T-427/21

ORDER OF THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber) 23 March 2026 (*) ( Non-contractual liability – Economic and monetary policy – Prudential supervision of credit institutions – Specific supervisory tasks conferred on the ECB – Decision to withdraw a credit institution’s authorisation – Material damage – Causal link – Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law ) In Case T‑427/21, Trasta Komercbanka AS, established in Riga (Latvia), represented by O. Behrends, lawyer, applicant, v European Central Bank (ECB), represented by C. Hernández Saseta, A. Witte and A. Pizzolla, acting as Agents, defendant, supported by Council of the European Union, represented by I. Gurov and A. Westerhof Löfflerová, acting as Agents, and by European Commission, represented by D. Triantafyllou and A. Steiblytė, acting as Agents, interveners, THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber), composed of I. Gâlea, President, M. J. Costeira (Rapporteur) and T. Tóth, Judges, Registrar: T. Henze, Deputy Registrar, having regard to the written part of the procedure, in particular: –        the decisions of 3 February 2022 and of 12 January 2023 to stay the proceedings, –        the measure of organisation of procedure of 17 October 2025 and the response of the ECB, lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 4 November 2025, –        the reassignment of the case to the Eighth Chamber of the General Court, makes the following Order 1        By its action under Article 268 TFEU, the applicant, Trasta Komercbanka AS, seeks compensation for the damage which it claims to have suffered following Decision ECB/SSM/2016 – 529900WIP0INFDAWTJ81/2 WOANCA‑2016‑0005 of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 11 July 2016 withdrawing its authorisation for access to the activity of credit institutions (‘the decision of 11 July 2016’), and the conduct of the ECB relating to that decision.  Background to the dispute 2        By Decision ECB/SSM/2016 – 529900WIP0INFDAWTJ81/1 WOANCA‑2016‑0005 of 3 March 2016 (‘the decision of 3 March 2016’), the ECB withdrew the applicant’s authorisation for access to the activity of credit institutions and rejected its request for suspension of the effects of that decision for a period of one month. Among the grounds for the withdrawal of the authorisation, the ECB referred, inter alia, to the applicant’s failure to meet capital requirements, the breach of limits to large exposures to a client or a group of connected clients and the failure to comply with requirements concerning the functioning of the internal control systems of credit institutions, anti-money laundering and the pursuit of a prudent strategy. 3        By application of 13 May 2016, registered as Case T‑247/16, an action for annulment of the decision of 3 March 2016, lodged on behalf of the applicant and some of its shareholders, was brought before the General Court. 4        Following a request for review of the decision of 3 March 2016, the ECB adopted the decision of 11 July 2016, by which it again decided to withdraw the applicant’s authorisation for access to the activity of credit institutions. 5        By application of 23 September 2016, registered as Case T‑698/16, an action for annulment of the decision of 11 July 2016 was brought before the General Court. 6        By order of 12 September 2017, Fursin and Others v ECB (T‑247/16, not published, EU:T:2017:623), the General Court held, first, that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the action brought by the applicant against the decision of 3 March 2016 due to the revocation of its representative’s power of attorney and, second, that the action brought by the shareholders against that decision was admissible. By judgment of 5 November 2019, ECB and Others v Trasta Komercbanka and Others (C‑663/17 P, C‑665/17 P and C‑669/17 P, EU:C:2019:923), the Court of Justice set aside that order, dismissed the action brought by the shareholders on the ground that they were not directly concerned by the decision of 3 March 2016 and referred the case back to the General Court for it to rule again on the action brought by the applicant.  Events subsequent to the bringing of the present action 7        By order of 17 November 2021, Trasta Komercbanka v ECB (T‑247/16 RENV, not published, EU:T:2021:809), the General Court ruled that there was no longer any need to adjudicate on the action brought by the applicant for annulment of the decision of 3 March 2016 as a result of the disappearance of the subject matter of the proceedings, given that that decision had been replaced, with retroactive effect, by the decision of 11 July 2016. Since no appeal was lodged against that order, the latter became final. 8        Following an appeal brought against the judgment of 30 November 2022, Trasta Komercbanka and Others v ECB (T‑698/16, not published, EU:T:2022:737), by which the General Court had dismissed the action for annulment of the decision of 11 July 2016, the Court of Justice held, inter alia, that that decision had had the effect of abrogating and replacing the decision of 3 March 2016, without, however, having eliminated that decision retroactively (see, to that effect, judgment of 22 May 2025, Trasta Komercbanka v ECB, C‑90/23 P, not published, EU:C:2025:369, paragraphs 105 to 111).  Forms of order sought 9        The applicant claims that the General Court should: –        order the ECB to pay compensation in respect of the harm suffered as a result of the decision of 11 July 2016 and the ECB’s conduct relating to that decision; –        order the ECB to pay the costs pursuant to Articles 134 or 135 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. 10      The ECB, supported by the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, contends that the Court should: –        dismiss the action; –        order the applicant to pay the costs.  