T-393/25

ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber) 21 January 2026 (*) ( Action for annulment – Taxation – Value added tax (VAT) rules for the digital age – VAT obligations in the short-term accommodation rental sector – Concept of ‘deemed supplier’ – Association protecting the interests of property owners renting out accommodation on a short-term basis – Legislative act – Act of general application – Lack of direct concern – Lack of individual concern – Inadmissibility ) In Case T‑393/25, Associazione proprietari alloggi dati in locazione turistica (Pro.Loca.Tur.), established in Milan (Italy), represented by A. de Moncuit de Boiscuillé and C. Worms, lawyers, applicant, v Council of the European Union, represented by O. Segnana and S. Santoro, acting as Agents, defendant, THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber), composed of S.L. Kalėda, President, M. Jaeger (Rapporteur) and H. Kanninen, Judges, Registrar: V. Di Bucci, having regard to the written part of the procedure, makes the following Order 1        By its action under Article 263 TFEU, the applicant, Associazione proprietari alloggi dati in locazione turistica (Pro.Loca.Tur.), seeks, first, the partial annulment of Article 3(1) of Council Directive (EU) 2025/516 of 11 March 2025 amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards VAT rules for the digital age (OJ L, 2025/516; ‘the contested directive’), secondly, the annulment of Article 3(3)(a) of that directive and, thirdly, the partial annulment of Article 1(8) of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2025/518 of 11 March 2025 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 as regards information requirements for certain VAT schemes (OJ L, 2025/518; ‘the contested implementing regulation’).  Background to the dispute 2        The applicant is an association of individual owners who rent out their properties on a short-term basis. 3        It is apparent from the applicant’s statutes, annexed to the application, that it was established to defend its members rights to private property, including by providing legal representation of their collective interests before institutions, in particular by participating in procedures for the adoption of legislative or administrative measures that undermine or restrict the right to private property in the field of short-term accommodation rental. 4        The contested directive, which amends Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax (OJ 2006 L 347, p. 1; ‘the VAT Directive’), forms part of a set of legislative acts adopted by the Council of the European Union on 11 March 2025 and designed to adapt EU rules on value added tax (VAT) to the digital age. That legislative package also includes the contested implementing regulation and a regulation containing new rules on the VAT administrative cooperation arrangements. 5        The contested directive seeks, in essence, to require online platforms to pay VAT on short-term accommodation rental services and passenger transport services by road in most cases where individual service providers do not charge VAT. Furthermore, in order to adapt the VAT reporting obligations, it introduces amendments to reduce the need for multiple VAT registrations in the European Union. 6        In recitals 26 and 27 of the contested directive, it is stated that the platform economy has led to an unjustified distortion of competition between supplies performed through online platforms that escape VAT taxation and supplies performed in the traditional economy that are subject to VAT. It is also stated that the distortion has been most acute in the two largest sectors of the platform economy behind e-commerce, namely the short-term accommodation rental sector and the sector of passenger transport by road. In order to address that distortion of competition, it is proposed to change the role that platforms play in the collection of VAT, by becoming the ‘deemed supplier’, which is a legal fiction according to which platforms would be required to charge VAT where underlying suppliers do not charge VAT because they are, for example, non-taxable persons or taxable persons availing themselves of the special scheme for small enterprises. That system is referred to as the ‘Deemed-supplier model’ in the acts forming part of the legislative package described in paragraph 4 above. 7        Specifically, as regards short-term accommodation rental services, Article 3(1) of the contested directive inserts Article 28a into the VAT Directive. That article provides that a taxable person who facilitates, through the use of an electronic interface, such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, the supply, within the European Union, of short-term accommodation rental services, namely the uninterrupted rental of accommodation to the same person for a maximum of 30 nights, is to be deemed to have received and supplied those services themselves unless the person providing those services has provided to the taxable person their identification number for VAT purposes and declared that they will charge any VAT due on that supply. 8        Under Article 28a(5) of the VAT Directive, Member States may exclude from the scope of Article 28a(1) of that directive, inter alia, supplies of short-term accommodation rental services made within their territory under the special scheme provided for in Title XII, Chapter 1, Section 2 of that directive, which concerns the special scheme for small enterprises. 