracted from a database maintained by ECHA. That information relates to export notifications under Regulation (EU) No 649/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 concerning the export and import of hazardous chemicals (OJ 2012 L 201, p. 60). In particular, that application related to export notifications for intended exports in 2024 and 2025, in so far as concerns substances classified as pesticides or chemicals in general, exported from Denmark to countries in Africa, Asia and South and Central America. 6        In accordance with Article 2(1)(a) thereof, Regulation No 649/2012 applies to certain hazardous chemicals that are subject to the prior informed consent procedure under the Rotterdam Convention on the prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade (OJ 2003 L 63, p. 29). 7        According to Article 6(1)(a) of Regulation No 649/2012, it is the task of ECHA to maintain, further develop and regularly update a database on the export and import of hazardous chemicals. 8        Article 7(1) and (3) of Regulation No 649/2012 states that the lists of chemicals subject to export notification, contained in Annex I to that regulation, are to be made publicly available by means of that ECHA database. 9        All the export notifications in question have, in this instance, received explicit consent from the national authority designated by the importing country. Consequently, the exports were able to proceed. 10      By letter of 19 February 2025, ECHA began a third-party consultation with the first applicant, in accordance with Article 4(4) of Regulation No 1049/2001, according to which, as regards third-party documents, the institution is to consult the third party with a view to assessing whether an exception under Article 4(1) or (2) of that regulation is applicable, unless it is clear that the document must or must not be disclosed. 11      On 25 February 2025, the applicants objected to the disclosure of all the information sought, with the exception of the name of the exported product and of the name of the exporter. 12      On 4 March 2025, ECHA adopted the contested decision, by which it informed the applicants of its intention to grant full access to the requested document. 13      By application lodged at the Court Registry on 14 May 2025, the applicants brought an action seeking annulment, in whole or in part, of the contested decision, in so far as ECHA rejected their request relating to the non-disclosure of information concerning the chemicals, that is to say, the concentration of the substance in the mixture and the expected yearly amount of the substance or mixture (kg/l per year) (together, ‘the information at issue’). 14      By a separate document lodged at the Court Registry on the same date, the applicants brought the present application for interim measures, in which they claim that the President of the General Court should: –        order suspension of the operation of the contested decision until conclusion of the main proceedings; –        adopt any other interim measures which the Court considers appropriate in order to preserve the full effectiveness of the final judgment in the main proceedings; –        order ECHA to pay the costs. 15      In its observations on the application for interim measures, lodged at the Court Registry on 2 June 2025, ECHA claims that the President of the General Court should: –        dismiss the application for interim measures; –        order the applicants to pay the costs of the present proceedings. 16      By a measure of organisation of procedure of 29 July 2025, the President of the General Court put questions to ECHA to be answered in writing. 17      On 12 August 2025, ECHA answered the questions put by the President of the General Court. 18      On 22 September 2025, the applicants lodged their observations on ECHA’s reply to the questions put by the President of the General Court.  Law  General considerations 19      It is apparent from reading Articles 278 and 279 TFEU together with Article 256(1) TFEU that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may, if he or she considers that the circumstances so require, order suspension of the operation of a measure challenged before the General Court or prescribe any necessary interim measures, pursuant to Article 156 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Nevertheless, Article 278 TFEU establishes the principle that actions do not have suspensory effect, since acts adopted by the institutions of the European Union are presumed to be lawful. It is therefore only exceptionally that the judge hearing an application for interim measures may order suspension of the operation of an act challenged before the General Court or prescribe any interim measures (order of 19 July 2016, Belgium v Commission, T‑131/16 R, EU:T:2016:427, paragraph 12). 20      The first sentence of Article 156(4) of the Rules of Procedure provides that applications for interim measures are to state ‘the subject matter of the proceedings, the circumstances giving rise to urgency and the pleas of fact and law establishing a prima facie case for the interim measure applied for’. 21      The judge hearing an application for interim relief may order suspension of the operation of an act and other interim measures, if it is established that such an order is justified, prima facie, in fact and in law, and that it is urgent in so far as, in order to avoid serious and irreparable harm to the applicant’s interests, it must be made and produce its effects before a decision is reached in the main action. Those conditions are cumulative, and consequently an application for interim measures must be dismissed if any one of them is not satisfied. The judge hearing an application for interim measures is also to undertake, when necessary, a weighing of the competing interests (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 22      In the context of that overall examination, the judge hearing an application for interim measures enjoys a broad discretion and is free to determine, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, the manner and order in which those various conditions are to be examined, there being no rule of law imposing a pre-established scheme of analysis within which the need to order interim measures must be assessed (see order of 19 July 2012, Akhras v Council, C‑110/12 P(R), not published, EU:C:2012:507, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 23      Having regard to the material in the case file, the President of the General Court considers that he has all the information needed to rule on the present application for interim measures without there being any need to first hear oral argument from the parties. 