T-383/25

Provisional text OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL BRKAN delivered on 3 June 2026 (1) Case T‑383/25 Hauptzollamt A v Segelbootwartung (Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Fiscal Court, Germany)) ( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Customs Union – Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 – Value added tax – Directive 2006/112/EC – Sailing boat brought into the European Union, without being presented to customs, for maintenance and repair works – Imposition of customs duties and import VAT ) Introduction 1.        When a private individual residing in a third country imports a means of transport into the European Union in order to have it repaired, without presenting it to customs and without using it as a means of transport before re-exporting it, must he or she pay import value added tax (VAT) and import customs duties? That is the question at the heart of the present case. 2.        Thus, this request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Fiscal Court, Germany) concerns the interpretation of the VAT Directive (2) and the customs legislation, in particular the Union Customs Code (‘the UCC’). (3) Legal framework European Union law 3.        In the present case, the relevant provisions are, inter alia, Article 2(1)(d) and Articles 30, 70 and 71 of the VAT Directive and Article 79(1)(a), Article 124(1)(k) and Articles 211 and 256 of the UCC. National law 4.        According to Paragraph 1 of the Umsatzsteuergesetz (Law on turnover tax), in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings: ‘(1)      The following transactions shall be subject to turnover tax: … 4.      the importation of goods into the national territory …; …’ 5.        Paragraph 21 of the Law on turnover tax provides: ‘… (2)      The rules governing customs duties shall apply mutatis mutandis to import turnover tax; …’ The dispute in the main proceedings and the questions referred for a preliminary ruling 6.        On 28 March 2017, the respondent in the appeal on a point of law (‘the respondent’) in the main proceedings, a natural person residing in Switzerland, brought a sailing boat registered in Switzerland into Germany on a trailer towed by a private vehicle via Customs Office A, without undergoing customs clearance. During a roadside check, he stated that he was travelling to the company X, established in Germany, in order to have maintenance and repair work carried out on the outboard motor of his sailing boat. The appellant on a point of law (‘the appellant’) in the main proceedings, namely the Hauptzollamt (Principal Customs Office, Germany; ‘the HZA’), therefore issued a notice imposing import customs duties and import VAT. 7.        After paying the import duties, the respondent in the main proceedings transported the sailing boat to the company X, which carried out maintenance and repair work on it. The sailing boat was re-exported to Switzerland on 18 May 2017, without having been used for any other purpose in the customs territory of the European Union. 8.        The respondent in the main proceedings lodged an objection against the notice imposing import duties. That objection having been dismissed, he brought an action before the Finanzgericht (Fiscal Court, Germany), which expressed doubts as to whether import VAT had fallen due, on the ground that, even though the sailing boat had been the subject of a supply of services, those services constituted a transaction distinct from importation, from a VAT law perspective. In any event, that court took the view that both the customs debt and any potential VAT debt had been extinguished by virtue of Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC. 9.        The HZA has brought an appeal on a point of law before the referring court. 10.      The Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Fiscal Court) considers that the resolution of the case brought before it depends on the interpretation of provisions of the VAT Directive and of the customs legislation. It therefore decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions for a preliminary ruling: ‘(1)      Does a means of transport enter the economic network of the European Union if it is not used as a means of transport in a Member State, but a service (in the present case: maintenance and repair works) is [provided in respect of] it? (2)      Is Article 124(1)(k) of the [UCC] to be interpreted as meaning that … non-Union good[s] [are] used, [for] the [purposes] of that provision, if, within the customs territory of the [European] Union, only maintenance or repair works are carried out on [them], and the non-Union good[s] [are] then re-exported?’ 11.      In the proceedings before the General Court, the Greek Government and the European Commission have submitted observations. The respondent in the main proceedings, the Commission and the Greek Government participated in the hearing held on 25 March 2025, during which they answered the written and oral questions put to them by the Court. Analysis Preliminary observations 12.      In the first place, since the answers to the questions referred for a preliminary ruling depend upon the preliminary issue of whether or not the factual situation in the case in the main proceedings falls within the scope of one of the special customs procedures provided for in Article 210 of the UCC, some clarification in that regard is necessary. 13.      It is clear from the order for reference that the sailing boat from Switzerland was temporarily brought into the customs territory of the European Union overland in order to be serviced and repaired there. Following those operations, it was re-exported to Switzerland without having been used as a means of transport in the customs territory of the European Union. 14.      In so far as a non-Union means of transport, in this case a boat, has undergone maintenance and repair work in the customs territory of the European Union before then being taken out of that customs territory, that work could, in principle, have been carried out under the temporary admission procedure or the inward processing procedure. However, as the referring court has noted, since the sailing boat was not used as a means of transport in the customs territory of the European Union, the application of the temporary admission procedure is precluded, such that it was not possible for the work in question to be carried out on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 204 of the Delegated Regulation supplementing the Union Customs Code (‘the UCC DR’). (4) 15.      Next, as regards the inward processing procedure, in accordance with Article 256(1) of the UCC, that special procedure allows processing operations – including repairs (5) – to be carried out on non-Union goods in the European Union without those goods being subject to import duty, other charges or commercial policy measures. In order for non-Union goods to be placed under the inward processing procedure, point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 211(1) of the UCC requires the issue of an authorisation by the customs authorities. 16.      In the present case, the referring court states that the respondent in the main proceedings did not have an inward processing authorisation within the meaning of point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 211(1) of the UCC. It must therefore be concluded that the two questions submitted by the referring court are based on the premiss that the inward processing procedure was not used in the case in the main proceedings, such that the sailing boat of the private individual residing in Switzerland was not placed under any special customs procedure when it was brought into the customs territory of the European Union. 17.      