9        Furthermore, Article 3(3)(a) of the contested directive introduces a new subparagraph into Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive, which provides that the uninterrupted rental of accommodation to the same person for a maximum of 30 nights is to be regarded as having a similar function to the hotel sector subject to criteria, conditions and limitations to be laid down by Member States. 10      In addition, Article 3(3)(b) of the contested directive adds a new paragraph to Article 135 of the VAT Directive, under which, inter alia, Member States are required, before 1 July 2028, to communicate to the VAT Committee the text of the main provisions of national law in which they set out the criteria, conditions and limitations referred to in the second subparagraph of Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive. 11      Moreover, Article 3(2) of the contested directive inserts Article 46a into the VAT Directive, which provides that the place of supply of the facilitation service provided to a non-taxable person through the use of an electronic interface, such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, is to be the place where the underlying transaction is supplied in accordance with the VAT Directive. 12      The contested implementing regulation was adopted, as part of the same legislative package as the contested directive, with a view to clarifying certain elements for the proper functioning of the deemed-supplier model, for electronic interfaces such as marketplaces, platforms, portals or similar means that facilitate inter alia the supply of short-term accommodation rental services. 13      Recital 2 of the contested implementing regulation states that it is necessary to define the term ‘facilitate’ in order to provide taxable persons who facilitate, through the use of an electronic interface such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, inter alia the supply of short-term accommodation rental services with legal certainty as to whether the deemed-supplier rule applies to those taxable persons. 14      Accordingly, Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation amends, in essence, Article 30 of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 282/2011 of 15 March 2011 laying down implementing measures for the VAT Directive (OJ 2011 L 71, p. 1; ‘the VAT Implementing Regulation’) by inserting a second paragraph according to which, for the purposes of Article 46a of the VAT Directive, the term ‘facilitation service’ means a service supplied by a taxable person to either a customer or a supplier, or to both, through the use of an electronic interface such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, thereby allowing the customer and the supplier to enter into contact which results in a supply of goods or services through that electronic interface. That paragraph further states, in the second subparagraph, that such a facilitation service is to be regarded as distinct and independent from the goods or services that the taxable person is deemed to supply.  Forms of order sought 15      In the application, the applicant claims that the Court should: –        annul the following provisions: –        Article 3(1) of the contested directive, in so far as it inserts Article 28a(1) into the VAT Directive, –        Article 3(3)(a) of the contested directive, in so far as it amends Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive by inserting a new subparagraph, –        Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation, in so far as it amends Article 30 of the VAT Implementing Regulation, by inserting a new paragraph (together, ‘the contested provisions’); –        order the Council to pay the costs. 16      In the plea of inadmissibility raised by separate document lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 1 September 2025, the Council contends that the Court should: –        dismiss the action as inadmissible; –        order the applicant to pay the costs. 17      In its observations on the plea of inadmissibility lodged at the Court Registry on 15 October 2025, the applicant claims that the Court should: –        reject the plea of inadmissibility; –        in the alternative, join the examination of the plea of inadmissibility to the substance of the case; –        order the Council to pay the costs.  Law 18      Under Article 130(1) and (7) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, on application by the defendant, the Court may decide on inadmissibility or lack of competence without going to the substance of the case. 19      In the present case, since the Council has requested a ruling on the inadmissibility of the action, the Court, considering that it has sufficient information from the documents in the file, has decided to rule on that application without taking further steps in the proceedings. 20      In the plea of inadmissibility, the Council contends that the applicant does not have standing to bring proceedings, within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU, for the purposes of the annulment of the contested provisions, in so far as, first, its interests as an association are not affected by those provisions and, secondly, its members are neither individually nor directly concerned by those provisions.  