24      In the circumstances of the present case, it is appropriate first to examine the requirement for a prima facie case.  The requirement for a prima facie case 25      According to settle case-law, the prima facie case requirement is satisfied where at least one of the pleas in law put forward by the party seeking interim measures in support of the main action appears, prima facie, to be not unfounded. That is the case where one of those pleas in law reveals the existence of a major legal or factual disagreement whose resolution is not immediately obvious and therefore calls for a detailed examination that cannot be carried out by the judge hearing the application for interim measures but must be the subject of the main proceedings (see, to that effect, orders of 3 December 2014, Greece v Commission, C‑431/14 P‑R, EU:C:2014:2418, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited, and of 1 March 2017, EMA v MSD Animal Health Innovation and Intervet international, C‑512/16 P(R), not published, EU:C:2017:149, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). 26      As regards disputes concerning interim protection for information alleged to be confidential, the judge hearing the application for interim measures – if he or she is not to disregard the intrinsically ancillary and provisional nature of proceedings for interim measures – may, as a rule, conclude that there is no prima facie case only where the information in question is obviously not confidential (see order of 2 March 2016, Evonik Degussa v Commission, C‑162/15 P-R, EU:C:2016:142, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited). That would be the case, for example, if the information for which protection is sought were published in the applicant’s annual report or in a measure published in the Official Journal of the European Union (see, to that effect, order of 11 March 2013, Pilkington Group v Commission, T‑462/12 R, EU:T:2013:119, paragraph 59). 27      The arguments put forward by the applicants must be examined in the light of those considerations. 28      With a view to showing that the contested decision is, prima facie, unlawful, the applicants raise two pleas in law in support of their action. The first plea in law alleges that ECHA erred in the interpretation and application of Article 6(1) and (2) of Regulation (EC) No 1367/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 on the application of the provisions of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community institutions and bodies (OJ 2006 L 264, p. 13). The second plea in law alleges that ECHA erred in the interpretation and application of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 and of Article 6(2) of Regulation No 1367/2006. 29      ECHA has not expressed a position on the prima facie case requirement. The reasons that led it to grant access to the information at issue are however set out in the contested decision. In addition, in its observations on the urgency requirement, ECHA states that the applicants have not appropriately justified the claim that the information at issue fell within the exception under the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, and that therefore it has not adopted a position on the application of that article. ECHA states that it took the view that the information at issue concerned emissions into the environment within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006, because the substances concerned would be used as pesticides and because their export had been authorised.  The first plea in law 30      By their first plea in law, the applicants claim, first, that ECHA failed to examine whether the information at issue would enable the public to know what is actually emitted or is likely to be emitted into the environment, which, according to the case-law of the Court of Justice, is a requirement for information to be covered by Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006. 31      Second, the applicants claim that the information at issue concerns hypothetical rather than likely emissions, since the export notifications reflect expected exports but not actual exports. 32      Third, the applicants submit that ECHA failed to consider whether the disclosure of the information at issue would adversely affect the protection of the environment to which the information relates for the purposes of Article 6(2) of Regulation No 1367/2006. As companies based in the territory of the European Union, they are subject to stringent environmental protection rules, which is not the case of their competitors established in third countries. 33      In that regard, it should be noted that Regulation No 1367/2006 aims, as provided for in Article 1 thereof, to ensure the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination of environmental information (see judgment of 13 July 2017, Saint-Gobain Glass Deutschland v Commission, C‑60/15 P, EU:C:2017:540, paragraph 64 and the case-law cited). It follows, in essence, from recital 2 of that regulation that the purpose of access to environmental information is in fact to promote more effective public participation in the decision-making process, thereby increasing, on the part of the competent bodies, the accountability of decision-making and contributing to public awareness and support for the decisions taken (judgment of 23 November 2016, Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe, C‑673/13 P, EU:C:2016:889, paragraph 80). 34      Article 6 of Regulation No 1367/2006 adds specific rules on requests for access to environmental information to Regulation No 1049/2001 (judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 79). 