That said, it seems to me important to note that it appears from the ruling of the Finanzgericht (Fiscal Court) referred to in point 8 above, which is included in the national case file, that that court of first instance has been seised of another action concerning the respondent in the main proceedings. That action concerns the rejection by the HZA of the application by the respondent in the main proceedings for a retroactive authorisation to use the inward processing procedure for the work carried out in Germany on his sailing boat. At the hearing, the respondent in the main proceedings stated that that action concerning the rejection of his application for a retrospective authorisation was still pending before the Finanzgericht (Fiscal Court). 18.      In that regard, it should be noted that, pursuant to Article 211(2) of the UCC, customs authorities may grant an authorisation to use the inward processing procedure that has retroactive effect. It is important to emphasise at the outset that the question whether or not the respondent in the main proceedings has a retroactive authorisation to use the inward processing procedure for the operations at issue in the case in the main proceedings is decisive in establishing whether the maintenance and repair work carried out in Germany on his sailing boat could be regarded as having been carried out under the inward processing procedure or whether that was not the case. In addressing the possibility that that was the case, the present Opinion includes considerations specifically relating to the situation where the respondent in the main proceedings does ultimately obtain, upon the conclusion of the national court proceedings mentioned above, a retroactive inward processing authorisation for the operations at issue. 19.      In the second place, it is clear from the case-law that import VAT and import customs duties display comparable essential features since they arise from the importation of goods into the European Union and the subsequent distribution of those goods through the economic channels of the Member States, and that that parallel nature is confirmed by the fact that the second subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive authorises Member States to link the chargeable event and the date on which import VAT becomes chargeable with those laid down for customs duties. (6) However, that parallel nature is limited, inasmuch as there are differences concerning the chargeability or the place of taxation of import VAT and of import customs duties. Thus, as Advocate General Kokott has already pointed out, (7) in addition to cases in which the places where the customs debt and the VAT debt arise may differ, (8) in certain situations, an import VAT debt may remain payable even when the customs debt corresponding to that VAT debt has been extinguished (9) and, conversely, import VAT is sometimes not chargeable even when the corresponding customs debt has not been extinguished. (10) 20.      Consequently, the question whether an import VAT debt is due in a situation such as that in the case in the main proceedings does not necessarily depend on the answer to the question whether the customs debt arising under Article 79(1)(a) of the UCC is capable of being extinguished pursuant to Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC. Accordingly, I shall examine the questions referred for a preliminary ruling in the order in which they were put by the referring court. The first question, concerning the chargeability of import VAT 21.      Although the first question submitted by the referring court, which concerns the chargeability of import VAT, does not refer to specific provisions of the VAT Directive, I consider that, by that first question, it is asking, in essence, whether Article 30, Article 70 and the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the chargeable event for import VAT and the chargeability of that tax arise from the fact of bringing into a Member State of the European Union a means of transport from a third country, without placing it under the inward processing procedure, in order for maintenance and repair operations to be carried out on it, even if that means of transport was subsequently re-exported without having been used as a means of transport while it was physically present in that Member State. 22.      Under Article 2(1)(d) of the VAT Directive, importation is a transaction subject to VAT. It is clear from the wording of that provision that, in contrast to the supply of goods, the intra-Community acquisition of goods and the supply of services for consideration, the importation of goods may be taxable including when it is effected by a private individual, whether or not there is a transaction and irrespective of whether any transaction is carried out for valuable consideration or free of charge. (11) The first paragraph of Article 30 of the VAT Directive provides that ‘importation of goods’ is to mean the entry into the European Union of goods which are not in free circulation within the meaning of Article 29 TFEU. Consequently, Article 30 of the VAT Directive covers the entry into the European Union of goods from third countries, in relation to which import formalities have not been carried out and customs duties have not been collected. 23.      According to Article 70 of the VAT Directive, which is also relevant to the present case, the chargeable event for import VAT is to occur and VAT is to become chargeable when the goods are imported. However, Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive provides, in the first subparagraph thereof, inter alia, that, where, on entry into the European Union, goods are placed under certain specific customs arrangements, the chargeable event is to occur and VAT is to become chargeable only when the goods cease to be covered by that arrangement. However, the second subparagraph of Article 71(1) refers to the specific situation where, for imported goods that are subject to customs duties, the chargeable event is to occur and VAT is to become chargeable when the chargeable event in respect of those duties occurs and those duties become chargeable. (12) 24.      It therefore follows from the wording of Articles 70 and 71 of the VAT Directive that the chargeable event for import VAT occurs and that tax becomes chargeable when goods coming from a third country physically enter the territory of the European Union, unless they are placed, at the time when they enter that territory, under one of the special customs arrangements, such as inward processing. (13) Indeed, those customs arrangements are based on the legal fiction that the goods from third countries are not, from a legal standpoint, in the European Union, despite the fact that they are physically present there. (14) That is why, when such goods are placed under one of the customs arrangements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive, the chargeable event for import VAT occurs and that tax becomes chargeable only when the goods cease to be covered by those arrangements. 25.      Let us take, as an example, a private individual resident in a third country who has obtained from the competent customs authorities an authorisation to use the inward processing procedure in order to have goods belonging to him repaired in a neighbouring Member State, and those goods are not intended for a specific use within the European Union. If that individual places the goods in question under the inward processing procedure at the time when they enter the territory of the Member State and, once the repair work is completed, he brings the goods back to his place of residence outside the European Union, and he has complied with the conditions for using that procedure as laid down in the customs legislation and in the authorisation, the chargeable event for import VAT does not occur and that tax does not become chargeable, and the tax is therefore not due. 26.      However, when the customs arrangements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive are used, irregularities may occur. In such circumstances, according to the case-law, there may be a requirement to pay VAT in addition to a customs debt when, based on the particular unlawful conduct which gave rise to the customs debt, it may be presumed that the goods entered the economic network of the European Union and may undergo consumption, that is, the act on which VAT is levied. (15) It is important to emphasise that that presumption is rebuttable. (16) Consequently, the fact that irregularities occur in the use of the special customs arrangements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive does not automatically result in the incurrence of an import VAT debt. 27.      