The applicant’s standing to bring proceedings 21      Under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, any natural or legal person may, under the conditions laid down in the first and second paragraphs of that article, institute proceedings against an act addressed to that person or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures. 22      In the present case, it is not disputed that the applicant is not the addressee of either the contested directive or the contested implementing regulation. Consequently, it cannot establish the admissibility of its action on the basis of the first situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. 23      Furthermore, first, as regards the contested directive, it is apparent from the first citation in the preamble to that directive that it was adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 113 TFEU. That article provides for a special legislative procedure, within the meaning of Article 289(2) TFEU, for the adoption of provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning indirect taxes, such as VAT. In that regard, it should be noted that Article 289(3) TFEU provides that legal acts adopted by legislative procedure are to constitute legislative acts. The contested directive is therefore a legislative act within the meaning of Article 289 TFEU. 24      However, according to the case-law, the expression ‘regulatory act’, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, refers to acts of general application other than legislative acts (see judgment of 6 November 2018, Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori v Commission, Commission v Scuola Elementare Maria Montessori and Commission v Ferracci, C‑622/16 P to C‑624/16 P, EU:C:2018:873, paragraph 23 and the case-law cited). 25      Accordingly, the contested directive cannot be regarded as a ‘regulatory act’ within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, which the applicant does not dispute. 26      Thus, in order to establish its standing to bring proceedings in the present action, in so far as it seeks the partial annulment of the contested directive, the applicant must demonstrate that it is in the second situation referred to in the fourth paragraph of Article 263, namely that it is directly and individually concerned by the provisions of the contested directive which it seeks to have annulled. 27      Secondly, as regards the contested implementing regulation, it is also necessary to examine, in the first place, whether the applicant is directly and individually concerned by Article 1(8) of that implementing regulation. 28      In that regard, it must be remembered that actions for annulment brought by associations have been held to be admissible in three specific situations. Those are, first, where a legal provision expressly confers on professional associations a number of powers of a procedural nature; secondly, where the association represents the interests of its members who would themselves be entitled to bring proceedings; and, thirdly, where the association is differentiated by reason of the impact on its own interests as an association, in particular because its position as a negotiator has been affected by the measure of which the annulment is sought (judgment of 15 September 2016, TAO-AFI and SFIE-PE v Parliament and Council, T‑456/14, EU:T:2016:493, paragraph 55). 29      As regards the first situation referred to in the case-law cited in paragraph 28 above, it should be noted that neither the contested directive nor the contested implementing regulation, nor any other provision of EU law, confers procedural rights on the applicant, which, moreover, has not claimed that it is in that first situation. 30      As regards the second and third situations referred to in the case-law cited in paragraph 28 above, the applicant submits that the contested provisions affect its own interests as an association and that its members are directly and individually concerned by those provisions. 31      It is therefore necessary to examine whether the applicant is directly concerned by the contested provisions, either as an association itself or in so far as its members are directly concerned by those provisions.  Direct concern 32      It is appropriate to recall that, according to settled case-law, the condition that a natural or legal person must be directly concerned by the measure that forms the subject matter of its action for annulment requires two cumulative criteria to be met, namely, first, the contested measure must directly affect the legal situation of that person and, secondly, it must leave no discretion to its addressees who are entrusted with the task of implementing it, such implementation being purely automatic and resulting from EU rules alone without the application of other intermediate rules (see judgment of 12 July 2022, Nord Stream 2 v Parliament and Council, C‑348/20 P, EU:C:2022:548, paragraph 43 and the case-law cited). 33      First, the applicant seeks the annulment of Article 3(1) of the contested directive in so far as it inserts Article 28a(1) into the VAT Directive, which provides that a taxable person who facilitates, through the use of an electronic interface, such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, the supply of inter alia short-term accommodation rental services is to be deemed to have received and supplied those services themselves unless the person providing those services has a VAT number and declares that they will charge any VAT due on those services. 