Law 11      Under Article 126 of the Rules of Procedure, where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation in law, it may, on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur, at any time decide to give a decision by reasoned order without taking further steps in the proceedings. 12      In the present case, the Court considers that it has sufficient information available to it from the documents in the file and has decided, pursuant to that article, to give a decision without taking further steps in the proceedings.  The scope of the claim for compensation 13      Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the proceedings before the General Court by virtue of the first paragraph of Article 53 of that Statute, and to Article 76(e) of the Rules of Procedure, the application initiating proceedings must contain the form of order sought by the applicant. The form of order sought must be set out in a precise and unequivocal manner, since otherwise the General Court would risk giving a ruling infra petita or ultra petita and disregarding the rights of the defendant. Thus, subject to the existence of certain circumstances provided for in Article 86 of the Rules of Procedure, only the form of order set out in the originating application may be taken into consideration and the substance of the application must be examined solely with reference to the order sought in the application initiating proceedings (see judgment of 8 November 2017, De Nicola v Court of Justice of the European Union, T‑99/16, not published, EU:T:2017:790, paragraph 28 and the case-law cited). 14      Furthermore, in accordance with Article 76(d) of the Rules of Procedure, the application must state the subject matter of the dispute, the pleas and arguments put forward, and a brief statement of those pleas in law. Those elements must be sufficiently clear and precise to enable the defendant to prepare its defence and the General Court to rule on the action, if necessary without any further information. In order to guarantee legal certainty and the sound administration of justice, it is necessary, if an action is to be admissible, for the basic legal and factual particulars relied upon to be stated coherently and intelligibly in the application itself (see order of 16 May 2024, Versobank v ECB, T‑421/23, not published, EU:T:2024:322, paragraph 20 and the case-law cited). 15      In order to meet those requirements, an application seeking compensation for damage allegedly caused by the ECB must contain, inter alia, information identifying the conduct which the applicant alleges against the institution, the reasons why it considers there to be a causal link between that conduct and the damage allegedly suffered, and the nature and extent of that damage (see, to that effect, order of 16 May 2024, Versobank v ECB, T‑421/23, not published, EU:T:2024:322, paragraph 21 and the case-law cited). 16      As regards the nature and extent of the alleged damage, an applicant may not have put in figures the amount of the loss which it submits it has suffered, while clearly indicating the evidence which enables its nature and extent to be assessed, so that the defendant is in a position to conduct its defence. In such circumstances, the absence of precise figures in the application does not affect the other party’s rights of defence (order of 22 July 2005, Polyelectrolyte Producers Group v Council and Commission, T‑376/04, EU:T:2005:297, paragraph 55). 17      However, a claim for any unspecified form of damages is not sufficiently concrete and must therefore be regarded as manifestly inadmissible (see order of 10 July 2020, KF v SatCen, T‑619/19, not published, EU:T:2020:337, paragraphs 54 to 58 and the case-law cited). 18      In the present case, it must be held that the applicant’s claim for compensation is sufficiently precise only in so far as it seeks compensation for the material damage which the applicant claims to have suffered as a result of the decision of 11 July 2016, corresponding to the value of its alleged shortfall, estimated to be at least EUR 162 million, plus appropriate compensatory interest and default interest. 19      Although the applicant stated in the application that it reserves the right to specify or quantify other heads of damage at a later date, including future loss of earnings and loss of reputation, it has not provided any details that would enable the Court to assess the reality or extent of such damage. It follows that the claim for compensation for that damage is, in any event, manifestly inadmissible, in accordance with the principles set out in paragraphs 13 to 17 above. 20      Consequently, only the claim seeking compensation for the material damage referred to in paragraph 18 above will be examined below.  The substance 21      Pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, the ECB is, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, to make good any damage caused by it or by its servants in the performance of their duties. 22      In order for the ECB to incur non-contractual liability, within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 340 TFEU, a number of cumulative conditions must be satisfied, namely the ECB’s conduct must be unlawful, actual damage must have been suffered and there must be a causal link between the alleged conduct and the damage pleaded. Given the cumulative nature of those conditions, the action must be dismissed in its entirety where one of those conditions is not satisfied (see order of 25 July 2023, D’Agostino and Dafin v ECB, T‑424/22, not published, EU:T:2023:443, paragraph 17 and the case-law cited). 23      As regards the condition relating to the damage pleaded, it is important to emphasise that that damage must be actual, certain and quantifiable. By contrast, purely hypothetical and indeterminate damage does not give rise to compensation. It is for the applicant to produce to the Court the evidence to establish the existence and the extent of the damage suffered (see judgment of 26 October 2011, Dufour v ECB, T‑436/09, EU:T:2011:634, paragraph 192 and the case-law cited). 