In the present case, in contrast to the example cited in point 25 above, it appears that the respondent in the main proceedings, who resides in Switzerland, brought his sailing boat overland into Germany without presenting it to customs. Since he was not in possession of an authorisation for inward processing for the purpose of having the maintenance and repair work carried out, his sailing boat was not placed under that procedure when it was physically brought into Germany. At the hearing, the respondent in the main proceedings maintained that his sailing boat did not enter the economic network of the European Union for the purposes of consumption there because it was re-exported to Switzerland and had not actually been used as a means of transport in the territory of the European Union. Similarly, at the hearing, in contrast to the position maintained by the Commission, he argued that, having regard to the case-law on the place where import VAT is incurred, the question of whether the chargeable event occurred and the tax became chargeable when the sailing boat was brought into Germany cannot depend on the issue of a retroactive authorisation to use the inward processing procedure. 28.      I take the view that the approach proposed by the respondent in the main proceedings cannot be followed. When it comes to establishing the existence of an import VAT debt, which is to say, deciding whether that tax is chargeable in the European Union, I propose that an approach should be adopted that takes into account the specific purpose of that tax when it concerns imports. Indeed, while the particular situation of the respondent in the main proceedings makes it tempting to adopt a ‘tailored’ interpretation of the provisions of the VAT Directive, so that he is not required to pay import VAT, it does not seem possible to me to confine the answer to the first question to the situation of a private individual residing in a third country who brings a means of transport into the European Union temporarily. Because the answer provided by the General Court will take effect erga omnes – and could therefore be applied to a situation where a means of transport belonging to a legal person is brought into the European Union temporarily (17) – the provisions of the VAT Directive relating to the chargeable event and the chargeability of VAT must be interpreted in such a way as not to open the way to potential abuse or fraud in connection with import VAT. 29.      It is important to emphasise that, although VAT is, admittedly, a consumption tax, the fact remains that making goods from third countries subject to import VAT is justified by the objective of external neutrality, which is aimed at ensuring that taxable individuals established in the European Union who supply goods to customers within the European Union are not placed at a competitive disadvantage by comparison with their competitors established outside the European Union. (18) Thus, the collection of import VAT is meant to align the tax burden on goods coming from third countries with the level of VAT that applies to comparable Union goods. (19) 30.      In order to attain that objective of preventing distortions of competition that could result from the introduction into the European Union of goods from third countries without their being subject to VAT, the EU legislature has laid down the general rule – both simple and automatic – set out in Article 70 of the VAT Directive, according to which the chargeable event for VAT purposes and the chargeability of import VAT result from the mere fact of such goods being physically introduced into the European Union, even where that physical introduction is effected by a private individual for private purposes or where the goods are brought in without any intention of financial gain. As an exception to that principle, the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive provides that the chargeable event does not occur and import VAT does not become chargeable when goods are physically brought in and they are placed under one of the customs arrangements referred to in that provision. With regard to the system of rules laid down in Article 70 and the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of that directive, Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona has previously expressed the view that the physical introduction of goods from a third country gives rise to a presumption that those goods enter the economic network of the European Union (the general rule in Article 70 of the VAT Directive), which may be rebutted if the goods are placed under a customs arrangement (the exception in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of that directive). (20) 31.      Those customs arrangements and situations referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive – by means of the reference to Articles 156, 276 and 277 of that directive – entail the completion of certain customs formalities and the implementation of customs supervision, (21) which enable the customs authorities to check that goods from third countries do not enter the economic network of the European Union while they are present there under one of the said arrangements. To that end, as regards the inward processing procedure, the authorisation granted by the customs authorities is intended to enable the identification of goods from third countries that are to be placed under that procedure, (22) and it falls to the customs authorities to specify the period within which the inward processing procedure is to be discharged. (23) When goods are physically brought into the territory of the European Union, their being placed under that procedure enables the customs authorities to take cognisance of their entry into the European Union so that they can exercise customs supervision over them. (24) For that purpose, the holder of the authorisation must, inter alia, keep appropriate records containing the information and particulars which enable the customs authorities to supervise the implementation of the procedure, in particular with regard to the identification of the goods placed under the procedure, their customs status and their movements. (25) Then, if the inward processing procedure is brought to a close, by the exit from the European Union of the goods placed under that procedure, when the procedure is discharged, the customs authorities can satisfy themselves that the goods re-exported are those that were brought temporarily into the European Union and that the duration of their presence in the European Union, and their movements, were limited to what was necessary in order for the authorised operations to be carried out. If that is the case, the chargeable event does not occur and import VAT does not become chargeable, such that no import VAT need be paid. 32.      It may be noted that, up to now, in the case-law on the existence of an import VAT debt, the fact that goods from third countries were placed under a customs arrangement at the time when they were physically brought into the European Union has been important. This was so in the three judgments concerning goods brought temporarily into the European Union and re-exported from the European Union. The case in Eurogate Distribution (C‑226/14) concerned accounting irregularities in connection with the use of the customs warehousing arrangement. That said, since the goods coming from a third country were covered by that customs arrangement until the time when they were re-exported from the European Union, they were not regarded as having been imported. (26) In DHL Hub Leipzig (C‑228/14), concerning goods coming from third countries and placed under the external transit procedure, the non-fulfilment of the obligation to discharge that procedure by presenting the goods at issue to the relevant customs office was found not to entail the incurrence of a VAT debt, for the reason that the goods in question had remained under the external transit procedure until they were re-exported. (27) In Wallenborn (C‑571/15), the external transit procedure was breached when customs seals were broken, albeit that was done in a free zone and while the goods remained in the free zone they were not released into free circulation, consumed or used. The goods were then immediately placed under the customs warehousing procedure and then re-exported from the European Union. The Court of Justice found that, in those circumstances, the goods coming from a third country appeared not to have entered the economic network of the European Union, which was a matter for the national court to establish. (28) 33.      