34      However, Article 28a(1) of the VAT Directive concerns taxable persons who facilitate, through the use of an electronic interface, the supply of short-term accommodation rental services, and not the suppliers of those services themselves. Accordingly, that provision does not directly affect the legal situation of those suppliers. 35      In that regard, the applicant submits, in abstract and general terms, that, by making taxable persons subject to VAT, the contested provisions directly affect its legal and economic situation inasmuch as that undermines the very purpose for which it was established, which is to defend the position that income obtained by individuals from private property rentals should fall outside the scope of VAT obligations applicable to businesses. However, that does not establish that the applicant is directly concerned, within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU. The fact that the applicant takes a specific stance on the nature of the income of its members’ property rental income does not alter the fact that Article 28a(1) of the VAT Directive covers only taxable persons who facilitate short-term accommodation rental services. 36      Furthermore, as regards the applicant’s argument that the contested provisions are of direct concern to it in that they will make its members’ short-term accommodation rental activities less economically viable, it should be noted that the mere fact that a measure may exercise an influence on an applicant’s material situation cannot suffice to allow him or her to be regarded as directly concerned (see, to that effect, order of 21 September 2011, Borax Europe v ECHA, T‑346/10, EU:T:2011:510, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). 37      In those circumstances, neither the applicant, as an association of individual owners who rent out their properties on a short-term basis, nor those owners, as the applicant’s members, can claim that Article 3(1) of the contested directive directly affects their legal situation. Thus, the first of the cumulative criteria required by the case-law cited in paragraph 32 above is not satisfied as regards whether the applicant is directly concerned by Article 3(1) of the contested directive. 38      Furthermore, and in any event, it should be noted that, under Article 28a(5) of the VAT Directive, inserted by Article 3(1) of the contested directive, Member States may exclude from the scope of Article 28a(1) of the VAT Directive, inter alia, supplies of short-term accommodation rental services made within their territory under the special scheme provided for in Title XII, Chapter 1, Section 2 of that directive, which concerns the special scheme for small enterprises. In that regard, it is apparent from Article 6(3) of the contested directive that the Member States are to adopt and publish, by 30 June 2028, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with Article 3 of that directive. 39      It follows that the Member States, as addressees of the contested directive, were granted a broad discretion as to whether or not to apply the scheme provided for in Article 28a(1) of the VAT Directive. 40      Consequently, the second of the cumulative criteria required by the case-law cited in paragraph 32 above is also not satisfied as regards whether the applicant is directly concerned. 41      Secondly, the applicant seeks the annulment of Article 3(3)(a) of the contested directive. That provision introduces a new subparagraph into Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive, which provides that the uninterrupted rental of accommodation to the same person for a maximum of 30 nights is to be regarded as having a similar function to the hotel sector subject to criteria, conditions and limitations to be laid down by Member States. 42      However, it must be stated, as the Council has done, that such a measure which provides, in a general and abstract manner, that those services are to be regarded as being similar cannot in itself produce direct legal effects, but, contrary to what the applicant submits, requires the adoption of legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions in order to be implemented. 43      Even assuming that the new subparagraph introduced into Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive is capable of affecting the legal situation of the applicant and its members, in so far as, under that subparagraph, the services provided by those members are to be treated as being similar to hotel services, it should be noted that that subparagraph makes such treatment subject to criteria, conditions and limitations to be laid down by Member States. 44      Accordingly, the new subparagraph introduced into Article 135(2) of the VAT Directive cannot be regarded as being capable of directly affecting the legal situation of the applicant or its members, since other measures adopted by Member States must lay down the applicable criteria, conditions and limitations. 45      Thus, neither of the two cumulative criteria required by the case-law cited in paragraph 32 above is satisfied as regards whether the applicant is directly concerned by Article 3(3)(a) of the contested directive. 46      Thirdly, the applicant seeks the annulment of Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation in so far as it inserts Article 30(2) into the VAT Implementing Regulation. According to the applicant, the latter provision defines the concept of ‘facilitation service’ as a service supplied by a taxable person to either a customer or a supplier, or to both, through the use of an electronic interface such as a marketplace, platform, portal or similar means, thereby allowing the customer and the supplier to enter into contact which results in a supply of services through that electronic interface. 