35      The first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 refers to the provisions of the first and third indents of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 and provides that an overriding public interest in disclosure must be deemed to exist where the information requested relates to emissions into the environment. That legal presumption relates to the last phrase of Article 4(2), excluding the possibility of refusing access to a document if a public interest overriding the protected interests justifies the disclosure of the document in question (judgment of 14 November 2013, LPN and Finland v Commission, C‑514/11 P and C‑605/11 P, EU:C:2013:738, paragraph 80). 36      It is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that, although the placing on the market of a product or substance is not sufficient in general for it to be concluded that that product or substance will necessarily be released into the environment and that information concerning the product or substance relates to ‘emissions into the environment’, the situation is different as regards a product such as a plant protection product, and the substances which that product contains, which, in the course of normal use, are intended to be released into the environment by virtue of their very function. In that case, foreseeable emissions, under normal or realistic conditions of use, from the product in question, or from the substances which that product contains, into the environment are not hypothetical and are covered by the concept of ‘emissions into the environment’ within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 (see judgment of 23 November 2016, Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe, C‑673/13 P, EU:C:2016:889, paragraph 75 and the case-law cited). 37      Furthermore, in the light of the objective set out in the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 of ensuring a general principle of access to ‘information [which] relates to emissions into the environment’, that concept must be understood to include, inter alia, data that will allow the public to know what is actually released into the environment or what, it may be foreseen, will be released into the environment under normal or realistic conditions of use of the product or substance in question, namely those under which the authorisation to place that product or substance on the market was granted and which prevail in the area where that product or substance is intended to be used. Consequently, that concept must be interpreted as covering, inter alia, information concerning the nature, composition, quantity, date and place of the actual or foreseeable emissions, under such conditions, from that product or substance (judgment of 23 November 2016, Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe, C‑673/13 P, EU:C:2016:889, paragraph 79). 38      On the other hand, the concept of ‘information [which] relates to emissions into the environment’ may not, in any event, include information that merely has a link of any kind, even direct, to emissions into the environment. If that concept were interpreted as covering such information, it would to a large extent deprive the concept of ‘environmental information’ as defined in Article 2(1)(d) of Regulation No 1367/2006 of any meaning. Such an interpretation would deprive of any practical effect the possibility, laid down in the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, for the institutions to refuse to disclose environmental information on the ground, inter alia, that such disclosure would have an adverse effect on the protection of the commercial interests of a particular natural or legal person and would jeopardise the balance which the EU legislature intended to maintain between the objective of transparency and the protection of those interests. It would also constitute a disproportionate interference with the protection of business secrecy ensured by Article 339 TFEU (judgment of 23 November 2016, Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe, C‑673/13 P, EU:C:2016:889, paragraph 81). 39      Moreover, although the concept of ‘information [which] relates to emissions into the environment’ within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 cannot be limited to information concerning emissions actually released into the environment, it does not however include information relating to hypothetical emissions (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 November 2016, Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe, C‑673/13 P, EU:C:2016:889, paragraphs 72 and 73 and the case-law cited). 40      In the present case, in the first place, it should be observed at the outset that establishing the scope of the concept of ‘information [which] relates to emissions into the environment’, within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006, calls for a case-by-case assessment by the Courts of the European Union. 41      In that context, it should be noted, first, that, as indicated in the export notifications concerned, the mixtures containing the substances ‘Imidacloprid’, ‘Thiamethoxam’ and ‘Thiram’ are intended to be used as pesticides in the importing countries and, second, as is apparent from paragraph 9 above, that all the export notifications in question have, in this instance, received explicit consent from the respective designated national authorities of the importing countries on the basis of the information in the export notifications. 42      Accordingly, first, in the contested decision, ECHA found, inter alia, that the concentration of the substance in the mixture and the expected yearly amount of the substance or mixture (kg/l per year), that is to say, the information that the applicants regard as business secrets, constituted information on emissions into the environment. ECHA stated in that decision that, since the mixtures at issue were intended to be used as pesticides in the importing countries, because the declared uses were related to seed treatment to protect crops, they were intended to be released into the environment by virtue of their function. ECHA therefore found that all the information that the applicants considered at that stage to be business secrets constituted information concerning the nature, composition, quantity, date and place of foreseeable release into the environment in the course of normal use, in accordance with the case-law cited in paragraph 37 above. 