In Latvijas dzelzceļš (C‑154/16), which concerned goods coming from a third country that were not re-exported from the European Union, the Court of Justice held that import VAT was not due in respect of the part of the goods that had been completely destroyed or irretrievably lost while under the external Community transit procedure. The Court found that goods totally destroyed or irretrievably lost while they were placed under that procedure could not enter the economic network of the European Union and, hence, could not exit that procedure. (29) 34.      By contrast, in Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20), which concerned contraband cigarettes brought into the European Union illegally – which is to say, goods not placed under any customs arrangement – the Court of Justice held that, where such goods had been seized and confiscated after going beyond the first customs office situated inside the European Union, the chargeable event for VAT purposes had already occurred. Consequently, in accordance with Article 70 of the VAT Directive, import VAT remained chargeable, even if the corresponding customs debt had been extinguished in accordance with Article 124(1)(e) of the UCC. (30) It also follows from that case that, although VAT is a consumption tax, it is not the actual consumption of goods within the European Union that triggers the chargeable event and the chargeability of import VAT, but rather potential consumption. Indeed, since the goods in question were seized and confiscated by border control officers after going beyond the first customs office situated inside the European Union, there had nevertheless been a potential for them to be consumed until the time they were confiscated. 35.      It therefore seems to me that it can be inferred from the case-law regarding the existence of a liability to pay import VAT that a failure to place goods coming from a third country under one of the customs arrangements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive automatically means that the goods have entered the economic network of the European Union, in accordance with Article 70 of that directive. Indeed, goods coming from a third country that are not placed under a customs arrangement at the time when they are physically brought into the European Union are, by reason of the absence of customs supervision, liable to be consumed or used within the European Union. Consequently, when such goods are physically present in the European Union, they are liable to compete with comparable Union goods, even if they are subsequently re-exported from the European Union. 36.      In the present case, although the sailing boat belonging to the respondent in the main proceedings was not used as a means of transport, it was the subject of maintenance and repair work in Germany. (31) In accordance with the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive, VAT would not have been chargeable only if the sailing boat had been placed under the inward processing procedure, since placing it under that suspension arrangement would have given rise to the presumption that it did not enter the economic network of the European Union. Accordingly, it should be considered that the sailing boat did enter the economic network of the European Union, given that, in the absence of the inward processing procedure, it could potentially have been consumed – or used, rather, since it was not an item of consumer goods – while it was present in the European Union. Indeed, the fact that the sailing boat was not placed under the inward processing procedure implies that it could potentially have been used by natural or legal persons established in the European Union while it was present there. 37.      The respondent in the main proceedings maintains that the effet utile of the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive is confined to providing legal certainty for natural and legal persons that comply with that provision when they physically bring goods from third countries into the European Union. That interpretation would therefore make it possible to rule out the possibility of a chargeable event occurring and the chargeability of import VAT arising, on the basis that no use is made of the goods within the European Union and that the goods are re-exported. However, if that interpretation were accepted, natural and legal persons would no longer be required to comply with that provision, since it would suffice for them to declare, when the goods leave the European Union, that they have not been used within the European Union in order to call into question the chargeability of VAT. 38.      Given the importance of the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive for attaining the objective of external neutrality pursued by import VAT, I take the view, as do the Greek Government and the Commission, that the effet utile of that provision must be fully preserved. Otherwise, if it were possible to rule out the chargeable event and the chargeability of VAT when goods coming from third countries are physically introduced into the European Union without being placed under one of the customs arrangements referred to in that provision, the absence of customs supervision at the time when the goods are brought in would, it seems to me, entail a risk of abuse and fraud. 39.      In that regard, a recent special report prepared by the European Court of Auditors concerning import VAT fraud states that lacunae in the regulatory framework for certain simplified procedures, namely customs procedure 42 and the one-stop shop for imports under the special scheme for distance sales, engender a significant risk of abuse and a risk for the protection of the financial interests of the European Union. (32) Admittedly, this special report does not specifically address the consequences that failure to comply with the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive could have for the Member States’ ability to collect import VAT revenue appropriately and to detect possible abuse or fraud in that connection. However, I consider that an interpretation of that provision which would make it possible to avoid the triggering of the chargeable event and the chargeability of import VAT without complying with the obligation it entails would create a loophole that could weaken the regulatory framework applicable to import VAT. Such a loophole could give rise to abuse or fraud and, consequently, the loss of import VAT revenue. Indeed, the customs and tax authorities would be unable to ensure the supervision of goods coming from third countries while they are physically present in the European Union. In particular, in the case of goods brought into the European Union and intended for re-exportation, the customs authorities would be unable to satisfy themselves that the goods have actually been re-exported if they are not informed of their physical introduction into the European Union by means of their being placed under a particular arrangement. (33) Nor would they be able to check whether the goods are sold in the European Union or what use may have been made of them while present there. However, it cannot be ruled out that a boat from a third country brought into the European Union by