47      In that regard, it should be noted that Article 30(2) of the VAT Implementing Regulation merely contains a definition relating to facilitation services and not to the supply of short-term accommodation rental services itself, which is why that provision cannot be regarded as directly affecting the legal situation of the persons providing those latter services. 48      In those circumstances, neither the applicant, as an association of individual owners who rent out their properties on a short-term basis, nor those owners, as the applicant’s members, can claim that Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation directly affects their legal situation. Consequently, the first of the cumulative criteria required by the case-law cited in paragraph 32 above is not satisfied as regards whether the applicant is directly concerned by that provision. 49      It follows from the foregoing considerations that the condition of direct concern, laid down in the second and third situations in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, for the admissibility of an action for annulment is not satisfied in the present case. 50      It must be borne in mind, as regards the second situation in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, that the conditions of direct concern, on the one hand, and individual concern, on the other, are cumulative (see, to that effect, judgment of 3 October 2013, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, C‑583/11 P, EU:C:2013:625, paragraphs 75 and 76 and the case-law cited). It is thus sufficient that one of those conditions is not satisfied, as in the present case, for the action to be held to be inadmissible. Furthermore, as regards the third situation in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, irrespective of whether the contested implementing regulation constitutes a regulatory act and whether it entails implementing measures, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, it must be held that the condition of direct concern is not satisfied in the present case. 51      However, the Court considers it appropriate, in the circumstances of the present case, also to analyse the condition of individual concern.  Individual concern 52      In the first place, the applicant claims, in essence, that it is, as an association, individually concerned by the contested provisions because they undermine the very purpose for which it was established, namely to defend the rights to private property of owners who rent out their properties on a short-term basis. In its view, in so far as those provisions reclassify short-term accommodation rentals as supplies which are deemed taxable and are therefore subject to VAT, the legal and economic situation of those owners and, therefore, of its own organisation as an association and its own economic viability are affected. 53      In that regard, it should be noted that, according to settled case-law, an association formed to promote the collective interests, whether economic or other, of a category of persons cannot be regarded as being individually concerned by a measure affecting the general interests of that category (orders of 18 December 1997, Sveriges Betodlares and Henrikson v Commission, C‑409/96 P, EU:C:1997:635, paragraph 45; of 16 May 2013, BytyOKD v Commission, T‑559/11, not published, EU:T:2013:255, paragraph 31; and of 7 April 2022, Bloom v Parliament and Council, T‑645/21, not published, EU:T:2022:230, paragraph 44). 54      Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that, although, in principle, measures of general application may be challenged only by the privileged applicants referred to in the second and third paragraphs of Article 263 TFEU, such measures may nevertheless, in certain circumstances, be of individual concern to certain natural or legal persons and are thus in the nature of a decision in their regard. That is so where the measure in question affects specific natural or legal persons by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and thereby distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee (judgment of 15 July 1963, Plaumann v Commission, 25/62, EU:C:1963:17, p. 107; see, also, judgment of 25 July 2002, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v Council, C‑50/00 P, EU:C:2002:462, paragraphs 35 and 36 and the case-law cited). 55      In the present case, both the contested directive and the contested implementing regulation are acts of general application, in so far as they are essentially intended to adapt the VAT rules to the supply of short-term accommodation rental services and passenger transport services by road through the use of an electronic interface. 56      As stated in paragraphs 4 to 14 above, under Article 3(1) of the contested directive, where a taxable person facilitates, through the use of an electronic interface, the supply of short-term accommodation rental services or of passenger transport services by road, that taxable person is to be deemed, for the purposes of the application of the VAT rules, to have received and supplied those services themselves, unless the person providing those services charges any VAT due on that supply. Under Article 3(3)(a) of that directive, short-term accommodation rental is to be regarded as having a similar function to the hotel sector. Furthermore, under Article 1(8) of the contested implementing regulation, the term ‘facilitation service’ means a service supplied by a taxable person to either a customer or a supplier, or to both, through the use of an electronic interface. 