24      As regards the condition relating to a causal link, that condition concerns a sufficiently direct causal nexus between the ECB’s alleged conduct and the damage, the burden of proof of which rests on the applicant, so that the conduct complained of must be the determining cause of the damage (see order of 25 July 2023, Nardi v ECB, T‑131/23, not published, EU:T:2023:444, paragraph 31 and the case-law cited). 25      In the present case, the applicant claims that the withdrawal of its authorisation had the direct and immediate effect of bringing its banking activities to an end and of triggering its liquidation, which occurred shortly after the decision of 3 March 2016. According to the applicant, that led to the complete destruction of its assets and to its insolvency vis-à-vis its creditors, with the result that it will not be able to return the share capital to the shareholders at the end of its liquidation. 26      As regards the calculation of the compensation sought, estimated to be at least EUR 162 million, the applicant refers to a shortfall of EUR 108 million, made up of EUR 86 million in debt and EUR 21.7 million in share capital, arguing that the value of that shortfall should be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 because of the undervaluation of the assets set out in its balance sheet. 27      The ECB, supported by the Council and the Commission, disputes the reality of the alleged damage and the existence of a causal link between the alleged damage and the decision of 11 July 2016. 28      In that regard, it must be noted that the applicant has not adduced any evidence of the damage for which it is seeking compensation. 29      First, the reality and extent of the alleged damage cannot be established solely on the basis of the assertion made in paragraph 107 of the application, concerning the information provided to the applicant by its liquidator on 8 December 2020, since that assertion is not supported by any evidence that would enable the Court to assess its veracity. 30      Second, the applicant has failed to explain the need to multiply the amount of its alleged shortfall by a factor of 1.5, and merely claims, without adducing any evidence, that the accounting valuation of its assets did not adequately reflect their value as a whole. 31      Nor has the applicant established a causal link between the decision of 11 July 2016 and the alleged damage. 32      In that regard, in paragraph 94 of the application, the applicant merely stated that the termination of its business and its liquidation, as well as the loss of its reputation, were direct and foreseeable consequences of the decision of 11 July 2016, stating that it is assumed that the link between that decision and the alleged damage is not disputed. 33      However, it is apparent from the file, as the applicant itself stated in paragraph 87 of the application, that the termination of its business and the triggering of its liquidation took place as early as March 2016. 34      Even if the alleged damage resulted from the termination of its business and its liquidation, the applicant has still failed to substantiate the reasons why the decision of 11 July 2016 should be regarded as the determining cause of that damage within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 24 above, given that, on the date of that decision, the applicant had already been placed in liquidation. 35      Furthermore, the applicant has not substantiated the reasons why the withdrawal of its authorisation is, in its view, the determining cause of the alleged deterioration in its balance sheet, when that withdrawal was based, inter alia, on a failure to meet capital requirements, on a breach of limits to large exposures, and on a lack of a prudent strategy, as recalled in paragraph 2 above. 36      In those circumstances, it must be held that the applicant, which did not lodge a reply, has not adduced any evidence to contradict the Commission’s contention that its capital shortfall existed prior to the withdrawal of its authorisation. 37      In the light of the principles recalled in paragraph 22 above, it must be concluded that the conditions for the ECB to incur non-contractual liability are not satisfied, and it is not necessary to assess the legality of the decision of 11 July 2016 and the conduct of the ECB relating to that decision. 38      It follows that the present action must be dismissed as manifestly lacking any foundation in law.  Costs 39      Under Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings. 40      Furthermore, under Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Member States and institutions which have intervened in the proceedings are to bear their own costs. 41      In the present case, since the applicant has been unsuccessful, it must be ordered, pursuant to Article 134(1) of the Rules of Procedure, to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the ECB, in accordance with the form of order sought by the ECB. There are no reasons connected to equity or unreasonable or vexatious costs, as referred to in Article 135 of those rules, for granting the applicant’s request that the ECB be ordered to pay the costs in accordance with that article. 42      In addition, in accordance with Article 138(1) of the Rules of Procedure, the Council and the Commission are to bear their own costs. On those grounds, THE GENERAL COURT (Eighth Chamber) hereby orders: 1.      The action is dismissed. 2.      Trasta Komercbanka AS shall bear its own costs and pay those incurred by the European Central Bank (ECB). 3.      The Council of the European Union and the European Commission shall bear their own costs. Luxembourg, 23 March 2026. T. Henze, Deputy Registrar   I. Gâlea Registrar   President *      Language of the case: English.