road in order for repair work to be carried out on it could be sold to a company established in the European Union before being re-exported to a third country. Similarly, if the boat is not placed under the inward processing procedure at the time when it is physically introduced into the European Union, the customs and tax authorities would be unable to determine the period of time during which the boat is physically present in the European Union and whether that duration is warranted solely by the carrying out of the repairs. For example, the repairs could take only a few days and the boat might then remain for several months in the European Union to be chartered out in the European Union. Moreover, if a check were to be carried out not when the boat enters the European Union but when it leaves it, then if the boat were not placed under the inward processing procedure on entry into the European Union, the authorities would be unable to satisfy themselves that the boat is indeed the one that was brought in. Admittedly, those examples of the risk of abuse and fraud do not correspond to the situation at issue in the case in the main proceedings, since the boat belonging to the respondent in the main proceedings was the subject solely of maintenance and repair operations and no use was made of it as a means of transport in the European Union. Nevertheless, as emphasised in point 28 above, it seems dangerous to me to adopt a tailored interpretation – which would nevertheless take effect erga omnes and could undermine the system of rules laid down in Article 70 and Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive – in order to fit the particular situation in the case in the main proceedings. 40.      Having regard to the considerations set out in points 29 to 39 above, I take the view that, when it comes to establishing the existence of an import VAT debt, in order to avoid triggering the chargeable event and the chargeability of that tax on the basis of Article 70 of the VAT Directive, the goods coming from third countries must necessarily be placed under one of the arrangements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of that directive. 41.      I do not consider that approach to be contrary to the line of case-law concerning the place where VAT is incurred, to which the respondent in the main proceedings has referred. 42.      Since the case in Fedex (C‑26/18), when it comes to determining the place where import VAT is incurred, the Court of Justice has similarly applied a rebuttable presumption of entry into the economic network of the European Union. Entry into the economic network is presumed to have taken place in the Member State in which the goods coming from a third country were introduced in breach of the customs legislation. That presumption may be rebutted if it is established that the final destination of the goods is another Member State in which they are consumed. (34) In Hauptzollamt Münster (Place where VAT is incurred) (C‑7/20), which concerned a land motor vehicle brought into the European Union in breach of the customs legislation, which then transited through the territory of several Member States before reaching the Member State of its final destination, the Court held that, in order to determine the Member State in which the vehicle entered the economic network of the European Union – or, in other words, to rebut the presumption – it is necessary to take account of the place where the vehicle was actually used. (35) In Hauptzollamt Hamburg (Place where VAT is incurred – II), concerning similar circumstances, the Court held that account must be taken of the place where the vehicle is actually and permanently used and that the place of residence of the user could provide relevant information. (36) I would observe that, in those three cases, the goods coming from a third country had not been presented to customs or placed under one of the customs arrangements referred to in Article 61 of the VAT Directive, which are identical to those referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of that directive. 43.      It is true that, on the basis of the case-law concerning the determination of the place where VAT is incurred, which takes account of the place where the goods coming from third countries are consumed or actually and permanently used, in circumstances such as those of the case in the main proceedings it could be considered that the re-exportation from the European Union of the sailing boat brought in from Switzerland means that the boat did not enter the economic network of the European Union, for the reason that it belongs to a person residing in a third country, such that its use in the European Union could not be permanent. 44.      However, even though they both rely on a presumption of entry into the economic network of the European Union, I take the view that a distinction must be made between the line of case-law concerning the existence of a liability to pay import VAT and the line of case-law concerning the determination of the place where import VAT is incurred. Indeed, in Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20), which concerned the question of whether or not import VAT was chargeable in the European Union – and therefore the very existence of that tax –, the approach taken was based on the potential consumption in the European Union of goods coming from a third country. (37) That judgment post-dates those concerning the place where import VAT is incurred, in which the approach taken was based on the Member State of actual consumption (Fedex, C‑26/18) or of actual use (Hauptzollamt Münster (Place where VAT is incurred), C‑7/20). 45.      It seems to me that such a distinction may be explained by the fact that the judgments relating to the place where import VAT is incurred pertain to situations in which a number of Member States are concerned and in which there is no doubt as to the existence of that chargeable tax in the European Union, by virtue of the fact that the goods from third countries are actually consumed or actually used in the Member State of residence of the consumer or user. It is therefore indisputable that the goods have actually entered the economic network of the European Union. Accordingly, it simply remains to be determined which Member State has competence to collect that tax. In order to do so, it is necessary to apply the principle of the territorial application of VAT, in accordance with which revenue deriving from import VAT belongs to the Member State in which final consumption occurs or in which the goods coming from third countries are actually and permanently used. (38) In those circumstances, the fact that those goods were not placed under one of the customs arrangements referred to in Article 61 of the VAT Directive at the time of their physical introduction into the European Union does not appear problematic. 46.      By contrast, in a situation limited to the territory of a single Member State and involving the unlawful and temporary introduction of goods from a third country, it is therefore a question of establishing the very existence of an import VAT debt due within the European Union. In such a situation, it seems to me that, in order fully to preserve the effet utile of the system of rules in Article 70 and Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive, which is necessary in order to attain the objective of the external neutrality of import VAT and to prevent abuse and fraud, I consider that, as was held in Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20), which concerned the unlawful introduction of goods from a third country into a Member State, it is the potential consumption or the potential use of goods coming from a third country that determines their entry into the economic network of the European Union. 47.      