57      It follows that the contested provisions, where appropriate following any implementing measures adopted by Member States, are liable to affect, albeit indirectly, all operators which provide, through the use of an electronic interface, services in the sectors of short-term accommodation rental or passenger transport by road. Those provisions constitute rules which apply to objectively determined situations, namely the situation of taxable persons who facilitate, through the use of an electronic interface, the interaction between the suppliers and customers of, inter alia, short-term accommodation rental services, and the situation of the suppliers of those services themselves, in that those services are to be regarded as being similar to hotel services. 58      Consequently, the contested provisions are liable to affect the general interests of all taxable persons operating, inter alia, in the short-term accommodation rental services sector, whether as providers of the electronic interface allowing the suppliers and customers of those rental services to enter into contact, or as the suppliers of those services themselves. 59      Accordingly, the applicant, as an association of owners who rent out their properties on a short-term basis, like those owners themselves, cannot be regarded as being affected by the contested provisions by reason of certain attributes peculiar to them or by reason of a factual situation which differentiates them from all other operators in the short-term accommodation rental sector, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 54 above. 60      In that regard, the arguments put forward by the applicant, which consist of describing the individual situation of three of its members, relating in essence to their age, their family situation, their net income from the short-term rental of their properties and their motivation to undertake such an activity, cannot distinguish them individually from all the other persons who rent out properties. Their individual motivation, socioeconomic situation or amount of income which they derive from the activity in question clearly do not constitute relevant circumstances, in the context of the adoption of the contested provisions, such as to distinguish the applicant’s members individually from all other operators in the sectors covered by those provisions, for the purposes of the case-law cited in paragraph 54 above. 61      In those circumstances, neither the applicant, as an association, nor its members can be regarded as being individually concerned by the contested provisions. 62      In the second place, the applicant submits that its role as negotiator in the legislative process both at EU and national level was affected by the adoption of the contested directive. In its view, that directive directly affected the legal and political positions which it promoted during the consultation phase of the legislative package of which that directive forms part. 63      In that regard, it should be noted that, according to the case-law, the presence of special circumstances, such as the role played by an association in a procedure which has led to the adoption of an act within the meaning of Article 263 TFEU, may establish the admissibility of an action brought by an association, in particular where its position as negotiator has been affected by that act (see, to that effect, order of 7 April 2022, Bloom v Parliament and Council, T‑645/21, not published, EU:T:2022:230, paragraph 45 and the case-law cited). 64      In order for an applicant association to be recognised as being individually concerned under that case-law, it must be in a particular situation in which it occupies a clearly circumscribed position as negotiator which is intimately linked to the actual subject matter of the contested act, thus placing it in a factual situation which distinguishes it from all other persons (see, to that effect, order of 7 April 2022, Bloom v Parliament and Council, T‑645/21, not published, EU:T:2022:230, paragraph 46 and the case-law cited). 65      In the present case, the applicant merely submits that it played a meaningful and identifiable role in the consultative process which led to the adoption of the contested directive in that it signed a joint stakeholder letter dated 14 October 2024, addressed to the Finance Ministers of the Member States urging them to reconsider their position in the context of the legislative package of which that directive forms part. It also claims to have collaborated with numerous Members of the European Parliament with whom it shared its views on that directive. In addition, it claims to have engaged substantively at the national level, in particular with the Italian Ministry of Tourism and with a Member of the Italian Parliament, in order to initiate a dialogue on the implications of the scheme proposed by the directive in question. 66      It should be noted that some of those claims are not relevant in the present case, in so far as they concern national authorities. 