43      Since the mixtures concerned are plant protection products intended to be used as pesticides in the importing countries, it therefore appears, prima facie, that those mixtures will inevitably be released into the environment by virtue of their very function, within the meaning of the case-law cited in paragraph 36 above. It follows that the foreseeable emissions into the environment, under normal or realistic conditions of use, of the mixture at issue, or of the substances which that mixture contains, do not appear, prima facie, to be hypothetical. 44      Second, as regards the applicants’ argument that the information at issue concerns hypothetical rather than likely emissions, since the export notifications reflect expected exports but not actual exports, first, it is appropriate to reiterate that the export notifications in question have, in this instance, received explicit consent from the respective designated national authorities of the importing countries. 45      Second, it is apparent from Annex Q.1 to ECHA’s reply to the measure of organisation of procedure that, on the basis of the information submitted by the applicants under Article 10(1) of Regulation No 649/2012, actual exports did in fact take place in 2024. 46      Furthermore, as regards the applicants’ argument that most export notifications are submitted even before a contract has been concluded with an importer of the product and often before a specific importer has been found, it should be noted that, under point 4(f) of Annex II to Regulation No 649/2012, it is necessary to include in the export notification the name, address and other particulars of the importing natural or legal person. It follows that there is necessarily a link, whether contractual or otherwise, between the exporting undertaking and the importer. 47      Consequently, it appears, prima facie, that the information at issue constitutes ‘information [which] relates to emissions into the environment’ and that it is covered by the presumption established in the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006. 48      In the second place, according to the applicants, ECHA has failed to examine whether the disclosure of the information at issue would have a specific adverse effect on the protection of the environment to which the information relates for the purposes of Article 6(2) of Regulation No 1367/2006. In those circumstances, the disclosure of information to the detriment of their commercial interests would disadvantage their competitive position compared with that of third-country competitors. 49      In that regard, it must be noted at the outset that the applicants’ arguments are general and vague. 50      In any event, it should be recalled that Regulation No 1367/2006 aims, as provided for in Article 1 thereof, to ensure the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination of environmental information. 51      According to recital 20 of Regulation No 649/2012, exchange of information, shared responsibility and cooperative efforts between the Union and the Member States and third countries should be promoted, whether or not those third countries are Parties to the Rotterdam Convention on the prior informed consent procedure for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticides in international trade, with a view to ensuring sound management of chemicals. The objective is to prevent the harmful effects of chemicals on human health and the environment, whether inside or outside the European Union. 52      It follows from the foregoing that, without prejudging the decision of the General Court on the main action, it must be found that the present plea in law appears, prima facie, to be unfounded, within the meaning of the case-law recalled in paragraph 25 above.  The second plea in law 53      By their second plea in law, the applicants claim that, even if the information at issue related to emissions into the environment within the meaning of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006, that circumstance would not permit ECHA to disregard entirely, without examining all the relevant circumstances, the interests of the person whose interests are protected by Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 or the interests protected by Article 6(2) of Regulation No 1367/2006. By failing altogether to examine those legitimate interests or to take them into consideration, ECHA erred in law. 54      According to the applicants, the interpretation proposed by ECHA would render wholly ‘redundant and illusory’ the protection afforded to their commercial interests and to their professional secrecy under Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 and the environmental protection under Article 6(2) of Regulation No 1367/2006, and would seriously jeopardise the balance of interests that the applicable regulations seek to achieve. 55      In that regard, it must be noted, first, that the applicants’ arguments are abstract and general. 56      The applicants fail to make clear how the disclosure of the information at issue would be likely to have specific adverse effects on their commercial interests. 57      Second, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that it is, indeed, necessary to adopt an interpretation of the concept of ‘information [which] relates to emissions into the environment’ within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 that does not render wholly redundant Article 339 TFEU and the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, to the extent that those articles protect the professional secrecy and commercial interests of a particular natural or legal person. The right of access to the documents of the institutions laid down by that regulation is subject to certain limitations based on grounds of public or private interest, including the protection of the commercial interests of a particular natural or legal person (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 November 2016, Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe, C‑673/13 P, EU:C:2016:889, paragraph 50). 