In the present case, the sailing boat was physically brought into the European Union overland without being placed under one of the arrangements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive. Consequently, when the boat went beyond the first customs office situated inside the European Union, in the absence of any customs supervision in the context of the inward processing procedure, it could potentially be used in the European Union. As a result, it entered the economic network of the European Union, such that importation took place, triggering the chargeable event and the chargeability of VAT. The VAT Directive does not contain any provisions other than those laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of that directive that could call into question the triggering of the chargeable event and the chargeability of import VAT. Indeed, no provision of that directive provides that import VAT is no longer chargeable in the European Union if goods coming from a third country that have not actually been used inside the European Union are subsequently re-exported. (39) It follows that the fact that a means of transport coming from a third country and physically introduced into the European Union is re-exported without actually having been used in the European Union as a means of transport does not mean that it had not been imported once it was physically present in the European Union without being covered by one of the customs arrangements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive. 48.      Therefore, when a natural or legal person physically introduces goods from a third country into the European Union in order to have them repaired, without placing them under one of the customs arrangements referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive, then, as the Commission correctly argued at the hearing, the only way to rebut the presumption of entry into the economic network of the European Union which arises under Article 70 of that directive is for the competent customs authorities to issue an inward processing authorisation with retroactive effect, granted in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 211(2) of the UCC. The fulfilment of the conditions in that provision enables the customs authorities to establish that the means of transport from a third country was not used for any purpose other than that of its maintenance and repair. In a situation such as that in the case in the main proceedings, it is, as the Commission stated at the hearing, for the applicant for retroactive authorisation to produce documents such as the registration certificate or ownership certificate for the boat, the invoice for the maintenance and repair work and, possibly, the nautical logbook. Furthermore, the time for which the boat was present in the European Union could also be a relevant factor to be taken into consideration in deciding on the grant of a retroactive authorisation. Thus, if the customs authorities take the view that the requirements of the inward processing procedure could have been satisfied, in light of the information provided by the respondent in the main proceedings, they could grant an authorisation with retroactive effect. Given the retroactive effect of such an authorisation, it would have the effect of meeting the requirement, laid down in first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive, to place the goods coming from a third country under one of the customs arrangements referred to in that provision on entry into the European Union. 49.      Having regard to the foregoing considerations, I propose that the answer to the first question referred for a preliminary ruling should be as follows: Articles 30 and 70 and the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the mere fact of physically introducing into a Member State of the European Union a means of transport from a third country, without placing it under the inward processing procedure, in order for maintenance and repair operations to be carried out on it, even if that means of transport was subsequently re-exported without having been used as a means of transport while it was physically present in that Member State, constitutes an importation triggering the chargeable event for import VAT purposes and the chargeability of that tax, unless the person concerned is issued with a retroactive authorisation by the competent customs authorities in accordance with Article 211(2) of the UCC. The second question, concerning the extinguishment of the customs debt 50.      By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC is to be interpreted as meaning that, where a means of transport has been temporarily brought into the customs territory of the European Union without any authorisation to use the inward processing procedure, maintenance and repair work carried out within that customs territory constitute use, for the purposes of that provision, even if that means of transport was not used for transportation purposes while it was present in the customs territory of the European Union. 51.      This second question from the referring court solely concerns the concept of ‘use’ for the purposes of Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC, since it is not disputed before that court that the sailing boat was re-exported. 52.      In that connection, it may be recalled that the Court of Justice has previously held, in Combinova (C‑476/19), (40) that the UCC does not contain a definition of the concept of ‘use’ for the purposes of that provision, and has pointed out that differences between the various language versions justify an interpretation based on the purpose and general scheme of the legislation (paragraphs 29 and 30 of that judgment). The Court found that it was clear from Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC, read in the light of recital 38 of that code, that that provision referred solely to use giving rise, on its own, to a customs debt (paragraph 33 of that judgment). Accordingly, the Court found that, in the case of goods placed under the inward processing procedure, the use of goods was to be understood as covering only use going beyond the processing procedures authorised by the customs authority (paragraph 35 of that judgment). The Court noted that, if use of such goods were also to include use in accordance with the authorised processing procedures, extinguishing the customs debt incurred under Article 79 of the UCC would be precluded under the inward processing procedure, which would go against the objective of those provisions (paragraph 36 of that judgment). 53.      Applying the principles established by the Court in Combinova (C‑476/19), it should be found that, in the absence of authorisation to use the inward processing procedure for the purpose of carrying out processing procedures on non-Union goods, any use of those goods in the customs territory of the European Union, whatever the nature of that use, necessarily goes beyond the processing procedures authorised by the customs authority. 54.      Admittedly, Article 220 of the UCC provides that goods placed under customs warehousing or a processing procedure or in a free zone may undergo usual forms of handling intended to preserve them, improve their appearance or marketable quality or prepare them for distribution or resale. (41) In accordance with that provision, where non-Union goods are placed under the inward processing procedure in order to undergo processing procedures authorised by the customs authorities, those goods may also undergo usual forms of handing, without it being necessary for the customs authorities expressly to authorise such handling. (42) However, it is important to emphasise that, as is perfectly clear from the wording of Article 220 of the UCC, usual forms of handling may be carried out only on non-Union goods placed under one of the customs arrangements referred to in that provision. It follows that non-Union goods that are not placed under one of those arrangements, which include the inward processing procedure, may not be the subject of usual forms of handling in the customs territory of the European Union. Consequently, in the absence of authorisation to use the inward processing procedure, causing non-Union goods that have not been placed under that procedure to undergo usual forms of handling constitutes use of those goods for the purposes of Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC. 55.      