67      Furthermore, the applicant’s other claims, even if true, would, at most, prove that it participated in the process of drafting the contested directive. The mere provision of information to the institutions of the European Union during the legislative process leading to the adoption of a measure, or the fact that an association has taken the initiative of contacting those institutions with a view to influencing their action, and has been heard or consulted in that context, is not sufficient to establish that the act in question adversely affects a clearly defined position as negotiator, or a similar position, which the applicant occupies and which places it in a factual situation which distinguishes it from any other person (see, to that effect, order of 7 April 2022, Bloom v Parliament and Council, T‑645/21, not published, EU:T:2022:230, paragraph 52 and the case-law cited). 68      In the present case, the contested directive was adopted on the basis of Article 113 TFEU, which provides that the Council is to act unanimously, in accordance with a special legislative procedure, after consulting the Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee. Accordingly, since the applicant’s alleged participation in the legislative procedure, on its own initiative, was limited, according to its own unsubstantiated claims, to sending a joint letter with other parties to the finance ministers of the Member States and to holding conversations with Members of the European Parliament, it cannot constitute a circumstance distinguishing it individually from any other association or interested party which could also have voluntarily stated its position on the directive to be adopted. 69      In those circumstances, the applicant cannot claim to be individually concerned by the contested directive by virtue of its participation in the procedure leading to its adoption. 70      Moreover, the applicant’s arguments concern only its alleged role as negotiator in the context of the adoption of the contested directive, without any reference to the contested implementing regulation. 71      It must therefore be concluded that the applicant is not individually concerned by the contested provisions. 72      That conclusion cannot be called into question by the applicant’s argument that the conditions for the admissibility of actions, as established by the case-law cited in paragraph 54 above, should be relaxed. 73      In the present case, none of the circumstances referred to by the applicant is present. 74      First, it has not been established that the Council should have taken into account, at the time of the adoption of the contested provisions, the specific situation of the applicant or its members among all the operators in the sectors concerned by those provisions. Secondly, those provisions cannot be regarded as having an impact on a right acquired by the applicant or its members. Thirdly, as noted in paragraph 68 above, the applicant did not play a crucial role that distinguishes it individually from other persons in the procedure leading to the adoption of those provisions. Fourthly, those provisions are not of a decision-making nature, but form part of the legislative package described in paragraph 4 above, by means of which the EU legislature made use of its policymaking powers to regulate, in a general and abstract manner, through indirect taxation such as VAT, an economic activity, namely short-term accommodation rentals and passenger transport by road through an electronic interface. 75      It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the present action must be declared inadmissible on the ground that the applicant lacks standing to bring proceedings under Article 263 TFEU.  The application to intervene 76      By document lodged at the Court Registry on 9 September 2025, the European Commission sought leave to intervene in support of the Council. 77      Pursuant to Article 144(3) of the Rules of Procedure, where the defendant has lodged a plea of inadmissibility or of lack of competence as provided for in Article 130(1) of those rules, a decision on the application to intervene is not to be given until after the plea has been rejected or the decision on the plea reserved. Under Article 142(2) of those rules, the intervention becomes devoid of purpose if, inter alia, the application is declared inadmissible. 78      In the present case, since the action has been dismissed as inadmissible, there is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application to intervene.  Costs 79      In the first place, under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council, in accordance with the form of order sought by the Council. 80      In the second place, pursuant to Article 144(10) of the Rules of Procedure, the Commission must be ordered to bear its own costs relating to its application to intervene. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Tenth Chamber) hereby orders: 1.      The action is dismissed as inadmissible. 2.      There is no longer any need to adjudicate on the application to intervene submitted by the European Commission. 3.      Associazione proprietari alloggi dati in locazione turistica (Pro.Loca.Tur.) shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union. 4.      The Commission shall bear its own costs relating to its application to intervene. Done at Luxembourg, on 21 January 2026. V. Di Bucci   S.L. Kalėda Registrar   President *      Language of the case: English.