58      However, by establishing a presumption that the disclosure of ‘information [which] relates to emissions into the environment’, with the exception of information relating to investigations, is deemed to be in the overriding public interest, compared with the interest in protecting the commercial interests of a particular natural or legal person, with the result that the protection of those commercial interests may not be invoked to preclude the disclosure of that information, the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 derogates from the rule requiring the weighing up of the interests laid down in Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. The first sentence of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 therefore allows actual implementation of the principle that the public should have the widest possible access to information held by the institutions and bodies of the European Union, with the result that a narrow interpretation of that provision cannot be justified (see, to that effect, judgment of 23 November 2016, Commission v Stichting Greenpeace Nederland and PAN Europe, C‑673/13 P, EU:C:2016:889, paragraph 54). 59      That means that an EU institution, hearing a request for access to a document, cannot justify its refusal to disclose it on the basis of the exception relating to the protection of the commercial interests of a particular natural or legal person, provided for in the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001, where the information contained in that document constitutes information which ‘relates to emissions into the environment’ for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 (judgment of 18 June 2025, Arysta Lifescience v EFSA, T‑222/23, not published, under appeal, EU:T:2025:609, paragraph 36). 60      It follows from the foregoing that the exception relating to the protection of commercial interests provided for in the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001 cannot, prima facie, be relied on in order to object to the disclosure of the information at issue, which is regarded as information which ‘relates to emissions into the environment’ for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 1367/2006 (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 2019, Tweedale v EFSA, T‑716/14, EU:T:2019:141, paragraph 127). 61      Third, according to the case-law, it is for a person who is seeking the application of one of the exceptions laid down in Article 4 of Regulation No 1049/2001 to the fundamental principle of openness referred to in particular in Article 15(1) TFEU to provide, in due time, explanations to the EU institution, body, office or agency in question as to how access to the document in respect of which access is sought could have a specific and actual adverse effect on the interest protected by that exception (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 January 2020, PTC Therapeutics International v EMA, C‑175/18 P, EU:C:2020:23, paragraphs 94 and 95). 62      In the present case, the applicants have not, in due time, provided such explanations to ECHA. 63      It is apparent from paragraph 3 of ECHA’s reply to the measure of organisation of procedure that, in the context of the third-party consultation procedure relating to the request for access to the information at issue, the applicants submitted no claim regarding adverse effects on the protection of commercial interests under the first indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 1049/2001. 64      Fourth, as ECHA submits and as is apparent from page 36 of Annex O.9 to its observations on the application for interim measures, information similar to the information at issue is already public as a result of ECHA’s decision in the context of the application with reference ATD/048/2024. 65      Consequently, it appears, prima facie, that the information at issue is manifestly not confidential in the light of the case-law cited in paragraph 26 above. 66      Fifth, as regards the applicants’ argument that ECHA should have analysed the interests protected by Article 6(2) of Regulation No 1367/2006, that line of argument must be rejected for the same reasons as those set out in paragraph 49 above. 67      It follows from all the foregoing that, without in any way prejudging the Court’s position on the action in the main proceedings, the present plea in law also appears, prima facie, to be unfounded, within the meaning of the case-law recalled in paragraph 25 above.  Final observations 68      In the light of all the foregoing, since the applicants have not succeeded in establishing the existence of a prima facie case, the present application for interim measures must be dismissed without any requirement to examine the other conditions referred to in paragraphs 20 and 21 above. 69      It is also necessary to reject as inadmissible the head of claim by which the applicants request an order for any other interim measure considered appropriate, in accordance with settled case-law to the effect that asking the judge hearing the application for interim measures to adopt any other interim relief measures, without specifying in what those measures might consist, amounts to asking the judge him or herself to draw up the form of order which that judge is subsequently supposed to assess (see order of 15 July 2019, 3V Sigma v ECHA, T‑176/19 R, not published, EU:T:2019:547, paragraph 37 and the case-law cited). 70      Since the present order closes the proceedings for interim measures, the order of 16 May 2025, DLF Beet Seed and United Beet Seeds v ECHA (T‑305/25 R, not published), adopted under Article 157(2) of the Rules of Procedure, by which ECHA was ordered to suspend the operation of the contested decision until the date of the order bringing the present interim proceedings to an end, must be cancelled.  Costs 71      Pursuant to Article 158(5) of the Rules of Procedure, it is appropriate to reserve the costs. On those grounds, THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL COURT hereby orders: 1.      The application for interim measures is dismissed. 2.      The order of 16 May 2025, DLF Beet Seed and United Beet Seeds v ECHA (T‑305/25 R), is cancelled. 3.      The costs are reserved. Luxembourg, 27 October 2025. V. Di Bucci   M. van der Woude Registrar   President *      Language of the case: English.