In this instance, in the absence of an inward processing authorisation and the placing of the sailing boat under that arrangement, any operations carried out on the sailing boat in Germany, including those that could constitute usual handling, constitute ‘use’ of that sailing boat for the purposes of Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC. 56.      That interpretation accords with the principle that the provisions regarding the grounds for the extinguishment of a customs debt, such as Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC, must be interpreted strictly, since they are responsive to the need to protect the European Union’s own resources. (43) Moreover, the inward processing procedure enables non-Union goods to be processed in the customs territory of the European Union without being subject to import customs duties. That arrangement therefore constitutes an exception to the principle that goods imported into the European Union are, as a general rule, subject to customs duties. Therefore, the rules relating to that customs arrangement must also be interpreted strictly. (44) 57.      The respondent in the main proceedings cannot maintain that that interpretation is contrary to recital 38 of the UCC because it would make it possible to rectify only formal irregularities. Admittedly, it is clear from recital 38 of the UCC that, in cases where a customs debt is incurred through non-compliance with the customs legislation, the good faith of the person concerned should be taken into account, so as to minimise the impact of negligence on the part of the debtor. However, it is clear from paragraph 32 of the judgment in Combinova (C‑476/19) that the Court of Justice took recital 38 of the UCC into account in its interpretation of Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC, according to which ‘use’ for the purposes of that provision refers to uses going beyond the processing procedures authorised by the customs authority. The Court thus found that recital 38 of the UCC cannot mean that that concept should be interpreted so broadly as to negate the requirement to obtain authorisation from the customs authorities to use the inward processing procedure. 58.      Furthermore, the failure to obtain authorisation to use the inward processing procedure cannot be equated with a purely formal irregularity, such as a failure to submit a bill of discharge within the prescribed period, as was at issue in Combinova (C‑476/19). Indeed, in the authorisation, the customs authorities specify the conditions under which that arrangement may be used. Thus, the absence of authorisation to use the inward processing procedure means that the use of that procedure is not possible. To that effect, the General Court has recently held that, if goods are placed under a processing procedure at a customs office not designated in the authorisation to use that procedure, the holder of that authorisation cannot benefit from exemption from import customs duties. (45) Furthermore, it would make little sense if a person who does not hold an inward processing authorisation could carry out more processing procedures than a person who does hold an authorisation to use that procedure and who, in view of the interpretation adopted in Combinova (C‑476/19), would be restricted to those procedures that have been authorised by the customs authorities. The result would be that a person who does not have an authorisation would be treated more favourably that a person who does hold an authorisation. 59.      It must be borne in mind that the absence of authorisation at the time when non-Union goods are brought into the European Union can be remedied by the issue by the customs authorities of an authorisation with retroactive effect, granted on the basis of Article 211(2) of the UCC. Thus, in the circumstances of the case in the main proceedings, if the respondent in the main proceedings were to obtain a retroactive inward processing authorisation for the maintenance and repair work carried out on the sailing boat in Germany, those operations could be regarded as use not going beyond the procedures authorised by the customs authorities. If one were to follow the view propounded by the respondent in the main proceedings that a retroactive authorisation is not necessary in circumstances such as those in the case in the main proceedings, the question of the effet utile of Article 211(2) of the UCC could arise. 60.      Having regard to the foregoing considerations, I propose that the answer to the second question should be as follows: Article 124(1)(k) of the UCC must be interpreted as meaning that, where a means of transport has been temporarily brought into the customs territory of the European Union without an authorisation to use the inward processing procedure, maintenance and repair operations carried out in that customs territory constitute use for the purposes of that provision, even if that means of transport was not used for transportation purposes while it was present in the customs territory of the European Union, unless those operations are authorised by a retroactive inward processing authorisation granted by the customs authorities in accordance with Article 211(2) of the UCC. Conclusion 61.      In the light of all the foregoing considerations, I propose that the General Court answer the questions referred by the Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Fiscal Court, Germany) as follows: 1.      Articles 30 and 70 and the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax must be interpreted as meaning that the mere fact of physically introducing into a Member State of the European Union a means of transport from a third country, without placing it under the inward processing procedure, in order for maintenance and repair operations to be carried out on it, even if that means of transport was subsequently re-exported without having been used as a means of transport while it was physically present in that Member State, constitutes an importation triggering the chargeable event for import value added tax (VAT) purposes and the chargeability of that tax, unless the person concerned is issued with a retroactive inward processing authorisation by the competent customs authorities in accordance with Article 211(2) of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code. 2.      Article 124(1)(k) of Regulation No 952/2013 must be interpreted as meaning that, where a means of transport has been temporarily brought into the customs territory of the European Union without an authorisation to use the inward processing procedure, maintenance and repair operations carried out in that customs territory constitute use for the purposes of that provision, even if that means of transport was not used for transportation purposes while it was present in the customs territory of the European Union, unless those operations are authorised by a retroactive inward processing authorisation granted by the customs authorities in accordance with Article 211(2) of that regulation. Maja Brkan Delivered in open court in Luxembourg on 3 June 2026. Signatures 1      Original language: French. 2      Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1; ‘the VAT Directive’). 3      Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 October 2013 laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ 2013 L 269, p. 1). 4      Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/2446 of 28 July 2015 supplementing Regulation No 952/2013 (OJ 2015 L 343, p. 1). 5      In accordance with Article 5(37)(d) of the UCC, the repair of goods is one such processing operation. 6      See, by analogy, judgments of 28 February 1984, Einberger (294/82, EU:C:1984:81, paragraph 18) and of 29 April 2010, Dansk Transport og Logistik (C‑230/08, EU:C:2010:231, paragraphs 90 and 91). See, also, to that effect, judgments of 11 July 2013, Harry Winston (C‑273/12, EU:C:2013:466, paragraph 41) and of 29 January 2026, Keladis I and Keladis II (C‑72/24 and C‑73/24, EU:C:2026:51, paragraph 158). 7      Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Palmstråle (C‑125/24, EU:C:2025:162, point 37). 8      See, for example, judgment of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung (C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraphs 48 to 53). 9      See, for example, judgment of 7 April 2022, Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20, EU:C:2022:277, paragraph 51). 10      See, for example, judgment of 18 May 2017, Latvijas Dzelzceļš (C‑154/16, EU:C:2017:392, paragraphs 65 and 72). 11      See, by analogy, judgments of 5 May 1982, Schul Douane Expediteur (15/81, EU:C:1982:135, paragraph 14) and of 9 February 2006, Commission v United Kingdom (C‑305/03, EU:C:2006:90, paragraph 33). See, also, Nellen, F., van Doesum, A., Cornielje, S., and van Kesteren, H., Fundamentals of EU VAT Law, 3rd edition, 2025, p. 659. 12      See, by analogy, judgment of 11 July 2013, Harry Winston (C‑273/12, EU:C:2013:466, paragraph 40). 13      The first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive expressly cites the special customs arrangements of temporary importation and external transit. It also mentions the arrangements referred to in Article 156(1)(b) and (c) of that directive, namely free zones, customs warehousing and the inward processing procedure. 14      Berlin, D., Directive TVA 2006/112 – Commentaire article par article, Bruylant, 2nd edition, 2025, p. 395. 15      See, inter alia, judgments of 2 June 2016, Eurogate Distribution and DHL Hub Leipzig (C‑226/14 and C‑228/14, EU:C:2016:405, paragraph 65) and of 1 June 2017, Wallenborn Transports (C‑571/15, EU:C:2017:417, paragraph 54). 16      See, to that effect, Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona in Wallenborn Transports (C‑571/15, EU:C:2016:944, point 69). 17      In addition to means of transport that companies own for the purposes of their economic activities, there are also situations where high-value means of transport are owned by companies but used by individuals for private purposes, for example yachts, luxury cars or business aircraft. 18      Nellen, F., van Doesum, A., Cornielje, S., and van Kesteren, H., Fundamentals of EU VAT Law, op cit. footnote 11, p. 658. 19      Kokott, J., Das Steuerrecht der Europäischen Union, C.H. Beck, 2018, paragraph 245. 20      Opinion of Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona in Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung (C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:146, point 54, first indent). 21      The particular situations to which the first subparagraph of Article 71(1) of the VAT Directive refers, in particular those referred to in Article 156(1)(a), (d) and (e) of the directive, equally require the placing of goods under a customs arrangement that entails customs supervision. 22      The first subparagraph of Article 256(2) of the UCC. 23      Article 257 of the UCC. 24      Article 211(4)(a) of the UCC. 25      Article 214(1) of the UCC. 26      Judgment of 2 June 2016, Eurogate Distribution and DHL Hub Leipzig (C‑226/14 and C‑228/14, EU:C:2016:405, paragraphs 62 to 67 and 71). 27      Judgment of 2 June 2016, Eurogate Distribution and DHL Hub Leipzig (C‑226/14 and C‑228/14, EU:C:2016:405, paragraphs 75 to 80). 28      Judgment of 1 June 2017, Wallenborn Transports (C‑571/15, EU:C:2017:417, paragraphs 32 and 33 and 50 to 57). 29      Judgment of 18 May 2017, Latvijas Dzelzceļš (C‑154/16, EU:C:2017:392, paragraphs 70 and 71). 30      Judgment of 7 April 2022, Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20, EU:C:2022:277, paragraphs 49 to 51). 31      In works of legal theory, the supply of a service subject to VAT is sometimes regarded as a relevant factor in determining whether goods have entered the economic network of the European Union. See, to that effect, Bender, T., ‘§ 21 UStG’ in Offerhaus/Söhn/Lange, Umsatzsteuer Kommentar, Otto Schmidt, 2026, paragraph 303. 32      European Court of Auditors, Special Report No 8/2025, entitled ‘Value Added Tax fraud on imports – The EU’s financial interests are insufficiently protected under simplified import customs procedures’, paragraphs 20 to 30 and 103. 33      It is true that, under the temporary admission procedure, on the basis of the combined application of Article 136(1)(a), Article 139(1) and Article 141 of the UCC DR and Article 218 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2447 of 24 November 2015 laying down detailed rules for implementing certain provisions of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down the Union Customs Code (OJ 2015 L 343, p. 558), means of transport may be implicitly placed under that procedure without the need for an express declaration to customs. Consequently, the tax and customs authorities do not necessarily have cognisance of all means of transport from third countries entering and leaving the European Union. That option afforded by the EU legislature seems to be justified by considerations of a practical nature, inasmuch as it would be impossible to require for all land motor vehicles coming from third countries an express declaration of placement under temporary admission on entry into the European Union. By contrast, where the purpose for which a means of transport is brought into the European Union is not manifestly evident, the possibility of implicitly placing it under the temporary admission procedure on the basis of Article 141 of the UCC DR seems to me to be difficult to envisage (see, to that effect, Henke, R., Renkhoff, N., ‘Artikel 250’, UZK, Zollkodex der Union, 9th edition, C.H. Beck, 2025, paragraph 68). Therefore, where a means of transport is not used as such when going through a customs office (for example, a boat transported on a trailer hitched to a car), given that the reason for its introduction into the territory of the European Union is not necessarily use for the purposes of Article 212(3) of the UCC DR, that means of transport should, in principle, be expressly declared to customs, at the very least by means of an oral declaration on the basis of Article 136(1)(a) of the UCC DR, in order to place it under the appropriate customs procedure and to ensure that it is subject to customs supervision. 34      Judgment of 10 July 2019, Federal Express Corporation Deutsche Niederlassung (C‑26/18, EU:C:2019:579, paragraphs 44 to 53). 35      Judgment of 3 March 2021, Hauptzollamt Münster (Place where VAT is incurred) (C‑7/20, EU:C:2021:161, paragraph 35). 36      Judgment of 8 September 2022, Hauptzollamt Hamburg (Place where VAT is incurred – II) (C‑368/21, EU:C:2022:647, paragraph 34). I would observe that the approach taken to determining the place where import VAT is incurred is similar to that taken to determining the place of final consumption of goods in order to establish whether a transaction constitutes an intra-Community acquisition. See, to that effect, the judgment of 18 November 2010, X (C‑84/09, EU:C:2010:693, paragraphs 44 to 46). 37      See point 34 of the present Opinion. 38      Judgment of 18 January 2024, Hauptzollamt Braunschweig (Place in which VAT is incurred – III) (C‑791/22, EU:C:2024:59, paragraph 32). 39      See, by analogy, judgment of 7 April 2022, Kauno teritorinė muitinė (C‑489/20, EU:C:2022:277, paragraph 49). 40      Judgment of 8 October 2020, Combinova (C‑476/19, EU:C:2020:802). 41      In accordance with Article 180 of the UCC DR, the usual forms of handling are set out in Annex 71-03 to the UCC DR. 42      See, to that effect, Witte, P., ‘Artikel 220’, in UZK, Zollkodex der Union, 9th edition, C. H. Beck, 2025, paragraph 8. 43      See, by analogy, judgments of 29 April 2010, Dansk Transport og Logistik (C‑230/08, EU:C:2010:231, paragraph 51) and of 17 February 2011, Berel and Others (C‑78/10, EU:C:2011:93, paragraph 46). 44      See, by analogy, judgment of 12 December 2024, Malmö Motorrenovering (C‑781/23, EU:C:2024:1014, paragraph 21). 45      See, to that effect, concerning the outward processing procedure, judgment of 15 April 2026, A-GmbH (T-589/24, EU:T:2026:254, paragraph 62).